CAN THE TURKISH MODEL GAIN TRACTION IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST?

MONDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2011
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Transcript by Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
THOMAS CAROTHERS: Good morning. Welcome, everyone. Ambassador, ladies and gentlemen, I'm Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. And it's my pleasure to host today's session on, “Can the Turkish Model Gain Traction in the New Middle East?”

In recent years, Turkish foreign policy has been attracting increasing attention in Washington. Building on its economic dynamism, Turkey has been asserting itself more throughout the region in which it's situated, especially in the Middle East. Turkey's relations with Iran, with the Arab world, with Israel have of course been attracting a lot of attention and sometimes friction here in Washington.

With the recent events in the Arab world, called these days the Arab Spring or the Arab awakening, there's even more attention to Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey has had to revise some of its basic precepts of its policy in the Middle East, particularly with respect to Syria, for example, where it's gone from a policy of close cooperation with the Syrian government to a much more challenging stance.

And here in Washington, the question of whether or not the Turkish model is applicable to the Arab states, as some of them at least attempt political transitions, has become much discussed – often discussed in rather superficial ways, I think, but fortunately it's also possible to go into the subject in a much deeper and profound way.

That's what Sinan Ulgen has done in his paper which you have before you, “From Inspiration to Aspiration.” Sinan is chairman of the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies in Istanbul, and he is also a visiting scholar with Carnegie Europe based in Brussels, and also comes to Washington regularly to work with us here in Washington. So it's a pleasure to welcome Sinan here today to talk about that.

We also have two distinguished commentators. On my immediate right, Marwan Muasher, who is vice president for studies here at Carnegie and oversees our Middle East program. Marwan of course was deputy prime minister of Jordan and foreign minister of Jordan, and also served as senior vice president at the World Bank.

On my left, Thomas de Waal, senior associate in the Russian and Eurasian Program here at Carnegie Washington. Tom is a noted expert on the Caucasus but has also given considerable attention to Turkey in the course of his career, as well as Russia – and has an additional regional perspective.

So I'm going to turn first to you, Sinan, to set out your basic argument. And then we'll hear some perspectives from Marwan, particularly get the view from the Arab world on this. And then Tom de Waal on sort of larger regional questions. Without further ado, Sinan, welcome.

SINAN ÜLGEN: Thank you very much, Tom. It's always a pleasure to be here and to get the opportunity to speak before a Washington audience, and – even if it's a pre-Christmas week. Now when the Arab revolts started, there was quite a bit of interest in the Turkish model. And I thought a paper on this would actually be interesting. My fear was that, by the time I would have finished the paper, it was published, all that talk about the Turkish model would disappear. But I was lucky. There is still quite a bit of interest in this Turkish model.
And in some way I must also perhaps thank Ali Akbar Velayati, who is the adviser to the Supreme Leader Khamenei in Iran, who just four days ago stated Iran’s position on this matter, which was that Turkey can never be a model for the Islamic awakenings.

So there is indeed a number of different viewpoints of whether Turkey can be a model, but beyond that, in what ways Turkey can be a model, because when you look at the people who have championed Turkey as a model, they range from Secretary of State Clinton to Tantawi in Egypt, including Ghannouchi in Tunisia. So a very different sort of – a cornucopia of different people, really, talking about the Turkish model.

So there really has been a selective reading about what Turkey is and the Turkish model is. So the first thing that I wanted to do in this paper – and this is what I want to do with you as well – is really to demystify what the Turkish model is about. For me there are five core features of the Turkish model. One is how Turkey has been able to combine political Islam, democracy, in a – and the principle of secularism, and in particular how Turkey has been able to manage the rise of political Islam in a formerly democratic and secular setting.

Now when I look at that perspective, there are three fundamental observations. One is that, despite its shortcomings, the Turkish democratic system has allowed political Islam to emerge and to hold on to political power. I will talk a little bit about the role of the military when I talk about the civil-military relations, but nonetheless that really has been the experience of Turkey, where we have seen the first rise of political Islamist parties in the early 1960s, and which have led, after a number of different transformations, to the AKP that rules the Turkey of today.

The second fundamental observation in terms of the Turkish experience in managing political Islam is really the real-world political experience that the Islam itself gave in local government. That really has – when I look back, at least – that really has allowed the current cadres of the ruling party to get real-world experience about the political world. And this has really helped them to transform and to acquire a sense of pragmatism that has helped them in governing at the national level.

And the third observation is that the Turkish democratic system was mature enough, and it gave enough confidence to the political activists, that Turkish Islam has never resorted to violence. So there was always the belief that, if you play by the rules of democracy, you would be able to acquire political power. So this widespread belief about alternation of political power to democratic means is, to me at least, one of the characteristic features of Turkey.

Now when I – again, when we look back at what happened in Turkey, is that at the end of the day, the Turkish experience, the Turkish democracy, has eventually managed to midwife conservative/Islamist parties wedded to the principle of secularism, democracy, and a democratically driven alternation of political power. So I’m not going to go into the reasons, but when I look – when I take a snapshot of this first characteristic of the Turkish – the Turkish model, I think this is how I can – I can summarize it.

My second point, or the second feature of the Turkish model, is really about the civil-military relationship. For a long time, Turkish democracy was influenced by the military. The military has played a major role in influencing political developments in Turkey, but in particular as a watchdog of the republican principles. And so – and this is
the role that the military has played in the past, which is, in a way – and perhaps paradoxically – has helped political Islam to emerge under its current form.

Because when we look at the history of how political Islam developed in Turkey, the first few iterations of political Islam were banned by the military. They were banned because they were thought to be too radical. And it’s only after these arguably nondemocratic measures that the political Islam acquired its current characteristics in Turkey. And this is how we can really explain the transformation over three decades from the initial setup to the AKP of today.

So the military has really shaped interaction between democracy and political Islam through its role of being the guardian of republican values. And it is this role of the military that actually gave the Turkish society enough confidence to experiment with political Islam.

Now I recall I was running for parliament 10 years ago now, in 2002, and I was campaigning. So I went to a neighborhood, and the neighborhood – which was, you know, a middle-class neighborhood – they were very dissatisfied with the – with the government of the time. And they said – the person that I talked to said he would vote for this new Islamist party, AKP. And at the time there was still quite a bit of doubts about AKP's true agenda.

