China’s Assertive Behavior

Part One: On “Core Interests”

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Among both casual observers and experts alike, the single most dominant theme in Sino-U.S. relations of the past year or more has been the emergence of a more “assertive China.” In CLM 32, we examined how both Chinese and outside observers look at China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage, that is, the purely perceptual dimensions of the issue. In this and several subsequent CLMs, we intend to assess whether, to what extent, and in what manner, the Chinese government is becoming more assertive in several major areas of relevance to the United States: First, in defining and promoting the concept of “core interests”; second, with regard to U.S. political and military behavior along China’s maritime periphery; third, concerning a variety of economic, trade, and finance issues, from so-called indigenous innovation to global standards regarding reserve currencies; and fourth, with regard to several issues related to international security, from counter-proliferation to climate change.

In each of these four areas, we shall to varying degrees attempt to answer several basic questions regarding Chinese assertiveness that build on those addressed in CLM 32: In what ways are Chinese leaders becoming more assertive, employing what methods, and to what apparent ends? Is Chinese assertiveness a “new” and highly significant phenomenon for U.S. interests, and if so, in what manner? What misconceptions, if any, exist about China’s assertiveness? What internal and external forces are driving China’s assertive behavior? In particular, is Chinese assertiveness associated with particular interest groups or factions within Chinese state and society? How is China’s assertiveness evolving in response to both inside and outside pressures? And finally, what do the answers to the foregoing questions tell us about the likely future direction and strength of China’s assertiveness over the next several years?

What Kind of Assertive Behavior?

As indicated in CLM 32, China’s assertiveness means different things to different people. As a result, the concept, in describing Chinese behavior, is somewhat vague and ambiguous, potentially encompassing everything from attempts to play a more active role
in a wide variety of international regimes, to deliberate efforts to alter basic international norms and challenge the fundamental national interests or policies of the United States. In addition, there are many forms of assertiveness, from mere verbal statements or comments, to concerted official actions that appear designed to intimidate or even to force other nations or foreign entities to change their behavior. As this typology suggests, some forms of Chinese assertiveness are probably beneficial to the workings of the international system and U.S. interests while others are not. Indeed, U.S. officials welcome a more active, engaged China that seeks both to strengthen and to shape international institutions and norms in ways that advance prosperity, stability, and the peaceful resolution of problems. They presumably do not welcome a China that desires or appears to do otherwise.

In addition, not all indications of Chinese assertiveness (whether “good” or “bad” for the United States and other Western powers) are sanctioned or supported by the Chinese government. Indeed, as we have seen in CLM 32, many unofficial Chinese observers and pundits express or advocate various levels and types of assertiveness that are not reflected in official Chinese statements or documents.

Thus, any assessment of Chinese assertiveness must distinguish between official and unofficial actions or utterances, productive or creative assertiveness (what one might call “positive activism”) and confrontational, destabilizing, or threatening (from a Western or U.S. perspective) assertiveness. This essay, and those that follow, focuses primarily on identifying, measuring, and assessing official or governmental forms of negative or potentially threatening Chinese assertiveness, given its clear significance for future Sino-American relations and the obvious attention that it has received among outside observers.

Why “Core Interests”?

Since at least November of 2009, when it was inserted in the U.S.-China Joint Statement between Hu Jintao and Barack Obama during the latter’s state visit to China, the notion of China’s “core interests” (核心利益) has received enormous attention among both media pundits and experts alike. Many observers interpret the use of this concept by the PRC government as an indication of strong (and growing) Chinese assertiveness in the international arena, for three apparent reasons: first, because in recent years the concept has been more formally defined and included in official PRC (and at least one bilateral U.S.-PRC) statements and documents to a greater extent than in the past; second, because some Chinese officials and unofficial observers have apparently asserted that China’s “core interests” are essentially nonnegotiable in nature, thus conveying a level of rigidity and perhaps militancy toward whatever issue might be defined as a core interest; and third, because China is allegedly steadily defining more and more controversial international issues as affecting its “core interests,” including U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, meetings between foreign leaders and the Dalai Lama, and disputed territories in the South China Sea, thus by implication challenging an array of foreign activities relating to such issues. In the remainder of this essay, we shall examine these observations in turn.
Increasing Usage and an Official Definition

An examination of the historical record indicates that the Chinese government has indeed in recent years invoked China’s “core interests” far more frequently, and presented publicly a more explicit definition of the term, than it has done in the past. In fact, official Chinese sources only began referring to China’s “core interests” on a fairly frequent basis in 2003–2004. The term was initially used in Chinese official media during the 1980s and '90s only in reference to the interests of other nations.

It was first used with reference to China in the mid-'90s and in the first years of the new century, but primarily in a domestic context. At that time, the term was closely associated with and seemed to emerge from the term “fundamental interests” (根本利益) as applied to China’s economic- and social-reform policies and the general maintenance of domestic order and stability.

The term “core interests” has also been used in official PRC media alongside the term “major concerns” (重大关切). The latter term was in fact employed earlier than “core interests” in official PRC media and at times was used in joint statements between China and foreign governments, for example, in a report on a meeting between Jiang Zemin and President Chirac of France in 2000. It has also been used to refer to the Taiwan issue and the one-China principle.

