



U.S. POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN

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SPEAKER:

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[00:19:29]

STAFF: Hi. Welcome. We're going to be starting in a few minutes. If I could have everybody turn off your BlackBerrys and cell phones; the signal interrupts and it causes a very uncomfortable sound, so –

We'll begin in just a couple minutes, and thank you for coming.

[00:20:24]

KAREN DEYOUNG: Hello and welcome. I'm Karen DeYoung; I'm the – I cover national security and foreign policy for The Washington Post and a former scholar and resident at the Carnegie Endowment, so I'm very happy to be back here, and particularly on this subject.

We have been at war for 10 years now in South Asia. And now we're in the middle of a political season. And yet, relatively little – pretty much nothing – is being said as part of the campaign so far on what we like to call Af-Pak – or on, really, any foreign policy issue, for that matter.

I'm sure all of you watched the Republican debate on Wednesday night and the ones previously. I don't think I'm mistaken in saying that the word Pakistan was never mentioned. And I suspect that will continue to be the case across the political spectrum. There will be occasional interruptions for crises that we'll all put on the front page for about a day, and then we'll all go back to talking about the budget.

Despite some fairly substantial bumps in the road between the United States and Pakistan this year – the killing of bin Laden, the expulsion of special operations trainers, the postponement of hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. military assistance and equipment – there is no anticipated change in U.S. policy toward Pakistan. We all know what the plans are for Afghanistan in terms of bringing troops home. And it's become a truism in the Obama administration, as well as within the Pentagon and most people in Congress, that the Afghan war cannot succeed without Pakistan's cooperation. And we know that the United States already gives Pakistan more money and military funding – assistance than any other country in the world except Israel. Secretary of Defense – now Leon Panetta – has said that the U.S. drone program in Pakistan has been the single most successful aspect of the U.S. fight against al-Qaida. That program, of course, is ongoing.

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So assuming that we do manage to get out of Afghanistan, what happens in Pakistan? (It'll ?) still be there with its growing arsenal of nuclear weapons, its weak and largely dysfunctional government, its powerful and unaccountable military, its tinderbox relationship with India, its suspicion of Afghanistan and its disproportionate number of citizens who believe that the United States is their enemy.

We've gathered today to discuss a paper by George Perkovich who's the vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program here at Carnegie. I'm sure you're all very familiar with his work. I know him as a journalist and as a friend and colleague, as my go-to person for everything regarding nuclear weapons, Pakistan, Iran and a lot else. You can find a longer biography in your – in the copy of his speech, which I'm sure you all have and have all read his paper.

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In making his arguments, George has unearthed some fascinating and depressing thoughts from previous policymakers. Among them, he quotes President Eisenhower, who in 1957 called what was then the American military commitment to Pakistan “perhaps the worst kind of a plan and a decision we could have made; it was a terrible error,” and “now we seem hopelessly involved in it.”

It reminded me back to a quote that Richard Holbrooke had once showed me in a plane on the way to Pakistan – where he always took his shoes off in airplanes and patted up to the front – and he was reading a book by Margaret Bourke-White where she was talking about the birth of Pakistan, and she was talking about an interview that she’d done with Mohammed Ali Jinnah. And she asked him what kind of assistance he would want from the United States. And he said, “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America. Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed, the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” And she says, “he leaned toward me, dropping his voice to a confidential note. ‘Russia,’ confided Mr. Jinnah, ‘is not so very far away.’”

And so I think the same – the same problems apply for U.S. policy; the perceived enemies of the United States are not so very far away.

George has made a very bold proposal for what to do about this and how to change this rut of enablement that the United States has been in now for six decades in Panama (sic). So I’ll let him his proposals and then I will ask him hopefully some probing questions and try to find holes in his arguments, and then go to questions from the audience. Thank you all very much.

GEORGE PERKOVICH: I think you stole mine.

MS. DEYOUNG (?): I took yours. (Chuckles.)

MR. PERKOVICH: Yeah. It’s all right, I think I can do it without it, but –

MS. DEYOUNG (?): Sorry.

[00:26:06]

MR. PERKOVICH: Thanks, Karen. And thank all of you for coming out on a lovely monsoon Friday; it has a certain feel of South Asia at a different time of year.

This was a hard paper to write. And it was a labor of frustrated affection in many ways. I haven’t been at it as long as Pakistan has existed – probably worked on it certainly longer than Richard Holbrooke did. Unfortunately, it would have been nice if he could have kept working on it for a longer time. But it is – it does inspire affection and then – and then frustration.

And I’d begin by saying that if Pakistan is dangerously dysfunctional for reasons that people know, Washington helped enable it to get this way. Pakistan is more strategically important than Afghanistan, and yet we’ve focused a lot of attention and treasury on Afghanistan.

But the shift and the preparation to reduce the military footprint in Afghanistan does, I believe, give us a rare opportunity to reconsider policy towards Pakistan. Karen alluded that this is probably not happening or going to

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happen, but I – it doesn't mean that people like us can't suggest, actually, that it needs to happen, that there are alternatives, and that this may be a time to do it.

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Now, I would argue that U.S. interests, which we commonly talk about – it's preventing terrorists from getting nuclear weapons, or a coup in Pakistan for controlling nuclear weapons, or preventing terrorism – in my view, these interests actually all boil down to one thing, which is the security of Pakistanis, and that if Pakistan is better governed and people feel more invested in their country, more secure within the country, they will take it upon themselves to expunge the terrorists. And that would also ensure that you wouldn't have the kinds of coups and other things we worry about that would take control of the nuclear weapons and so forth.

So the – throughout the paper, what I'm trying to argue is, the internal condition of Pakistan is the most important thing and should be the key policy objective, much more than the external role that Pakistan can play in helping the U.S. and neighboring states and more broadly.

Now, getting to the point where Pakistan is a more promising country and its own people feel invested in it in a way that perhaps they are not now, that may be impossible. But it certainly won't happen as long as the United States continues to treat Pakistan as a means to an external end, as a means to accomplishing something else.

And we have done this; the U.S. has done this since the 1950s. And Karen talked about the quote from Eisenhower. We started a military alliance with Pakistan in the early 1950s, and at that point, it was a platform to gain intelligence on the Soviet Union in the fight for communism. Meanwhile, Pakistan gained resources to fight India, which began the war in '65.

Then, from 1969 to '71, President Nixon, Henry Kissinger worked with General Yahya Khan to open relations with China, which was a very important initiative for the U.S. At that time, the latter part of that, in '71, meanwhile, the West Pakistani Army, led by Yahya Khan, was repressing the people of East Pakistan, causing that crisis that became the 1971 war with India. In the aftermath of that war, Pakistan started its nuclear weapon program. So the U.S. is focusing on helping – getting help to go to China, and Pakistan is having its own internal crisis with its consequences.

In the '80s, it's much better known how we cooperated with Pakistan and the ISI to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. With much of that assistance that was provided, the ISI cultivated the groups that then pivoted, in the late 1980s and the 1990s, to Kashmir.

