After nearly two years of intense negotiations, Iran and the six world powers have reached a landmark nuclear agreement aimed at limiting Tehran’s nuclear program. Carnegie held a media call with James Acton, George Perkovich, and Karim Sadjadpour to discuss the deal and its implications.
The following transcript is not checked against delivery.
Nick Parrott: Good morning, this is Nick Parrott. I’m the director of communications here at Carnegie. Thanks very much for joining this call. I’m pleased to be joined by my colleagues. And we’ll get straight to it.
So, we’ll kick it off with George Perkovich, vice president for studies who will give sort of an overview of his reactions to yesterday’s announcement.
George Perkovich: Great and thanks Nick, and thanks people for joining. I guess I would just make a couple of general comments based on what seems to have been the public discussion especially in the U.S. since the deal was announced. That is that it’s – the one line of commentary, which you can call criticism highlights the reality that the most of the terms of the deal lasts between ten and 15 years.
And so, there’s kind of a narrative that well at the end of the 15 years, Iran can do whatever it wants. And, you know, this was all fine until it ends. And there are a number of things that I think have been missing in that story.
And it’s been interesting especially watching TV where people haven’t been questioned on that. There is no basis for imposing permanent limits on Iran. Iran is part of the NPT. The NPT doesn’t provide a basis really for any kind of limitations other than you can’t make a nuclear weapon.
And a nuclear weapon is not defined. So this agreement derives from Iran’s violations of its past safeguards and various UN Security Council resolutions. None of which talked about permanent restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities. All of which were oriented to have Iran take steps to build international confidence that it would not acquire nuclear weapons.
And so, this agreement basically is a – is an agreement between Iran and the P5 plus 1 on how Iran would build that international confidence that it doesn’t want nuclear weapons. And the idea from the very beginning was if Iran fulfills that confidence building exercise by going through all these steps, then it’s back to being treated as a normal country under the NPT; in which case there was no basis for the kind of restrictions that people are kind of now saying, well, in 15 years there are no restrictions.
So, I think a lot the discussion there has really lacked context. I would go even further and say without this agreement, we’ve always known Iran could have or could withdraw from the NPT just like any other state could. And now, whether they could do that when they were in violation is a whole other story. But if you’re in compliance, you can withdraw.
What’s interesting about this agreement is that Iran very explicitly says it will never make any nuclear weapon of any kind. And this agreement doesn’t have a withdraw provision like the NPT does have an article that allows for withdraw. So in some ways, Iran is making a, kind of a more durable commitment in this agreement that hasn’t been discussed.
And so, the last thing I would say all on this general topic is that at the end of these 15 years when a lot of the – this talking about it in the last day has been, you know, the… If the world may come to an end, Iran can, you know, just walk towards a nuclear weapon. It’s still under all of the monitoring. You still have the supply chain being monitored.
And you have all of the information that had been gleaned in the prior 15 years in terms of what their plans were. Where activities were going on. Who their suppliers were. So that if at that moment they were decided – they decided let’s do the whole thing over again. And start breaking with our commitments to seek nuclear weapons; the capacity to detect that and to know that will be greater than it has been before.
And if, and when that happens, we go back to the exercise again; and whether it’s sanctions, military strikes, or whatever. But this idea that somehow the agreement ends; and then Iran just goes and gets nuclear weapons.
And it’s all fine. It’s kind of a thing that’s out there now. But it has no basis.
Nick Parrott: Great, and thanks George. So, we’ll turn next to James Acton who’s co-director of our Nuclear Policy Program. And he can talk a bit about the verification for the deal.
James Acton: Yes. Good morning, everyone. I wanted to talk a bit about verification, which is in a way the hot potato. And everyone says they care deeply above verification and will scrutinize all of the provisions. Although, I know from experience that when you then start discussing the provisions, eyes do tend to glaze over a bit.
So, advisedly, let me talk a bit about the verification arrangements. The scenario that worries me most is the scenario of a sneak out. That is of Iran deciding to try and build secret facilities dedicated to bomb making. There’s been a lot of talk about breakout, the use of declared facilities, and declared nuclear materials that are under (IAA) monitoring to build a bomb.
I think the provisions lengthening the breakout time to a year are very useful. But fundamentally the (IEA) is extremely good at monitoring declared facilities. And Iran will have to reckon that if it tried to breakout, it would get caught very quickly.