The term “core interests” was apparently first applied to China in a foreign context in PRC media in early 2002, but in an unofficial capacity, in an article written by a Chinese scholar. The first official foreign-oriented reference to the term “core interests” appeared in the report of a meeting between Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Secretary of State Colin Powell on January 19, 2003, in which Tang identified Taiwan as among China’s “core interests.” (See below for more on the link between Taiwan and the emergence of the official PRC use of “core interests”).

The first apparent official identification of the oft espoused concepts of “sovereignty and territorial integrity” (主权和领土完整) as a Chinese “core interest” occurred in April 2004, again in the context of a discussion of Taiwan. During the remainder of 2004, both official and unofficial Chinese usage of the term “core interests” in reference to sovereignty and territorial interests (and Taiwan in particular) increased significantly. The related issue of “national security” (国家安全) was apparently first explicitly identified officially as a core interest in a speech given by then Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in September 2006 and reported in the People’s Daily.

As one might surmise from the above references, major official and unofficial PRC media mentions of China’s core interests in a foreign-policy context increased notably beginning in the early 2000s, from a mention in one People’s Daily article in 2001 to 260 articles in 2009 and 325 articles in 2010.
Moreover, by 2004, Chinese officials had begun routinely mentioning the need for countries to respect and accommodate one another’s “core interests” in speeches with foreign officials and dignitaries, thus indicating that the term had not only entered the official lexicon but also become an important element of PRC diplomacy.  

It is therefore not surprising that the senior Chinese official responsible for PRC foreign policy (State Councilor Dai Bingguo) publicly defined the general elements of China’s core interests in July 2009, during a session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). Dai stated in his closing remarks at the S&ED that the term includes three components: 1) preserving China’s basic state system and national security (维护基本制度和国家安全); 2) national sovereignty and territorial integrity (国家主权和领土完整); and 3) the continued stable development of China’s economy and society (经济社会的持续稳定发展). Variations of this multi-part definition have occurred officially since that time, and have been repeated by unofficial Chinese sources as well.

In addition, Chinese officials have also at times identified “national unity” or “reunification” (国家统一/两岸统一/统一大业) as a Chinese core interest, as well as “independence” (独立), in some instances alongside the three elements listed above. However, the former references were almost invariably intended to buttress the Chinese position regarding issues associated with territorial integrity, such as Taiwan, and hence can be taken as largely duplicative of an element contained in Dai Bingguo’s list. In the case of “independence,” references have been very few in number and have always occurred in a bilateral or multilateral context (with regard to the “core interests” of both
countries or of countries in general); in some cases the word was inserted within the phrase “sovereignty and territorial integrity,” as in: “The defense of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity is the core interest of every country.”16 Thus, the concept is, as with “national unity” or “reunification,” most closely associated with the general category of sovereignty and territorial integrity as a core interest.

Chinese officials have also identified “human rights” as a Chinese core interest. However, this has only occurred nine times in official Foreign Ministry sources. Hu Jintao used it twice, in November 2006, during state visits to Laos and Pakistan. In both instances, he was expressing China’s appreciation for the support the two countries have extended to Beijing’s position on “ . . . Taiwan, Tibet, human rights and other major questions involving China’s state sovereignty and core interests.”17 The seven other references include two from Yang Jiechi in 2008 and five from various ambassadors, including statements by Zhou Wenzhong, ambassador to the United States, in November 2009, and Song Zhe, ambassador to the EU, in December 2008.18 Moreover, overall, this context seems to suggest that human rights as a core interest refers primarily to Beijing’s right to determine how the lives of China’s citizenry will be promoted, especially in contested regions such as Taiwan and Tibet, for example, via the advancement of local economic and social conditions. In other words, the issue is again associated with domestic interests or other core interests involving sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Therefore, the most common and authoritative formulation of the general concepts comprising China’s core interests appears to remain that of Dai Bingguo, presented in July 2009. That said, since Dai articulated his definition, Chinese officials have continued to place the most emphasis on “sovereignty and territorial integrity” as the most important characteristic of China’s core interests. The first and third elements of Dai’s definition—“basic state system and national security,” and “continued stable social and economic development”—are still only infrequently mentioned in the context of China’s “core interests.”

Motivated by the Taiwan Issue?

It is not entirely clear what prompted official Chinese sources to begin employing the term “core interests” to such a degree and in this manner. Of course, the defense or protection of China’s national security, the PRC system or regime, and Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the protection and advancement of China’s economy and society, has been a staple of PRC foreign policy for decades. Indeed, they are basic to any nation’s definition of its national interests.