So I asked him, you know, well, I mean, don’t you feel that AKP represents a threat to Turkey’s secular principles? He said, well, you know, if they actually decide to play a dangerous game like that, the military is out there, and the military will solve the problem. So this is just an anecdote to capture that it was the presence of the military that, again paradoxically, gave enough confidence to Turkish society to experiment with political Islam.

The challenge that Turkey faces today is that, now that the military has lost its political power, society has to find a new and much more democratic order to establish the checks and balances that existed before on political power. And this is the challenge in many ways that Turkey faces today, to replace the military tutelage with the rights, constitutional democratic norms of checks and balances. And here the record is not very clear.

Now, the third feature of the Turkish model is the market-state relationship. The Turkish economy has started its program of economic liberalization back in 1980. Then there was another episode of global trade integration with the – with the Customs Union with the EU at the end of 1995. So today what we have in Turkey, in terms of the market-state relationship, is a business community that is independent of the government. And I think that is one of the core characteristics of the Turkish model, especially when we compare it with some of the countries where this model could potentially be translated.

The second aspect here in terms of the market-state relationship is, you need the disciplining effect that globalization, integration with the global economy, has had on Turkey’s economic governance. So these two factors – again, from a more, perhaps, synthetic perspective – are what defines the market-state relationship in Turkey.

Now the fourth feature is Turkey’s links to the West. I’m not going to go at great length about what those links are; you know them – the trans-Atlantic partnership, NATO, EU, which really has helped to create the modern-day Turkey in many ways. One particular entity that I would want to highlight nonetheless, which I think did not really capture the type of attention that it deserves, is Council of Europe. Because Turkey’s membership to the Council of
Europe – and in particular the decision of the government in 1987 to allow the right for individual petition to the European Court of Human Rights – was a radical step that basically allowed Turkey to import and to enforce European norms in the area of democracy – again, with all its blemished track record – democracy and human rights.

But this factor, the Council of Europe membership – and the – and the fact of accepting almost a super-national entity like the European Court of Human Rights to be able to pass – to pass verdicts on the human-rights situation in Turkey, to overturn court cases in Turkey, is really one feature that I think has not – did not get the deserved – enough attention in explaining the Turkish model.

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And finally, the fifth feature to me is Turkey’s state tradition. Democracy, in essence, it’s about – it’s about the acceptance of dissent. You can’t have democracy if you don’t have tolerance for dissent. And if you have strong state institutions, that in a way facilitates this acceptance of dissent. And that is what Turkey had, because of its imperial legacy – the Ottoman Empire and this whole bureaucratic tradition that was carried over to the republic has always allowed Turkey to have a strong sense of the state and a very developed professional bureaucracy. And I think this is also something that merits attention in understanding what the Turkish model is.

So fundamentally it’s the interaction between these five core features that defines the Turkish model. The question – the second question, once we have defined the Turkish model, is to look at the relevance of this model, how relevant the Turkish model is, how – in order to understand, in order to help, in order to assist the Arab countries in transition.

Now at first blush, you may want to argue that, OK, there’s Turkey out there, but all of these different features are Turkey-specific features. And they’re not easily transposable, they’re not easily replicable, so we can’t really spend too much time talking about the Turkish model because it doesn’t really have a relevance beyond Turkey’s borders.

Now it is true that there’s no simple and direct way to apply the Turkish model in its totality. But I would argue that there are smarter ways to leverage the Turkish model or the Turkish experience. Now why do I think that? Because, one – as Huntington had stated in his book on the third wave of democratization – he talks about the – an effect of – an effect where past transition, past democratic experiences have a bearing on countries that want to start this type of democratic experience.

So this demonstrative effect that Huntington talked about mainly for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has relevance for Turkey. I think it works. It works not because what Turkey is intent of doing – and I will talk about what – how we can operationalize the Turkish model – but it works because what Turkey is. It works by giving an example of how these different sort of features interact to create the model – the success that Turkey is today in many ways. So this demonstrative effect is even stronger, as Huntington argued, when you have such an example in your own neighborhood, and that is what Turkey is.

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The second issue or argument that I would put forth for why the Turkish model is relevant, is really an argument about cultural affinity. It is more meaningful for the countries in the region to see what happens in Turkey, with all its faults, than going beyond Turkey and looking at the European experience or the Latin American experience or the South Asian – Southeast Asian experience. So that cultural-affinity argument is the second one.

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And the third one is the fact that Turkey is still a work in progress. It’s not an unblemished democracy. But, curiously enough, that is why the Turkish model is a potent model. It’s because Turkey has all its faults, or these faults, or these deficiencies still – whether it’s in the area of democracy, human rights, economic standards – that it appeals to the Arab world. Because this is the type of setup that they can relate to.

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Now these are arguably, as economists would say, these are mostly supply-side-driven arguments. But there are also demand-side-driven arguments. And here I will refer to some of the polling that was done. One very recent one – and one of the authors here is here in the audience, so he can speak at, you know, a more, you know, more detailed manner than me – but in one of – in one of the polls that was done throughout the region, the question that was asked – conducted by the University of Maryland – is: Who played the most constructive role in the Arab Spring? Which country played the most constructive role – which two countries, excuse me, played the most constructive role in the Arab Spring? And Turkey was clearly ahead of the field. Out of the 200 percent perfect record, Turkey got 50 percent. The second country that came after Turkey was France with 25 percent – so half of the – half of the support.

Then there was another question in that poll – they asked Egyptians: Is – you know, what sort of political system would you like to see in your country? And the authors gave a number of different countries as example. Turkey came out first with 44 percent; France, the second country, with 10 percent. Saudi Arabia was 8 percent. Now, I think it’s interesting, especially in light of the success of the Al-Nour party in the elections, why in the poll only 8 percent of the Egyptians would say they would want to have Saudi Arabia as a model for their political governance. And Al-Nour party got, what, 24, 25 percent of the votes.

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Another example is from the 2001 Arab attitude survey where they looked at the policies of different countries, and the support for Turkish policies in the Arab world were astounding – 80 percent in Morocco, 98 percent in Saudi Arabia, 93 percent in Lebanon with Hezbollah, and only 45 percent in Jordan. Marwan, maybe you can explain that. (Laughter.)

Now, I think that this shows that Turkey has a vastly improved image in the Arab world, and it is this image that essentially helps; Turkish leaders, you know, like to talk about Turkey’s soft power. But it’s really this popularity, which we see in the polls, that undergrids (sic) Turkey’s soft power and shapes Turkey as a real actor, as a policy-relevant actor to work in this neighborhood. Now, if that is indeed the case, how is it that Turkey can operationalize, can leverage this soft power? If we accept that the Turkish model – again, some talk about Turkey as a source of experience – not to sound too imperial. How can we leverage this? How can we operationalize this? Because so far the discussions that we have had, had dealt mostly with the definition of the Turkish model, and they were mostly theoretical discussions.