On the other hand, it has tried to sneak out before repeatedly. (Three of) Iran’s (four) enrichment facilities were not declared to the (IEA) in accordance with its rules. So we’ve seen sneak out before. And I actually think these agreement (duels) with sneak out in pretty robust and actually quite innovative way. There’s been discussion of the fact there’s not any time and anywhere inspections. And that to me is a bit of a red herring.
The agreement does allow for anywhere inspections. But it doesn’t allow for any time inspection. There is a negotiating process. And that could last up to 24 days. But the critical point is you can’t sanitize a nuclear facility in 24 days.
If Iran has been conducting nuclear activities somewhere, and we get evidence of that. And then requesting inspection there; and then it is delayed for up to 24 days. Iran can remove equipment, but traces of nuclear material will remain.
It’s impossible to sanitize a nuclear facility that quickly, if it’s – indeed it may be impossible to sanitize it at all. And when inspectors got there after 24 days, it would unquestionably still be evidence it was detectible of nuclear material.
So, I would argue that although the agreement doesn’t provide for any time anywhere access, it does provide for timely access anywhere. And that I think is the right threshold. And then there’s also some quite innovative provisions to do with getting the initial evidence (where) – so, you could have some idea about where a secret nuclear facility was.
Those – and so, for instance, George has already mentioned this dedicated procurement channels. So, all of Iran’s equipment was entering into Iran on the monitoring. And that meant that if the world’s intelligence agency detected any nuclear related equipment that wasn’t passing through this channel, that would be evidence of cheating.
There’s provisions like extending monitoring to centrifuge production and centrifuge components. It sounds kind of very mundane and technical. But it’s actually very clever. It means that Iran has built these facilities for producing centrifuge components.
It can’t use those to feed its clandestine program because it now – would now be caught. It could try and build more secret facilities. But that would create more opportunities for detection. So, my bottom line is that, you know, sneak out is a problem regardless of whether we have a deal or not.
Even without a deal, Iran could try and sneak out. The difference is that sneak out is significantly more likely to be detected with a deal that was no deal. And that I think is the cheating scenario that we have to worry about and plan for the most.
Nick Parrott: Thank you, James. So, I’ll turn now to Karim Sadjadpour whose (inaudible) with our Middle East program and can offer a perspective from that.
Karim Sadjadpour: Sure, I would just say that we’re really in an unprecedented moment in the history of contemporary U.S., Iran relations. And we’ve never had this type of high level contact with Iran. I mean, the metaphor I think about is imagine a couple that’s been divorced for 36 years. You know, and meets up again in Europe and spends a few weeks in a hotel room on their own. It’s really unprecedented.
In the past, there has been moments of tactical cooperation between the United States and Iran against the common foe, whether that was the Taliban or Al Qaeda. It’s never developed into a strategic cooperation. And so, I think it remains to be seen whether just or kind of the fruitful cooperation on the nuclear issue can be applied to other arenas.
And whether that’s Syria, Iraq, ISIS, I think certainly foreign minister (Zarif) and president Rouhani would welcome that type of strategic cooperation. It remains to be seen, if the forces in Iran which control those (files), namely the supreme leader and the revolutionary guards are amenable to that type of – that type of cooperation.
And I would just say a couple of more things. One is about the mood in the United States, which I think is very conflicted at a popular level and amongst members of Congress. And that the vast majority of Americans welcome a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to this conflict.
On the other hand, a vast majority of Americans are deeply skeptical about Iran’s trustworthiness. I think in Iran, the country’s internal conflict is less between, you know, sentiment about… Well, I’d say the biggest conflict in Iran is really between a society which aspires to be like South Korea.
We saw that in the overwhelming, you know, joyful (street) process. We saw – I guess they (weren’t process). They were, you know, the eruptions of happiness and dancing in the streets of Tehran. You know, these types of displays of happiness I think tellingly happen when the regime has made a compromise with the outside world.
It’s not when they display shows of nuclear prowess or military prowess. And so I think the society clearly welcomes this. They welcome a better relationship with the United States.
But I think the regime itself is in conflict between, you know, the forces like Rouhani that want to prioritize the country’s national interests and the traditional forces like the leader that, you know, that have – whose organizing principle has always been resistance against the United States. And I think for two reasons; it may be difficult for Rouhani to really challenge the hardliners and the revolutionary (guards).