That said, it is quite likely that Beijing began to sharpen and promote vigorously the concept of “core interests” in response to growing concerns over the Taiwan issue. By 2004–2005, Beijing had become extremely worried about what it regarded as the efforts of former Taiwan president Chen Shui bian to achieve de jure Taiwan independence, possibly with U.S. backing. In response, during that time, the National People’s Congress promulgated the so-called Anti-Secession Law (ASL, in March 2005), and PRC officials began pressing (or warning) the United States and other countries to reject Chen’s efforts
and to recognize China’s vital interests on the issue.\textsuperscript{19} As indicated above, it is precisely at this time that Chinese officials began to emphasize China’s core interests, and to specify Taiwan as a primary example.\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, for some unofficial Chinese observers, Beijing’s “core interests” are primarily about sovereignty and territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{21}

**Used as a Warning and for Diplomatic Leverage**

As suggested above, China’s relatively recent and repeated invocation of the phrase “core interests” generates concern among both foreigners and some Chinese in large part because of: 1) Beijing’s efforts to pressure foreign governments (and especially the United States) to officially acknowledge acceptance of the general concept and the specific policy issues to which it applies (such as Taiwan—discussed below); and, more importantly, 2) its apparent association with a rigid, uncompromising diplomatic or military stance. In other words, the appearance of the term appears to signal a more vigorous attempt to lay down a marker, or type of warning, regarding the need for the United States and other countries to respect (indeed, accept with little if any negotiation) China’s position on certain issues.

Regarding the first point, beginning in the early 2000s, Chinese officials increasingly pressed the United States to issue formal statements indicating a willingness to respect one another’s core interests (as indicated above), and even, in recent years, to explicitly and formally recognize the category of “core interests and major concerns” in general, as a necessary basis for the advancement of the bilateral relationship.\textsuperscript{22} This pressure campaign culminated in the inclusion of the term in the November 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statement. This was the first time that it had been used in an official, high-level Sino-American statement or communiqué. In fact, even in past meetings where senior Chinese officials were pressing their U.S. counterparts to respect China’s “core interests,” U.S. officials never repeated the phrase, but instead merely conveyed support for various long-standing U.S. policies, such as the “one China” principle and the three joint communiqués.\textsuperscript{23}

The 1972 and 1982 Sino-U.S. joint communiqués do affirm “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states” and “respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (respectively), which Beijing has since identified as one of its core interests.\textsuperscript{24} However, by November 2009 Beijing had significantly expanded its definition of core interests to include several other general categories, as indicated in the July 2009 statement by Dai Bingguo, discussed above. Therefore, such past U.S. acknowledgments (of respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity) could not be viewed as a precedent for the U.S. acceptance of Beijing’s “core interests” in the Hu-Obama joint statement.

Since the signing of the November 2009 Joint Statement, Beijing has repeatedly and emphatically cited the mutual commitment to respect one another’s “core interests” contained in that document as a basis for its demands that Washington alter its behavior in a variety of areas, from arms sales to Taiwan to presidential meetings with the Dalai Lama. Indeed, the Chinese have branded the joint statement as an “important consensus”
that is a major step in the development of a “new era” (新时期) in U.S.-China relations. It is often mentioned in official Chinese sources alongside the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués. However, the reference to “core interests” was not included in the joint statement issued after Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington in January 2011. The reason for this omission is not entirely clear, but most likely reflects, at least partly, a U.S. desire to avoid the controversy that followed the inclusion of the term in the 2009 joint statement. At that time, some observers argued that the Obama administration had shown undue weakness in allegedly acceding to a Chinese demand to include a phrase closely associated with Beijing’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, and other supposed territorial ambitions.

Regarding the association of “core interests” with an uncompromising official PRC stance, the historical record suggests that, although Chinese officials have not to our knowledge used the phrase “non-negotiable” (不能谈判, 非流通, 不可转让, 免谈的) to describe China’s stance toward its “core interests,” they have certainly employed similar terms on many occasions. For example, officials have stated that China will “never waver, compromise, or yield” (决不动摇, 决不妥协, 绝不会让步), will not haggle or bargain (付价还价), and “must stand firm, be clear-cut, have courage to fight, and never trade away principles” (必须立场坚定, 旗帜鲜明, 敢于斗争, 善于斗争, 决不拿原则作交易) when dealing with its core interests, and with issues involving sovereignty and territorial integrity in particular.

Moreover, Chinese officials and official media sources have at times separately used the term “non-negotiable” to refer to issues that Beijing has described as a “core interest,” notably, sovereignty and territorial integrity, involving, for example, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet. And in some cases, Chinese officials have explicitly connected the defense of specific core interests (again, most notably sovereignty and territorial integrity) with the possible use of force. Such language has been used quite consistently for years. Of course, even official (and unofficial) statements of strong resolve and a refusal to compromise do not necessarily guarantee that Beijing would in reality in every instance employ such a rigid approach (including, perhaps the use of force) to defend what it has defined as its core interests. Yet, at least with regard to sovereignty and territorial issues, the historical record of China’s behavior suggests that such a possibility would be extremely high, and certainly cannot be dismissed.

Hence, what China labels as its “core interest” is certainly significant. And so, perhaps the most important issue becomes, what specific policy areas does Beijing include among its core interests?