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The U.S. pulled out of Pakistan because in the '90s, it was not serving an instrumental U.S. purpose. The U.S. withdrew; Pakistan took the assets, basically, that had been built together in the '80s and turned them and deployed them against India in Kashmir.

The story after 9/11 is better known. The U.S. comes back into Pakistan, saying, you know, you have to choose, you are with us or against us. And General Musharraf says, OK, we're kind of with you. And in that instance, again, the U.S. took the expediency of depending on the Pakistani army over the recognition that was available in the U.S. that that army's obsession with India and its determination to control Pakistani politics would lead to the sort of internal crisis that we're now facing today.

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All along, the U.S., in all of this history, has always wanted to foster a prosperous democracy in Pakistan. It's just that that had been the second choice or the second priority over the cooperation with the Pakistani military to fight some other external battle.

And this has been recognized. In the paper, I quote Robert McMahon. I have a prop; I don't do PowerPoint but I have a prop. I recommend this book, "Cold War on the Periphery." And basically, the man was a historian of the State Department. And it's – it's a pulling of declassified U.S. documents from the '50s and '60s. And if you read them and just change the dates and the names, it's the exact same stuff that's happening today.

And people knew that, basically, the army was sitting on a country that was not a real nation-state, that had terrible internal problems, and that the U.S. was supporting that army, but that underneath it all, it was unstable, and that the army and the U.S. support to it will be unsustainable by the country because it was becoming way too oversized. This was known in 1956 and you can find cables coming back. And then you can read the same cables from the '70s and the '80s and then '90s. And I guarantee you, in WikiLeaks, you will find the same thing being said.

Now, all throughout, this support by the U.S. has had an unintended but undeniable effect of empowering Pakistan's grossly oversized and hyperactive military and intelligence services. And this has been at the expense of civil society and progress toward effective government – governance. This is why I call it enablement. And our policy of colluding with the army and the intelligence services has been like enablement, the indulgence and augmentation of a friend's self-destructive outlook and action.

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Now, again, why I say this has been self-destructive for Pakistanis, primarily, is that from the beginning, Pakistan's main problems have been internal. And one can go through – and Pakistan was founded in an extraordinarily, unimaginably difficult circumstance that we can talk about. It was brutal. And somehow, they came through it, but there had always been the big fissure between West and East Pakistan, all right? It was a country that had two halves separated by a thousand miles of India and totally different cultures, Bengali culture and the different cultures in West Pakistan.

Within West Pakistan, what is now Pakistan, there had always been fissures between Punjab, the dominant province, and Baluchistan. They're fighting a war now, a conflict now with Baluchistan; it's been going on since 1970, '71.

There are conflicts within Sindh. Karachi is being torn up by violence today. That's an internal conflict, part of which is the wider challenge of relations between Muhajirs and indigenous peoples of what became Pakistan.

There's the feudal patterns of ownership. There are right-left ideological splits. There are conflicts over religious identity, not only between Sunni and Shia, but within Sunni communities. There's the abysmal state of education, which has always been the case in Pakistan.

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One can go on, but the point is that these myriad injustices and conflicts within the country have always been the greatest threat to it, and they've come at the same time that the political system has not ever produced an ideology or institutions that can express and reconcile those internal conflicts in any way that gives people real confidence.

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And so with that – with these unresolved internal crises, the military stepped in. And that irresolution gave them the opportunity – first in 1958 with the first coup when Ayub Khan came into power, and – so he comes in '58 and basically, for 33 of Pakistan's 64 years, it's been ruled by the military directly. And in the other periods, especially after '58, the military has been the dominant wielder of power behind the scenes.

Now, for understandable reasons, that military has always had an obsession with India. But its role in internal politics has then injected that obsession in a very disproportionate way into the whole body politic, into the political economy, into the formation of ideology. And it becomes a circular problem that the institution of the army has exploited, all right? The army justifies its dominance in part by saying, there's this external threat out there, India, and we're the only ones that can meet it, and so that's why we're taking power, because this external threat is so great. And that's why we need the money and the resources.

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But then they have to keep reinforcing that the problem is external and don't pay enough attention to the internal problems, which an army is ill-suited to try to resolve.

Now, the great metaphor or expression of this was – what I already mentioned was 1971 and the loss of half the country in the war that led to the formation of Bangladesh. I mean, that was an internal repression by the west and by the army against East Pakistan – and we can talk about, you know, the nature of that – and a result of an election that was basically, the East Pakistanis won it, but Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in West Pakistan said, well, democracy doesn't mean the majority counts; Punjab and Sindh are more important than the majority. And they repressed Bengal, and that led to a conflict.

And India then joined; it became the Indo-Pak war. And that Indo-Pak war enabled the later narrative to put Pakistan's problem in this – in this context with India. But we tend to forget that it was, again, an internal crisis that produced it. And this – history just keeps repeating itself.

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The point is that India is not the primary cause of Pakistan's problems, nor is it the greatest threat to Pakistan. But the army thinks and acts as if it is and has gotten power on that basis.

As Maleeha Lodhi – who many of you may know, who's a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States and then to the United Kingdom – as she put it recently, Pakistan's story is one of the state's underreach internally and overreach externally. The state led by the army has done too little to redress the internal crises facing the state and has done too much to confront India, whether directly or in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

And the point that Maleeha and others would make is that that external projection will no longer work. And indeed, it's killing Pakistan.

The army's claim to power depends on India being an omnipresent, (coherent ?) threat. And the army's confidence in – competence in contesting India is its singular virtue. But what started to happen is that competence has come under question.

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The Osama bin Laden raid was the most dramatic way in which, all of a sudden, people said, is this army deserving of its role? Is it, in fact, competent? And then, days later or a couple of weeks later, the raid on the naval base near Karachi reinforced this sense of, oh my God, these guys aren't even competent.

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All of this happens in the background of India's rising power. The world's talking about India being a growing power, and so the comparisons with Pakistan are very painful and tormenting.

I'll skip over – in the paper, I talk about – this challenge came to – came to the surface in a remarkable way, then, in June 9th, when the corps commanders – who are the true power in Pakistan – General Kayani and the nine corps commanders met in the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid and the Mehran naval base.

And the ISI, the intelligence service, has published a remarkable report of that meeting, which if you read it – and it's available, you can find it online – each part of it is basically an implicit admission of something the army had done wrong over the years. But the main point is they're worried that the public was now questioning the army.

So there's a statement out, and I'm quoting here now: “In order to confront the present challenges, it is critical to stand united as a nation. Any effort to create divisions between important institutions of the country is not in our national interest. All of us should take cognizance of this unfortunate trend and put an end to it.” In other words, don't question the army.

And then he goes on, and Gen. Kayani says, basically, economic rather than military aid is more essential for Pakistan. So he says – this is quoting Kayani directly: “It is being recommended to the government that the U.S. funds meant for military assistance to army be diverted toward economic aid to Pakistan, which can be used for reducing the burden of the common man.”

Very interesting. There's a vulnerability there, an acknowledgement of what's happened in the past. And they say, okay, now we don't want the money. Let's give it to the people.