Number one is that he needs their cooperation. It’s the revolutionary guards which oversee the nuclear program. So he needs their cooperation to actually implement this deal. So, it’s going to be a big – it will be difficult for him to try to clip their economic and political wings.
And number two, in the few instances historically where we’ve seen the regime compromised, they’ve clamped down internally to send a signal to the population that external flexibility doesn’t mean internal weakness. But, you know, and I say this all as by way of precedent at a time when we’ve reached – when we’re unprecedented and unchartered territory between the U.S. and Iran.
Nick Parrott: Thank you, Karim. So with that, we’ll turn to questions. The operator will have a queue. And we’ll introduce the questions one by one. Thank you.
Operator: Certainly, and at this time if you’d like to ask a question, please press star and the number one on your telephone keypad. And if you choose to withdraw your question, simply press the pound key.
We’ll pause for a moment to compile the roster. And Your first question comes from the line of (Warren Strobel). Your line is open.
(Warren Strobel): Hi. Can everyone hear me OK?
Nick Parrott: Yes.
(Warren Strobel): This question is for Karim. You mentioned the unprecedented moment in contemporary U.S. and Iran relations. And understanding all of the great difficulties and distrust and even violence on – that has occurred on either side.
Can you think of any areas where there might be (at loose) tactical cooperation in the months ahead? Obviously Islamic State is one potential area. But are there others?
Karim Sadjadpour: You hit on what I was going to say, which is ISIS. Now, the question is whether Iran senses that (Assad) is a lost cause in Syria. You know, we in 2011, senior U.S. officials said that (Assad) is a dead man walking. People had written him off.
And Iran doubled down. They doubled down on (Assad) and Hezbollah. And they were able to shore up his power. The question is whether they may attempt to do the same thing especially now that they’re about to receive this cash windfall. Or, do they sense that it’s simply a – Syria is a black hole for them?
And it’s time to, you know, to think seriously about a, kind of a diplomatic settlement, which would at least (perverse) – preserve some of their interest in Syria. And I suspect. I’m totally speculating here. But I expect that’s an issue which John Kerry is going to want to pursue.
It’s the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world today. And now that, you know, he has this strong working relationship with Javad Zarif, I would imagine, you know, he may make a push on Syria. And it will be a push, which in contrast to previous attempts, it includes Iran with a seat at the table.
(Warren Strobel): Thank you.
Nick Parrott: So, the next question?
Operator: Your next question comes from the line of (James Reynold). Your line is open.
(James Reynold): Hi, can you hear me?
Nick Parrott: Yes, (inaudible).
(James Reynold): OK, great. My question is about the deal going through Congress. (Just the stuff) I’m reading and the people that I’m speaking to talk about this two-thirds majority. That the Republicans and maybe some skeptical Democrats will need to get to (beat) Obama’s veto.
And you know, by all accounts it seems really unlikely that it’s going to go that way. So, can you just give an indication as to how you think this deal is going to play out in Congress over the next 60 days? What to look for and what to expect? And whether or not these guys can really go against the president on this one?
Nick Parrott: George?
George Perkovich: I – my instinct is that the Republicans in general will try to, you know, put as many kind of slash wounds in the president as possible knowing that – and this is a terrible metaphor. Let me – let me – let me rewind. That they are going to try to damage hi and in a sense abuse him; and talk about how untrustworthy and what a terrible negotiator, and terrible president he is.
And they’re going to do that for as long as they can. And then, at the end they’re going to – they’ll probably vote against this deal when they know that they won’t be able to actually bring it down. Because they won’t want to bring it down in the end; because the aware among them, which isn’t a great number. But it’s enough of a number.
And it includes Senator Corker and other leaders. They’re aware that if the U.S. were to kind of pull out of the deal, the European sanctions would be removed in any case. The Europeans and others would move to implement – and are committed to implement their part of the deal.
So, the sanctions regime on Iran would fall apart without necessarily the other benefits that we’re deriving from it. And the U.S. Congress and indeed the Republican party would be blamed for that. So, these guys will score as many points as they can and try to raise as much money as they can for their – for their political races while they’re scoring points.
And then, at the end calculate that they won’t be able to defeat it. And I think for the Democrats, there will be a few who will join the Republicans. Those who are in, you know, tough races in 2016. But he will have enough.