**Territorial Issues (and Especially Taiwan) are at the Core**

A large number of unofficial Chinese and foreign observers have identified a range of issues as being among China’s “core interests.” These include Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang-related issues; territories in the South China Seas; the defense of the Yellow Sea; the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands; bilateral trade; and the value of China’s currency. Some of these issues (such as Taiwan and access to international waters near China)
directly concern critical U.S. security interests. In truth, much of the unofficial commentary contains inaccuracies, distortions, and misconceptions. A close examination of the historical record, along with personal conversations with knowledgeable senior U.S. officials, confirms that thus far the Chinese government has officially, and repeatedly, identified only three closely related issues as specific core interests: the defense of China’s sovereignty claims regarding Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

As indicated above, the Taiwan issue probably originally triggered official use of the term “core interests” in the realm of foreign affairs and has clearly been most often associated with its official use. On the subject of Tibet, Chinese officials have of course for many years referred to Tibet’s status as part of China as an important or fundamental sovereignty issue. For example, the 1992 PRC white paper on Tibet stated that “there is no room for haggling” (讨价还价) on the fundamental principle (基本原则) that “Tibet is an inalienable part of China.” However, perhaps the first (or at least an early) occurrence of an official, explicit reference to Tibet as a Chinese “core interest” occurred in April 2006, in a meeting between PRC Vice President Zeng Qinghong and the prime minister of Sri Lanka.

Similarly, Chinese officials have often referred to Xinjiang’s sovereign status as an important Chinese interest. The earliest use of the term “core interest” in reference to that Chinese region apparently also dates from 2006. In November of that year, in a speech in Pakistan, Hu Jintao first identified “the fight against East Turkestan” terrorist forces as a Chinese “core interest,” alongside Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. This clearly implies that the defense of China’s sovereignty over Xinjiang (which the East Turkestan terrorist forces violently contest) is a PRC core interest. On subsequent occasions (beginning largely in 2009, it seems), Chinese officials have referred simply to “Xinjiang” as being among China’s core interests.

As far as we can surmise from the official PRC sources used in this study, references to the defense of the Yellow Sea, Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, bilateral trade, and the value of China’s currency as Chinese core interests are entirely unofficial. In other words, we can find no official source stating that such concepts are among China’s “core interests.”

The reference to the South China Sea as a Chinese core interest is a more complex matter. The New York Times apparently first reported that Chinese officials had identified the defense of China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea as a “core interest” in a private meeting held in Beijing in March 2010 with two senior U.S. officials, NSC Asia Director Jeffrey Bader and Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg. Many other media sources (and other New York Times reporters) subsequently repeated this initial New York Times story, often without citing it as the original source (or perhaps in some cases merely duplicating the story by interviewing the same U.S. official paraphrased in the New York Times story), thus creating the impression that the report came from multiple sources. At least one media source subsequently asserted that Dai Bingguo had also identified the South China Sea in this manner to Hillary Clinton, at the May 2010
meeting of the S&ED in Washington. Clinton herself repeated this during a recent press interview in Australia.

However, a close examination of the official Chinese sources consulted for this study failed to unearth a single example of a PRC official or an official PRC document or media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC “core interest.” In fact, when given the opportunity to clarify the official record on this issue, Chinese officials have avoided doing so. During their October 11, 2010, meeting in Hanoi, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie apparently did not mention the issue of the South China Seas to U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. And when President Hu Jintao traveled to Washington for his state visit in January 2011, he explicitly identified only Taiwan and Tibet as core interests.

In addition, personal communications with very knowledgeable U.S. officials confirm that Chinese officials did not explicitly identify China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea as a “core interest” in the March 2010 meeting with Steinberg and Bader. In that meeting, the PRC officials listed the issue as one among several about which they were attempting to elicit U.S. understanding and deference for Beijing’s position. Although this effort was viewed as a clear attempt to raise the importance of the South China Sea issue in China’s overall hierarchy of concerns, it did not explicitly constitute an effort to brand it as a “core interest.”

Regarding Dai Bingguo’s comment to Clinton at the May 2010 S&ED, a review of Dai’s remarks at the opening and closing sessions reveals no reference to the South China Sea issue as a PRC “core interest.” Moreover, one very well-placed U.S. official confirmed to the author in a personal correspondence (conveyed prior to Clinton’s recent remark in Australia) that Dai indeed did not describe the South China Sea issue in this manner. In fact, all Chinese remarks regarding the South China Sea made at the S&ED were presented spontaneously by a lower-level official, and thus should not be regarded as authoritative, according to the U.S. official.

What then about Clinton’s recent remark, noted above? It is possible that Dai actually made the remark to Clinton in a private, offline, and unofficial conversation, or that Clinton: a) did not accurately recall what Dai said; b) mistook the abovementioned lower-level official for Dai Bingguo; or c) made the remark, knowing it was not true, to add to existing U.S. efforts to deter China from attempting to add the South China Sea to its list of core interests.

In any event, the foregoing information strongly suggests three conclusions: first, at the very least, Beijing has not unambiguously identified the South China Sea issue as one of its core interests, as it has done with Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Second, even if Beijing did identify the issue as a core interest on one occasion (at the May 2010 S&ED), this was done in a decidedly unofficial manner. Third, although Beijing originally attempted in the March 2010 Steinberg/Bader meeting to raise the importance of the South China Sea issue as a Chinese interest in U.S. eyes, it has deliberately avoided
clarifying its stance on the matter since that time, thus creating the impression that it is backing away from the controversy.

