Narrow by
Use this menu to filter your search results. Check boxes below to return search results related to any combination of issue and regional interest.
Issues
Regions
Stay Connected to Sada Subscribe Sada is published in English and Arabic and available as articles are published or in a weekly digest.
Enter name and address (All fields are required)
Select Delivery
x
Morocco
 Print
 

Sada - Analysis

Will Morocco’s King Deliver on Reforms?

March 16, 2011 عربي

The king has promised significant constitutional reforms; will he allow changes that would lessen his own powers? King Mohammed VI’s March 9 pledge to sponsor broad constitutional reforms following moderately-sized protests on February 20 distinguishes him from other leaders in the region, most of whom have offered too little in terms of reforms and offered them too late in the process of uprisings to make a difference. On the surface, King Mohammed’s proposed reforms are significant. But the lack of specifics about the depth of these reforms creates doubt in view of past experiences.  

King Mohammed announced in a televised speech a process of constitutional change that will be put to a popular referendum. Proposed reforms would increase the parliament’s powers in unspecified ways, create a more independent judiciary, and grant elected officials executive powers at the provincial and local level within a decentralization scheme first introduced in 2010. Decentralization will redistribute power from an appointed governor to new regional representatives to be elected by the people. Under the reforms, the prime minister would have greater executive powers, and the revised constitution would contain greater assurances of political and civil liberties and human rights.  
 
A commission headed by constitutional law expert Abdelatif Mennouni is tasked with consulting with representatives of labor unions, political parties, civil society, and other interest groups to discuss the scope of these reforms over the coming months.  The 18-member commission will include representatives from professional syndicates and human rights groups (such as Amina Bouayach of the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights), political activists, judges, as well as technocrats such as Omar Izziman and Lahcen Oulhaj (who represents Amazigh/Berber interests). The committee’s recommendations will be reviewed in June and then put to a national referendum. The king indicated that as soon as these reforms are ratified, they will be implemented.
 
For reformists, the king’s proposal is promising, but some skepticism remains. The largest parties —Istiqlal, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), and the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) —have lauded the initiative and hailed the king as a statesman, while some on the left have criticized the appointed commission, saying it should have been elected and pointing out that many of those on the committee (particularly Mennouni) are too close to the monarchy. Most of the organizers of February 20 protests reacted in much the same way; they indicated that the commission does not represent them and demanded a decisive stand against corruption, release of political prisoners, and greater freedom of the press. All are waiting to see whether reforms will impose any checks on the king’s powers, the true test of their credibility. 
 
Mohammed VI’s approach fits a strategy that he has adopted since taking the throne in 1999, when he distanced himself from the repressive policies of his father Hassan II. Among his first acts as a new sovereign was to dismiss Driss al-Basri, his father’s feared interior minister and close confidant. Mohammed VI supported the leftist-dominated of Abdelrahman al-Yussoufi, an outspoken critic of the policies of King Hassan II. At that moment Morocco seemed on the way to real change. The al-Yussoufi government started with high hopes and undertook an agenda of progressive reforms, but much of what was promised never materialized.
 
Nonetheless, the king emerged from this experience with a popular reputation as a reformer, while the politicians and technocrats were blamed for the failures of what he billed as foray into progressive politics. What followed was ten years of superficial change suggesting that the king was more concerned with making an early impression than with embarking on genuine reform. 
 
The new chapter of promised constitutional reform could turn out to be similar in the sense that the king is once again outmaneuvering elected officials. The initial response of the government to the February 20 protests—promising to create jobs for several thousand recent university graduates—was a transparent attempt to tame and co-opt youth groups. The king’s subsequent initiative calls on groups across the political spectrum to take ownership of the reforms and become accountable for their failure or success. Even if this initiative is genuine, it will put pressure on the politicians who have clamored for a chance to lead and have long complained that the king does not give them room to operate.
 
Mohammed VI is trying to get out in front of demands for change rather than be chased by them. What is still unclear is whether he will agree to reforms that would place checks on his power and move Morocco toward becoming a true constitutional monarchy.  For now at least and until the protesters speak again, the 47-year-old king is trying to cement his position by making himself an ally of the protesters rather than their target. 
 
Intissar Fakir is a special assistant to the Deputy President of the National Endowment for Democracy. The views expressed in this article do not reflect those of the National Endowment for Democracy.  
 

 
عربي

Comments (9)

 
 
  • nabil
    It's said in the article: "Mohammed VI invited Abdelrahman al-Yussoufi, an outspoken critic of the policies of King Hassan II, back from exile and allowed him to form a leftist-dominated government", and it's false. Because it was the king Hassan II who invited Abdelrahman al-Yussoufi, to prepare the power transition to the new king Mohammed VI, before his death.
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Vendhya
    Surprisingly sloppy...
    El-Yussufi was prime minister before the death of King Hassan II.
    The 10 years of Mohamed VI can be divided in two: a first period characterized by somewhat bold changes, with greater freedom of the press and a King-led reform of the rights of women (against the will of a large part of the population). The later half of the reign of the monarch is characterized by a marked slow down of reforms and a focus on economic development. One cannot understand the absence of real "days of rage" without acknowledging that some of the earlier reforms provided enough breathing space for the population to be able to vent some of its anger.
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Intissar Fakir
    Thank you Nabil and Vandhya for pointing my oversight. Abderahman Al-Youssfi indeed came to power in 1998, a year before Mohammed VI, although, in my mind his tenure is more closely associated with Mohammed VI. We have made a change in the article to reflect that.
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Bergag.net
    The first reform that Morocco needs is to get the rid of their real Virus, their prime minster who has every single member of his family, relatives & friends taking up some of top Government jobs. That's what I call a Real Virus that is eating us apart around Morocco.


    SPEAK OUT !
    @Reda
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Zara.
    Vendhya, please explain why, in your opinion, Mohammed VI reforms for the rights of women were "against the will of a large part of the population"?
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Marechera
    There were massive demonstrations in 2001 in Casablanca against the reform. About 1 mio people were demonstrating against the change of the Familiy Law.
    In my opinion the opposition by the Islamists (PJD, ‘Adl wal Ihsan) was grounded on the exploitation of an occasion to confront the king. Creating outrage was more important then really discussing the arguments, about guardianship etc.
    After the attacks in Casablanca, the PJD- party feared to be outlawed and even voted for the reforms in parliament.
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Zara.
    And hence "Morocco falls in the lowest third of countries on the level of human development and gender equality. It is clear that economic, social & political conditions for women in Morocco are pulling the country towards the bottom of the pile". (See ArabReform bulletin article "A Legislated Victory for Moroccan Women by Maati Monjib. Oct 6th 2009.) A shame really, for such an extraordinary and wonderful country in so many other respects. At least Mohammed VI has been attempting to address this inbalance despite the corruption of those around him in government. We shall indeed see how true his colours and strong his word is now, in the light of his recent speech.
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Suhaib
    Informative and eye-opening article... great to see a piece by you again.
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Adil
    I found the analysis does not really address the question of: will Mohamed VI deliver on his promises. I think that the speech of March 9 was excpected in light of the regionalization reform that the king announced last year. The February 20 protest only triggered the announcement that was planned before the start of the Arabic spring. There is little evidence at this time to predict what will happen, but I believe that morocco remains well advanced in terms of political openess compared to its neighbors.
     
     
    Reply to this post

     
    Close Panel
  • Report Abuse
Source: http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/16/will-morocco-s-king-deliver-on-reforms/6bj8
 

Stay Connected

Subscribe to Sada:
 
Subscription Options Sada is published in English and Arabic and available as articles are published or in a weekly digest.
Select Delivery
 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036-2103 P: 202.483.7600 F: 202.483.1840
Carnegie Middle East Center Emir Bechir Street, Lazarieh Tower Bldg. No. 2026 1210, 5th flr. Downtown Beirut P.O.Box 11-1061 Riad El Solh Lebanon P: +961 1 99 12 91 F: +961 1 99 15 91