So I think there was a need to think beyond that and to look at, if we wanted to, both from the standpoint of policymakers in Ankara, but really from a more global perspective – the international community, especially the trans-Atlantic community. What can it do with Turkey in the game? And in the paper, I’ll outline a number of different policy areas. I will not talk about all of them, but just a select few. But let me just go through the list. The list includes: political party reform, security sector reform, economic governance issues, trade policy reform, financial sector reform, social policy reform including housing policy, private sector development, regulatory capacity building. These are all areas where I think the Turkish experience can actually be brought to bear.
Now, I will talk only about three of those today, and the first one is really about political party reform. What we have seen in the Arab world is this desire to – from the political Islamists, in particular – to associate themselves with the Turkish ruling party, with the success of AKP in Turkey. So we have seen, for instance, the same name even given to a party in Morocco, a very similar name with the Brotherhood’s party in Egypt. We have seen a number of different statements coming out of the politicians, in particular by Ghannouchi in Tunisia, basically reflecting the fact that they want to appear as the AKP of their own constituency. And I think the reason is, is basically they’re using the reference to AKP as a way to appease their own constituencies about their own agenda, given that these are relatively new parties coming to power. And that gives a lot of leverage to the Turkish ruling party.

There are a number of already informal contacts. The Turkish ruling party has helped some of those parties in their – how they manage their campaigns and so on, but so far these links have not been formalized. And I think this is the next step, and it’s going to be a very interesting step. It’s going to be a very interesting step because it’s going to be the first time that Turkey will start to become a player in the game of cross-border party collaboration. Turkey does not have the experience that the U.S. has with NDI and IRI’s – (inaudible) – and Turkey does not have the experience of the political systems of the Germans. So it’s really going to be the first time that we shall see, I think, the emergence of Turkey as a serious player in this neighborhood, in helping political parties and mostly, in this case, the parties that emerge from political Islam.

The second, again, policy area where I want to focus a little bit is trade policy reform – trade policy reform because, when we look at the economic stats, now have become a real obstacle to political reform in those countries. One way to overcome the difficult economic problems of the region is through trade utilization. Now, you may – you may claim that there’s already the EU acting on the basis of the Barcelona Process that was put into place in 1995 as the driver of trade utilization in the region. But when you take stock of what has actually happened since 1995 – so we’re talking 16 years back – that blueprint has not worked. It has only helped to consolidate the EU’s market share in that region, but it hasn’t really helped those economies to become more liberal; it hasn’t helped those economics to acquire competitiveness globally; and it certainly has not helped to foster interregional integration in the region.

So the idea here is to extend the Turkey-EU customs union to the whole region because, by that simple step, many of the obstacles, both political obstacles – and there are a number of political obstacles. Today, Algeria and Morocco cannot have free trade between them. They can’t conclude a free trade agreement. But if we’re able to extend the Turkey-EU customs union to the whole region, that would be a way to very, in a way, aesthetically overcome some of the problems that have undermined the creation of this zone of seamless trade in the region.

Another example is financial sector reform. Now, when we look at where the financial sector stands in those countries, you may argue that, actually, it’s not too bad. You know, in terms of their level of income, they have enough financial deepening. The problem is that that financial deepening has not translated into an effective system that fuels growth, that allows access to capital. That is the main predicament of the financial system in those countries, and that is because in the old days most of the financial landing was based on politically motivated decisions, on connected lendings – so you could get access to money if you knew somebody or if you were close to the government.
So this is, to a great extent, the handicap that the Turkish banking system had in the old days, in the 1990s. And that is exactly the type of reform that Turkey was able to undertake very successfully, as the resilience of the Turkish financial industry demonstrates today, due to the program that was run by Kemal Dervis, who’s also here. And this is a replicable experience because Turkey operates in a very similar environment. We also have a very large informal economy; we also had very weak regulatory institutions. And it’s this experience of overhauling all the financial sectors, which is so critical to usher in a sustainable growth in those countries. That is one of the areas where I think the Turkish experience is relevant.

And my final example will deal with a model, a public-private partnership model, that is – that may not be as well-known here on this side of the Atlantic, but which is ultimately very – has been very instrumental in allowing the Turkish ruling party to gain elections after elections. And that is the housing policy. The ruling party has devised a public-private partnership which allowed the government to develop mass housing in a very affordable way and to distribute those housing units to the less – to the less advantageous, the more poor sections of Turkish society.

This has been a phenomenal success – the way the system that was put. So because it is – it is a public-private partnership, it is about risk sharing, it’s about management of financial forces, it’s about very efficient sales and marketing, and so on. And there’s a very big demand now for a number of a countries, not only in the region, but even Venezuela – the Chavez government wants to import this knowhow. So I think this is also an area – and I have other examples – where Turkish experience, in terms of coming up with innovative ways to manage social policies, can actually be applied in the region.

Now, to conclude, I think regardless of the terminology that we want to use – whether Turkey is a model, whether it’s a source of inspiration – there’s an added value here. Turkey has, I think, a lot of assets that it can bring to bear on Arab transitions. It has a lot to contribute to this process, and the recent developments in the Arab world has only increased, enhanced Turkey’s policy relevance. It’s only way to transition to democracy in that region that we can actually talk about a policy-relevant Turkish model because before then, when Arab societies didn’t really have an option to choose, to make decisions about their own future, it was really rude to talk about the model. It was, you know, a theoretical discussion.

It is now that this discussion is much more important, much more policy-relevant because the people in the region, hopefully in all parts of the region, will have this freedom to choose. And it is with this freedom to choose that the importance and the policy relevance of the Turkish model comes – becomes much more important. And this is a great value, this is a great asset also for the trans-Atlantic partnership.

We have seen in the past 60 years two big episodes of trans-Atlantic cooperation – one, after the Second World War, and, two, after 1989. In both of those episodes, Turkey was a non-player. This time around, there’s another opportunity, and that is to help the Arab transitions. This has the potential to become a very critical pillar, almost at the same level as the two prior episodes of trans-Atlantic cooperation. And here, Turkey is very likely to play a much bigger role, a much more important role. So the question that I want to leave you with is: How can we invent, design, engineer the multilateral instruments to allow this cooperation to emerge? Because today we don’t have those.