Perhaps for some observers, the issue of whether or not Beijing has identified the South China Sea as a core interest is a purely semantic one, of little real significance, especially given China’s apparent attempt to raise its relevance in March 2010. However, as noted above, the Chinese application of the term “core interest” to an issue is intended to convey a very high level of commitment to managing or resolving that issue on Chinese terms, without much if any discussion or negotiation (at least regarding basic questions such as China’s ultimate sovereign authority, as in the case of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang). In other words, it conveys a high level of resolve, and to some extent a warning of sorts to other powers. In this particular instance, labeling China’s claims to the South China Sea as a core interest would have signaled a significant, and alarming, shift in China’s historical stance toward the issue. That stance not only recognizes the multinational nature of the South China Sea issue as a sovereignty dispute among several countries (albeit one that Beijing wishes to handle on a bilateral basis, with each claimant), but also seeks to convey Beijing’s willingness to negotiate the ultimate nature and extent of Chinese sovereignty over the region. In contrast, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang are described as purely Chinese internal affairs not subject to dispute or negotiation.49

But if the term “core interests” has such significance, why has Beijing avoided clarifying whether or not it applies to the South China Sea issue? Although it is impossible to say with certainty, it is probably because confirming the association would signal a clear shift in position that would likely provoke an even stronger international reaction than has occurred thus far (as indicated above), while an official denial of the association might convey an impression of weakness and retreat from China’s basic stance on sovereignty and territorial issues, thus inviting domestic attack.50 Moreover, in reality, Beijing has not clearly confirmed the precise nature and extent of its sovereignty claims to the South China Sea; hence, clarifying its stance on whether the issue constitutes a core interest could generate confusion and thereby force China to make such a clarification.51

Some unofficial Chinese observers have also argued that Beijing should not officially confirm that the South China Sea is a core interest because to do so would not only sow confusion among other nations, but also “... be used by unfriendly forces in the international community in a bid to contain China.”52 Some Chinese academics even suggest that the United States was falsely accusing China of elevating the South China Sea to the level of a “core interest” in order to hype the China threat among China’s neighbors, culminating in Secretary Clinton’s orchestrated pushback against the Chinese at the ASEAN Regional Forum in late July 2010.53 Other Chinese observers more broadly argue that China should be extremely cautious in describing any specific issues (including the South China Sea) as a “core interest,” given the potentially provocative nature of the term to other nations.54 However, as suggested in endnote 32, many unofficial Chinese observers argue that the South China Sea issue is or should be declared a core Chinese interest.
The preceding unofficial differences in viewpoint, along with the likely dilemma involved in confirming whether the South China Sea is a core interest, together suggest the possibility of disagreement among the Chinese leadership on this matter. If such disagreement exists, it is probably not along civil-military lines, however, since some PLA officers (such as Han Xudong and Yin Zhuo) oppose declaring the South China Sea a core interest, while others (such as Luo Yuan) support such a move.55

Conclusion

As the foregoing analysis shows, Beijing’s use of the term “core interest” with regard to issues involving the international community, and the United States in particular, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Its usage probably derives from growing Chinese concerns over the Taiwan issue in the early 2000s. However, the term has since been unambiguously applied to two other sovereignty-related issues (Tibet and Xinjiang), and its general coverage has been expanded to include three other general sets of state interests: the Chinese political system, national security, and socioeconomic development. Despite much reporting to the contrary, Beijing’s territorial claims with regard to the South China Sea have not been clearly identified officially and publicly as a “core interest.” Moreover, the application of the term by senior PRC officials to other general issues such as “independence,” “human rights,” and “national unity” or “reunification” seem intended to reinforce the existing primary emphasis placed on sovereignty and territorial issues as core Chinese interests.

The term “core interests” has its precursors and draws on long-held stances toward sovereignty and territorial issues. However, its increasing use in official statements and diplomatic documents, and its explicit application to specific contentious policy issues (most notably Taiwan) arguably signals an attempt by a stronger, more assertive Chinese leadership to elicit greater respect and deference from other nations for China’s position on those issues. Equally important, as suggested in CLM 32, this effort is perhaps also motivated by a belief that the United States and other powers are increasingly challenging some of China’s core interests, thus requiring a more assertive PRC response. In addition, Beijing’s apparent refusal to “haggle” or compromise, and its stated willingness to employ extreme measures—including force—to defend its position with regard to China’s core interests, arguably constitute a warning to other nations that should not be ignored.

Of course, every nation has its national interests, many of which are described as “vital” or “core.”56 China is obviously no exception. Nonetheless, Beijing’s explicit and growing emphasis on the term, its adoption of a seemingly rigid negotiating stance on core interests, the application of the phrase to contentious issues such as Taiwan, and, perhaps most importantly, the possibility that a stronger China might expand the scope and sharpen the definition of its core interests further to include other issues of contention, together pose a significant challenge to U.S. (and Chinese) efforts to maintain a stable and mutually productive bilateral relationship.
Notes

2 The major primary sources employed in this study to chart the official use of the concept of “core interests” and related terms include: The official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国外交部), Chinese and English versions (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn and http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng, respectively); the archives of People’s Daily (人民日报), at PeopleData (http://data.people.com.cn, 人民日报数据库; 中国政府文献信息); the archives of PLA Daily (解放军报) at East View Information Services (http://www.eastview.com); and the databases of the Chinese Government and the Communist Party of China (CPC), both at PeopleData. We are also grateful to Professor Alastair Iain Johnston of Harvard University for providing his unpublished data on the PRC usage of the term “core interests.”


