CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

ABOLISHING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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ADAM WARD: Okay, well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Adam Ward and I am the director of the Washington, D.C., office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which is very pleased to be publishing this Adelphi paper monograph on the rather large and important topic of abolishing nuclear weapons. And I would like to thank George Perkovich and the Carnegie Endowment for staging this meeting today.

The IISS is this year celebrating its 50th anniversary. The institute was founded in 1958 to help build up some of the intellectual structures needed for managing the Cold War. And like others, we wanted to stimulate some thinking about how international relations could be conducted in a civilized way in the nuclear-weapons age when our work in consequence focused a great deal on nuclear deterrence and arms control.

At the same time, however, the question of how to move safely towards eventual nuclear abolition was also a source of inquiry at the IISS, if perhaps, wondered at times had a slightly abstract quality to it. Now, the fact that the IISS, in its 50th anniversary year, is publishing on nuclear abolition in one sense, seems to show how little we have progressed towards that goal over the decades. But I think the much more encouraging point to make is that this Adelphi paper is responding to what seems to be a genuinely altered mood – or the beginnings of a genuinely altered mood in some intellectual and policy circles – towards the question of nuclear abolition.

And I think in bringing fresh thinking to bear on this topic, the IISS could have no better bedfellows than the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which all of you know has established a phenomenal reputation on questions of arms control and nonproliferation. And we are absolutely delighted that George Perkovich has produced such a strong Adelphi paper with James Acton.

The Adelphi paper has already been launched and presented in London and Geneva. And we certainly think it deserves the widest readership. I should also like to acknowledge the role of Sir Michael Quinlan, the éminence grise on nuclear policy questions in the United Kingdom, for providing intellectual guidance to us on the IISS side of this project.

And finally, I should express all of our appreciation to our far-sighted sponsors of this publication, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom, the Norwegian foreign ministry, the Swedish foreign ministry, and also the Ploughshares Fund. So now let me turn over to Michael Quinlan who will set some of the intellectual and policy contexts, which inspired us to undertake this project. And then George will present to you its main conclusions.

Thank you very much.

SIR MICHAEL QUINLAN: Thank you very much, a great pleasure to be here in Washington, in particular, at Carnegie. The substance of this paper will be presented to you by George. But let me just explain a little bit about the background to it.

The notion of abolishing nuclear weapons entirely has been around since virtually the start of the nuclear age. First meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in London in 1946 commissioned work to that end. And the idea surfaced at least at a rhetorical level from time to time thereafter. It is there in the preamble to the NPT in '68, at least as an aspiration, though, on a strict construction, I think you can argue that the operative content of the treaty doesn’t actually say complete nuclear
disarmament. But then, there are other episodes like the dialogue at Reykjavik between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik in ‘86.

A powerful speech by Rajiv Gandhi at the U.N. General Assembly in ‘88, and then in 1995, the NPT review conference, which gave the treaty indefinite extension, had a commitment by all the nuclear five to regard this as a real goal. And we wouldn’t have got the indefinite extension in all probability without that undertaking, which was reaffirmed again in the 2000 review conference.

But though, to be frank, there had been what I might call exchanges of rhetorical – [4:49] – between the rightist abolitionists at one end of the spectrum and the dismissive realists at the other. For the most part, there was some good work that had been done by NGOs like Pugwash and others. There had been especially at governmental level surprisingly little examination in what might regard as genuinely serious depth.

But then the situations opened up by that Wall Street Journal piece in January of last year by that dangerously subversive group of peaceniks. (Laughter.) And that got us at the IISS thinking further about it. We had a short general essay on the subject in the journal “Survival” in last autumn. And, indeed, before that, Margaret Beckett, who was somewhat briefly British foreign secretary, had said something about it at Carnegie, I think, in New York. It was here, was it – in June of last year.

And as Adam has implied, we got some U.K. governmental financial support for the idea of looking at this – support, I have to say, on a scale – not such as to embarrass us or seriously to corrupt our independence – (laughter) – but the crucial advance was that to our enormous satisfaction, we managed to persuade George Perkovich with James Acton, a very able, young physicist from King’s College London alongside him to undertake the production of a substantial paper in our Adelphi series. And that is what we are launching today.

I am not going to attempt to summarize or to characterize the paper. George will do that for you a very great deal better. But perhaps, I could bring out just a couple of points. The first is, in our view at the Institute, the case for looking very seriously at the abolition idea is one that ought in logic to be shared by both ends of that spectrum of opinion I mentioned earlier – both the optimists and the skeptics or the pessimists – to get realism into the subject at whatever one’s hopes or expectations may be about what the conclusion will be.

And my second point is about the breadth of the challenge for studying the abolition concept. There has been, I think, sometimes a temptation to focus exploration of this theme upon technical – or at least political or technical aspects – like how can you verify abolition. How can you enforce it? How can you square it with the likely spirit of nuclear energy? And those are, indeed, large, essential parts of the task.

But there is also what is to my mind the more fundamental issue – in many ways, the more difficult issue – of what would have to change in the world politically to make all the current nuclear weapon possessors, and perhaps also those who enjoy extended deterrence from some of the possessors, as in NATO, and in the case of Japan. What would have to change to make them truly regard abolition as a desirable objective? Just consider Pakistan, consider Israel, consider, indeed, Russia. And might we, indeed, need to have some more basic changes in the international system.
itself to compensate for losing the contribution, which many of us think that nuclear weapons have made to preventing major war these last 60 years.

Now, the Adelphi paper, though, it is pretty tightly written – can’t get into full detail on all that. But it does give us, I believe, salutary reminders of just how broadly the challenge does reach. Now, personally, I am agnostic, in the strict sense of that word, about the abolition project. Its achievement is, at least on any reasonable view, decades away and perhaps more than that. I sometimes think that if I were asked, do you reckon we will have got rid of these things by the time we come up to the centenary in 2045 of Hiroshima, will they still be around? My guess is no better than 50/50 chance, and perhaps poorer than that.

But I do believe, firstly, that we shouldn’t acquiesce passively any notion that these things have got to be around for the rest of human history. And secondly, that we have both an intellectual and a political obligation to study seriously what abolition would have to entail. And that is the endeavor to which this Adelphi paper is directed.

For my part, I regard it as a highly important contribution to a debate, which I hope has a great deal of serious mileage remaining in it. George?

GEORGE PERKOVICH: Thank you, Sir Michael, and thank all of you for coming. For me, it was a very simple decision to undertake this project. And it was simple because it was Sir Michael who asked, and I have the greatest admiration and respect for him. And so after that, it was – the hard part was writing, but the decision to do it was very easy.

On the writing part, he helped enormously. He is actually – he is a great thinker. He is a great ethicist. He is an amazing editor and etymologist, which has become kind of a joke between us because I have learned the meaning of words that I had been speaking for 50 years. (Laughter.)

SIR QUINLAN: (Off mike.)

(Laughter.)

MR. PERKOVICH: He is a lot of fun, too. (Laughter.) So this has been a pleasant experience – maybe not a pleasant experience to read the product of, but it was pleasant to produce.

As Sir Michael suggested, a central purpose of the paper and indeed, of the ongoing work that we are going to do, such as this and further discussions, is to encourage and help structure a conversation among and between officials and experts in the nuclear-armed states and the states that don’t have nuclear weapons. What we know, I think, if we are honest, is that representatives of the recognized nuclear weapon states have paid lip service to the issue of disarmament. But one of the ways that you can know that it hasn’t really been serious is that none of these states has a full-time employee, let alone an interagency taskforce dedicated to figuring out what will be required to actually eliminate all of their nuclear arsenals.

On the other hand, the states that don’t have nuclear weapons, including leaders among those states, have not really engaged this disarmament challenge either, we argue, in spite of the disarmament rhetoric. The view often tends to be that disarmament is something that the states with nuclear weapons are obligated to provide and they should just report back when they are done.
But the idea of collaboration and cooperation along the way is not something that is fully engaged. And so our view kind of undergirding – views don’t undergird, as Sir Michael would say probably – a premise underlying us is that there does need to be this cooperation. There does need to be a joint venture between the nuclear-armed states, which is a phrase we use to include India, Pakistan and Israel – and those without nuclear weapons.

As a starting point, we also can’t emphasize too much that the elimination of all nuclear arsenals, in our view, is not an end in itself, but rather should be evaluated as a means to enhancing global security. Nor do we in the paper deeply analyze the whether and how questions, the desirability of nuclear disarmament. We do a bit at the end. At the very end, we come back to that and suggest some of the strong reasons we believe for this.