Thank you. (Applause.)
MR. CAROTHERS: Sinan, thank you. Terrific presentation – full of interesting ideas and a lot to discuss. You’ve presented, in a sense, from the perspective, as you said, of supply. Let’s look at it from the – How does this look from within the Arab world, looking towards Turkey and, in a sense, from demand? So Marwan, would you give us some additional perspective on this topic?

MARWAN MUASHER: Sure. Thanks, Tom. Thanks, Sinan, for a very, very interesting presentation. I think that to me the most important part of this paper is that it has parsed the Turkish model. In other words, I think it is very difficult, if not impossible, for any one group or country in the Middle East to look at the Turkish model in its entirety and adopt it en masse. Take the issue of, you know, secularism in the Turkish model. There is no country or group in the Middle East, in the Arab world that is – that would adopt the kind of secularism that is there in the Turkish model, I think, today.

However, if you look at the different attributes of the Turkish model, then I think there is something there for everybody. And people will pick and choose from the Turkish model as they make the transition to democracy. And I think it will indeed be a very important and valuable model to look at if it is parsed, rather than if it is looked at in its entirety. And I’ll explain – I’ll explain what I mean.

Let me first remind us all that the relationship between Turkey and the Arab world has not been a good one until only very recently. The Ottoman history, the breakaway from the Arab language, the look to the West, the relationship with Israel – I mean, all these are examples of where the Arab world and Turkey looked in opposite directions for a very long time. And the other thing I want to point out is when Turkey started to become popular in the Middle East, prior to the Arab uprisings, it was not because of its model of democracy. It was because of Mr. Erdoğan’s view and position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. That is what made Mr. Erdoğan popular in the Middle East – not his model of democracy, but his position on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

That has started to change now, with the Arab uprisings. The Arab uprisings brought a new element where people out of work now are looking for answers. They make the – you know, they were able to topple old regimes, but they had not yet been able, of course, to build new structures in the absence of civil society, in the absence of strong party – political party cultures. And so everybody now is looking for answers, and there Turkey, you know, has the potential of providing answers on a number of different questions.

I think it is interesting to note – that’s, at least, my view – is that before the Arab uprisings, the Islamists in the Arab world were pointing out to the Turkish model to calm down the political establishments in the Arab world and tell them: Look, Islam can co-exist with democracy. After the success of Islamists in the Arab world, it is the secularists in the Arab world now that are looking at the Turkish model and saying: Hm. Maybe Islam can co-exist with democracy. So I think – I think after the success of the Islamists, it’s the secularists now that are having a closer look at the Turkish model than the Islamists. So far, only Nahda in Tunisia has publically and sort of embraced the Turkish model as a model they want to emulate. No other Islamist party in the Arab world has come out and said: Yes, we want to, you know, take the Turkish model as our model.

The other point I want to make is about the role of the military, Sinan, also. In Turkey, the army sort of play the role as the guardians of the system in Turkey. And as you pointed out in your paper, they did that, but they never had any interest in politics. And once they did that, they turned it over, at different times, to a civilian leadership.
In the Arab world, in most countries the army is either the system or is a – you know, very strong, integral part of the system. To expect the army to play the same role as Turkey, I think, is unrealistic. And we have seen this in Egypt. I mean, the fact that the army played the role of a security blanket in Egypt was totally out of necessity and at the first sort of real test, that relationship broke down and the army now is not seen in the same light that it was seen at the beginning of the – of the year.

And the third point I want to make is on the economic model. I think Turkey succeeded in its economic model because of many factors – some of them are in this room – but mainly because it did – it implemented this model within the context of a politically diverse society and system. And therefore, you had – as imperfect as it was, you still had a system of checks and balances in Turkey that made sure that economic liberalization took part within such a system.

In the Arab world, which has undergone maybe a similar, in many Arab countries, economic liberalization scheme, but it took place without a system of checks and balances, without a political framework. And as such, the benefits from such opening and liberalization was perceived both, I think, in reality and perception to have gone to an elite few rather than to the general public.

I say this because today economic reform and liberalization in the Arab world has acquired a very bad name. And any emerging regime is not going to be able to just import an economic model, however successful it is, if it does not couple that with a parallel evolution of a political – serious political reform process. If it doesn’t do that then neither the Turkish model, nor any other model, would succeed in the Arab world because people today are very, very skeptical about any economic liberalization model that takes place without a system of checks and balances.

I think you make a very important point about the independence of the business community in Turkey, because certainly in the Arab world the business community is not independent, is in – to use a good expression – is in bed with the regimes in the Arab world – are not interested in any kind of reform process that would rob them of their benefits. And therefore, the business community in the Arab world has not played a constructive role in opening up the systems in the region.

And you make, also, I thought another very important model which is the move away from a rentier system to productivity. I mean, that’s something that I think the Arab world needs to do if it is indeed to tackle the – for example, problems like unemployment, which today in most Arab countries is the number-one issue in the Arab world. You will not be able to do that effectively if there is no productivity in the system. And there, I think, foreign aid, for example – whether it is in the form of oil or whether it is in the form of assistance from the West – has not always played a positive role in the Arab world, because it has not encouraged a culture of productivity. And so far, the culture in the Arab world – the economic culture is certainly one of a rentier system.

So what I would like to say is, I think the Turkish model also has matured over the years. That’s something that is not in the Arab world. The Arab world is still going to go through a very bumpy road along the road to stable and prosperous societies. And therefore, as they make this transition, I think they will find attributes of the Turkish model that are very useful; each country and each group will find different attributes. And therefore, in my view, the Turkish model is going – or attributes of the Turkish model are going to be important, useful, constructive, positive for the Arab world over time. But it’s not something that is going to take place instantaneously or immediately.
MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you, Marwan. Sinan, Marwan has raised some very fundamental points, and before we turn to Tom de Waal, let me just pause over one or two of them. Marwan’s a diplomat, and I think he was saying, you know, I’m not so sure about this model for the region, or let’s be careful in our enthusiasm. And your first point, Marwan, is really fundamental and I think we need to turn back to it, which is secularism and the Turkish approach to — let’s see, however one would put it — the role of secularism in Turkish socio-political development over the last 50 years.