4 For example, see “驻美国大使馆召开胡锦涛总书记重要讲话座谈会,” 中华人民共和国外交部; (“U.S. Embassy held important talks with General Secretary Hu Jintao,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), January 11, 2009, available at http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/zybd/1531443.htm; “周大使 . . . 指出 . . . 把握民族根本利益和国家核心利益，体现了尊重历史、尊重现实、尊重人民愿望的实事求是精神.” (“Ambassador Zhou . . . stated that . . . grasping fundamental interests and core national interests reflects the truth-seeking spirit of respect for history, respect for reality, and respect for the wishes of the people.”)

A 1995 article from the PLA Daily specifically discusses the adjustment from a focus on “fundamental interests” to “core interests” in the process of economic and social reform. However, it does not clearly define the difference between the two terms. Based on a reading of the article, it is possible that the former referred to the basic interest of promoting overall national economic development while the latter was intended to focus on the attainment of greater economic and social equality and common prosperity. Nonetheless, both concepts were at the time applied to domestic issues. See “图片 / 照片 / 其它,” 解放军报 (“Picture/Photo/Other,” PLA Daily), February 17, 1995, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/14466790. For a similar usage, also see “《求是》杂志发表署名文章 《划清‘四个重大界限’的有关理论与实践问题》,” 解放军报 (“Qiushi published a signed article by Hua Qing: ‘Four Major Boundaries of Theoretical and Practical Issues,’” PLA Daily), August 17, 2001, available at http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/22327893.


Da’s remarks were to some extent presaged (though not explicitly spelled out) by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, in remarks delivered in Washington, DC, on March 12, 2009. At that time, Yang stated: “Mutual respect means that we should respect international law and norms governing international relations, view each other in an objective and sensible way, respect each other’s choice of development path and core interests, and refrain from doing anything that may harm each other’s sovereignty, security or development interests.” Yang Jiechi, “Broaden China-U.S. Cooperation in the 21st Century,” Speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., March 12, 2009, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/t542231.htm, emphasis added.


Da Wei, deputy director of the Department of American Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations [CICIR], cited Dai Bingguo’s definition in his discussion of how China should strategically utilize the term “core interests”; see Da Wei, “Why Should China Declare Its Core Interests?” Huangqiu Shibao, July 28, 2010, OSC CPP20100729788013.

Jin Canrong, vice director of the School of International Studies at China’s Renmin University, also discussed Da’s definition, explaining that the phrase “basic system” referred to the system “of multiparty cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China.” See “China Denies Taking Tough Stance on International Affairs,” Global Times Online, March 8, 2010, OSC CPP20100308722006.

For other unofficial references to Dai Bingguo’s multi-part definition, see Wu Zhong, “China Cut To the Core,” Asia Times, August 19, 2009, OSC CPP20090819715002; and Cary Huang, “A Bolder China Asserts ‘Core’ Interests But Will It Act?” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2010, OSC CPP20100812715004.

This is the earliest reference to “national unity” (国家统一) or “reunification” (两岸统一) as core interests of China found on the PRC Foreign Ministry website. For similar later references, see “曾庆红会见匈牙利总理久尔查尼,” 中华人民共和国外交部 (“Zeng Qinghong meets with Hungarian prime minister Gyuresuly, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), September 8, 2005, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/wjwb/zwbd/t172364.htm.


16 See “纳米比亚议会和政府支持我通过《反分裂国家法》,” 中华人民共和国外交部 (“Namibian parliament and government to support the implementation of the “Anti-Secession Law,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), March 18, 2005, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/zt/ywzt/2005year/5lfj/t442120.htm. This is the first reference to the phrase “independence” (独立) in the context of “core interests.” Also see “国家主席胡锦涛接受中媒体联合
Moreover, Hu Jintao delivered a speech in the run-up to the passage of the Anti-Secession Law wherein he spelled out “Four Nevers” vis-à-vis Taiwan and declared that “safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity is where a country’s core interest lies.” “President Hu sets forth guidelines on Taiwan,” Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Hungary, March 5, 2005, available at http://www.chinaembassy.hu/hu/xwdt/t185890.htm.

21 See Cary Huang, “A Bolder China Asserts ‘Core’ Interests But Will It Act?” South China Morning Post, August 12, 2010, OSC CPP20100812715004. This article cites Professor Jin Canrong, associate dean of Renmin University’s School of International Relations, as stating: “There is consensus within Chinese diplomatic circles and think-tank scholars that the term [core interests] will apply to only two categories—territorial integrity and sovereignty—at least for the moment.”