And then it goes on and says, you know, that the army – Pakistan has no room for terrorism, and the army will, quote, “continue supporting the democratic system without any preference to any particular party.” Again, all of these are, kind of, admissions of other things. And so you do get a sense that it's beleaguered and it's in trouble, but it'll remain. And it'll remain a source of resistance, and that's one of the things that U.S. policymakers are aware of but don't fully confront.

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And the Pakistan Army is incapable of creating a positive national identity or leading a political process to reconcile all these conflicts that I mentioned earlier, which are the causes of Pakistan's decline. Ahmed Rashid, who's a journalist – very well-known, well-regarded Pakistani journalist – summarized the challenge in a way that I think is very revealing.

He said, “What Pakistanis desperately need is a new narrative by their leaders, a narrative that does not blame the evergreen troika of India, the United States and Israel for all of the country's ills, that breaks the old habit of breaking outsiders, and instead looks at itself more honestly and more transparently.” Then he goes and he says something that – points that psychology here is the heart of the matter. He says, “Pakistanis as a nation seem

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incapable of self-analysis or apportioning blame according to logic and reason rather than emotion.” I’m going to come back to that in a second.

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U.S. leaders partially recognize these problems. But for 50 years Washington has been trying to modify the army and the ISI’s behavior with either positive reinforcement through military assistance, financial help, equipment and so on; or negative reinforcement – the threat of removing of the money. But it’s always been behavior modification.

Yet there’s plenty of evidence in the same 50 years that these behaviorist policies and incentives and punishments won’t change the army’s psychology and actions. Techniques of behavior modification are simply inadequate to change obsessions that are as deeply rooted as those that animate the army and the ISI. And this is why I say the Rashid quote is so important: the incapability of actually analyzing the situation in a reasonable way.

Now, President Obama recognized this. If you read Bob Woodward’s book, “Obama’s Wars,” it’s very interesting – and it happens a lot in that book – and there’s one great quote where the president says, “There’s no clear answer yet with regard to what induces Pakistan to make a strategic shift in our direction.” And then Woodward paraphrases Doug Lute and Tom Donilon, saying basically forget it; they’re not going to do it; they’re so hardwired against India. Pakistan’s not going to change.

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I think that may be right, but then we don’t act on that analysis. So you’ve got the president saying, nobody’s got an answer for Pakistan. Everybody else is saying we can’t win the war in Afghanistan if Pakistan doesn’t change. Then the advisors that are actually making the most sense are saying that they’re not going to change.

And then we go ahead and still offer all the money and say Pakistan may change. And you know, Adm. Mullen or others go and they meet with Kayani and say, well, we had a meeting of the minds, and I think, you know, they’re with us. And this is the essence of folly.

Barbara Tuchman, you know, wrote the book “The March of Folly,” and this case, in a sense, describes it – in a sense that you do things that – organizations, governments do things that people within them at the time know aren’t going to work and have been saying repeatedly aren’t going to work, and where there are some alternatives being proposed, but you just keep pressing the same levers that you always press.

And by the way, Pakistan follows a folly because the army keeps trying to contest India and focus on contesting India. They’ve lost every war, but you keep doing it. The country’s going down the drain and still that’s your preoccupation. So we’re kind of wedded, the U.S. and Pakistan, in this kind of mutual folly, where we’re reinforcing the institution that is leading Pakistan in its folly, thinking it’s going to change, which is our folly.

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It seems to me the only constructive alternative is democratization: the creation and protection of a space for the people who have a different psychology within Pakistan, who don’t share the military’s and the ISI’s focus on India, obsession on India, determination always to fight India, and who are more concerned about the internal conditions within the country.

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Now, bringing them to power is, I would say, necessary, but there's no reason to be optimistic it's going to happen – which isn't a reason to then avoid the conclusion that that's the only way out. Pakistan's previous interludes of democracy have not evolved into promising governance. This doesn't negate the strategic value of recognizing that has to be the priority, but it does mean the odds of success are low and it's going to take decades.

Now, there's a little bit of optimism in the sense that many Pakistanis believe that President Zardari should serve a full term, despite his universally perceived corruption and fecklessness. It is hard to find – if you think President Obama's unpopular, it is hard to find anyone in Pakistan who would say anything other than that Zardari is totally corrupt and feckless. And many would add, a coward and many other things.

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And yet the same people will say it's very important that he finish his term, which is very interesting. That wouldn't have been the case in other years necessarily. But there is this sense that democracy is the only way forward for Pakistan.

Now, if democratization has to be the key strategy, I would say there's little that the U.S. actually can do to help in this process and to help organize Pakistani progressives. The struggle really is theirs. And the U.S. is so unpopular, even if it were to try to latch onto, or say that these people, actually, are the most promising ones, that would totally backfire. It's their struggle. We have to recognize it.

Yet there are some things that the U.S. can do, and the first – and I emphasize in the paper – is, you know, stop making things worse. It's their struggle. They're going to have to solve the problem. Let's stop beefing up the people who are the problem, stop beefing up the institutions that Pakistani democrats ultimately must take power from. And that's what we've been doing. We've been putting them on steroids for decades and then wondering that, you know, the little guys who don't have the same kind of muscles can't actually achieve anything.

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The second category, and it's related to stop doing harm, is to diminish the U.S. footprint in Pakistan, and the fingerprint on civilian assistance. I think the U.S. – and I'll talk a little bit more about this – we need to pool efforts with Pakistanis who are doing good work – and this includes Pakistani businessmen and others who would like their society to be different than it is, as well as NGOs – but pool it also with other governments and multinational organizations who are much less controversial, can move around the country more freely and have a much better sense of what's going on in the country than U.S. government people do.

Now, this would require both a mental and a physical retrenchment of American officials and security contractors from Pakistan. And my point here is less may be more. You always have this sense, especially in – well, it's very important, so let's really go in there; and we'll build a much bigger embassy, put many more hundreds of diplomats in; now we're putting dozens more accountants in, and kind of flooding the place with people, because that's how we show that it's important.

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But when you're on the other end of it, you kind of go, oh my God, there's more of them. And it actually may make things worse, especially because they can't come out of the compound. And when they do, they go out in armored convoys. And so less may be more in this case.

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Now, in the paper – I won't go into detail – I talk about four basic thrusts of change in U.S. policy. I'll just highlight them here. The first is to stop pushing and funding the Pakistani army to fight America's battles. U.S. and – Admiral Mullen and others have been going for years to the Pakistani army saying, you've got to fight the Haqqani network; we need you to move into North Waziristan; you've got to fight on this part of the line so we can crush the bad guys in between us.

And the Pakistanis generally have been saying, you know, not now; we can't do it now, maybe. But we keep offering the assistance to do that and every once in a while they say they will. I think we should asking. They're not going to do it.

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And their own people correctly say, this is your war. It's not felt to be their war, so the idea that they would somehow fight our war full-heartedly and effectively when they don't share the objective – it seems to me you could only think of that here. I mean, you can't come up with ideas like that if you spend any time actually in the place, talking with people there.