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And on the one hand it’s a bit puzzling because in some ways the Turkish model is often seen here in Washington as, oh, here’s an example of a country that’s managed to incorporate a major Islamist party into a democracy, yet Marwan is saying, in a sense more deeply, the place of secularism in Turkish society is something that, as you said, no Arab society currently would accept. And those two things are hard to put together. Could you help us understand that a bit better? When you hear that, how does it strike you — this question of whether or not a fundamental element of the Turkish model is, in fact, something that no Arab society would accept?

MR. ÜLGEN: Yes, indeed. That is one of the pitfalls of the Turkish model because when we look at how secularism — the principle of secularism came about in Turkey, that was a different age and day. It was a top-down design that was implemented at the founding of the republic which slowly, but gradually, became widespread principle that today is not really challenged in Turkey.

So that sort of social engineering is not available today for Arab societies. If there’s going to be secularism that needs to be — again, that’s a big question mark — but that needs to be a bottom-up process, because today that cannot anymore be a top-down process. So — and that is why I’ve tried to outline all of these different elements because some of them are more transposable than the element of secularism.

So, however, what is interesting here is that the image that Turkey projects in the Arab world since AKP came to power, and this was, in essence, what the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan said when he went to the Arab world in Egypt — is that secularism — a constitutional secularism is not in opposition to being a good Muslim.

So you can be a very good Muslim while still championing constitutional secularism. And that’s what he said. He said it in Egypt, he said it in Tunisia, he said it in Libya. So I think this is how we can smoothen the transition, if the transition is going to happen, towards a secular regime. That is the value of the Turkish model of today.

MR. CAROTHERS: Interesting. Let’s bring Tom de Waal into the picture. Thank you, Marwan. Yeah.

THOMAS DE WAAL: Thank you. And I’d also like to congratulate Sinan on a brilliant paper, which I think makes an absolutely fascinating read. I was also going to make a similar point, I mean, I’m sure Sinan — one of the great things about your paper is that you lay out in such detail, you know, a basis for its own critique. I mean, I think that’s — so that you’re not promulgating something as a perfect model.

[00:49:20]

But I would, again, question whether — does — is this a Turkish model or is this a sort of something which has evolved a sort of managed division within Turkish society through a rather Hegelian process of a clash of forces? And you said you wouldn’t wish — there are the traumas that Turkey has gone through — all the military coups and the banning of parties and so on — in order to arrive at what is currently, obviously, rather a good product in
Turkey. So that’s obviously a question; you would wish the Turkish model on these countries, but you wouldn’t wish the traumatic process which has given birth to this model through this clash of forces.

But I have a couple of “who” questions, because I come at this from a different regional perspective. And there is a cautionary tale here, which is Azerbaijan, which in ’91 achieved independence. The language, as you know, is basically a dialect of Turkish or very similar. And there was huge expectations on both sides about this great affinity that Azerbaijan could adopt a Turkish model.

And yet it didn’t happen. And obviously Azerbaijan being much closer than the Arab countries – and obviously culture and history obviously mattered a lot more than people thought at the time – the Soviet legacy in Azerbaijan; clearly there’s a different legacy in the Arab world. And, you know, there’s problematic things, as you said, about the Ottoman legacy.

So there’s a sort of – there’s a danger of a lot of their going south here, which I think – there’s a cautionary tale there which needs to be watched. And so I think the first “who” question is, who is the mediators? Who are the people who actually understand on both sides where the differences are and where the similarities are so that there isn’t some initial embrace which goes wrong?

The second one is who are the – who are the implementers? Because another thing I noticed as an observer of Turkish foreign policy in the former Soviet Union is that – is that the ambition is ahead of the capacity. And the ambition and intentions are often very good, but because there’s often – well, if you look at foreign policy in particular, Turkey’s coming out of a period when it was very much – or rather an isolated power, and now has the ambitions to be a regional power.

In the region I work in – a marked under-capacity in terms of people who speak Russian or understand that region. I suspect, possibly, not nearly enough Arabists within the Turkish elite. I don’t have the exact figures; one of our Turkish-minded colleagues here can confirm them, but I think there are probably 5(,000) or 6,000 people in the Turkish foreign ministry, which is probably about a third or a quarter of an average European foreign ministry.

So there are capacity issues. And again, that – and obviously across government, who are the implementers of a Turkish model? And there’s, again, a danger in which the good intentions are there but because there is, again, a lack of experience and just a lack of pure people and bandwidth that, again, the wrong thing gets across.

MR. CAROTHERS: Sinan, would you like to respond directly to that because, again, it’s a fundamental point. Thank you, Tom.

MR. ÜLGEN: Sure. When we look at the recent history of Turkish foreign policy we see a cycle of differences between ambitions and capacity, which is only now being bridged. There as a case in the early 1990s. There was a big ambition, as Tom said, for Turkey to go out there and to embrace its brethrens in the Caucasus, in Central Asia, and to help them economically and politically – with a minor detail that Turkey didn’t have the capacity to do that at the time. And therefore, that whole vision floundered rather soon – soon rather than later.

The difference today is that even though Turkey now has even a – you know, a set of grander ambitions in the region, that has also come in parallel with a very substantial increase in state capacity, which was underpinned by
Turkey’s economic performance over the last 10 years. So when we look at this question of ambition and compare it to state capacity, there will – there will always be, to my mind, a gulf. But that gulf is being bridged.

And we see that in many ways. We see it in Turkey’s ambition to expand, for instance – you raised the issue – its diplomatic network – 23 new embassies in the last two years, at a time when many of our EU partners are cutting down on their diplomatic relations and diplomatic infrastructure. You see this in Turkey’s official development assistance which is now, according to a statement made by the Turkish President Gül at U.N. General Assembly, more than $1 billion. You see it in the ambition that Turkey has in playing a role in different international fora. [00:55:00]

So there are many different elements that can be given as an example of this growing state capacity for Turkey to do exactly the type of oversea aid and assistance to these countries. Now, we can certainly talk about whether that is enough, and that’s certainly a very – a very justified discussion. But at the end of the day – and here I’m going to come back to my – to my final point – is we should certainly be aware of where the holes lie in Turkey’s own infrastructure, in Turkey’s own capacity. But the way to overcome these gaps is really to build this platform, these institutions that would help Turkey to leverage its own assets. And I think that’s the key term – to help Turkey to leverage the assets that it has developed.

To build this type of partnership, which is missing, Turkey and the U.S. has – have what is called a model partnership. But it’s an empty shell. This is high time to really plug in, to give meat to the smaller partnership. And that would be the way, Tom, to overcome some of these institutional human resources shortcomings that Turkey has.

