Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security

James M. Acton, Andrew Parasiliti April 26, 2011 Washington, D.C.
Summary
After two decades of stagnation, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for reductions in nuclear warheads. But the vision of mutual disarmament remains plagued by doubts on all sides.
Related Media and Tools
 

After two decades of stagnation in arms control, Russia and the United States have pledged their support for deep reductions in their nuclear forces. But this vision remains plagued by doubts—many hold on to the belief that, when it comes to deterrence, size matters. Will downsizing the number of nuclear arms threaten a country’s security?

In a new Adelphi book, Deterrence During Disarmament, Carnegie’s James Acton examines long-held concerns about the effectiveness of deterrence at low numbers, the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament, and risks surrounding nuclear multipolarity. At an event hosted by Carnegie, Acton discussed the book with Andrew Parasiliti of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Carnegie’s Toby Dalton moderated.

Disarmament and International Security

In his opening remarks, Parasiliti highlighted the relevance of disarmament to international security. Acton expanded on his comment, noting that any serious argument for deep reductions needs to consider their effects on international security. He also noted that any practical scheme for deep reductions must be both gradual and eventually multilateral.

Concerns About Reductions

Acton’s book surveys concerns about deep reductions based on both the deterrence literature and, more importantly, interviews with a wide array of former and current officials and experts. Beyond the fear of a step into the unknown – which Acton noted is not entirely fair, given instances during the Cold War where the antagonists had relatively small arsenals – four primary concerns motivate skepticism about arms reductions:

  • Central Deterrence: Central deterrence is the ability of a nuclear-armed state to deter aggression against itself. Various argument are put forward as to why effective deterrence requires large arsenals. The most important of these relates to the question of what adversaries value. Since the late 1970s, U.S. targeting strategy has been based partly on the premise that probable American adversaries do not value their citizens as much as their sources of state power (political leadership, industry, military forces, and command and control infrastructure). This assumption  results in plentiful targets and hence a need for many weapons.

    Given its Cold War roots, Acton argued that U.S. thinking needs to be re-evaluated in light of new evidence that suggests the United States developed an incorrect understanding of what the Soviet Union valued. Historical case studies including the Berlin Airlift – where a small number of nuclear weapons probably acted as a significant deterrent to Soviet escalation – add further credence to the case for the effectiveness of small arsenals.
     
  • Extended Deterrence: Extended deterrence is the ability of a nuclear-armed state to deter aggression against allies. The most important argument as to why large arsenals enhance extended deterrence relates to “damage limitation”: if the United States can destroy all or almost all of an adversary’s nuclear forces, then it can limit the damage it would suffer in a nuclear war and thus enhance the credibility of its threats. However, Acton observed that the historical evidence suggests that political leaders do not distinguish between outcomes in a nuclear war – they appear to view any nuclear exchange as devastating. Furthermore, the academic literature overstates the ease of destroying an enemy’s nuclear forces. If leaders do not distinguish between outcomes and the total destruction of an adversary’s forces is unachievable then maintaining a large arsenal for damage limitation adds little to extended deterrence.
     
  • Crisis Stability: Another justification for large arsenals is that they reduce the incentives to strike first during a crisis. The fear here is that as arsenals shrink, they grow less survivable, potentially creating incentives to use nuclear weapons out of the fear that an adversary might do so first. Acton argued that arsenal size is only one factor – and not even the most important – in enhancing survivability. Indeed, crisis instability might be a problem in future – even at high numbers. In consequence, arms control to enhance stability is a worthwhile activity regardless of whether the United States seeks deep reductions.
     
  • Rearmament Stability: The least discussed – but probably most problematic – aspect of deep reductions is the possibility of rearmament. In particular, with smaller arsenals, the possibility of a growing conventional imbalance sparking rearmament could grow. Acton identified three factors affecting the likelihood of rearmament: 1). Doctrine; 2). Conventional imbalances – weaker states use nuclear weapons to offset conventional imbalances; 3). Transparency of nuclear weapons production complexes.

He concluded by observing that while low numbers of nuclear weapons are not unconditionally stable, the right arms control measures during reductions  would enhance stability. He noted, however, that politically such measures might be very difficult to implement.

About the Nuclear Policy Program

The Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program is an internationally acclaimed source of expertise and policy thinking on nuclear industry, nonproliferation, security, and disarmament. Its multinational staff stays at the forefront of nuclear policy issues in the United States, Russia, China, Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.

 
Source carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/26/deterrence-during-disarmament-deep-nuclear-reductions-and-international-security/nm6
 

Stay in the Know

Enter your email address to receive the latest Carnegie analysis in your inbox!

Personal Information
 
 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
 
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036-2103 Phone: 202 483 7600 Fax: 202 483 1840
Please note...

You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers.

请注意...

你将离开清华—卡内基中心网站,进入卡内基其他全球中心的网站。