India, Turkey, and Brazil are often held up as prominent examples of emerging powers in terms of growing economic and political clout as well as influence in the nuclear order. Ankara and Brasilia famously teamed up in 2010 to try to rescue the Tehran Research Reactor deal after negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 broke down. India reached accommodation with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and is now being promoted for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. But is there a common “emerging power” agenda in the nuclear area? How do relations between these countries and the established powers (specifically the United States) impact their nuclear policies? If so, what interests do these states share, and what does it mean for efforts to continue to strengthen the regime? How much disarmament would emerging powers regard as sufficient to support further strengthening of nonproliferation rules? Do emerging powers seeking greater representation in international bodies such as the NSG and the UN Security Council aim to strengthen or weaken these bodies’ authority to make and enforce rules that may limit state activities?
Togzhan Kassenova, Matias Spektor, Sinan Ülgen, and Nirupama Rao discuss what interests these states share, and what it means for efforts to continue to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Share your comments and questions below.
Kassenova is an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.
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