So they're not going to do what we ask, but we should stop offering to pay for it too. And if they don't want to do it, say fine, then you don't need the money. And take Gen. Kayani up on his statement at the corps commanders meeting on June 9 saying we don't want the military assistance, we don't want the military money; give it to the people through economic aid. Fine, great, we hear you. That should be a clear position of the U.S.

But importantly, it's not punitive. It's not what we tend to do. It's not, oh, we're going to take the money away. We're going to stop asking you to do this stuff, is the key message. And then with that comes the retrenchment of the funding.

The second change that would be very important, would cost relatively little but would have important symbolic and economic value, is stop blocking Pakistani imports. It's primarily apparel and textiles. That's the biggest export industry in Pakistan. It's almost all of Pakistan's exports, and it's 0.2 of one percent of U.S. imports. But we have unusually high tariffs on these Pakistani goods.

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Now, members of Congress, especially – well, I won't be partisan – like to say “trade not aid.” The trade is the best way to develop economies. It's dignified; it's not like welfare. Trade – you earn it. And when it comes to Pakistan, who's our non-NATO strategic ally, who Karen mentioned we give more military assistance to than any country but Israel, a few members of Congress are blocking change in tariffs that would allow Pakistani imports to come into the United States, which would, by the way, displace Chinese imports, if anything. The American textile and apparel industry is tiny.

But we block it. And in Pakistan this is a big issue. You read about it just about every day in the Pakistani press, and to them it makes all the professions of U.S. assistance and friendship seem like a lie because wait, you can't do that? It makes no sense to them. And you keep saying trade not aid, but then you block the trade.

So this is a shift, and I would – you know, the onus is on the Congress. The Bush administration wanted to change this; the Obama administration would like to change this. There's a few members of Congress that block it and the others don't care enough to then try to press on it.

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The third big change which is in the stop doing harm thing, is stop overindulging India. And let me be clear: I have here in mind two things. One's at the moral-political level and the other is in terms of security cooperation and arms sales.

I say this as somebody who thinks that the U.S.-India relationship is very important. It should and will only grow. India's economic importance is so important. Its alignment with basic U.S. security interests is clear, as well as its democratic structure make it natural that the U.S. will seek to deepen ties with India. And India's power will inevitably grow and Pakistan will always find that upsetting and has to learn to deal with it.

Having said that, though, the U.S. and India must be much more alive to the legitimate difficulties that Pakistanis experience in coming to terms with this, and we have to understand that there are things in our politics and our statements and our behavior now that are deeply offensive to Pakistanis, and for decent reason. Many Pakistanis feel that the dignity and moral worth of Muslims are disrespected as a result of the war on terrorism as defined by the U.S. and India.

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So after the Mumbai attacks in India in 2008, the U.S. rightly was very, very immediate and strong in expressing its sympathy to Indian victims, its denunciation of the terrorism. This was played strongly in the media here and with all politicians. Fine, but Pakistanis will point out that in 2007, one year before Mumbai, 42 Pakistanis were murdered in a firebombing of the Samjhauta Express, which was a train going from India to Pakistan. This was an act of terrorism that killed 42 Pakistanis.

An Indian investigation's been going on for four years and still hasn't found anybody responsible. The outside world doesn't care. I don't know how many people here have heard about this or known about it. I don't know how many articles the Post or the Times or anybody else has written about this. But in Pakistan it's a very important deal.

And the contrast of the attention given to the Mumbai attacks or other terrorism that happens in India is very painful, and it leads them to the conclusion that our value, our lives, our moral self-worth, are somehow greatly inferior, in the minds of Americans, to the Indians who are now their new best friend. That makes it very difficult politically for progressive Pakistanis who want to say, let's stop focusing on India; let's focus on our internal problems. It makes it very hard for those people to get a hearing because others can say, no, no, these people are out to kill all of us. They disregard us as moral beings.

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And the U.S. is complicit in it, in their view, because we're silent on these issues and go out of our way, now, for other reasons, as well as the valid reasons of morality or whatever – but the economic and strategic reasons of wanting India to be very happy with us. We highlight when Pakistan does something, but not when there's a pogrom in India, as in Gujarat in 2002, or when the perpetrators of the Ayodhya riots and destructions in the early nineties have still not been brought to account.

We don't ever say anything about that – and again, for strategic reasons, perhaps, but it's noticed in Pakistan. So I think changing that and at least acknowledging when India doesn't live up to its own values and its own constitution, and when people's human rights and sense of justice are violated in India, that we at least can

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acknowledge that, it could be a useful measure to restore the sense in Pakistanis, especially amongst progressives, that there's a moral regard there.

More concretely, the U.S. is trying – India's not helping that much, but we're trying to sell a lot of military equipment to India. India's not buying so far. I mean, they're buying some, but not as much as the U.S. would like them to buy, and they're not buying nuclear power plants as much as the U.S. would like them to buy. But still, the effort is there and India's a great market, and for good reason.

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But Pakistan then worries that what would be supplied to India in the form of advanced military equipment could then make Pakistan more vulnerable. Now, they have one ready answer to that, which I think is reasonable, but it's not liked here – which is, we're going to make more nuclear weapons.

So if you talk to the heads of the Pakistani nuclear complex, Gen. Kidwai and others, he says, no, we see what you're prepared to do and India's growing conventional capability; and so I need niche nuclear weapons to counter all those things, and we'll just keep making as many as we need. And by the way, nuclear weapons are one thing that Pakistan does very well. And so they will keep doing that.

That's fine, but the broader issue is I think the U.S. needs to be more careful in its military cooperation and sales with India, to make efforts to reassure Pakistan that these would not or could not be used offensively against Pakistan. And it may make sense that in proposing such sales, if and when India wants to buy them, that you do an assessment of the effect on the deterrent stability between India and Pakistan. We're going to sell this, and here's how we think it shouldn't upset the deterrent stability of India and Pakistan – and to present that.

[00:59:55]

Now, in a rational world, it should be possible to reassure Pakistanis that India, in fact, does not have offensive intentions and would not use these offensively. And there's plenty of evidence for this, in a rational world. I mean, India was attacked in 2001 and 2002 by terrorists linked to Pakistan. It was attacked in 2008. The U.S. spent a lot of effort persuading India not to retaliate militarily, which showed U.S. intentions are not to abet India in attacking Pakistan – quite the opposite. But more importantly, India concurred with the U.S. urging that it not attack Pakistan.

[01:00:35]

So if you look at this cooperation between India and the United States, in times when it really mattered it did not result in a threat to Pakistan but quite the opposite actually – resulted in kind of a calm and Indian forbearance. So it ought to be possible to reassure Pakistan that this cooperation wouldn't lead to offensive capabilities. But that's rational, and Pakistani professionals don't always see this rationally. But still I think the importance is to document it and make the effort to explain it so that others can see it.

Now, the last big shift – and I'll be very brief – is the need to pause and reinvent U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Money is not the problem. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill of 2009 – which basically, you know, dedicates 7.5 billion (dollars) for civilian assistance to Pakistan – that's plenty of money. In fact, there's more money that can be well-spent now. And there's a recognition in that bill that the U.S. has overdone, historically, the military cooperation, the military investment in Pakistan, and needs to balance it more on the civilian side.