MR. CAROTHERS: Sinan, one more question from here before we turn to the audience. A cardinal element of Turkey’s foreign policy in the second half of the last decade, as it became more active in the broader Middle East, was respect for sovereignty – in some ways as an alternative to what was sometimes seen in the region as the intrusive approach by a number of Western countries. And Turkey instead was going to get along with Iran, going to try to continue to get along with Israel, get along with the Arab world – a policy of no problems as they described it. [00:57:01]

And that was typical of other rising democratic powers that are asserting themselves more in foreign policy – like India or Brazil or South Africa or Indonesia – this strong tradition of the non-aligned movement in some cases, but a high respect for sovereignty. Yet, now in this new context you’re describing a policy which is more normative, which has a core normative element, and in which Turkey tries to influence the domestic direction of some of its neighbors.

And this, in a sense, is –it seems to me really a fundamental question and one I haven’t seen other rising democracies really cross that threshold and accept the idea. I think if you scratch most Indian diplomats today and give them a choice between the traditional respect for sovereignty or a more interventionist policy by India, they would still say respect for sovereignty is a cardinal principle of Indian foreign policy. Is Turkey ready to cross that threshold?

MR. ÜLGEN: Yes. I think it is ready and it has shown that it is ready.

MR. CAROTHERS: Could you talk about Syria in that regard?
MR. ÜLGEN: Absolutely. I think the former policy, which was, as you state, the – encapsulated by this very nice sounding slogan of zero problem with neighbors, has collapsed. It has collapsed in the face of the Arab Spring because fundamentally that policy meant having zero problems with the regimes. And therefore Turkey had to choose. It had to choose between support to the authoritarian regimes. And it really – it really – you know, I mean, that’s – that was the cause of the prevarication on Libya, where Turkey was the last Western state to shift its allegiance to the democratic – to the opposition in Benghazi.

So the Arab Spring demonstrated the fundamental incompatibility between the former policy of zero problem with regimes and the – now the new policy of supporting democracy. And I say, the way I see Turkish foreign policy now has even gone beyond that. The idea, the vision now is to brand Turkey as the protector of the victimized people of the region. So it’s even beyond that.

Now, when you look at what – (inaudible) – is saying, you know, this – these are the type of sound bites that you get from them. And this now is the context which first started with Gaza – with, you know, Turkey having a very clear line on the plight of the people in – Palestinians in Gaza, then in Libya, then the prime minister visit to Somalia during the Muslim religious holidays, and now Syria. And this change happened really in a matter of months. It was remarkable to show the pragmatism, perhaps, of the political lawmakers, because this is a very clear departure from established practice.

Turkish diplomacy was about non-interference. It was about protecting the status quo. It was about being non-confrontational. And that’s gone. Today when we look at the policy towards Syria, Turkey is very confrontational, is very assertive. It is even supporting the Syrian National Council, as well as the Free Syrian – the Free Syrian Army – so giving support to both the civilian and the military pillars of an opposition to a neighboring regime. Turkey used to abhor the international sanctions. Now Ankara is talking about unilateral sanctions against Syria, one of its neighbors.

Let’s not forget that barely a year ago Turkey made a big effort in order to prevent, or – and it voted no at the end at U.N. Security Council against a set of aggravated sanctions on Iran. So there is a fundamental shift in how Turkey envisions its own foreign policy. And I think there are going to be a number of both intended and unintended consequences of the shift in terms of both Turkey’s relationship with its neighbors, but also Turkey’s relationship with the West, which might be the subject of my next paper, Tom. (Laughter.)

MR. CAROTHERS: Turn to the audience and get some further perspectives and questions on this. I’m going to ask you – we have microphones coming around – ask you to introduce yourselves.

I’m going to start right there, yeah. Mmm hmm, microphone’s coming to you.

Q: Hi. Marina Ottaway, with the Carnegie Endowment. Hi, Sinan. (Chuckles.) Good to see you.

I have been traveling a lot in the Middle East since the beginning of the Arab Spring, and I have talked to a lot of people in many different countries, mostly political parties, civil society organizations. And what is – I mean, in – what you – the – nobody’s talking about models. I mean, yes; for, you know, an official speech, it sounds good; Marwan was talking, it’s reassuring, the Turkish model to one group or another.
But what is driving, I think, the transformation in these countries is politics. It’s the balance of power. It’s who can get what done; who can win the elections and so on, so that if we want to see the possibility of a Turkish model arising in any of the Arab countries that are undergoing a transition, I think we really need to look not at Turkey and what Turkey is doing, we need to look at what’s happening domestically and what’s the balance of power internally.

[01:02:53]

And it seems to me that on that basis, there is only one country that even remotely might be able – might, at the end of the – of that process, come out with something resembling the Turkish model, and that’s Tunisia. Tunisia, it’s the only country that has a secular tradition that has survived the ’80s, the ’70s and the ’80s – that is, has survived the re-Islamization of many countries in that period. It’s the only country that has not only a truly moderate Islamist party, but moderate Islamist parties that not – that’s it’s not been pushed by more radical organization. I think – I think the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is pretty moderate; it has the Salafists breathing down its neck at this – at this – at this point, which might change the – change the situation. So if we start looking at – you know, what are – at the political players, at the factors that really are driving the transformation, I think there are very few chances of the Turkish model really developing in many countries.

Just one more comment concerning Egypt, which is the – you know, it’s the one everybody looks at because it’s such a big country. One, we have – you have one element in Turkey, which is the military, that it’s deliberately looking at the Turkish model of the 1980s – not the Turkish model of today, but the Turkish model of the military as the – as the arbiter in the country. But you also have another factor that I don’t think Turkey had: That is, you have a military which is very divided. And I think it’s becoming – the impression that one gets as far as we can judge, it’s becoming more divided by the day, which is going to make it even more unlikely that this Turkish model is going to develop in the country.

MR. CAROTHERS: Any reaction to that, Sinan?

MR. ÜLGEN: Well, I mean, you are right in many respects. But what I’ve tried to do here is basically look at what are the different core features of the Turkish model. Secularism, as we have discussed, is certainly one key feature, but it’s not the only feature. So to operationalize the Turkish model – to me, at least – doesn’t mean to take the Turkish model as a block and impose it as such on Arab societies. And what we’re seeing in practice – and this is how the game will unravel – is to – for those societies to do – you know, to pick and choose about what they like in the Turkish model. Now, that can be – if it’s not secularism, that can be the market-state relationship. That is, you know, how you can develop and, you know, sequence your economic reforms and look at the value of having an independent business community, or what does globalization and integration with the global economy mean in terms of your own internal governance. So there are many issues like that that is part of the Turkish model if we look at the Turkish model, and if we – and if we sort of do not condition the Turkish model as a – and require it to be transported as a block, but look at the different sort of features that is embedded in the Turkish model that can still be policy-relevant for the future of those societies.

[01:06:26]

MR. CAROTHERS: OK, let’s take – we have two gentlemen down in the front. I’m going to take – if we could bring the microphone – I see – bring the microphone here.

Sir.

Q: (Off mic.) Thank you. My name is – (off mic) –
MR. CAROTHERS: Speak up a bit.

Q: OK. Can you hear me now?

MR. CAROTHERS: Yeah. OK.

Q: My question to you – you alluded to at the – (off mic) –

MR. CAROTHERS: Hold on. Let’s see if we can –

Q: My question to you, which you alluded to at the end of that – that you – it will be a subject of your next paper – is this – you know, this marked departure for Turkey from, let’s say, protecting against sanctions against Iran to, say, an aggressive – an aggressive attitude towards change in Syria and so on – does it mean that Turkey now is looking to the Arab world as a natural place for it and away from Europe? Or is it going to use that as leveraging a robust entry into the European – let’s say, a member of the European Union? Thanks.

[01:07:27]

MR. CAROTHERS: Let’s go ahead and take the second – yes –.

Q: (Inaudible) –

MR. CAROTHERS: If you could introduce yourself.

Q: Yes. Kemal Derviş, from Brookings. I wanted to ask Sinan, you made a very specific recommendation in terms of extension of the customs union. And I am – by that, you mean the customs union with the European customs union, right? So then linking up to also the last question, how does this whole thing fit into the Euro-Turkish relationship and also the Euro-Mediterranean space? That is relevant for the – I think for the Arab countries, given their partnerships with Europe, their migration of Arab populations in Europe, and also just a geographical proximity.

[01:08:07]

MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you. Yeah, these two fit together. Yeah. Go ahead, Sinan.

MR. ÜLGEN: I think as things stand, there is big uncertainty about where the Turkey-EU relationship is going. There is big uncertainty because there is a loss of momentum zeal on the Turkish side, and there’s definitely other issues on the European agenda. When I was in Brussels, one of the comments that I received on this is that the Turkey-EU relationship is not part of the annex of the European agenda with all the crisis, the eurozone crisis and so on.

So whatever happens today will be – will have its own dynamic. Turkey’s shift of foreign policy vision, its rapprochement with the Arab world, its more assertive role as a regional player may or may not help Turkey’s EU accession. But it is not done in view of support of Turkey’s accession. It has its own dynamic. It is part of Turkey’s own foreign policy vision of becoming a regional power, if not to say hegemon.

[01:09:22]
So to come back to your question, Kemal – (inaudible) – how that will eventually fit in the Turkey-EU relationship, it will really depend on what sort of EU will come out – (inaudible) – from this crisis, because the EU that we will see two years down the road will certainly not – the EU of your – of our fathers. It’s going to be a very different structure. It’s going to be very different to you. It’s going to have the EU with the core and with a periphery that will, in all likelihood, include U.K. and possibly a number of other countries.

So the question is how Turkey will engage with that – with that EU. The fact that Turkey now has this role, this very influential role in the Arab world will certainly help Turkey in its future negotiations with the EU. But we still don’t know where those negotiations will lead to because we still don’t know what sort of EU will emerge from this crisis. So I think we will need to wait for at least two years for this new structure to emerge with the EU, and for the EU’s new vision.

Q: How does the customs union – (inaudible) – concrete.

MR. ÜLGEN: Well, the customs union is a way to overcome many of the problems in terms of inter-regional integration and so on. And the customs union would be the big political idea that the EU and Turkey could jointly launch in the region, because when we now look at what the EU is trying to do, it is behind the curve in many ways. It is behind the curve politically. It’s behind the curve economically. It’s behind the curve financially. So this would be a very appealing way to come to the region with a big political idea of enlarging the Turkey-EU customs union.

And now – and I’ve been talking in number of European capitals about this. This idea is starting to get traction. It has the support of a number of governments. And the only people that are against it so far are the people at the DG Trade in the Commission, because they don’t want their own mental roots to be – to be criticized and to be transformed. So this is a discussion that I think will certainly gain some traction in the U.S. – well, I hope .

MR. CAROTHERS: We’ll take just a couple more and then we’ll finish up. I see a lot of hands; I’ll do my best. Sir, and then this, and then in the back there. Yeah, right there. Yeah. Mmm hmm. (Affirmative.)

[01:11:59]

Q: Michael Lemmon at the Near East South Asia Center. Sinan, first of all, I want to compliment you on this paper which I think makes an important contribution to framing and stimulating the conversation on both sides of the – of the Atlantic. But I’d like to follow up on two points. One is your comment about giving the model partnership real substance, which I think you’re right on – real substance particularly in terms of the rising generations, if you will, of folks within the bureaucracies and the – (inaudible) – on both – in both countries. I think that’s really needed and that’s something that should be explored further and would help with the capacity issue that you were addressing.

The second is another phenomenon that’s also generational in its implications, which is the networking, the engaging of civil societies in the region. I was in Istanbul when there was a fascinating conference of the Nava (ph) network and the Young Citizens Movements (sp), which sought to bring together elements from across the region – younger elements, the Facebookers of the world, if you will – in an exchange of ideas and brainstorming and sparking off one another from their different perspectives, their different contexts, their differing experiences. In that bottoms-up approach that you were mentioning about, how do you make a transition to this new paradigm, whatever it might be, in each of these different countries? The engagement of think tanks, Turkish think tanks doing outreach to counterparts, as well as political parties in the region – again, in a similar way, not trying to
impose a model so much as sharing experiences and approaches. Could you elaborate a little bit more on that just a minute?

[01:14:10]

MR. CAROTHERS: We'll take two more and then we'll finish up. Yes, right directly behind the woman there. No, the woman right there. Yeah. Thank you.

Q: Thank you. Carol MacDolowitz (ph).

Sinan, I was very interested in your model, and I think it does have many positive –

MR. CAROTHERS: It's not his; it's Turkey's model. (Chuckles.)

Q: Your elaboration of the Turkish model. And I think it does have many elements that would appeal to the region.

However, I was wondering about the appeal of perhaps deficiencies in what's happening in Turkey. You have the AKP in power going on 10 years with no end in sight. You have a very dominant leadership, personalistic leadership of the prime minister and lack of overall party reform, reform of the parliamentary quota, et cetera, that enables the dominance of the ruling party.

[01:15:08]

So perhaps there's other things in Turkey that appeals to some of the leaders in the Arab Awakening who have less of a democratic mindset. Thank you.

MR. CAROTHERS: One more. Yes, sir. Yeah, right there. Mmm hmm. (Affirmative.)

Q: Rich Coswerch (ph) from George Mason University. Assuming that this model does get promoted as you describe it, what would you expect the reaction of Iran to be?

MR. CAROTHERS: Sinan, would you like to finish and respond as you see fit to those three comments or questions?

MR. ÜLGEN: I'll start with Iran.

The relationship with Iran has today become one of the very clearly problematic relationships. We see this almost on a daily basis. Iranians have started to threaten Turkey for accepting to hold the early warning radar system. They have constantly – they are constantly criticizing Turkey on its approach to Syria. And fundamentally, this shift in Turkish foreign policy from a noninterventionist, the sanctity of the state approach, to a more normative – even being the protector of – you know, of the victimized people type approach, is going to have fundamental consequences for the relationship with Iran, because unlike what Turkey did in the past, which was to call Ahmadinejad on the day that he was elected after this – you know, the elections in 2008 where – with gross violations, and President Gül going to Iran on the day at the peak of the oppressions against the Mousavi regime or Mousavi people and not saying a word about them in Iran in Tehran in his official talks – that was the old Turkish policy. Today, with the new Turkish policy, a Turkish government that is criticizing Syria on how it treats its own citizens, Turkey cannot remain aloof anymore to the – to the behavior of the regime in Iran. So I think that
relationship as well as the relationship with Damascus is in for a very tense period, and we already see signs of that in many ways.

Carol, there is also a section of the paper that deals with the deficiencies in the Turkish model, and I – but I didn’t want to go into that because I think that’s – I don’t think that that’s unimportant, but I just wanted to look at what can be done constructively in the region. But certainly, there are deficiencies in Turkey’s own democratic system; these deficiencies are possibly becoming more apparent now, and – with the fundamental shortcoming of not really having checks and balances in the system, which allows the political that’s in power to enlarge day after day its influence over the Turkish state. And that’s not just the executive; that’s all branches of the Turkish state and even beyond. That’s the threat that Turkish democracy is facing.

But having said that, and I hear this argument very often, how can Turkey be a model because it’s had its own deficiencies in this democratic order? Now, that’s true, but that’s also like saying, OK — in a way, what is out there other than the Turkish model? So if you’re going to compare to Iran, which is also trying to play this role, even with all its deficiencies, the Turkish model is likely to remain much more attractive.

And in a way, it works in practice. It works in practice because of the demand-side figures that I’ve tried to share with you. Despite its shortcomings, Turkey and the Turkish model remains appealing. So it’s like this French intellectual who is looking at, you know, this thing works in practice, but will it work in theory? (Laughter.) I think it works in practice.

Now, on civil society engagement, again, Turkey is rather new to this – to this game. There are a number of informal links that have been formed on the party level, but also interestingly on the humanitarian aid level. There are number of Islamic NGOs of Turkish origin that have a – quite a significant footprint in the region. Now, beyond that, at the level of think tanks, academics, it’s still very, very slim. It is slim because, as Tom said, you know, there’s a language barrier.

At the end of the day Turks are not Arabs. We don’t speak Arabic and we don’t, possibly, have at this point enough people that do in the policy circles and academic circles. So that’s certainly a handicap. It’s a handicap in the type of work that we do in Turkey; it’s a handicap for the policy world as well. But there’s now an enormous interest for Turkey to expand its human resources. And so I think that is going to certainly be the type of development that we shall see more and more in the future.

MR. CAROTHERS: I think –

Q: Quick follow up on –

MR. CAROTHERS: No, sorry. We started –

Q: (Inaudible) – in English.

MR. CAROTHERS: Yeah.

Q: It’s a common language between Turks and Arabs.
MR. CAROTHERS: Thanks, yeah. We’re short of time and Marwan would like to make a final comment. I’m afraid – sorry, sir, we’re just about out of time. Marwan or Tom, if you’d like to say anything else, you could.

MR. MUASHER: Well, I think it would be more accurate not to talk about a Turkish model, once again, but to talk about attributes of a Turkish experience that can be applied to different groups and countries because – and I think Sinan agrees with that – that we cannot talk about the Turkish model in its entirety. That’s the first one – the point I want to make.

The second one is that I believe much of the interest in the Turkish model, again – especially in the West – is because of the secular and secularism in Turkey, which, as I said before, does not apply to the Arab world. I think the best one can hope for in the Arab world is to talk about states in which religious parties will play an important role, but within a democratic context. But to talk about, you know, secular regimes in the Arab world I think is not possible.

And the final point I want to make is, I think that if we can talk about a Turkish model, I think the best – or one of the best things that can happen to Turkey that might positively affect groups in the Arab world making the transition to democracy is something that has not happened yet in Turkey, which is what happens when the AKP loses the elections. If the AKP – and I don’t have a reason to expect that they won’t – if they voluntarily give up power to someone else, that is the best sort of example that can calm down a lot of people in the Arab world that will believe that a peaceful rotation of power is possible within – or in an Islamic society. Thank you.

MR. CAROTHERS: Marwan, so are you saying they should voluntarily lose elections?

MR. MUASHER: (Laughs.) Voluntarily give up – no.

MR. CAROTHERS: OK. One final comment from Tom, yeah.

MR. DE WAAL: Just very briefly – just to reiterate the kind of cautionary point that we have been here before, that in the early '90s the newly – the Turkic post-Soviet states emerged into independence. There was expectation that the Turkish model could be applied here – there. It didn’t work. And I think we wish this second experiment great success, but it is worth reviewing why that didn’t fail (sic) last time, as you seek, I think, a very – you know, to promote a very good model for the Middle East.

MR. CAROTHERS: Sinan, you’ve taken us far beyond the easy generalizations typical in Washington about the Turkish model. And Marwan and Tom, you’ve added an important dimension to that. We look forward to your next paper, but thank you for coming and sharing this one with us.

MR. ÜLGEN: Thank you, Tom.

MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you. (Applause.)

(END)