Nothing about Iran is easy. Everything about it is complicated. This essay begins with assessments of whether Iran intends to build nuclear weapons and whether its technological activities prove or disprove its intentions. Under current international rules, some activities that may lead to nuclear weapon capabilities are allowed as long as there is no evidence that a state intends to build nuclear weapons.
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About the Author
George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and co-author of Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security(Carnegie Endowment, 2005), and author of India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (University of California Press, 2001).
The Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program is an internationally acclaimed source of expertise and policy thinking on nuclear industry, nonproliferation, security, and disarmament. Its multinational staff stays at the forefront of nuclear policy issues in the United States, Russia, China, Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.
The Carnegie South Asia Program informs policy debates relating to the region’s security, economy, and political development. From the war in Afghanistan to Pakistan’s internal dynamics to U.S. engagement with India, the Program’s renowned team of experts offer in-depth analysis derived from their unique access to the people and places defining South Asia’s most critical challenges.
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