22 For recent examples, see Liao Lei and Hou Lijun, “(Foreign Affairs) Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zou Gang: We Expect More Positive Results from Obama’s China Visit,” Xinhua, November 10, 2009, OSC CPP20091110062018. The article states, “In response to a question about whether a specific statement will be made during this visit about meddling in Taiwan and Tibet, [Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson] Qin Gang said that clear stipulations and promises are set out to address these issues in the three Sino-US joint communiques and this is also an important political foundation for forward development of the Sino-US relationship. To allow the Sino-US relations to move forward in a healthy and stable manner, the United States must abide by the three joint communiques and respect the core interests and major areas of concern on both sides” (emphasis added). Also see “Hu Jintao Holds Talks with US President Obama,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 17, 2009, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmtdyzs/xwlb/t628187.htm. This official PRC account of the Obama-Hu talks in November 2009 reported Hu’s stating that “to respect the core interest and major concern of each other” was necessary for strategic mutual trust.


A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs report states that Obama “urged both sides to respect each other’s core interests” during the Hu-Obama meeting of April 2009 on the sidelines of the G20 Financial Summit in London. However, this report was not an official statement, and the official U.S. statement on the meeting found on the White House website does not mention any reference by Obama to “core interests.”


Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi is perhaps the most direct statement of the fundamental non-negotiable of China’s so-called “core interests” as well as issues that it defines as its core interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and “sovereignty and territorial integrity” (主权和领土完整):

- 必须立场坚定，旗帜鲜明，敢于斗争，善于斗争，决不含糊，决不能搞妥协。 (must stand firm, be clear-cut, have courage to fight, and never trade away principles)
- 决不会妥协 (never compromise)
- 决不退让 (not yield)
- 决不会前进一步，不给一步 (never yield)
- 决不会容忍 (never tolerate)
- 决不能有丝毫犹豫、含糊和退让 (will never have the slightest hesitation, faltering, or concession)
- 在任何时候都决不会拿自己的主权和原则做交易 (will never at any time trade off its sovereignty and principles)
- 不容分割 (brooks no division)


28 See Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China,” October 22, 1984, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, volume 3, 1982–1992, ed. People’s Daily Online, available at http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol3/text/c1280.html. In this source, Deng Xiaoping states that he told Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in their 1984 meeting on the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese rule that “sovereignty was not negotiable” (主权问题不是可谈判的). This was said in the context of Hong Kong (and later in these remarks he compares Hong Kong to Taiwan). However, the comment is often taken to refer to sovereignty issues in general. Jiang Zemin also used the exact same phrase as Deng Xiaoping——“the sovereignty issue is non-negotiable” (主权问题是不能够谈判的), on this occasion in direct reference to Taiwan. See “江泽民会见美国总统国家安全事务助理伯杰,” 中华人民共和国外交部 (“President Jiang Zemin meets with U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Samuel Berger,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China), November 7, 2000, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/xhly/wqjsj/t7531.htm. However, a 2008 article by current Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi is perhaps the most direct statement of the fundamental non-negotiability of sovereignty and territorial integrity
China’s “core interests.” See 杨洁篪, “改革开放以来的中国外交” (Yang Jiechi, “China’s diplomacy since reform and opening”), September 16, 2008, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/wzb/zzxx/t512782.htm. Yang states: “In major issues involving core national interests, stand firm and clear-cut, dare to struggle, put up a good fight, and never trade principles. At the same time pay attention to strategy, adhere to a flexible and pragmatic approach, reasonable, beneficial, and restrained, maintaining the long-term and fundamental interests of our country.” (“在涉及国家核心利益的重大问题上，必须立场坚定，旗帜鲜明，敢于斗争，善于斗争，决不拿原则作交易。同时讲究策略，灵活务实，坚持有理、有利、有节，维护我国的长远和根本利益。”)


Recently, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the same observation regarding China’s core interests, stating: “China has announced a number of ‘core interests’ which are, in essence, non-negotiable and for which China is prepared to fight, if necessary.” See Henry A. Kissinger, “Power Shifts and Security,” keynote address, 8th ISSS Global Strategic Review, September 10, 2010, available at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-review/global-strategic-review-2010/plenary-sessions-and-speeches-2010/keynote-address/henry-kissinger/.


“Q: Recently, there are lots of reports on China’s core interests in the Yellow Sea. Could you outline China’s core interests? And in what way will the US-ROK joint naval exercise compromise China’s core interests?

A: China’s core interests refer to national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and development interests.”

As for the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, in response to a direct question on their “core interest” status, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei neither confirmed nor denied that the disputed islands were part of China’s core interest. See “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on November 2, 2010,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 3, 2010, available at http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t766610.htm.

“Q: . . . China once said that issues such as Taiwan and Tibet bear on China’s core interest. Is the Diaoyu island issue also part of China’s core interest?

A: The Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands have been China’s inherent territory since ancient times.”

39 Edward Wong, “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” New York Times, April 23, 2010. Wong cites “an American official involved in China policy” as follows: “In March, Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. Bader and James B. Steinberg, that China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of China’s ‘core interest’ of sovereignty, said an American official involved in China policy. It was the first time the Chinese labeled the South China Sea a core interest, on par with Taiwan and Tibet, the official said.”


42 See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Interview With Greg Sheridan of The Australian, Melbourne, Australia, November 8, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/11/150671.htm. The transcript of the interview quotes Clinton as stating, “And when China first told us at a meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue that they viewed the South China Sea as a core interest, I immediately responded and said we don’t agree with that.” The reporter then asked, “Was that Dai Bingguo that said that to you?” And Clinton replied, “Yes, yeah.