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All that's to the good, but as the Center for Global Development, across the street, has very well documented – and I commend you to go their website and look at what they've written about aid programs to Pakistan.

Notwithstanding the good intentions of these programs, they're just not delivering. And they go into a lot of the reasons why this is so.

But the requirements for getting the assistance, which are largely dictated by Congress's obsession that there not be any corruption, are so heavy-handed and so difficult – and the bureaucratic presence associated with the aid is also so constrained that very little is being dispersed. And so it reinforces the impression in Pakistan that basically the U.S. is interfering in Pakistan more than it's helping.

And I think there are people in both Washington and Islamabad who recognize it's not working but who then try to keep – you know, do it more and do it faster even though it's not working. And it seems to me that it'd make more sense to call time out and regroup and perhaps pause.

[01:03:05]

You know, corruption is widespread in Pakistan. And institutions are relatively weak. And there are a lot of NGO scam operators there, so that it actually does require – to distribute assistance and to invest in public interest and development – does require a lot of people with extensive experience to go out and vet and to network and really know who is who.

And so it makes sense to be mindful of corruption and being scammed. And yet, the conditions under which U.S. administrators operate make this almost impossible. So security constraints are very severe. It's very hard to go out. If you do go out you have to go with lots of security, which then undermines the political message that you're trying to send and makes it harder for people to get out.

[01:04:00]

Also, for security reasons, people tend to be posted to the embassy there for one-year terms. So you take somebody who's never been in Pakistan, doesn't have networks there, doesn't know the culture – you bring them in for a year and say, OK, you go figure out who would be good, non-corrupt implementers of assistance to help build democracy in Pakistan. Oh, and by the way, you can't really go out, and when you do go out you have to make a long appointment to get the security to go with you, and so on. It's designed – it's destined – for understandable reasons – it's destined not to work.

And then also to appease Congress and reassure them, you know, about corruption, we – the requirements now are, you know, that a Pakistani recipient be certified by a public accountant that it's – that it – that it meets all the necessary requirements. And if your little NGO in Pakistan doesn't have an accountant or isn't certified – which, you know, like, who would be – then one has to be designated to go sit in your organization.

[01:05:02]

And to strengthen the accounting against corruption, in the embassy we're adding, you know, tens of accountants to sit in the embassy to look it over. So if you look at what's now becoming of these programs I would call it the full employment for accountants act – (laughter) – in both Pakistan and the U.S – all for good intentions basically imposed by Congress because there's so many scandalmongers in Congress that if any one of these guys finds out, oh, this grant went to the wrong person or whatever, they're going to go up and try to bring down the whole program.

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So to protect that you end up spending all this money and wasting all this money, which is much greater than that which would be lost by corruption in the first place, to be able to tell some guy in a congressional hearing, oh, no, we took every precaution. We got a million accountants there.

[01:05:46]

And so this doesn't work. They don't know – and there are other people who know this topic much better than I do – but it seems to me, you know, pausing would make some sense, not renegeing on the commitment – that would be not in our interest for a bunch of reasons but would inspire tremendous backlash – but talk about the possibility of stretching it out, not out of parsimoniousness but because it's not working and we want to keep the commitment but only deploy the money when it's working in the interest of Pakistanis – who right now don't feel it's working in their interest – and use that time to figure out whether it's possible to pool the resources.

And I point out Warren Buffett, who's a very wealthy man and has decided to give – I forget – 45 billion (dollars) or whatever – of his fortune to philanthropy – he's basically turning it over to the Gates Foundation. His idea was why – these people do it efficiently; they know what they're doing. So rather than invent his own whole structure and be able to put his label on it and everything else, he's saying, you know, it'll be more affective to deploy it that way.

[01:06:53]

And I think, you know, if it could be done, the U.S. should think about pooling its resources with others who are more effective, can move around better – might be wise for reasons of efficiency and other ones, but also to reduce the sense of fingerprint – to reduce the sense of the U.S. kind of owning Pakistan and being all over the country. I think the only problem with it would be back here, again, in Congress – the idea that they want a big stamp – made in the USA – because then people will love us.

And if you took that out of it and you said, actually, we're just trying to be efficient and deliver the best benefits, you would probably pool this resource. And so that's one of the things I'm urging in the report – is rethinking kind of the unilateral approach to aid.

[01:07:48]

Let me close by saying Eisenhower's quote in '57 where he said that the military commitment to Pakistan was “perhaps the worst kind of” “plan and decision we could have made.” I would argue that 54 years later there's little to suggest that Eisenhower would have revised that conclusion. And the point is that Pakistanis must save themselves. And what we have to focus on, I would argue, is reversing past practices and current policies that impede their helping themselves by building up the institutions that actually won't solve their fundamental problems.

I'm not optimistic, as Karen said, that there's a mood for this. I – we can talk in the Q&A about other times when people have tried to shift U.S. policy on Pakistan. It tends to be immune to it. But this is what we do here, is try to see things and suggest alternatives. So thank you for coming and hearing mine. (Applause.)

MS. DEYOUNG: Thank you. I'd like to start by looking at the sort of – the kind of timing of how changes could be made. As I think you brilliantly point out in the paper, U.S. policy toward Pakistan is characterized by either

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crisis or indifference. And when there's a crisis we pour things into – do what we think needs to be done to end the immediate crisis, and then when the crisis is over we don't pay attention anymore.

[01:09:39]

Right now we're certainly in a crisis, I think a lot of people would argue. I think you're right about North Waziristan, you know, which has been the mantra of U.S. policy for so many years now: Go. Go get the Haqqanis. And it's louder than ever now. And I think you're totally right, it's not going to happen. They're not going to do it.

And yet –and yet, we have gotten something out – we have bought something out of the policy. We've gotten transport of supplies for Afghanistan; we've gotten permission and cooperation on the drone strikes – despite what the Pakistani government may say publically. We've gotten intelligence cooperation. So from the standpoint of U.S. objectives for what we say is the most important thing in that region at the moment, we actually have bought what we wanted.

So how do we – at this point, what can we do – what can – what can the United States do to address these long-term problems and the very strong likelihood, as you said, that we will slip right back into the same thing? Because once this is over people are going to be so tired of it and they're just not going to say, look, let's try to avoid the next crisis as opposed to just waiting, and then see how much we can – we can spend on it.

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, I – it's a complicated question. A couple thoughts – one is – first of all, at least, it's cognitive in that recognizing that Pakistan is the crisis. So you were right, because you were framing it the way Washington framed it, which is Afghanistan's the focus and the problem and Pakistan is, again, kind of the instrument. And so if you get out of Afghanistan then you can ignore Pakistan. But what I would say is conceptually and in terms of policy Pakistan is the crisis. And so, you know, that should remain the focus even if you're out of Afghanistan. I think people can get that – policymakers can get that. Now, how you operationalize? It's a different issue.

Then, second point, you're right. We have gotten transport and, you know, and toleration if not cooperation on the drone strikes. But I think that could continue and, again, it's kind of a framing issue and the way you interact with the Pakistanis. It would have been a lot easier to get all that at the same time if we weren't pressing them to go all this time into North Waziristan and fight our war. If we were saying basically we want to rent your services and your supply lines and, you know, we'll pay you as a transport route, you know, I – they need the money, so I mean, I think they would have done it.

Where it got more controversial is when we're trying to then get them to go fight what they saw as our war. And you see this in the drones because the targets of the drones are not particularly people that the Pakistani Army and the ISI favor – especially the foreign targets. And it gets, you know, different, but a lot of the targeting has been the foreigners – the al-Qaida – and I think they're sympathetic.

[01:13:00]

But I – that fits in with a structure that I'm trying to say we should emphasize, which is our priority is – should be the internal situation in Pakistan and saying to the Pakistani army and people that as long as you're focusing on protecting the lives and wellbeing and security of your own population, that's what we want to cooperate with you in doing, but we're not going to ask you to do stuff in Afghanistan that you don't see as in your interest, but is in our interest. I think – I think you could sustain that and get more support for that within Pakistan.

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MS. DEYOUNG: But I wonder how much support you could get in Congress and in this country as long as you're losing soldiers and spending a huge amount of money in Afghanistan – if you've posited the situation as being our enemy is not here; our enemy is there. And we're saying – but the Pakistanis don't want us to go after them and so we're not going to do that.

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, I – we end up screwing ourselves the other – I mean – I mean, and you get me started on Congress. I mean, you're right, as soon as you bring in Congress – name a problem to which Congress is a solution. I mean, so we're – (laughter) – so it's all – so then they're the obstacle that you have to get around to find a solution to the problem. And so – but that's real and so one has to try to do that.

[01:14:32]

But I think the – with the reduction of the military footprint in Afghanistan, the tacit switch in the objective or strategy which is becoming much more counterterrorism and less really a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan – may be more satisfying to Congress because there's a desire to kind of pull back. And so in Pakistan you can make the case that we do have a long-term interest in Pakistan. It will cost less because if you're doing less on the military side in Afghanistan than you need to do – that costs less but also you need to put less on the table in Pakistan – military – so you're saving money. There's a reduction ultimately that's going on there.

And then the argument which is – you have to be careful in portraying it here because many of you say, well, the problem is nuclear weapons in Pakistan which could be used against us; then people in Pakistan hear that in a way that undermines the policy. They say, oh, the Americans are coming to steal our nuclear weapons; we better hide them better. And – but the point with Congress is the internal preservation of Pakistan. The sense of some kind of progress in Pakistan is absolutely vital to maintain a control over its nuclear assets, to prevent war with India and to enable Pakistanis to go after terrorists in their own country for their own reasons.

And all of that is in our benefit. I think over time there are members of Congress who could understand that. And so the alternative is we do what we did in the '90s, which is just leave all the way. It wasn't the end of the world; I mean the A.Q. Khan network proliferated the nuclear material and knowledge to Iran and Libya and North Korea, and the Taliban were created, and all of that. But you've seen that movie, so you could probably head that off, so it probably wouldn't be the end of the world if we just left all the way – all the way. I think that wouldn't be as bad as what's happening now.

MS. DEYOUNG: One of the things – obviously the flipside of not enabling the military and not encouraging them in either their power or their paranoia is promoting a political class and a civil society class. You talk, I think, about how the ways in which we try to do this with IRI money and NDI and trying to go in and teach them democracy and teach civil society how to operate is basically not very effective.

[01:17:24]

How can we – at the same time, we're saying that there is something we can do to build the civilian side in Pakistan. Is there any way, short of pulling back, that we can support it; that we can – you know, as you explained in some detail, the political class there is not responsive to people. It never has been, and there's no reason for them to be at this point. How do we – how do we strike the balance between being intrusive in a way that really is counterproductive and actually accomplishing something that's commensurate with our – with our – with our needs there?

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MR. PERKOVICH: Well, I – again, I think, you know, some of what I was describing is pooling efforts with others that may have found more effective ways to do these things. And I would distinguish between, you know, development and health and energy – you know, mainly it’s about efficiency in use – agriculture and use of water – those kinds of development things I think are more – there’s more to be done; there’s more receptivity in Pakistan and there are others who are doing it with whom we could pool.

[01:18:46]

The political part that you’re talking about is – particularly the development of parties and so on – that’s sensitive in every country, first of all, and it seems to me for understandable reasons we have organizations and institutions. Once you identify a problem, you say, OK, go there. And so it’s supply pushed in a sense. I mean, we could come in and say, OK, you folks need democracy and, you know, we got somebody from Congress so, OK, you know, what do you want to do – and try to work with them on it.

I think a better model, you know, is a foundation model, which is you let it be known that a resource is available and if people want to develop proposals and come – and so it’s kind of demand pulled. We’re working on something, we want to do a reform, we want to know the expertise you have, we want – and so will you come here or will you provide assistance – would be more effective than what tends to happen, which is when we see a problem and, you know, you go marching in to then, you know, find the people that you can – that you can tell how to fix their own problem.

[01:19:56]

I – you know, I don’t have a clear or obvious solution. But again, one of the things is just stop doing what doesn’t work.

MS. DEYOUNG: How do you think – on the point of India – how do you think the Indians would respond to a U.S. policy that was not, as you describe it, kind of giving India the moral high ground? You know, as you said, you don’t have to scratch any U.S. official very far before they say the Pakistanis are just crazy about India – they’re obsessive and – although if you listen to the – you know, there are 500,000 troops on the border. There is trouble in Kashmir where the Indians have not been particularly honest about what they’re doing. There is a nuclear arms race. The Pakistanis are speeding up; so are the Indians.

[01:20:48]

How would the Indians, if this administration or any other administration were to go in with that argument and say, look, this is – you know, yes, you’re our friends, we recognize rising power, but this is not working this way, we’re going to have to rebalance our – at least, rhetorically, our focus?

MR. PERKOVICH: Well, I – it – A, you have to be very careful. It’s very, very difficult. You know, I wouldn’t focus, you know, publically at least initially on Kashmir. We saw what happened when Richard Holbrooke, you know, was first put into that position and thought, you know, India would be part of his ambit – and, you know, in order to get Pakistan to do the things you need to – you need to resolve Kashmir – and the Indians wouldn’t give him a visa to come to India. And which, you know – anyway. (Laughter.)

So I don’t think – I – so real public pressure, like, on Kashmir per se would probably backfire. But that’s different from acknowledging when there are abuses of human rights, when human rights monitors aren’t being allowed to go investigate – which you would demand in almost any other country – when the, you know, what happened in

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Gujarat, you know, is kind of neglected so much. And it doesn't – it doesn't have to – I'm not talking about – the things that we tend to do as government is, you know, go out and start demanding, you know, change and so on – but at least acknowledging it, not papering over these issues when there're – when there are – when there are lives that have been lost in a horrible situation.

[01:22:36]

Now, that's different from what I was talking about on the military side in the cooperation. And there, I mean, you can't let Pakistan have a veto just like we don't let China have a veto on arms sales to Taiwan. But, you know, there's a sensitivity. You go and you try to explain it – you go through it. And what I was talking about is at least there ought to be an assessment that somebody at least ought to be able to put on paper: If we provide this kind of cooperation or this kind of weapon, here's how we think it shouldn't upset the stability of the deterrence – you ought to be able to do to that. And if you can't do that then maybe you shouldn't do the thing.

I don't – at this point the disappointment in the U.S. in terms of India's perception of the defense relationship may make it easier to do. I mean, so India hasn't agreed to the memos of understanding with the Pentagon that – required for any kind of joint operation.

MS. DEYOUNG: Want to buy their planes somewhere else. (Chuckles.)

[01:23:34]

MR. PERKOVICH: Yeah. India's – and buying the planes is another – India doesn't want port visits anymore. So India's actually reducing the defense cooperation with the U.S. over the last few years contrary to all of the claims of 2005 when we did the India deal that, you know, this cooperation was going to the moon – we were going to – it's going in the opposite direction.

And so I think that makes it easier – it should make it easier for U.S. officials to – not to beat up on India, but to stop not talking and not acknowledging things that, you know, that India does that may not be productive. So stop taking a dive, basically, and just stand up and tell – you know, say what you think.

MS. DEYOUNG: Let's go to the – to the audience for questions. And we'll start over here. OK, could you introduce yourself and –

Q: Thank you. I'm Tom Reckford with the World Affairs Council. You mentioned in your talk that Zardari was both feckless and corrupt. Are there some other leading political figures in Pakistan that give you more confidence and would do a better job as president?

[01:24:48]

MR. PERKOVICH: Pretty much no. (Laughter.) But – I mean, but I should qualify that. Imran Khan's not believed to be corrupt. He's a – he's a – he's a former cricket star – very charismatic person. There's a story I can tell about being on a plane with him, like who is that guy? I mean, he just has this aura. And he's got a lot of money from playing cricket and so he's not known to be corrupt. He's – he doesn't have a – I mean, there's no real base behind him and it's not clear that he actually has a thought-through policy on just about anything. But he's not corrupt.

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Then the two political parties that actually have bases and institutions and so on are the PPP of Zardari and then the Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif. With Nawaz Sharif, I mean, he's had several turns in power, not particularly stellar performances – little reason to think it would change. And so – but the hope would have to be that within those two parties, over time they could become institutionalized democracies. They're family fiefdoms right now. So, you know, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, her husband – you know, they'll try to do the kids. You know, but there are people with talent in the PPP that – so that that party could evolve.

[01:26:22]

And people say that there's similar things about the Muslim League, that you could imagine the Muslim League over time evolving. And then there's the MQM in Karachi which, you know, there's a lot of killing and violence going on in Karachi right now and they're implicated in it, as are other parties. It actually is the only party in Pakistan that really calls for structural reform and changing the feudal/agricultural system, educating people – because it come – it – they, Muhajirs, they came from any – they aren't part of the land that way.

So if you look at kind of their agenda and what they say, you kind of go, oh, this is kind of like a middle-class party that actually has a modernist agenda. The problem is they tend to operate like a mafia and like – like the mafia used to operate before whoever it was kind of cleaned them up. And so there isn't any – and the last thing I would say is that that's what's dispiriting, is that – is that in Pakistan you meet many, many extremely thoughtful, motivated people: you know, retired military, even some former military, you know; university people, business people and so forth. But they're not organized. They don't organize.

[01:27:44]

And so it's always this kind of atomistic (ph) sense of all the people who really want it to be changed – and so what often happens – like, the last few times I was there, they kind of go, OK, we know it's not the army; we don't want the army anymore. They go, maybe the supreme court could impose a technocratic government. So it wouldn't be the army this time, but it would be technocrats imposed by somebody. So – but there's never an idea of forming a party or organizing to do this. And so that's one of the reasons you have to be pessimistic. But it – but it still doesn't lead back to the conclusion of, OK, therefore the army – which is where the default always goes.

MS. DEYOUNG: I think – we don't have a whole lot of time, so – and I want to get to these questions. Why don't we just have each of you ask your questions, and then we'll have George – I think Doyle?

[01:28:30]

Q: Doyle McManus from the Los Angeles Times. Let me take another crack at Karen's counterterrorism question, but I want to take Afghanistan and Haqqani out of the equation for a moment. Let's imagine ourselves three or five years from now in a happy state where the war in Afghanistan has been resolved in some way. American counterterrorism strategists are still going to be very preoccupied with Pakistan, right, not just the FATA but also LeT. How do you wage a robust counterterrorism campaign in Pakistan without building up the Pakistani military and ISI in the process?

MS. DEYOUNG: Yeah, is there – was there some – someone, yeah –

Q: Well, I – just a short one. Now, I assume from the things that you've said that we should continue to take a dive on Kashmir, vis-à-vis India and Pakistan?

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MR. PERKOVICH: OK, no, but I'll tell you.

MS. DEYOUNG: (Laughter.) And then right here?

[01:29:27]

Q: Thanks. Alexander Evans – Yale and the Library of Congress. I mean, I think there's two really important messages here. And I appreciate the fact that you're putting them out. The first – and both for which I very strongly agree with. The first is that Pakistan is more important to the United States than Afghanistan. I think that's a really important message for the administration. I think the second is that there is an opportunity, ironically with Pakistan's declining strategic importance – because of the supply lines into Afghanistan, there is a strategic opportunity to think again about policy.

But the question I'd like to ask, really, is one about prospects for success. You know, the strategy that you lay out is very much based on hoping to reverse Pakistan's trickle-down politics. You're hoping instead of having a patronage-based politics in Pakistan, you can see democratization from inside Pakistan itself. What do you think the prospects are for success given the framework you suggested?

[01:30:22]

MS. DEYOUNG: And then we have two more – one there and one here.

Q: My name is Butt – Kami Butt; I write for the Pakistani Spectator. My question is about Karen's question of we are spending huge amount of money in Afghanistan. Would we – should we – do you think that we will be able to successful to do reconfiguration in that part of the world the way we did in Iraq in the terms that Pakhtun-Pash (ph) population is, like, 50 percent in Afghanistan but we are trying to make them a weaker or submissive party to Northern Alliance, and given that Pakistani army or Pakistani people or Pakistan Pashtun population that are more in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, they will never tolerate that?

So in that (then ?), aren't we wasting about billion of dollars? And aren't we – these billion of dollar are manifesting in Pakistani Balochistan that is on fire and – because every Pakistani believe that it's because India has so many opportunity, and it's getting even with Pakistan for what Pakistan did in Indian-occupied Kashmir or Indian-controlled Kashmir? So my question is about – I mean, about these two points.

And secondly, I mean, are we going to give any recognition to poor Pakistani – there are 30,000 people who lost their lives in that country since September 11th and Pakistanis see this very clear connection that they are paying for the sin that was committed by somebody else. And we don't give them any respect; we just think they are just statistics as long as they are working for American interests. Thanks.

[01:31:58]

Q: Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute. Let's say that the U.S., in your words, stops overindulging India. Will that really reassure Pakistan? I mean, the 1950s, '60s, '70s, when India-U.S. ties were not that close, when there was barely any military cooperation and less economic aid, any American gesture towards India was still seen as kind of a betrayal by Pakistan. So will that really make a difference?

MR. PERKOVICH: Great questions – that I can't answer. Doyle, on how do you do counterterrorism without building up the ISI unit, I think there – I mean, we – much like it's done now, there's cooperation and not

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cooperation, I mean, and you saw this with the Osama bin Laden raid and the – and the Raymond Davis thing. So it's never – it's never as much cooperation as we hope or as is claimed, but there's some cooperation there, in part because there are mutual interests and part because there's a rent relationship – would be number one.

Number two, I – my sense is if – again, the proper framework, from the standpoint of what I believe is the main U.S. interest is the focus on the security of Pakistan and Pakistanis. And that – and that should be, you know, the army and the ISI's interest, but it probably is the Pakistani people's interest – and so if you can communicate that. So on – you know, a lot of the terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, are targeting Pakistanis now, including the army.

[01:33:49]

When you – I mean, and this is part of where I talk about the obsessions of the ISI on India and stuff – you know, I remember – I guess it was earlier this year – going to meet the number-two guy in the ISI, and my car was stopped three times and searched along the way there. And so I go in and the guy – and the guy just starts playing the tape about India, I mean, for like half an hour – it's like, the Indians this and the Indians that and the Indians there and – I said, general, look. I get it, but I have to tell you, my car was stopped three times and searched. And they put the mirror under the car; they looked under the hood. Were they looking for Indians?

MS. DEYOUNG: (Chuckles.)

[01:34:29]

MR. PERKOVICH: And he kind of, like, looked at me for two minutes and he didn't say anything and then he went – and the Indians in Balochistan – and he went, like, you know – (inaudible, laughter). But the point is that that's – I mean, they do have an internal terrorism problem. To the extent that we frame it that way and you can get intelligence on them and go after them, I think there's a better chance – money's going to have to trade hands. And I'm not talking about, you know, that the U.S. should say or threaten to withdraw, you know, in toto in – from any of this.

But I think, you know, focus would be – and by the way, also, the view of: look, and we'll do this ourselves if we have to. I mean I think that they don't like to hear that and they're – and it's very upsetting and – but I think that also is, clearly, in a – that's a constitutional requirement for the U.S., and that needs to be part of it.

But I think these things – lastly, and it touches on some of the other points – I mean, these things are related. In other words, if there is a greater sensitivity to the moral dimensions in Pakistan, and the gentlemen here talked about the 30,000 Pakistani dead, too, that we don't – that kind of greater sensitivity to the humanness part of this, including the – that helps. The trade piece helps. All these pieces that I'm talking about create a better sense – to answer Aparna's question though, that will never be sufficient. They will never be totally reassured, especially the army, no matter what you do. But it – but incrementally it enables you to get farther than I think we've gotten in the way that we've pursued it.

Let me take a – leap to Aparna's question because she asked: Will the Pakistanis really be reassured if we did all this? No. And I – I mean, like, one of the ways I – a thought experiment I do as I thought about this analysis was, you know, well, if India disappeared from Kashmir, how much would change in Pakistan? A bit – but still the – I mean, would the army say, OK, we're going home? They're out of Kashmir, that's all we were here for; we go back to the barracks; you can take the golf course and – you know, you know, all of that. We'll divest of the big foundations; we'll step out of the presidency of all the universities. We'll do all that because we solved the problem.

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No. It'll be some other issue. So of course it won't be sufficient. But in my view it's the best we can – doing nothing isn't a good option. Doing what we're doing is not good. Doing more of what we're doing would be even worse. And so in my view this is kind of, like, the best thing I can think of, but it wouldn't be sufficient. But over time maybe it leads to a little bit better situation.

On taking a dive on Kashmir – no, but you have to be effective. I mean, public demands or trying to insert oneself into a mediating role would just backfire in India. And that's a plain fact. So it's not taking a dive that way. But when there are things like excessive use of force by the Indian security services, when mass graves are discovered – as has happened recently in Kashmir – I mean, I think acknowledging that, not – you know, not going out and screaming about it, but acknowledging it and recognizing it and relating it to Indian counterparts – that is appropriate on every – on every level.

By the way, there are people – Bill Burns the deputy – I mean, he knows how to do this. There are people who know how to do this. I think the problem is more – at a higher level even when you have more politically minded people who are thinking about campaign dollars and this, that and the other thing, and so – and aren't as thoughtful as, say, somebody like Bill Burns.

Alex's question on Pakistani – yes, it's more important. Prospects of success – I used to walk around, and my boss will tell me for five years – she's here – (laughter) – for five years she would say to me, you know, we have to do more on Pakistan; we should – and I'd say, it's hopeless. Well, it's – it may – I mean, it's a little north of hopeless. But it's – but it's – but it's in the hemisphere. I mean, it's very – I mean, it's – the prospects are very poor. I mean, you know the – I mean, it's – they're very poor.

But I'm pretty sure – I mean, what I know is we can't fix it, and what we've been trying to do over the years has been counterproductive; and the army can't fix it. And so at some point – you know, it's like with individuals: At some point you just step back and say, well, maybe it gets – they'll kind of – for survival they'll fix it themselves. But I wouldn't – I'm not optimistic about it.

[01:39:42]

And then your question about the – you know, in Afghanistan and so – look, I don't – I mean, Karen and others here know this a lot more than (I do ?). I don't think anybody's trying to do something that makes Afghanistan dominated by the Northern Alliance and keeps the Pashtuns down and everything. I think there's a – there's a desire, it's quixotic, that there be some kind of reconciliation and balance within Afghanistan where everybody feels like they have a stake in the system and nobody's getting totally screwed so that they decide they have to have a civil war – that's the hope.

And so I think that's basically, you know, the U.S. interest as well. I don't know anybody outside of parts of Pakistan who thinks that India is the cause of what's happening in Balochistan or the hidden hand or – it's been going on for – I mean, again, this is like what I was saying earlier about, you know, the Bangladesh war becomes part of the Indo-Pak narrative. It was an internal Pakistan problem, and what happened in Balochistan was an internal Pakistani problem from the beginning. Its resolution will be an internal Pakistani resolution, and at times, maybe the Indians or the Iranians or somebody, like, you know, gave something to somebody who, you know, made it worse. But it's a total misdirection to then focus on that.

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And what intelligence community people tell me is since this was really brought with emphasis to Manmohan Singh's attention in 2009, actually there isn't evidence of Indian kind of instigation and activity in Balochistan precisely because the government of India recognized Pakistan has got enough problems, and the idea of having more problems in Pakistan is a disaster for India.

MS. DEYOUNG: That's it. I thank you all. We've gone a little bit over time.

MR. PERKOVICH: Sorry.

MS. DEYOUNG: But I think I could – for one, could sit and listen to George on this subject all day. It's a wonderful paper; I commend it to all of you if you want to learn not only how we got here, where we are, but some idea to bring this situation, as George says, slightly north of hopeless. And I thank you.

[01:41:56]

MR. PERKOVICH: Thanks, Karen. (Applause.)

(END)