And so, it will become on of those cynical Washington exercises where, you know, at the end they kind of do the right thing. But on the way there, there are just lots of point scoring and money raising.
Nick Parrott: Thank you, George. Shall we turn to the next question?
Operator: Your next question comes from the line of (Matt Spatelmik). Your line is open.
(Matt Spatelmik): Yes hello. A lot of the concern in Congress and Israel on the Gulf Arab States is that the – that once Iran’s assets are unfrozen that money will be used more to kind of make trouble in the neighborhood of (fuel proxy) forces rather than for improving the economic conditions for the people at home.
And, of course, that would create even more problems for the U.S. and the region as well. So, can you all speak to that (as) (inaudible)?
Nick Parrott: Karim?
Karim Sadjadpour: You know, that’s one of these. I kind of see it as a red herring. Iran is going to have more money. And its regional policies have been very consistent over the years. So I don’t envision them significantly altering the regional policies.
I think at a time when (Assad) is on the ropes; and maybe, you know, Hezbollah has been weakened as a result of their involvement in Syria. I would imagine they will try to fortify their regional allies. They’ll also, you know, have to spend money at home.
So, I think that the, you know, the Iranian. The way Iran spends its money especially in the region is really – it’s a black box. The official numbers – the unofficial numbers are – you know, and never, if you talk to U.S. intelligence officials, they never can tell you with precision how much Iran spends in Syria or in Yemen or elsewhere.
But I would just say that I think that the thing I would focus on is not exactly the money but the politics. And the question is will their regional policies change? And I don’t see the regional policies changing.
And I do see now that Rouhani, you know, he puts – he’s like the gambler one that goes to Vegas. And he puts all of his chips on one number of the roulette wheel, which was the nuclear deal. And he won. And I think he now will be able to pursue some of the other issues that people voted him for. Yes, (inaudible) –
George Perkovich: Could I – can I – this is George. Can I add to that? Because that’s a question that comes up all of the time now for obvious reasons. But behind it is kind of a puzzling logic. There was never an option of maintaining sanctions forever if Iran dealt with its nuclear problem.
The sanctions were produced, at least the nuclear sanctions, which are the ones that are going to be relieved. They were put on because it was violating its nuclear commitments. The assumption in the putting of them on was if they dealt with the nuclear problem, the sanctions would come off.
So, to then criticize the deal by saying, my God, Iran is going to get, you know, the money. That was how we got here. That was the whole premise. That was how you got the sanctions in the first place. So, if from a policy point of view, we absolutely ought to be asking.
OK, how do you contain Iran? And how do you give it incentives not to use this money for inimical purposes? But there was never an option of somehow keeping the money.
And so, it’s just not a valid criticism of the deal. It is a good description of a policy problem.
Nick Parrott: Thank you George. So, we can turn to the next question.
Operator: Your next – yes, your next question comes from the line of (Trudi Ruben). Your line is open.
(Trudi Ruben): Thank you and thanks for doing this. It just – to pursue the points about regional impact. Do you think there is any way to reassure the Middle East allies on the (still) Sunni Arabs and Israel? And if Iran is unlikely to change its regional policies, including policies and in Iraq that are actually inflaming the problem and not really contributing to pushing ISIS back at a meaningful way.
If those policies continue and if the U.S. wants to reassure allies, they’re going to have to take anti-Iranian policies, stronger policies in the region. For example, helping disarm the Sunni tribes or arming the Kurds directly, and so forth.
If the U.S. acts more aggressively in the region to contain Iran, what impact do you think that will have in implementation of the deal? So, can they reassure allies? Can they prevent the nuclear arms race from starting now with building up new nuclear programs? And if they act in that accord, will it boomerang against the deal?
Nick Parrott: Thanks (Trudi) – and Karim.
Karim Sadjadpour: Well, (Trudi), if you read (Tom Friedman’s) interview with the president yesterday.
(Trudi Ruben): Yes.
Karim Sadjadpour: The president alludes to the fact that there is going to be forthcoming security cooperation with Israel. He said he couldn’t go into detail. But did they have some cooperation plans? At the same time I saw Ben Rhodes talking to Charlie Rose yesterday.
