



Extremist Rehabilitation and Disengagement in Saudi Arabia

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21 January 2009

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE



Overview

- Background on the current security situation
- ‘Soft’ security measures
- PRAC Strategy
- Counseling Program: Rehabilitation and reintegration

Previous Photo: *Arab News* (Riyadh)

Ar-Rass, May 2005



Photo: Jane's Information Group

'Soft' counter-terrorism measures




Photo: *Atlantic Monthly*



Photo: Jane's Information Group

Advisory Committee Structure



Religious Subcommittee

Advisory Committee

Religious Subcommittee

~150 clerics and university professors

Not Ministry of Interior or police!

Two hour sessions

Long study sessions



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

٢٤٤٨/١/٤١
٢٤٠٧/١١/٤

الموضوع / المبراد وضوابطه

- ① أهمية إداري وولي الأمر
- ② أهمية أدنى
- ③ وضوح
- ④ جوانب

Photo: Author's photo, Nov 08

Psychological and Social Subcommittee





Photo: *Jihad Rehab Camp*, www.time.com



Demography of Program Participants: 1st Group

- Young (20s)
- Large families (7-15 siblings)
- From major cities
- 1/3 (~200) engaged in jihadi abroad: Afghanistan, Somalia, Chechnya
- Mothers & Fathers have low education
- Fathers lower/middle class
- Economically from low & middle class
 - Income correlation with parents
- Few high & middle class
- Radicalized through books, tapes, video, web
 - Most popular: Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi: *Clear Evidence of the Infidel Nature of Saudi State*
- Not religious education
- Most were students, some had jobs
- Very few in 'high employment'
- Very few in religious jobs, *mutawwa* or imam
- Criminal background
 - 25% criminal records
 - 13% drug offenses

Source: Ministry of Interior, Advisory Committee interviews; author's field research in Saudi Arabia, 2007-2008



Demography of Program Participants: 2nd Group

- 20%: orphans
- 13.2%: driving offenses
- 7.5%: fired from employment
 - Greater private sector employment
 - Average income, ~1-3,000 SAR/month (~\$266-\$800)
- 35%: family problems
- 26%: polygamous fathers
- 50%: father over 50 years old
- 10%: non-practicing Muslim
 - No mosque, no praying
- Violent criminal records

Source: Ministry of Interior, Advisory Committee interviews; author's field research in Saudi Arabia, 2007-2008



Inspiration

1st Group: Theorists

- bin Laden
- al-Uqla
- al-Khodeir
- al-Ulwan
- Azzam
- al-Hawali
- al-Fahd

2nd Group: Leaders

- bin Laden
- Miqrin
- al-Zawahiri
- al-Aufi
- al-Zarqawi
- al-Ayeri



Sources of Motivation

1st Group

- Sympathies
- Audio tapes
- Video tapes
- Jihadi awakening
- Shaykhs
- Friends

2nd Group

- Expel the US
- Revenge against the security services
- Revenge against the US/UK
- Iraq
- Gain training and experience



Radicalization Drivers

1. Tapes
2. Books
3. *Juma* prayers
4. Shaykhs
5. Friends
6. Lectures
7. Islamist magazines
8. Media
9. Islamic institutions
10. Internet
11. Brochures
12. Trends and currents within the Islamist movement



Recruitment Targets

- Confusion
- Low knowledge of Islam
- Recently repentant
- Thirst for spiritual knowledge
- Dedication to Islam
- Spiritual concern
- Desperation
- Naiveté
- Physical needs



Methods of recruitment

- Single narrative (28%)
- Trap and scare (22%)
- Deception, Jihad in Iraq (11%)
- Elimination of sins
- Access to heaven
- Not religious, other reasons
 - money




Radicalization Process

Interest → **Radicalization** → *Recruitment*

Interest → *Recruited* → **Radicalized**

Non-practicing → *Recruited* → **Radicalized**

Security Subcommittee



Media Subcommittee





Photo: Donna Abu Nasr (Associated Press), 3 July 2007

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Photo: Jihad Rehab Camp, www.time.com



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For more information, see *Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Policy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*, Carnegie Paper 97 (September 2008)