43 For example, see “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on September 21, 2010,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 21, 2010, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t756092.htm. In response to a specific question (“US officials said China once expressed that the South China Sea is its core interest. Please confirm.”), Jiang replied: “Each country has its own core interests. Issues concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity and major development interests are significant to all countries. China believes the South China Sea issue is only the dispute of territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests between relevant countries rather than an issue between China and ASEAN, let alone a regional or international issue. It can only and must be settled through friendly consultations between both parties in a peaceful manner. Adhering to ‘putting aside disputes and seeking common development,’ we are always committed to proper settlement through bilateral consultations with relevant countries. The channel of communication is smooth.”


46 Personal communication with senior U.S. officials. One should add that Beijing probably emphasized the importance of the South China Sea territorial issue to Chinese interests at the March 2010 meeting with Steinberg and Bader in order to deter Washington from raising the issue at the Hanoi meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), scheduled for the following July. If so, the Chinese clearly failed in that attempt, since the ARF meeting witnessed a largely U.S.-orchestrated discussion of the issue, and a clear U.S. attempt to increase its overall involvement in the controversy. This event will be discussed in greater detail in an upcoming CLM, as part of an analysis of Chinese behavior regarding maritime issues.


48 Personal communication, senior U.S. official.


An October 2010 article in the South China Morning Post reported that the Chinese government had indeed privately included the Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea in its category of “core interests,” citing “diplomats familiar with the process.” PRC leaders allegedly “agreed in a meeting late last year to classify major foreign relations issues into two categories”: “core national interest” and “national interest.” See Cary Huang, “Diaoyus Row Marks Shift in Beijing’s Diplomatic Posture,” South China Morning Post Online, October 3, 2010, OSC CPP20101004715017. However, such a formulation, if it truly exists, has never been publicly articulated. More importantly, as explained in this CLM article, the specific issues of the Diaoyu Islands and the South China Sea have never been publicly identified by Chinese officials as core interests.

51 This issue will be discussed in greater detail in an upcoming CLM.

52 For example, see Wang Haiyun (vice president of Chinese Society for Study of the History of Sino-Russian relations), “China Does Not have an ‘Anti-Intervention Strategy,’” Dongfang Zaobao, October 12, 2010, OSC CPP20101018038001. Major General Wang (a former military attaché to Russia) largely agrees with the argument of these unofficial observers, stating: “The idea that ‘the South China Sea issue is a core interest for China’ has only been mentioned by individual Chinese scholars and has not been formally stated by high-level leaders; still less has it been written into national strategic reports or legal documents.” However, he then confuses the situation by adding: “The best explicit formulation is that ‘the question of South China Sea sovereignty involves China’s core interests,’ and to declare that even though it is an issue
involving China’s core interests, China advocates resolving it through peaceful and friendly consultation.” This seems like a distinction without much of a difference! In any event, Wang states that such a formulation “will not give the United States a pretext for attacking China, and [will] . . . reduce suspicion of China among countries around the South China Sea, and curb their irrational impulse to bring in external forces to put pressure on China.” In contrast, at least one other Chinese military officer has made a distinction between “core interests” and “important maritime interests,” placing Taiwan in the former category and the South China Sea in the latter. See “Major General Yin Zhuo, a Noted Military Expert, Comments on US-South Korean Military Exercises,” Renmin Wang, July 29, 2010, OSC CPP20100730787001.

53 See Chen Chenchen, “East Asian Unity Will Survive Rocky Waters,” interview with Su Hao, director of the Asia-Pacific Research Center, China Foreign Affairs University, Global Times Online, October 25, 2010, OSC CPP20101026722011. Su Hao states, “China has never said publicly that sovereignty in the South China Sea is one of China’s core interests. The concept has been hyped by the US to alienate China from its surrounding partners.” See also Wang Haiyun, “China Does Not have an ‘Anti-Intervention Strategy’,” Dongfang Zaobao, October 12, 2010, OSC CPP20101018038001. Wang accuses the United States of promoting a “false proposition” about China’s categorization of the South China Sea in order to “stir up anti-China feelings in the area and build a containment zone against China.”

54 For example, see Da Wei, “Why Should China Declare Its Core Interests?” Huangqiu Shibao, July 28, 2010, OSC CPP20100729788013. Da warns against overasserting “core interests” or misinterpreting the meaning of the term, especially since every state has core interests and asserting them can be not only defensive (when other countries are infringing on one’s interests) but also offensive (when national strength is rising). Colonel Han Xudong of NDU argues that China should not declare its specific “core interests” at the present time because: a) China does not have the capability to militarily defend all of them; and b) it detracts from a focus on other non-core but still important interests. Han argues that China’s core interests should be announced in “batches” as China’s strength grows—hardly a reassuring thought to many foreign observers. See Han Xudong, “Prudent To Use Core National Interests,” Liaowang, no. 30, July 26, 2010, p. 64, OSC CPP20100729788017.

55 See endnotes 32, 52, and 54.

56 For example, see “A National Security Strategy for A New Century,” the White House, December 1999, pp. 1–2, available at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nsr-1299.pdf. This Clinton administration document identified three levels of “national interest”: “vital interests,” “important national interests,” and “humanitarian and other interests.”