And Charlie asked him whether they could persuade Netanyahu that this was in Israel’s interest and persuade him this was a good deal. And he basically conceded that wouldn’t be possible. He wouldn’t be able to persuade Netanyahu.
On the Gulf Arabs, I doubt whether anyone, you know, among the… I doubt whether any of them have really read the deal. I think that for them, it’s just discovery action and this visceral reaction they have towards Iran; which, you know, many people in the U.S. have as well.
And what a Gulf ambassador told me a couple of days ago was that for us it was never about the technical details of a deal. It was about $150.00 – (or) $150 billion cash influx to Iran, which we worry it will spend throughout the region.
And so, this is going to be a challenge. You know, how do you? How do you check Iran’s regional ambitions without putting in jeopardy the deal? I think that that’s going to be a challenge for many years to come.
Nick Parrott: So thanks Karim. And James?
James Acton: Yes, I do want to add one point, which is if we hadn’t – you know, if the United States hadn’t gone for a deal. Under that scenario reassuring allies would have been a huge problem. And I would argue an even bigger problem.
I mean, if you take at face value what it appears some Republicans, Mr. Netanyahu and others would have the U.S. do. It was try and (really) ramp up sanctions indefinitely until Iran capitulated completely. If the U.S. doesn’t seem to negotiate in good faith, the sanctions regime collapse in which case you have no nuclear deal under the influx of cash to Iran, which is really going to worry allies.
But you know, if you – you’re not going to get Iran to capitulate. And if you ramp up sanctions and sanctions, and sanctions to start to strangle Iran economically without addressing the nuclear program; and then, Iran is upping its enrichment level and its numbers of centrifuges, and its stockpiles of enriched material.
Would that really be more reassuring to U.S. allies in the Gulf and to Israel? I mean, I think in that scenario, we’d hear the chorus of criticism that the president was focusing too much on regional issues and ignoring the big threat, which was the bomb. I mean, you know, one ultimately has to make choices here.
Nick Parrott: Thank you, James. We’ve (already) got time for two more questions at this point.
Operator: Your next question comes from the line of (who – someone who) did not leave their information. Please state your first and last name. Your line is open. Caller, (she’s) queued up for a question. Please state your first and last name. Your line is open.
Male: (Yes, on the phone).
Nick Parrott: Please OK, please go ahead. Hello? OK, I think we’ll move on.
Operator: Again, if you’d like to ask a question, please press star one on your telephone keypad. And we have a follow up question from (Trudi Ruben). Your line is open.
(Trudi Ruben): Yes, if I can ask another one. I’d like to ask just on the – on the verification part. First of all is the (IAA) capable of doing everything that’s going to be now poured on its head with these huge demands?
And secondly, that the (PMDs), do you think this will or can ever be resolved? And since I have the chance, let me also ask about lifting of the arms embargo, which obviously is going to be big deal with Congress. Does this seem like a really dangerous prospect to any or all of you?
Nick Parrott: Thanks (Trudi) – James do you want to start?
James Acton: So, is the (IEA) capable? My answer is yes, it will need more cash. I can’t believe that wouldn’t be forthcoming. I mean, you know, the P5 plus 1 have invested so much into this deal. The idea that they’re not going to (stamp up) ten, $20 extra million or whatever it is.
I – you know, that money will be forthcoming. And the (IAA) I’m sure will have the resources to do this particular job. Though, as a matter of general rule, it is over – it is under resourced. On the – specifically on the (PMD), it’s a great question.
I – the timetable, you know, if I have a concern about this agreement, it’s how difficult implementation is going to be. This is an amazingly complex agreement. And decades re required for implementation. And you know, even with goodwill on all sides, there is stuff that go wrong.
And I think a good example of that is (PMD). The timeline for resolving the (PMD) issue is pretty short. The report, if I remember rightly, it has to be submitted to the (IEAA) by October 15th.
(Trudi Ruben): December 15th.
Nick Parrott: No, (and that’s when the compliance) –
James Acton: No, and then the…
Nick Parrott: – The (judgments are on) December 15th.
(Trudi Ruben): I think.
James Acton: OK.
Nick Parrott: The reports (are) October 15th.
James Acton: Now.
(Trudi Ruben): OK.
James Acton: So, you know, even if Iran gives a complete declaration that really is totally honest, even with the (best) (inaudible) in the world, it could take the (IEA) more than two months to, you know, and verify that declaration and close the file as it were.