But rather, in the beginning, we stipulate that the political and security cost today of rejecting the idea that nuclear disarmament is an obligation would be immense. And so that one has to start with the premise that this should be a high-level objective and do what we then focus on in the paper, which is assess how would you do it. How would you accomplish the elimination of all nuclear arsenals? And that is the task that we really address in the paper.

And one of the ways that we approach it – and this is a little bit of a departure – is to think about the problem both in the top-down sense, which is how it normally is, which is you start with the U.S. and Russia. They are the ones that have more than 95 percent of all the nuclear weapons and fissile material in the world. And they have already a record of arms reduction, arms control. And so you start from there and you work your way down the ladder, as it were.

We do that. And that does need to happen. But as we approach the issue and thought about, again, what was our task, which was looking at the question of absolute zero. We actually felt that looking from the bottom up provided a much kind of sharper indication of what the real problems were. So if you start from the position of India, Pakistan and Israel, and say what would it take for them to get rid of their nuclear weapons, it opens up the issue in a way that you don’t quite see it when you think from the U.S. and Russia down. And so you will see that throughout the paper.

Another kind of preliminary or framing thought is that we encountered early on the statement or assertion that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. And you will hear that a lot – if this issue is debated in this town, you will hear that a lot. And usually, it will be in the first paragraph of somebody’s statement – oh, you can’t disinvent these things. That is true. But it is beside the point, as we try to suggest. No human creation can be disinvented. Gas chambers weren’t disinvented. What society can and has done is decide that certain artifacts, certain technologies are either too dangerous, too inhumane, or otherwise unacceptable for society.

And then the task becomes to determine whether you can dismantle these artifacts and do it in a way that is verifiable enough or secure enough that society then feels that it can live without them. And that is what the challenge is with nuclear disarmament. It is not a disinvention challenge, but rather to assess whether you can dismantle all of these weapons and related infrastructure as necessary to minimize the risk of cheating and to build confidence in the enforcement measures if someone should cheat.
And that is the agenda that we basically set out to address. We do it through five chapters, basically. And I will just give you kind of the highlights of each or some of the more interesting dilemmas or points that come out of each.

The first starts from today and says, basically, look, we recognize that today, it is nearly impossible for political leaders in any of the eight nuclear-armed states – I am putting North Korea to the side for a second – the eight nuclear-armed states to imagine how they would actually go about getting rid of their last nuclear weapons. It is too far over the horizon. So what we try to say are okay, well, what are the steps that we know need to be taken to get to the ground from which they could start to look over that horizon? And that is what we try to do in the first chapter.

And one of the first things that you recognize is that you can’t separate the project of eliminating nuclear weapons from realities of balance-of-power politics. This process will have to go hand in hand with the management of power and the balancing of power. And so among the things that that means, first of all, is that the relationship between the U.S. and Russia and between the U.S. and China, and then triangulating that amongst the three is absolutely vital. That this process, the process of reductions, the process of movements towards eliminating nuclear weapons, fundamentally depends on Russia, China and the U.S. agreeing on a vision for the strategic future, on having enough cooperation in their relations that they can not only reduce current arsenals, but also not plan against each other in the way that they do now.

And you can see that in a variety of ways, but ballistic missile defense is one of the most acute. And ballistic missile defense is actually a very, very interesting issue or topic in this whole problem because on the one hand, it can really reinforce and encourage the project of eliminating nuclear weapons because it provides some measure of insurance. It could if the technology worked, et cetera. It, in principle, could provide some insurance for a world without nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, you can’t get to that world if you have non-cooperative, competitive, strategic relations, particularly between the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. and China, because Russia and especially China will be extremely reluctant to reduce their forces and imagine eliminating them if they think that the U.S. retains ballistic missile defense for first-strike capabilities – or to negate their deterrent.

So you have to sort that issue. But as we explore in the paper, even if you could get that issue sorted, the U.S. will also confront this question – not only from Russia and China, but from other states as well – which is to say, is a world without nuclear weapons basically a way for the U.S. to seek domination through conventional superiority? This is one of the way in which people – privately in Russia and China – already respond to the op-eds by Secretaries Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Senator Nunn, which is in private, they will say, sure, sure, these guys are realists. We know who these guys are. And they understand that the U.S. can dominate a world that only has conventional weapons because you have such great conventional capability.

And so somewhere in this process – in other words, to get people to commit to and actually move towards zero – we will have to deal with issues of conventional capability, but more issues of intervention. What are the principles? What are the constraints by which the international community will constrain the intervention in other people’s affairs because that is fundamentally why people seek and hang onto nuclear weapons is to deter incursions. And China and Russia will be especially sensitive to this.
And as we are now more acutely aware, for example, the new members of NATO will be also very sensitive about this issue, especially in light of what has happened in Georgia. The polls are not going to be real keen about a nuclear disarmament agenda if the power considerations and the thrust of Russia's foreign and security policies aren't more reassuring. So that is the kind of stuff we address in the – and don’t resolve – but put on the table in the first chapter to say, that is what you have to do to set up the capacity to think about how you get rid of the last few weapons.

The next chapter focuses on verification, which will obviously be key, but actually not as key as many people think. At least, that is our conclusion. We go through the ways in which technology has improved and protocols have been developed to verify the dismantlement of declared nuclear weapons, and also to verify what is happening in declared facilities. Obviously, there is a greater difficulty with undeclared facilities and possibly undeclared stockpiles. We talk about that. I won’t rehearse it here.

Where it gets really difficult is the whole issue of past stockpiles – or stockpiles including past produced fissile materials. And there, you just have to confront the reality that, regardless of whatever technology exists inherently, there will always be uncertainties of at least a few percent of how much you can account for and verify in terms of fissile material and what you can actually physically count.

Now, a few percent in the case of the U.S. and Russia is more than 1,000 nuclear weapons. But importantly, in the case of the other nuclear-weapon states, it isn't remotely that large. But what that means is that verification can’t be a panacea here, first of all. And secondly, that to get a handle or to deal with those inherent uncertainties, you are going to have to mobilize kind of human resources in different ways. You are going to need to have the histories taken from people who were in every nuclear program and get more of a tactile nuance feeling of do things add up. Do the stories add up?

But you are also going to need what we talk about a societal verification. The mobilization of human resources and societies that goes beyond what inspectors can go and look at. And that part of the discussion actually aroused the most response when we sent drafts out internationally. And I urge you to read it. It is interesting. But one of the ways to address that is actually done by Brazil, which when it ended its clandestine nuclear-weapon program and joined the NPT, in its constitution, it forbids the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

And lots of things fall from that – or follow from that – including that then work on such a process clandestinely would be violation of fundamental law. And so these kinds of requirements and adaptations in law domestically, in morality, in corporate practice and how you would hold industry accountable in this area are some of the things we explore in this chapter.

And in the end, you conclude basically that there is too much emphasis really put on verification because it doesn’t get at the fundamental issue of enforcement, which I will come to after I do this little diversion – but it’s not a diversion – in the chapter on managing nuclear industry in a world without nuclear weapons.

What we haven’t had in the past, but are facing right now is kind of the simultaneous interest in expanding nuclear industry and dealing with nuclear disarmament. Some of the past discussions of disarmament occurred when the industry was in the doldrums. And this – what we currently face
is a very different prospect of people wanting greatly to expand the role of nuclear energy, including in states that now don’t have nuclear technology and infrastructure. At the same time, as there is more demand and interest in nuclear disarmament.

And there is a tension here because if you increase the scope and scale of nuclear industry, you are going to have to produce more fuel. If you have to produce more fuel, there is more capability to produce nuclear weapons because, for example, uranium enrichment facilities can – are dual use – inherently dual use, as we are wrestling with in Iran. So if industry spreads and expands, you are going to have more fuel production. If that happens without much stronger nonproliferation rules, there is going to be a fear that proliferation will result from this.

If there is a fear that proliferation will result from this, then the states that now have nuclear weapons are going to be even less inclined to get rid of all of them because they are going to feel that they are in a more dangerous nuclear world. But without a greater commitment to disarmament, the non-nuclear-weapon states now won’t agree to stronger nonproliferation rules. So we have this circular problem that we want stronger nonproliferation rules, and then others say in order to get that, you have to do more disarmament.

But we can’t get more disarmament without stronger nonproliferation rules. And so it is this who-goes-first problem, which we identify, but don’t resolve because we can’t resolve it. And no one in this room alone can resolve it. And no one in one country or one industry can resolve it. This has to be worked out amongst buyers and suppliers, weapon states and non-weapon states. And that is, again, the central purpose of our paper.

What we do know is that, at a minimum, if you are going to take the objective of zero and move toward it, you are going to have to have much stronger safeguards procedures – inspection procedures and rules than we have today. Now, today, we have an additional protocol, which is stronger than the basic model of safeguards. But it is not universally adopted. And many key non-nuclear-weapon states resist that and say it shouldn’t be for a variety of reasons. So we can’t now get the additional protocol implemented in many places or made to be a condition of supplying nuclear technology.

And yet, you can’t imagine states agreeing to get rid of their last nuclear weapons without something even stronger than the additional protocol. So this is, again, another one of the circular who-goes-first problems that we address in the context of nuclear industry going forward because there is another problem, which is – if you are advocates of nuclear industry and you are very bullish on this industry and its future – more than the industry recognizes, that future depends on very, very strong nonproliferation protections, which may then be affected by disarmament, because if there is one big proliferation incident that happens or a terrorist use of nuclear weapons or a nuclear accident anywhere in the world, the whole industry is going to suffer and become constricted.

And yet, industry, though it may be willing to talk about safety right now because it feels like that record has improved enormously, they don’t want to talk about nonproliferation or put industrial weight behind strengthening the nonproliferation regime, which will only work if you then were willing to talk about disarmament and commit to that, which industry absolutely doesn’t want to get into.
So there is a – we would argue strategically over the longer term – there is this tension between the very bullish nuclear future and this agenda that we are talking about. And it hasn’t been addressed and so that is what we are calling for is an engagement having identified these issues.

All right, so then the key issue – next chapter – is enforcement precisely because verification can never be 100 percent reliable. But even if it could be, someone could still decide to cheat or break out. So in any case, you need to deal with the enforcement issue. And that is the issue that has been dealt with least historically in all the discussions of eliminating nuclear weapon. The Canberra Commission, for example, which is an estimable – you tell me – (laughter) – it is a good project – (laughter) – and it is a very good report. I could run for president. I’ll say good. It is not evil. But it has basically one sentence on enforcement. It says, of course, the U.N. Security Council will have to take suitable measures to be able to enforce this.

And other efforts similarly kind of underscore this enforcement challenge. What we try to do is, again, kind of lay out what we think some of the major elements of the enforcement challenge are. And we pause it, for the sake of discussion that the U.N. Security Council would have to be a central element. And one of the reasons for this is because the five recognized states with nuclear weapons are the five permanent members of the Security Council. So in any kind of agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons, they are going to have to decide whether and how it is enforced.

And so if they want – if they want it to be in the Security Council, they are going to get their way. And if they don’t want it to be someplace else, they will get their way. So for practical purposes, we talk about the Security Council as an entity. But we then look at the issue of well, India, Pakistan and Israel have nuclear weapons, have to be part of this process, absolutely, and don’t have permanent seats in the Security Council. So by what mechanism are you going to enforce an eventual elimination of nuclear weapons where you could somehow dream you could exclude three of the actors who would be asked to give up these assets?

You can parse that problem and say, well, Israel’s concern isn’t global and so it will be much more regional. But I can venture to say that India would insist that as part of giving up its nuclear weapons, it would want the absolute same power and voice at least as China has and whatever global enforcement mechanism there is. So let’s call it the U.N. Security Council. It is very difficult to imagine India giving up its nuclear weapons without a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council with the same prerogatives that the other five have.

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to imagine how Pakistan would react to the idea of India being a permanent member of the Security Council and how that plays out. Not saying it is insurmountable, but saying this is the kind of issue that if you think about the enforcement challenge you confront. And if try to avoid, as many do, the enforcement issue, then our view is it is not a realistic discussion.

Similarly, with the issue of automaticity, one way that people have thought about the issue in the past of disarmament is, well, if you get to absolute zero and someone cheats, then you would have an automatic capacity or agreement to sanction them, to authorize, you know, cutting them out of all international institutions, et cetera. There would be automatic penalties. And we look at that. And you can read it, but basically come out with the view that that seems unimaginable to us when you go through the political calculations and imagine, in particular, parliamentary systems, including
the U.S., where people would look at automatic enforcement as a trap, in which they could be falsely accused and then have enforcement triggered.

Moreover, the enforcement issue, as some of the Chinese commentators on the paper have raised, when you – it is fine because when one works on this, one imagines a certain kind of country cheating, and then all the things we could do to stop them or limit the damage that they could do. But if you ask what if the U.S. cheats, what are the enforcement options? Because when we talk about another country doing it, you would say, well, you sanction them. When you talk about the U.S. cheating and then the others go, wait, we are going to sanction the U.S. economy. And then what are they going to do to us? And how can we afford economically to sanction the U.S.?

Or we are going to talk about a blockade. Wait, how are we going to do that? And so you start going through these issues, which for us are very fanciful because, of course, the U.S. wouldn’t cheat. But when you talk to people in China and Russia, in particular, but also elsewhere around the world, they say, well, what is the enforcement against the U.S.? And then they say, you know, the United States does have a pattern of violating what we consider to be international law, so how do we deal with that?

Again, we don’t have answers, but it comes back to these balance-of-power considerations with which we begin. And a fundamental tension that I think has been underrecognized, which is that on the one hand, to imagine that horizon of getting rid of nuclear weapons, you would want to have strong conventional military capabilities to deal with somebody who might break out or threaten another state that is now deterred, we believe, by nuclear weapons. So you would want a strong conventional capability.

On the other hand, the other states may not be willing to go to zero if we, for example, have a strong conventional capability, so that the kind of relationship and balance of power, you need to get people to politically agree to go to zero might undermine the kind of enforcement you need to make that world safer. And again, this is something that we think, you know, think tanks, analysts need to work on a lot more and needs to be much more of a North-South discussion.

Let me conclude on that note that that is – we don’t – we have tried to lay out some reflections, some questions, you know, an agenda with enough detail to at least push people to dig deeper and go beyond slogans. Ideally, this would be taken up by government. They are not doing a hell of a lot in Geneva, for example. They could do more. We don’t assume that that will be the case, and so suggest that if governments don’t want to take up this issue, then at least they could and should support think tanks, analytic communities, international – including government think tanks, government-sponsored think tanks in China, in Russia because there aren’t – with the exception of a few – the other kind, to begin working through this agenda in more detail as a genuine international collaboration, and then to report back to governments, whether through the NPT process, through the CD, through the U.N. General Assembly to undertake some movement and raise attention to this issue while governments may want to continue – or some governments – not the U.K., but some governments, may want to continue to stonewall.

And so this is something we urge with – last point – the basic view that everything that is necessary to get to that ground from which you can see going to zero, but also to move towards zero. All of those steps would be beneficial regardless. They are worth undertaking in any case in terms of international security. And so the downside is very, very slight. The upside is very positive.
And many of those steps are things that are already on the agenda or do need to be on the agenda as problems to solve today.

So if you had as an organizing principle that we are actually trying to eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons, you may bring more support to this agenda, which already is fundamental to the national security agenda, at least of major states. Let me stop there and open it for discussion.

And just raise your hand, and then say who you are, all that stuff.

Okay. Linton Brooks, who needs no introduction.

Q: Brent Scowcroft has argued that the stability of a world without nuclear weapons is undesirable. Charlie Glaser has made the similar arguments from the academic side. Does your analysis deal with that at all?

MR. PERKOVICH: I am going to respond and Michael should also, if you wish. Yeah, I mean, this is, again, this is a process. So our view would be you are not going to get the last step of eliminating the last weapons without having addressed the underlying stability issues. Now, as I understand, General Scowcroft’s views, and you know them better than I do, I mean – and it is a part I don’t understand. I mean, I think I know what he means, but I don’t share it in a sense that even talking about it or setting it as an objective is somehow destabilizing because otherwise I don’t quite understand the premise that you would actually take those last steps if you didn’t have a sense of the stability of the world.

And, for example, you know, the Israelis aren’t, and the Pakistanis aren’t and the Russians aren’t going to vis-à-vis us, so that is one where I don’t quite get the problem as it relates to what we should set up trying to do today. But you may know it better or Mike –

SIR QUINLAN: Just to say the same thing, I spoke to George in different words –

MR. PERKOVICH: Better words.

(Laughter.)

SIR QUINLAN: Certainly I wouldn’t want to get rid of nuclear weapons unless you change the – (inaudible) – about the world. If I could have a magic wand and could abolish them now, I certainly would. But – (inaudible) – of stability. A lot else has to change. But that is another reason, in my view, and I think yours, that not studying the things we can study now. And there is plenty to that.

A world with no nuclear weapons is going to be different in a lot of other ways, but this one certainly. It merits study in its own right.

MR. PERKOVICH: Do you want to say more? I mean –

Abner Collin (ph), who also needs no introduction, but bring him a mike. He does need a mike.
Q: What is – have you come in your study to any conclusion about Israel’s opacity? In other words, in order to do that, that Israel first has to remove, modify, change or – (inaudible) – one question. The other question is have you learned something new – new insight from this kind of exercise about how to deal with Iran today? In other words, from looking globally, have you learned something about the Iran –

MR. PERKOVICH: Great questions. On Israel’s opacity, a subject on which we have had lots of discussion – I think no, and in fact, I think one of the insights we kind of convey, although not as explicitly as I would if I were writing a separate piece is that while we try to – there is this problem that Israel, India and Pakistan are not part of the NPT. It is not clear what category they are in. There is no format or international forum in which to involve them.

So – and talking about nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states even is misleading. There is no category in which to put them. So we have come up with this phrase, nuclear-armed states, to include them – not a juridical concept, but it is a descriptive concept.

If you go further and think about the disarmament problem, I think actually Israel’s opacity is a virtue and useful because all we are talking about – if you speak in terms of states with unsafeguarded fissile materials, the disarmament process, the elimination of all nuclear weapons basically can be defined, in part, as the putting of all fissile materials in whatever form under international safeguard. That is what it means.

So you have states that now have fissile materials in unsafeguarded form. The object is to get them all under international safeguards. Israel has unsafeguarded fissile materials. Regardless of what else you would say about it, it needs to have those totally safeguarded with all the kinds of inspections that you would need to verify. And it seems to me you can get from there to here without dealing with do they declare having nuclear weapons or not – because the same thing is if somebody has got a clandestine program where it is not declared they have nuclear weapons wherever you want to make sure that everything there is declared as under safeguards.

So that is how I would approach it – and avoid a lot of the other issues – the juridical issues, but also the problem that I would think in a specific case, which is that if there were a declared or the world were saying, yes, they have nuclear weapons –

Q: (Off mike) – the real problem. The real problem is they have weapons. They don’t have just on safeguard theory – (inaudible) – weapons.

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, but wait, South Africa – the solution in South Africa was, again, the world didn’t know it, didn’t see it. Nobody declared it, didn’t matter. They put everything under safeguards in a dismantled form. And everybody said yea.

Q: (Off mike, cross talk.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Not weapon.

Q: Seven weapons and dismantling those –
MR. PERKOVIČH: They declared it after they dismantled it. If Israel wants to declare it after they dismantle it, I have got no problem. We used to have nuclear weapons; now we don’t. And here is all the stuff. That works for me. Declaring it now seems to me a provocation to Egypt and the others that none of those governments actually wants.

Now, the Iran issue, yeah – and we talk about it longer in there than some people liked or wanted us to in terms of commentators. No, I think the – first of all, Iran says it doesn’t want nuclear weapons. And I think that that is very important and we should focus on that and hold them to that. So therefore, that others have nuclear weapons shouldn’t be an excuse for what they are doing and isn’t actually why they are doing it and so on. And so we shouldn’t grant that.

Now, would it be easier if Israel didn’t have nuclear weapons and others didn’t have nuclear weapons? Yes. But that isn’t and shouldn’t be an impediment to doing what needs to be done in Iran. And the Iran issue, obviously, brings up lots of broader problems about fuel cycle, inspections and so on, which we talk about. But I don’t think there was any real revelation in our work on that.

Yeah, Stephen Young.

Q: Stephen Young with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Two distinct questions. One, is there a useful distinction between prohibiting nuclear weapons and the verification and enforcement you would want to have to do that and abolishing them? Is there a question there about that fine point? You could prohibit weapons and still hide them, et cetera. Is there a useful area to explore in that final turning point?

And, second, does the – in your view, does the recent India negotiations – NSG – changes – does that help us on this road? Or is this not going to be helpful on the abolition road?

MR. PERKOVIČH: Oh, ha, ha, ha.

And I think Michael has thoughts on the prohibition, abolition spectrum. A couple thoughts on it. One is – and we talk about it and our last chapter, I didn’t talk about this kind of – talk about discussion of hedging and stuff. In other words, we kind of presume that the weapons would be prohibited before all of the infrastructure and know-how and capability would somehow disappear from the earth.

So you are going to be on a spectrum in any case where there is – where you get the prohibition before you get to absolute abolition. So that is – and there is as continuum. But you are asking a more distinct question, which is if we could decide today to prohibit nuclear weapons and not address their existence, then therefore, using them would be illegal for now, and then you work on abolishing them.

And there are different views on that. The – and we don’t address it in the paper. But the idea, for example, of just the straight prohibition – and the Indian government has proposed this and some others have proposed this – just go straight to a prohibition and then the rest of the stuff is detail about their existence.

I guess I think the stability-instability issues that would be raised and the insecurity of prohibiting something that still exists in these large quantities and not having adjusted doctrinal and
use questions are very tricky. Now, you could do that along the way. But if they exist and you have prohibited them, what do you tell the people who control them – your military and others? These guys, as we know, need – you know, inevitably need orders. And what happens if someone cheats or uses theirs? Or in a crisis when you see somebody moving this thing that has been prohibited, they may not be using it. They are moving it around. How do you interpret – so those kinds of issues, it seems to me, should be addressed even if you do want to go that route and say, well, let’s prohibit them first and worry about abolishing – there is a lot you have got to work through in order to make that prohibition kind of stable, I think.

But, Michael, you have thoughts?

SIR QUINLAN: Just to say – I am personally a skeptic about prohibition as distinct from – (inaudible). Abolition – it is declaratory, essentially, and on something where nuclear weapons come into play only in extreme circumstances. And in those circumstances, prohibition is for the birds.

Consider a case. The Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which virtually everybody signed up, prohibits first use of chemical weapons. Didn’t stop Iraq doing it in the 1980s. Didn’t mean that in NATO, we didn’t have to have defensive plans in case the Russians used their nuclear armory. It doesn’t ultimately change serious reality. And nuclear weapons, like it or not, are serious reality.

MR. PERKOVICH: I can’t resist making a joke. I can’t usually remember jokes. One of my best friends is a great brewer – Stone Brewing. Look it up. It is one of the best breweries in the world. And so we were in Geneva talking about prohibition. And he said, yeah, he says, you know, the water – your body is 98 percent water. And prohibitionists want to make it 100 percent. (Laughter.) Anyway, it has nothing to do with this – (laughter) – but I remembered it. Isn’t that good? It’s good. And you can get it at Whole Foods – Stone Beer.

Jill?

Oh, sorry, Jill, time out. The India thing. I can’t see anything good in the realm of nuclear disarmament from the Indian view. And I basically don’t see anything good from a nonproliferation standpoint. I see good things in terms of U.S. and India relations. You could argue from an energy standpoint. So, I mean, there are reasons to have done this. But these aren’t those reasons. I could elaborate, but so you could.

Jill?

Q: Hi. Thank you, George. Jill Parillo, Physicians for Social Responsibility. I just had a question about something that you mentioned. I wondered since the debate on how to better manage the fuel cycle is opening up this Pandora box of concern from the non-nuclear-weapon states, why not rely more on industry to develop rules, which will be backed up by domestic and international law?

I know that industry has developed some policies like trust, for instance – a policy which would ask utilities to only sell fuel and reactors and following these nonproliferation rules both domestic and international. Thank you.
MR. PERKOVICH: Thanks. That is a great question. And in fact, we have a project underway here that is quiet, so I am not going to talk a lot about it, but working with industry on just that. And there is some interest in industry. They recognize – most of them. It takes a little while, but – and the only reason I say it takes a little while is that the industry leaders tend to be engineers, who, as one of them put it, is all we think about is how big a slab we need to put the thing on. All this nonproliferation stuff is just a totally foreign language to us.

So it takes a little bit of a conversation, but then they kind of get it very quickly that they have shared liabilities potentially if something goes wrong from a proliferation standpoint. And so then they start saying, okay, so what do we have to do? Now, their worry then becomes what their competitors will do. And so they say, okay, so we – yeah, right, we wouldn’t sell to those guys or we wouldn’t sell under those circumstances. But what about X? And so we are going and trying to get X. And so you start collecting, but a challenge is that the set of X is growing.

And so – and if the industry takes off, the set will grow, so that you might have a discussion with AREVA who understand this, and GE and – and then they say, well, what about the Russian vendors? Okay, so you – they are under lots of domestic pressure to sell, but okay. So we get the Russians in. And if you say, yeah, but the Indians might want to start exporting, and there is nothing in the U.S.-India nuclear deal that would keep them for exporting, but they are not members of the NSG – I mean, so there is like interesting issues that arise from that, which doesn’t mean that you can’t address this through industry. It just – that it starts to broaden.

And it starts to then look to me anyway a little like Wall Street, which is at some point, you know, government should be involved and maybe regulate a little bit what goes on. But like with Wall Street, there are reasons why that doesn’t happen. I mean, the politics and the pressures against state-negotiated rules on this are enormous. And so it will have to be led, as you suggest, I think, by industry, and then the kind of official regulatory process would have to keep up, I think. But it is a great question.

Stan Norris, and then this gentleman.

Q: Stan Norris, Natural Resource Defense Council. George, this issue has entered into the presidential campaigns, amazingly enough. I think this would have been almost impossible to conceive a few years ago, but it has. I was wondering if you could comment on the seriousness with which you think they have addressed this, and what they might do if either of them win.

MR. PERKOVICH: I think it has been – it has been remarkable and a little surprising to me that Senator McCain joined the issue in a way that didn’t make more difficult the achievement of progress. In other words, historically, there is a real attempt if one guy, as Senator Obama did early, goes and says, okay, I am going to – I want to get rid of these things or take major steps. And the other guy goes, ah, now I can show my manliness and say he is a sissy.

And McCain didn’t do that. He, in essence, said, yeah, me too. I am interested in that, too. So that was very constructive. My preference – and many people here would disagree – would be if they didn’t say any more about it in the campaign, that is probably good because over the next 50 days, whatever they say is going to get tougher. I mean, Senator Obama put force back on the table last night with Iran, which is not, I think, a good idea.
But anyway, I mean, but that is the way it tends, so hopefully they won't talk more about it, in my view. But – and I think from talking to some of Senator McCain's advisors, the major speech he gave on this topic, he was trying to not be destructive or negative to make this not be an issue and left all the options open in terms of where they were. And I know that there is a lot of division amongst his advisors on where to go, what this means and so on.

So I think we would have to wait and see. My sense – and there are many people who work with the Obama campaign here, but I would guess that they would say that there is much more serious interest there – development of a sense of things they would actually do. And so then the issue would be this is going to be a president who is going to inherit a financial situation, they say, more dire than any since the depression, two wars, a healthcare system that doesn’t work, et cetera.

And so how – where is this going to be on his priorities? I have no way of judging. But I think it has been a positive campaign compared to others.

Yes, sir?

Q: Thank you. I am Yang Yonghong with Chinese Embassy. I quite agree with your comment that there should be understanding and cooperation, collaboration among major powers – for example, in China and the United States. As far as I know, China and the United States have many contacts or cause of tensions – both academic and officially. And there are some agreements and some disagreements in terms of nuclear-weapons issues.

My question is that why the United States cannot adopt non-first-use policy of nuclear weapons? As you know, China clearly stated when it first had nuclear weapons more than 40 years ago that China would not use nuclear weapons against any country, especially non-nuclear countries. So I wondered was there a comment on U.S. position in terms of non-first-use policy. Thank you.

MR. PERKOVICH: This is one on which Michael has very strong views, not necessarily from a U.S. point of view, but from a doctrinal and – well, from a doctrinal and operational point of view. And also, Linton Brooks here knows a lot more about it than I do.

My own view is that it is that there are other ways to get at that issue that would be very positive and don’t run into the ambiguities of the declared policy of no first use. And personally, I don’t – if the U.S. president tomorrow came out and said, “our policy is we won’t use nuclear weapons first.” I would have no problem. I wouldn’t lose any sleep.

But I understand reasons why others would have more difficulty. It seems to me a related and perhaps as important step would be what kind of nuclear forces do we deploy? In other words, if we didn’t deploy nuclear weapons and fix silos, then the reason by which – or for which we might use nuclear weapons first – would be diminished enormously. So for me, I would say well, get rid the land-based nuclear weapons. And then what we have got are submarine-based weapons, which are invulnerable. And so you don’t, you know, you are not under pressure to use them first, and then there are air-based systems, too.

So there are other things that we ought to be doing whether or not we declare no first use. Similarly, if we declared no first use and still had missiles in fixed silos, if I were another country, I wouldn’t be that confident in our no-first-use declaration. So it is – I think there – and I think one
of the things that people looking at China wonder about – because China does have this very clear policy that it has always had. But then as they look as China is modernizing its nuclear force and also the array of missiles that are facing Taiwan, people start saying, well, you know, how much can they rely on that doctrine? I am not challenging. I am not questioning. I am just saying what people wonder about.

So there is this mixture between doctrine and forces that are operated. And I think that would be a very useful part of this discussion, which we are urging to happen internationally would be on these doctrinal questions and how they relate to force deployments.

But Michael, do you want to –

SIR QUINLAN: I do regard this as rather tangential and subsidiary, the question of abolition. But since we are asked, it seems to me to distinguish between a policy and a promise. I don’t for a moment believe in no-first-use promises. A promise is an undertaking to behave in a certain way regardless or not of whether, when the time comes, you happen to find it convenient to do so. Now when the time came, when you really wanted to consider seriously nuclear weapons as the least bad course available to you, the notion that you would have your course of action determined by something you had said years and years ago in some peacetime tranquility is, frankly, nonsense.

What I do think we could possibly move towards is – well, firstly, a clarification. To refuse to give a no-first-use promise is not to have a policy of first-use. Still less is it to have a policy of pre-emptive first strike or anything like that. I do myself believe that it might be useful, perhaps for example when NATO, as it probably will next year, embarks upon re-stating or updating its strategic concept, made it clear that it didn’t want to make first use, that it sought the likelihood that having to make first use is low, and that it would so organize its deployments and its policies, both political and military, as to keep the likelihood of having to entertain it as remote as possible.

Now all that, I think, would be useful, but it isn’t a promise, and promises are, I think, for the birds in this field.

MR. PERKOVICH: Linton, do you want to say anything? I don’t want to put you on the spot, but – okay, all right.

MR. BROOKS: You can’t top what he just said.

(Laughter.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Okay, good. Thanks. Anybody else? Yes?

Q: Amy Woolf, from the Congressional Research Service. You started out today by saying that abolition is a long way down the road, maybe not even a 50-50 chance by 2045. In the meantime –

SIR QUINLAN: I didn’t say that. George did.
Q: George said that. In the meantime we’re going to still have nuclear weapons, and in other rooms around town and around the country right now there are meetings going on about how to maintain the credibility of our nuclear enterprise in an era when budgets are declining, interest is declining, and the process is declining.

If on the one hand half of the meetings in half of the rooms are talking about getting rid of nuclear weapons, and half of the meetings in the other half of the rooms are talking about how to sustain the nuclear enterprise, how do you square that circle or round off those edges?

MR. PERKOVICH: Great question. I’m a simpleton on these things. So I do a little thought experiment and I ask people, I say, does anybody here think that Israel’s nuclear weapons, which Abner and I can talk about whether we can talk about them, but won’t work and aren’t credible. I’ve never heard anybody say, right, that it’s rubbish, they won’t work, they’re not credible. And so then I say, well, okay, so they either tested them once or never. Don’t go out and do all this sturm und drang, you know, about reliability and all that. It seems to me we may overdo it.

Then in respect to the argument that, yes, as long as you’re going to have them you should make sure they’re safe and secure and all that. Amen. And we ought to do that. My understanding about reliable, which is the word that most of the discussion hangs on, and if there’s anybody on the planet who can correct me, it’s Linton, but my understanding of reliable is it means something different than it means to, you know, 99.999 percent of the people who are going to vote in this election, for example. When we say reliable, is it going to go boom.

But that concern that exists primarily, and is driving this issue in the complex is a very different definition of reliability that I think deserves more discussion about just how vital that definition of reliability in terms of predicted yield and so on is. But in any case, it seems to me that if the thing I was worried most about was the stockpile and the infrastructure of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, the thing I could best do to save it, in my view, would be to push on the objective of eliminating nuclear arsenals, that we really do want to get rid of these things. We want to draw others into the process of getting rid of them. But as long as we have them, we have to make sure that they don’t go off when they’re not supposed to and that they’re safe and secure. That seems to me you’re in a much stronger position than allowing the impression, in fact, that you actually don’t want anybody to talk about getting rid of these things. You think it’s a really terrible idea. Oh, and give us billions to, you know, ramp up the infrastructure and so on. That strikes me as kind of the worst. I think tactically it doesn’t make sense. But also I don’t think it makes sense in terms of U.S. security over the long term. But I defer to Linton and others on a lot of that.

SIR QUINLAN: Could I comment, George? It seems to me that the question arises not just on our government, but, in the British case – (inaudible) – committed to at least extensive design work on a new generation of submarines to continue to carry Trident missiles.

It’s one thing to decide is that you hope to be able to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely by – let me invent a date – 2030. It’s quite another to say, and I am prepared to bet my security on that being achieved. Those are two quite different things. And since we are talking of things which lie very deep in our security provision, you don’t give up the insurance provision until you’re jolly sure that your goal is going to be achieved. We can’t, clearly, be sure of achieving this splendid aspiration in short order. We have, therefore, since we’re in the security business, to maintain the insurance.
MR. PERKOVICH: And my point is that that argument is much more palatable, I think, and sale-able if the government behind it actually is trying to create conditions to eliminate these things, as opposed to sending signals that in any case it doesn’t want to get rid of them.

Q: Baker Spring with the Heritage Foundation. Almost a direct follow-on question. It seems to me that the term that’s left out of this safety, security, and reliability, is military effectiveness. And you talk about getting to that horizon point where you can see the direction towards abolition. At some point it becomes difficult for me to distinguish when I look at those specific kinds of recommendations to separate out getting towards the horizon from just nuclear weapons atrophy. And to put it in somewhat derogatory terms, admittedly, that you could say that the Air Force is on a perfect path for reducing the saliency and prominence of nuclear weapons in the overall U.S. security structure.

What is it that you would see in this interim period that would permit us to move forward with things that would service the concept or the principal of military effectiveness with regard to our nuclear deterrent force?

MR. PERKOVICH: I think that’s a great question, and one that our political system ought to be addressing in all the relevant places. I mean, I have some views, which is that I think the military effectiveness, or necessity of nuclear weapons for the U.S. to me is hard to define. And I think of a remark General Cartwright made, which is basically almost everything that I need to do based on the guidance, I can do without nuclear weapons. There’s one thing he couldn’t, and if he could conventionally arm ballistic missiles, he could do that one, in which case what’s the military effectiveness we’re worrying about for the U.S.?

Now for other countries looking at the U.S. as the intervener that they’re trying to deter, actually the military effectiveness challenge is greater than for the U.S., which then feeds back. So that’s part of it. So I agree that that’s – I think that’s why it needs to be addressed. But I think that it’s easy to over-estimate the military effectiveness, and that’s one of the reasons, again, why Shultz, Kissinger, et al., want to get rid of these things.

Another way that I’ve looked at this, and it’s related to the Air Force a little bit, people for a while talk about bunker busters and so on, as if the problem was an ordnance problem and not an intelligence problem. So in the paper we talk about, in the section on terrorism, the record of going after top priority individual targets in Iraq. There were the 50 top guys that we tried to attack and got zero of them with conventional weapons. And so then you imagine now it’s a nuclear weapon, and the threshold of political-strategic calculation the president would have to make to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. With that kind of record, and the kind of confidence you would need in intelligence, the military effectiveness of that option and of spending a lot of money on that option seems pretty slight, given the unlikely need or utility.

But I think that’s the kind of discussion that we really ought to be having, and my view is that that discussion is perhaps more acute right now in Russia and China, maybe in Pakistan, than it is here. But then that becomes our problem too. I don’t know if that was a satisfactory answer.

Q: Thank you. I’m Carl Stoiber. I’m a consultant in nuclear law with the IAEA and other organizations. I have a couple of comments which I will disguise as questions. On page 29 you say
that tensions between Russia, its smaller neighbors, and national enclaves within them are more fluid and less difficult to resolve than Taiwan or Kashmir. I wonder if in view of what’s happened in Georgia in the last two weeks you would still have written that sentence, and whether you could expand on some of your earlier comments about what’s going on in Georgia now and how that affects the ultimate goal that you’re interested in.

My second point and question is that you indicate on page 115 that the international community should make the illicit proliferation of nuclear weapons and material an international crime. I’ve seen this suggestion in a variety of publications, and I note that the people making the suggestion are typically not former criminal prosecutors, as I am. I’m wondering, my point is, is this necessary, and is this really going to advance your agenda?

The point I would make is that if you look at the convention on physical protection of nuclear material, which has now 136 sponsors in its 2005 amendment, and you look at the new nuclear terrorism convention that just went into effect, both of those instruments require states to criminalize a wide variety of activities related to nuclear materials and terrorist activities. It would be my submission that that almost virtually makes any proliferation, really, of activity an international crime already. The problems with international criminalization are selecting a tribunal, identifying the elements of the offense, what would be the defenses to that offense. And that’s a complicated business, which seems to me to be diverting energies from the task of abolition rather than assisting it.

MR. PERKOVICH: On the Russia issue, yes, I would have written it differently. But I still – I don’t know that I would change the essential judgment. I mean, kind of prior to the situation one would have thought that U.S. capacity to influence the Georgian government’s actions and so on was relatively stronger. So to help deal with this in advance – we tried. The U.S. government tried.

Now that it’s been done, I mean, it still brings – it means that the NATO issue is still front and center, so we have to address it, with Ukraine in particular, and how to adjust, or how to integrate those considerations with what we need from Russia on Iran and on a whole host of other issues. But we have fora, we have history with Russia of working these things out. We have people in both countries that know how to do that. There’s a common language, there’s a common understanding. There still is a framework within NATO.

So I think it’s going to take time, and Sir Michael might want to comment about how much time it might want to take, but I think it’s not out of – there’s a CFE treaty that you could kind of come back to if you wanted to start rebuilding that strategic relationship.

So is that harder than Kashmir right now? I don’t know, given what’s happening in Pakistan. I mean, I think there’s reason for optimism on Kashmir between India and Pakistan, but now you’ve got a government in Pakistan that’s so beleaguered, and incursions and violence have started going up again in Kashmir, so whether Russia fits there. Taiwan is relatively optimistic now.

So I would tweak it, but it doesn’t seem like it’s – let me put it another way. If we’re going to restore relations from Russia, or keep them from really descending, the strategic nuclear agenda seemed to me to be the best way to begin that restoration, or to at least convey to each other and the rest of the world there’s a limit beyond which the deterioration won’t go, for all the reasons I
suggested. We know how to do it, there’s mechanisms, there’s instruments. The START treaty’s expiring at the end of 2009. No one in either country thinks that’s a good idea to let that go without being addressed.

So if I was going to do some restoration work, that’s where I’d do it. Does that mean Russia is going to be eager to go to zero? No. I think right now, as we mentioned on another page – I think it’s in there, and I don’t remember what number it is – Russian commentators say, look, this is not a good career move in Moscow right now to talk about nuclear disarmament. So we’re not there right now.

On the international criminal issue, you know more about it than I do. What we’re trying to get at are several things. One is the problem of extraterritoriality, that if you have people in a network and they go to relatively safe havens and operate and hide out or spend their money, it would be good to find a mechanism that if they were on other ground they would at least run the risk of capture and trial. That’s what we were trying to do. There may be other ways to do it better than that.

There is another issue that will have to be addressed that we just point to, but I think it’s very important going forward. If you imagine a world where all nuclear weapons have been eliminated but there’s still a generation in many countries that have made these things and know how to make them, there will be this question also of kind of legal framework for monitoring people and knowledge that’s very different from – and with some criminal elements to it that’s very different from what we’ve dealt with thus far in today’s world.

How one deals with that, and it may be right that that’s just like, forget it, it’s too complicated, you can deal with the problem in a bigger way. But we’re just trying to put things on the agenda so I welcome –

Q: Just one final comment – (off mike, inaudible) – mention that an obligation to either prosecute or expedite any offenders under those conventions. And so the issue of extraterritoriality does not become a big problem under either of those conventions.

MR. PERKOVICH: I mean, I’m just thinking of A.Q. Khan as an example. Hard to imagine somebody extraditing him, or trying him in Pakistan, but when he used to go around and visit his hotels and stuff, it would have been nice to be able to try him in another place, but that’s wishful thinking.

Do you want to say something about timing?

SIR QUINLAN: Perhaps I can say something about Russia and pretend it’s an answer to your question. (Laughter.) Clearly in the medium and long term no conversation about this whole subject is going anywhere unless you involve Russia, and clearly also one has to make at least an effort toward some follow-up to the Moscow treaty with its limitations, both as on the path to any endeavor down this road, and because of its significance, I believe, and something we haven’t mentioned, which is the review conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2010, where we can’t afford another fiasco of the 2005 kind.
But it seems to me there are issues of two different levels about Russia, and I don’t have a
good answer to either. There’s the question of when does the Georgia shadow cease to make any
sort of dialogue about anything difficult. I’m old enough to remember – I was beginning to do
some work about what the British should think about SALT I back in 1968, when the Russians went
into Prague, and that certainly set things back. But nevertheless, because it was ultimately in the
interest of both the United States and Russia to do business, though things were deferred, SALT I
discussions, which were eventually productive, whether or not you liked the outcome, got underway
15 months from the invasion of Prague. I think that’s the sort of thing one can look for this time,
whether it’s 15 months or some other time, I don’t know. But it won’t be a permanent stopper on
business.

What I think is more difficult to forecast is, is Russia seriously interested in doing business in
this territory at all? Are they interested in the success of the Moscow treaty, which to my mind
would have not only to be of more solid duration, with stronger verification, but it would have to
to get into the difficult business of non-strategic weapons, of which Russia has had 10 times as many as
the United States, and where Russia moreover is not looking at U.S. programs which it is anxious to
get capped. It’s going to be very interesting to see whether Russia in anything like the near term
wants to do business in this territory at all. One can only see when perhaps the new administration
puts that to the test, as I hope it will.

MR. PERKOVICH: Yes, sir, in the way back.

Q: John Barry, Newsweek. I haven’t read this paper so I’m just relying on your
presentation. But I must say, relying on those, it seems to me that you’ve written a deeply
subversive paper because it is seeking to go, as you say, beyond the slogans. What you’ve
demonstrated is how horrendously difficult it would be to actually achieve the disarmament that
large numbers of people want and talk about.

You say that the steps to that are good in and of themselves, George. I wonder whether
that’s the case. It seems to me that one could argue that the sorts of steps that you regard as
necessary, which is expansion of the membership of the U.N. Security Council, all sorts of
agreements about who’s going to have what size of conventional forces, agreements about who can
intervene, why and when and against whom. It seems to me all those are going to be discussions
which will raise extreme attentions as between one nation and another, so it seems to be that the
very process of international negotiation on issue after issue is going to be a destabilizing factor, with
still the goal quite unclear. So, in other words, people are going to be asked to buy things and
undergo great turmoil for a goal that is still very, very uncertain.

As against that, what’s the argument for movement? I mean, is the present situation so
unstable? Is the prospect of proliferation so imminent and so uncontrollable and so destabilizing
that it is actually worth embarking upon the sorts of international steps that you take?

MR. PERKOVICH: That’s a great question, John. You get a different answer to that
question wherever you go, first of all. And by the way, on this issue, one of the things that’s always
fun to note is when you send out a paper like this for comment, you get, depending on if the
respondent lives in a state with nuclear weapons or without, you get almost a diametrically opposite
perspective on each of these issues. And so the why bother issue, or what’s wrong with the present
situation, it’s very different from Brazil or South Africa, you know, or Egypt or Sweden.
Their view is, yeah, nuclear weapons are really, really bad and they’re dangerous and they’re morally objectionable and, moreover, they reflect, they represent a structure of international relations that people don’t like that much and besides you guys promised and this is an example of disregard for others and so on. So it’s like a – it’s kind of, the world we live in is not acceptable in many places, and so they want it changed. And one of the ways they want it changed is on this disarmament agenda.

So that – so we, meaning U.S. officials, and you see this on this issue in particular, so you know whether it’s John Deutch and Harold Brown who say, you know, it’s utterly undesirable to eliminate nuclear – but we absolutely have to get new rules on a nuclear fuel cycle. We’ve got to get the rest of the world to agree that no one else will acquire uranium enrichment – (inaudible). As if those two propositions are not related and as if the rest of the world does not get to vote on whether they accept those no rules.

So from the perspective of, let’s say, the U.S. national security establishment, which says proliferation is the thing we’re most worried about, my view would be, look, if you could get much stronger nonproliferation protections without doing anything on disarmament, go for it. A lot of these other issues, you’re right, don’t – I just don’t think you can, in which case you have to at least say, okay, well, let’s try and go down that road and address what these issues are.

And again, that brings us back to the point of our paper is that we bumped our heads against that and come up with these things that, if – you’re right, they say, there are difficulties. Now, I would love to have people say, no, you’re absolutely wrong, this isn’t difficult and you can ignore that issue and so on. That’s part of the invitation that we’re extending through this paper is for people to come and say, no, it’s much easier, you know, here’s how. That would be great. Alternatively, if no, you’ve got it about right, I mean, we are going to have to deal with this and that issue, then what we’re saying – you know, then let’s try and let’s look at that.

One of the things that might happen, and it has happened in some discussions, is that people look at some of the points that you made and the difficulties and they say, okay, right, I’m realistic. But what if the states that now have nuclear weapons got down to really, really low numbers, but you didn’t deal with the problem of going to absolute zero, which is what makes a lot of this much more difficult, low numbers, and you put them in the basement and quit wagging them in our face, and quit using them as measures of great power and everything, what about that world?

Well, that’s a different discussion. And if that’s part of the response of the difficulties that you said, where you get to capture some of the latent or inherent deterrent value of nuclear weapons, but you took away the politically offensive elements of it and so on, well, maybe that’s a different discussion that would arise out of confronting some of the difficulties that we do. But I certainly don’t have those answers. I’m just trying to – and James and Sir Michael, I’m just trying to noodle through what we think, you know, you run up against when you try this and welcome whatever the response is.

But doing nothing and saying the status quo works, I don’t think that’s tenable from either side. I don’t think the rest of the world will do a lot of other stuff we want and I don’t think we’ll get the nonproliferation measures that we’re calling for. But if I were wrong, that would be great.
SIR QUINLAN: Would beginning the process, the very long process that you lay out, would that actually do anything to stop proliferation? I mean, your own – (inaudible) – India and, by extension – (inaudible) – to make decisions about whether to have nuclear weapons based upon whether that perception of that security – (inaudible) – some international – (inaudible) – treaty – (inaudible) – he was doing, even for the right reasons. Surely, that’s going to hold true over the course of 35 years, but you seem to be anticipating – (inaudible) – disarmament – (inaudible).

MR. PERKOVICH: Yeah, there’s a very important distinction that I would make and I think you’re generally right about the way in which a given country would decide whether it wants nuclear weapons or to proliferate. But that’s not – that’s only an element of the problem. What I’m speaking more to is what do the rest of us do and how do you shape the system of rules and enforcement measures or whatever that make it harder for a country to decide that it wants nuclear weapons? Raise the costs and the penalties, raise the confidence and likelihood that if they tried that, they would get caught or would get pushed back.

Those are two very different things. And they often get mixed up. The driver on the one country versus the environment you’re in, what I’m suggesting is that this agenda and addressing this agenda, taking it seriously, especially if the U.S. does that, makes it much more likely that you can get the rest of the world to shape that environment, in which an actor here or there may decide or calculate whether it wants to achieve nuclear weapons and then what our strength is against that person. That’s why you do it. But I don’t think it’s to make country X or country Y actually change their calculations. So they are two different things. Yes, sir.

Yeah, Katie, here.

Q: Yes, I’m Carl Lundgren from Jonah Speaks. To summarize what you may have written, since I haven’t read it yet fully, before we can really get to zero in terms of nuclear weapons, we should first have world peace. For example, if we want Israel to get rid of its weapons, Israel must be assured that it will not be the subject of, shall we say, a massive attack, you know, with nukes or biological or chemical or even a very strong conventional attack. To get rid of nuclear weapons, say, between U.S. and China, we’d have to resolve the Taiwan issue, because of Taiwan is about to be attacked, what would they want in their defense and would a simply conventional force be enough? And that’s the kind of question we have to assure every nation that wants to nukes their security needs will be met.

MR. PERKOVICH: Great – there’s – right, there’s the – you’re just, basically you’re calling for world peace argument. Then the flip side is, one also hears, you’re just going to make the world safe for war. So it’s two sides of the same coin. I don’t think at all we’re saying that you need world peace first, but what we are saying is you can’t force any of the states that now have nuclear weapons to give them up. We can’t force them; the world can’t force them. They’re going to have to choose to do that in current circumstances, or in foreseeable circumstances.

So then the question is on what basis are they going to choose to do that? And so then you do have to, in our view, you will have to tend to some of these issues. It doesn’t mean world peace. And I’m glad you brought up Israel in a sense. I mean, in a way, Israel is very decoupled from the world process in world peace. In other words, what they’ve said about a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and what makes sense is that they would require first, you know, durable peaceful relations with their neighbors. Now, you could get that absent a resolution of the Taiwan-China
issue and if Israel’s needs were satisfied, I think there’s every reason to think they would make that decision independently.

Conversely, you could resolve Kashmir-Taiwan-U.S.-Russia relations, but if Israel and its neighbors are still reconciled, they aren’t going to give up their nuclear weapons. So these things are decoupled in a way from the global process. But I don’t have an easy – I mean, if there’s another way to convince these countries – and again, we’re talking about countries that some of which aren’t democracies and which we don’t have these discussions in, in which, you know, kind of public opinion or even legislative bodies aren’t going to compel decisions.

Then I – you know, they’re going to have to decide they want to and so I’m trying to figure out what are the ways in which they might be encouraged to make that decision. I don’t know. There’s not an easier way around it. I mean, I can’t resist this because I’ve been haunted by it, but Pakistan has nuclear weapons. The place where people who would go to talk about this stay, which was blown up two nights ago. I’ve spent many, many times – you know, that’s who was there.

Now, we can’t make that reality go away. That’s the real world we’re going to have to deal with, as painful as it is. I think that’s just the reality. I’d love to be wrong. And again, that’s part of the invitation of this paper, is say where it’s wrong. I mean, you know, if there’s easier ways, that’s great. This gentleman, and then behind. Yeah, here, Katie, you give it to this man right here and then we’re all ready to go. You’re on deck, in baseball parlance.

Q: Hi, my name is Car Thikuh (ph). My question to you is related to – I mean, you addressed the disarmament question, but my question is what do countries that are suspected of developing nuclear weapons, what do countries like Iran do when they are confronted with larger powers like the United States that really don’t need nuclear weapons to deal with smaller states like Iran. They have overwhelming conventional might. I mean, I’d like to draw your attention to what I think General Sundarji said – I’m from India, so he said the best way to take on the United States is to acquire your own nuclear capabilities. So it just serves as an incentive.

The problem partly is more with the U.S. itself. I think you touched upon this when you addressed the question by somebody from the Heritage Foundation. Because if it is related to something to do with U.S. foreign policy itself and not so much its capabilities alone, maybe its capabilities give it an incentive to act in a certain way, but it certainly produces the source of proliferation-related challenges that you’re trying to defeat.

MR. PERKOVICH: I think that is part of the problem. It’s only part of it. In other words, the point you made about capabilities and policies and habits and how people look at you, and I think that’s going to be a big part of it and I don’t dispute that for a number of countries the actor that they would want to deter and they challenge they face is the U.S. I would again, though, point out, just to show this issue in its fullness, that if you’re a Pole today, maybe Hungarian, given what happened in Georgia, you want NATO with nuclear weapons, you’d probably want them based on your territory. So it isn’t – it’s a broader problem of big powers.

One of the reactions to this discussion and this paper in Japan, and it’s part of a bigger discussion in Japan, is that at least in the security forces, defense forces, there’s real nervousness about this agenda because of China and the extended deterrence. They’re worried about China’s power projection over time, with conventional capabilities or other means, and concern that, you
know, how the U.S. would manage that relationship, the broader deterrent relationship, not just nuclear deterrence, but deterrence broadly with China and how Japan fits into that. So it’s another way of saying what you’re saying, but broadening it beyond the U.S., which will be the discussion that Pakistan will have about India and so on.

So I agree that that is part of the discussion. The U.S. is kind of the leading figure and the one that’s easiest to point at because it has the biggest military and the most active adrenal glands. But others – but it’s a broader problem. Yes, sir.

Q: Yousaf Butt, National Academies. You mentioned that missile defense may play some marginal role in perhaps if it becomes – towards becoming perfect can help abolish the nuclear weapons, but my issue, you know, that I’d say in the incarnation that it currently is and with the aims – the nation that it’s aimed at, which is Iran and North Korea, wouldn’t you say that it’s only addressing one of the delivery methods and these nations, if they really wanted to bring harm to the U.S., for instance, missile defense may be irrelevant because they would have other delivery methods. You know, that’s one level. And the other one is just, you know, the point that to bring about the scenario in which it would be useful, it would need to be near perfect and it seems to be remote at this point.

MR. PERKOVICH: Yeah, yeah. I mean, I’m not, believe me, I’m not wedded to missile defenses. I mean, the idea was that it is double-edged and that that needs to be addressed. And in the case of – I mean, this gets actually back into the last discussion because you’re right about Iran. I mean, Iran could have other ways of delivering a nuclear weapon. But the issue right now in the systems that are being developed, kind of tactical and battlefield systems, isn’t about protecting U.S. forces in power projections, so actually missiles really do matter if the primary thing you’re worried about is how do we project force into the Persian Gulf and how does our Navy operate out there and how do we protect our air bases there? The thing we’d be worried about actually are missile-born nuclear weapons against our forces, and so those are the defenses that are being prepared. Nothing wrong with that.

If you look at from the other side’s point of view, right, it’s U.S. power projection and intervention and that’s why we may or may not need nuclear weapons. Then the argument has to be, to come back to your question on Sundarji, is be careful, because like, you know, a couple may not help. In other words, getting from where you are to where you actually have something that operationally makes you better off is a very dangerous process and may be one reason why the Iranians haven’t decided actually that that’s the outcome. But the missile defense issue, I think it just has to be there and it has to be addressed if, for nothing else, the Chinese are very concerned about it and we haven’t had – we haven’t engaged with them on those issues.

Q: Yeah, that’s the reason I brought it up because on balance it seems like, you know, it’s aimed at North Korea and Iran, but it’s causing serious problems with China and Russia, so you know, there has to be some on balance calculations going into the ballistic part of the missile defense there, ICBMs.

MR. PERKOVICH: Right. And if it’s really just about Iran and North Korea, there ought to be a way to assure China and Russia. If it’s not, then there’s a bigger problem. This gentleman back here.
Q: Milton Hoenig. You mentioned in one of your previous answers the NPT promise by weapons states to get rid of their nuclear weapons. What do you say about how the non-weapons states should behave during this extended period while the weapons state tarry in getting rid of their nuclear weapons?

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, we don’t say how they should behave; we try to pose it as a problem or dilemma. It’s this circular problem that I mentioned before that if there aren’t stronger nonproliferation rules, it’s very unlikely the weapons states are going to go as far as one would like to get rid of their arsenals. We need non-nuclear weapons states’ cooperation on the additional protocol, on fuel cycle controls, on stronger inspections, probably I would urge also clarifying the withdrawal process from the NPT. There are lots of things where we need non-nuclear weapons states.

The paper doesn’t say what they should do. It tries to posit that these nonproliferation steps are absolutely vital to a disarmament process and so – but we recognize there’s a who-goes-first problem and suggest that the weapons states probably have to be the ones to take the initiative to the non-nuclear weapons states and acknowledge that there’s a who-goes-first problem. And in most of those problems, this used to happen when my brothers and I would jump off cliffs into the water, it was like, well, you go, no, no, so the only way you end up doing it is you hold hands and push each other at the same time. (Laughter.)

And I think that’s what this is going to be like, that we’ve been saying, no, no, you guys have to do more on nonproliferation before we’ll disarm and they say, hey, we already – you promised three times, you haven’t delivered squat, we’re not budging again, so we have to set up a mechanism where we actually hold hands and go forward. That’s at least – that’s almost explicit in the paper. But I think that’s the only way to do it. Others? Everybody’s exhausted.

SIR QUINLAN: George, minutes ago, John Barron (sp) – it’s nice to see you again, John – about the agenda. It seems to me that this, firstly – (inaudible) – near-term – sorry, thank you. There is such a relatively near-term agenda, of the kind in which indeed the Gang of Four pointed with various things like reducing numbers, de-alerting, perhaps some changes in doctrine, perhaps Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and so on, which is useful in at least three, or can be useful in three ways.

Firstly, most of these things are worthwhile in their own right. Secondly, they contribute to the nuclear powers doing good things and that is of value in the nonproliferation context because it helps the non-nuclears to accept what are quite burdensome things which you should be asking of them probably at the conference in 2010. And thirdly, they are potentially on the path towards this distant objective and they may help to create trust which will make other things easier. But that agenda stands on the first two purposes alone, whether or not you believe in the third.

There is also a further agenda, largely political agenda, which is very difficult and it’s the kind of thing I think that you were implying in what you said. One of the reasons why all of this is so distant is some of these things are ones which you can’t sensibly tackle now. It’s not good trying to negotiate things for which the conditions for a sensible negotiation do not yet exist. There will have to be a lot of patience exercised here and that’s why it will take, at best, a very long time. But it is certainly useful now to try and identify at least what they are.
MR. PERKOVICH: Well, you all have been patient and I want to thank you again on behalf of IISS and the Carnegie Endowment. And we welcome comments and critiques on the paper. You know how to find us. So thanks again for coming.

(Applause.)

(END)