So, that’s a real challenge there. The other point that I’d make about (PMD) in general is – in general is that I’ve always assumed that part of the reason why Iran finds it hard to engage on (PMD) was, you know, it doesn’t want to acknowledge it actually had a nuclear weapons program.
And, you know, it’s worried the – you know, the (IEA) keeps on saying why did you do that? Why did you do that? And, you know, ultimately Iran doesn’t have an answer beyond (where) we had a nuclear weapons program. And it’s not willing to say that.
My belief is that the (IEA) should investigate what and not why. (I.e.), it should push Iran to give a compete description of what it did. But the (IEA) doesn’t ask Iran about why it did it.
And (Iran) doesn’t say about why it did it. And that I think is a potential formula for trying to close this issue. But it is going to be a huge challenge to get that done by December the 15th.
(Trudi Ruben): Thank you.
Male: Do you want (to – on this topic)?
Male: (Inaudible) –
Nick Parrott: (Inaudible) (shouldn’t) (inaudible).
Male: Well, on the – on the arms embargo, (Trudi), I – a couple of things. It’s as I understand it. We’re still was it eight years (before)…?
(Trudi Ruben): Eight years from missiles, five years for weapons. And it could be sooner depending on the (IAEA).
George Perkovich: Right. And the – and the – and the judgment there. So, we don’t know what the situation is going to be in Syria. We don’t know what the situation is going to be in Iraq (inaudible). So, it’s a little hard to prejudge it now, number one.
And number two, I’ve heard at least; but I don’t. I can’t, you know, validate it that, you know, the…. That’s there a (different) – there’s also an understanding about defensive systems and versus less defensive systems that would be allowed for commerce with Iran. Iran does have legitimate defensive needs.
It lives in a nasty neighborhood. It does – you know, it is a state within the UN, et cetera. So, I think a lot of it would depend on what would flow. But I would say in an ideal world that there wouldn’t be certainly a flow of missiles or offensive systems.
But that Russia and China, you know, have had a role to play in all of this. They’ve been very instrumental in imposing sanctions. That’s one of the things that made the sanctions work. They get a vote. And they had pushed hard on immediate relief here.
And so, we may not like what the result is. But again, you wouldn’t have had the sanctions. You wouldn’t have gotten here without their cooperation. So, you know, they get a vote on some of this, too.
Nick Parrott: Thanks George. So, we can probably squeeze in one more question, if there’s one there.
Operator: I have a question from the line of (Armand Rosen). Your line is open.
(Armand Rosen): Hi, this is a follow-up on the (PMD) issue. What’s your understanding of what happens, if it’s not resolved by December 15th? What that would trigger? And what kind of contingencies would be in place, if on this, you know, very early benchmark for implementation of the agreement things fall short?
George Perkovich: Right. Well, I mean, and I think the – there are different threshold issues. The one that is kind of most objective and that where you could say Iran wasn’t complying is if they don’t cooperate in the sense of providing people to talk to; and providing access that the (IAEA) requests.
Because then (IAEA) can say, look we’re just not having cooperation. Now once you get access and once you get to talk to people, you can’t control what they say. So, you can talk to them. And they can say things that you don’t think are (fulsome) and don’t fully disclose anything.
But that’s, you know, that’s not a violation of a commitment. That’s probably a standard problem in this case. And so, I think there are different levels.
So, my guess is you’re never going to have many of these questions fully resolved. And if that’s what the (IAEE) ultimately is going to report? That yes, finally we’ve got cooperation. And we’ve got access to things.
We clarify it a little bit. But much remains unclear to us; and so, we can’t make a final pronouncement on X, on Y, and on Z. and that will be their conclusion. And that will be their report – would be what I would predict.
George Perkovich: (I think) James doesn’t agree, so you…
Nick Parrott: Thank you George.
James Acton: No, I do agree. I was just – I was just saying I didn’t (need) – have anything to add.
Nick Parrott: Final words, Karim?
Karim Sadjadpour: No.
Nick Parrott: No? OK, thank you all very much for joining. So, (Clara Hogan) is around today as are my colleagues. So, if you have any sort of follow up, please get in touch in with (Clara). And we will hope to have the transcript by the end of the day. And we’ll share that with you all. Thank you very much.
You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers.