CARNEGIE EUROPE

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

WASHINGTON DC ▪ MOSCOW ▪ BEIJING ▪ BEIRUT ▪ BRUSSELS

The Next Generation of Security Threats: Reprogramming NATO?

TRANSCRIPT

February 24, 2009

Speakers:

Jamie Shea
Director of Policy Planning, Private Office of the SG
NATO

Ashley J. Tellis
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Brooks Tigner
Chief Editor, Security Europe

Pierre Goldschmidt
Non-Resident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Garry Hindle
Head of Security and Counter-terrorism, RUSI

R. Andreas Kraemer
Director, Ecologic Institute

Chair:

Fabrice Pothier
Director, Carnegie Europe

Opening Remarks:

Michael Stopford
Deputy Assistant Secretary General, NATO

FABRICE POTHIER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen and welcome to the first Carnegie Europe NATO Lunch Debate on NATO at 60. My name is Fabrice Pothier; I am the Director of Carnegie Europe.

On behalf of Carnegie, it is a pleasure and honour to host the first in this series of NATO Lunch Debates. I would like to start by thanking NATO Public Diplomacy for making this meeting possible. This meeting is part of a reflection and debate exercise in the run up on NATO's summit, part of the preparation of the new strategy concept which will define NATO's strategy priorities and outlook for the next decade.

We have a great line-up of speakers and commentators to tackle this question and the more particular question of NATO's strategy towards the next generation of security threats, like weapons proliferations, terrorism, cyber terrorism or even climate change and energy security. It is particularly important to step back and have this discussion at a time when NATO is focused on the conflict in Afghanistan. It is important to take some strategic distance, and to think through what the possible next threats where NATO will need to be an effective global security player might be.

It is NATO's 60th anniversary, and it is normally at 60 you enter the age of respectability and wisdom, if I am correct. But, in fact, NATO faces the questions of an adolescent, and I mean that in a nice way. It faces existential questions about its raison d'être, its strategic and geographic boundaries. To continue this metaphor, NATO could be seen as the Benjamin Button of global security. The older it gets, the younger and the fresher the challenges it faces are.

We are going to start with our two main speakers, Jamie Shea and Ashley J. Tellis, who will each speak for around seven minutes. Before that, I would like to turn to Michael Stopford, the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Strategic Communications at NATO, Monsieur Communication. Michael has a very impressive background in Public Affairs and Communications, in both private and public sectors - including most recently Coca Cola and, before that, the World Bank, the UN and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Michael, over to you.

MICHAEL STOPFORD: Welcome everybody. I thought that was a very nice and relevant metaphor on aging and rejuvenation. I don't know whether Benjamin Button won any Oscars - I didn't watch the Oscars, I'm afraid - but I'm sure we'll be an Oscar-winning organisation. As for the Coca Cola example, when I joined here there were a lot of little comments about now we'll be expecting NATO Light and NATO Zero etc, so I think I won't go any further in the Coca Cola direction.

NATO is delighted to be launching this series. Carnegie is an ideal and very thoughtful partner for these meetings and discussions.

It's clear that there are a lot of issues on the table for NATO. I am not going to get into detail on the strategic threats area or strategic challenges because that is what my two distinguished colleagues are going to be discussing. Now we have the 60th anniversary, as Fabrice said; we have the NATO summit in Strasburg-Kehl next month. We have a new U.S. Administration. And, of course; we're going to have a new Secretary General at NATO. We have the French reintegration into the command structure, an important time for NATO, and we will have this expansion with two new members, we hope, in the next few weeks.

Having been at a regional security conference in Albania in the last couple of days, I am very aware of all the ins and outs of regional politics on the expansion which are, as you know, causing some heartache - with the issues and discussions between Croatia, Slovenia, etc. This is creating a somewhat fraught situation at the moment, which we are focussing on and hope to see resolved. On the other hand, it was heartening to be in a country - Albania - over the weekend where there's 94% support for NATO membership. That is quite clearly a good example of where we would like to be in the communications arena at NATO.

Our two distinguished speakers whom I do not think need an introduction will focus on the new strategic security threats and challenges.

When we talk in this vein, we cannot overlook the most crucial threat of all at the moment- the economic crisis. We are in a very different situation today than we were six months ago.

In our polling research in NATO, which complements that done at the GMF, at the EU and elsewhere, we ask 'what are your primary security concerns?' And whereas in such polls people used to put, six months ago, as their number one security concern, terrorism, and as maybe number two some other aspects of classic or military-related security. But I'll bet that if any of us did this today, it would be the economy, the economy, the economy. It would be people's daily lives, their homes, jobs, and education and pensions: so where does that play out to a security alliance like NATO?

I am sure my colleagues here will also be addressing that question. I think we might consider that in an age of anxiety such as the present, we can perhaps suggest that people can take some degree of comfort in the fact that there is a successful, tested, long-lasting security alliance that has successfully looked after people's primary security interests over the last 60 years. That there is a security foundation which can reassure people in this age of anxiety we face, at a moment where institutions are questioned, banks are questioned, there is no trust, where there seems to be a general insecurity prevalent in people's minds and lives.

Finally, for those of us in this defence and security arena, there is also the question of how you link security expenditures and security priorities and defence establishment requirements to the pressing social concerns around health and employment and everything else that we all face now.

I assume this is the sort of urgent backdrop we will be looking at today and I look forward accordingly to a very illuminating discussion. And thank you all for participating - such a wide collection of representatives from many different backgrounds in the Brussels international community - for joining us today.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thanks a lot, Michael. So let me now turn to our first speaker. Jamie Shea is Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General and, more importantly, he has been the leading mind and voice of NATO for the past years. He also has other duties such as Professor at the College D'Europe in Bruges. So now I turn to you, Jamie, for seven minutes about NATO's next generation of threats. Thank you.

JAMIE SHEA: As NATO reaches 60, it is a time when normally the future becomes increasingly clearer and is going only in one direction. Not the case for NATO; this is an alliance which has to reinvent itself virtually every ten years as the security situation changes. NATO's job is to provide its members security and, as the nature of security changes, clearly NATO has to change too. Otherwise it will become increasingly irrelevant and obsolescent.

Therefore at NATO's summit in Strasbourg in just over a month, I believe that there will be a need for a new strategic concept. This is not just because there's a sense that the old one is already a 20th century document going back to 1999 and therefore it's a decent interval to update it, but because I think that allies are increasingly conscious that if NATO is to remain – you know my love of football – a premiership security organisation in today's world and to receive the political attention and the resources of its member states, there are three fundamental issues that we have to get a grip on and urgently.

The first one is what I call the paradox of security. There are more and more things for NATO to do; the sort of the market for our potential products is expanding rapidly. One day it's peacekeeping, the next day it's military intervention, then it's humanitarian relief, then its piracy or counter-terrorism or whatnot. There's no shortage of challenges that NATO can potentially address. The problem is, is that what NATO traditionally has to offer, which is the multilateral use of military power, is increasingly only part of the solution in dealing with those issues. To use a well-known phrase, we're often a necessary condition of success, but increasingly, as you see in Afghanistan today, an insufficient condition of success.

The new strategic concept will be the first one where the non-members' contribution to what NATO can achieve has become almost as important as what NATO's actual membership, the 26, soon to be 28,

allies are willing to put in. In other words, NATO can run textbook military operations, as in Afghanistan, and still fail because the interconnectiveness between what NATO has, military power, and the other key actors on the civilian side is absent.

The first question, therefore, is how can we use the strategic concept exercise to, first of all, focus on those issues, where what we have to offer, military power, is most relevant to the solution - one thinks of missile defence, for example, versus terrorism, which is more of a police and intelligence affair - but secondly, how can we assure that that military power is sufficiently well-connected and organised that it provides optimum value?

This is an increasing issue because military power has become less and less effective as we've moved from the Cold War to the Balkans and now to Afghanistan today. The amount of political result that we were getting out of an equivalent use of military power in Kosovo or Bosnia in the 1990s, I think is in a pretty much 10:1 ratio with what we're getting out of that same military power in Afghanistan today. We've gone from the war without tears, the revolution of military affairs in the 90s with the belief that military power, even used in a very proportionate way, could achieve very quick, very durable gains, to a 19th century almost colonial type of environment, boots on the ground, taking causalities or long-term commitments to achieve limited political results.

If NATO's basic contribution is to be the multilateral use of military power, we're going to have to think much harder, not just about transformation, but what kind of transformation do we need in order to, once again, optimise the results. Because if our public opinion increasingly says, 'Jamie, you're firing million dollar missiles at Serb tanks in Kosovo, it's costing us billions of dollars and you're only hitting 14 Serb tanks', or 'we're spending billions in Afghanistan on military deployments to achieve what?' If military power is devalued then NATO as an institution which uses military power is devalued too. So we have to get a grip on that.

The second problem which we need to get a grip on is fragmentation. As security expands, unfortunately it becomes harder to find the common denominator in the alliance of what are the common interests that bring us together. During the Cold War, if you asked a NATO member what are your three or four top security concerns, you would have got the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union or the Soviet Union. It was a different degree of intensity according to whether you were Germany on the frontline, or Portugal or Canada, more towards the rear. But there was still an essential common agenda. Now, as you know, it would be difficult to find two allies who could give you exactly the same shopping list of challenges or they would have the same issues in very different orders.

It's clear that there has been a certain regionalisation of the alliance; the geography has come back. If you listen to, for example, the Norwegian Foreign Minister telling you about the thousand year period of peace between Norway and Russia, and the excellent degree of cooperation that Norway has with Russia. Due to the high north, in dealing with fisheries and so on, this obviously is a very different Russia from the one that you will have if you go to the Baltic States or elsewhere. Obviously, we need to take account of the greater diversity of interest; but an alliance cannot work simply on trade-offs between the different members, of different interests. We cannot be the jack-of-all-trades and master of none. Clearly we have to find the common denominator of the most threatening threats or the most common of the common challenges that bind us together.

The third aspect is the central purpose of NATO. Here there are two basic debates. The first debate – and you're all experts, you're familiar with this – is to what degree do we come home to an Article Five territorial focus, which is what we had during the Cold War, or to what degree do we continue in the vein of the 1990s as an expeditionary alliance taking on global challenges globally.

The second question concerns whether NATO is essentially a provider for operations, largely activated by the UN or other organisations and not always by itself. In other words, we exist when we send troops somewhere. Or to what degree do we get involved in the new security debate on human security, arms control, non-proliferation, NPT, what I call the normative aspects of trying to be part of the regulation of the international security environment so that everybody, including the emerging powers of China and India, play by the accepted rules of the game? So those, I think, are three debates which we need to have.

A final comment or final couple of comments: we need to take our time. There may be some who believe that because we need a strategic concept, we need one fast and therefore better to rush through an exercise which would be ready for maybe 2010. My own view – and I give a personal view here – is I think the issues are so complicated and it's so important that we get them right that we should not be rushed. We should take our time; there's increasing interest in having a Wisemen's Group.

I'm a great believer in the methodology used by France in preparing the *livre blanc* of a very senior, well-informed commission conducting hearings, including the think-tank community, well beyond NATO Governments and preparing a blueprint which does not evade the hard questions, which does not evade the hard choices, which clearly determines the priorities and which member states can deliberate on.

Obviously – and this is my final comment - a strategic concept is a bit of chicken and egg situation. You need a strategic concept so produce consensus. But you also need a certain degree of strategic harmony or consensus to produce a strategic concept and get people in the right frame of mind of being intellectually relaxed away from the crisis of the day, so that they're willing to think ahead. And therefore my view is that another advantage of a Wiseman's type exercise, it would also buy us time in 2009 to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan.

It's important this year that we turn the corner there, not only in producing success, but also producing among our public opinion the perception of success, which is just as important. What the US comes up with in its new strategic review will be key there; but, at the end of the day, you can always reinvent a strategy. If you don't have the resources to implement that strategy then you get not very far.

I think, in 2009, we not only have to up our game in NATO in terms of providing the resources on the ground and for training, but we also of course have to persuade the other key international actors to give Afghanistan the same priority as we have. If by next year there's a sense that we've turned the corner and that we are now seeing signs of progress, this obviously is going to create a better atmosphere for thinking about NATO's long-term future.

The final point I would make is that a security organisation like NATO cannot neglect the present for the future. To some degree, what we do today determines the degree of confidence of the allies in what we can do tomorrow. So the strategic concept passes through Kabul, ladies and gentlemen, even more than it passes through Brussels. Thank you.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Jamie, a very compelling and clear picture about the main questions and challenges that NATO's strategy concept is facing.

I would now like to pass the floor to Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ashley is a leading thinker and expert on questions related to international security, defence and Asian strategic issues. Before and during his stay at Carnegie he has advised the State Department. He was intimately involved in the negotiations on the US/India nuclear deal. Before that, he served on the National Security Council as a special assistant to the President and was advisor to the US Ambassador to New Delhi. So, Ashley, I turn to you, seven minutes.

ASHLEY J. TELLIS: It is a pleasure to be here with all of you again this afternoon and to join my good friend Jamie Shea. I will start by saying that I endorse heartily everything that Jamie Shea has said. That, in principle, should allow me to keep to the seven minutes better than I would have otherwise.

It is actually, in terms of international relations theory, quite an accident that we are here today. By all the conventional explanations about alliance longevity, NATO simply should not exist. It was created as a military alliance to deal with the very specific and defined threat. That it has survived despite the absence of that threat demands an explanation. That explanation has to be found in the permanence of the institution. That is, the organisational components of the institution, as well as the set of values that, over a period of time, NATO has incarnated within Europe and within the European Community at large.

NATO has done a remarkable job of maintaining its integrity, providing for the common defence, and providing the security which has allowed each of its members to sustain it, despite the fact that the precipitating event is no longer. As NATO looks to the future, however, the collective security that it has so successfully brought about during the Cold War will encounter newer elements of cooperative security. This tension between collective security, which has centred on military capabilities in the service of a common defence, and the new elements of cooperative security, will be the test by which NATO manages both the long-term questions of its survival, as well as its ability to operate in areas that it traditionally has not.

Let me give you one simple example. There is a very big question right now about the spatial dimensions of the alliance. What should this alliance consist of? What is its membership to consist of? The Secretary General has taken the position (with which I concur) that NATO should be open, in principle, to all states that share common values and which have a particular way of looking at international politics.

This vision, however, as we have all seen, is rapidly going to encounter resistance in those parts of Europe that have not participated in this collective security system; in those parts of Europe where conventional great power politics is still alive. In other words, when you have a situation where a manual doesn't fit, you have to construct solutions which require more than just simply collective security. You have to, building on the base of collective security and the military capabilities that support the common defence, tease out elements of cooperative security that will provide reassurance to NATO's neighbours and thereby permit the task of expansion to continue in the manner envisaged by its protagonists.

However, in talking about collective security and cooperative security, the challenge will be to do justice to both ends of the spectrum. A NATO that simply moves in the direction of cooperative security will have forgotten its fundamental mission. The key instruments that give it its purpose and utility will be a NATO that will essentially be irrelevant to the great powers of the day. Yet, as one continues to maintain these capabilities which provide NATO with its real value, the challenge will be to reach out and move, absorb elements of cooperative security to provide reassurance that the organisation actually can be a force for good.

You can see this in different ways when one looks at NATO's out-of-area operations. There the cooperative security elements may be less relevant in comparison to the collective security elements because, right now for example, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, what we see are ultimately tests of NATO's efficiency as a war fighting organisation, as a combatant command, as an organisation that can actually deliver on peace and security that it advertised.

In this context – and let me the last and final point – the functional issues that are on the table today for discussion in NATO and elsewhere, issues like cyber warfare, questions of climate change, terrorism, proliferation, are not going to be optional issues for NATO in the future. These issues are going to go to the core of its ability to maintain its obligations of collective security.

Previously, NATO has had to do three things well: make certain that it mastered the arts of warfare, make certain it learnt how to use air power in support of ground forces and make certain that it had the requisite naval capabilities to be able to be able to swing forces between the United States and Europe.

Today, for the very success of its collective security mission, for the very success of its alliance as a system of military defence, it has to master the technologies of cyber warfare; it has to be able to appreciate the impact that climate change is imposing on military operations today, particularly new openings that might arise in the Northwest Passage, new opportunities that may arise for naval and maritime operations in areas of the world where previously naval forces could not operate. The challenges posed by terrorism, which threaten not simply the alliance, but the cohesion of the alliance and the internal security of the member states.

Finally, proliferation - NATO's military missions in the years ahead will not be military missions that will be conducted in a world that is free from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. In many instances that one can imagine in the future, military operations will be conducted under the shadow of nuclear weapons; under the shadow of chemical and biological weapons. The alliance's ability to master these new

evolving areas of war fighting will go to the core of its mission of being able to develop a collective security.

As one thinks of the future, the big challenge is going to be maintaining its core competence, which is its military capabilities, its ability to protect its member states, whilst still being able to reach out to newer forms of cooperative security that shape the environment and make the task that the alliance faces in the future more tractable and more manageable.

FABRICE POTHIER: Before I turn to our four commentators, I am just going to summarise the very interesting points that were raised both by Jamie and Ashley. What is striking between the two presentations is the common perception that there are three fundamental strategic tensions that NATO is facing in its attempt to redefine itself for the next decade and the next threats.

The first tension is that NATO is a military alliance in a world where solutions are non-military. The second tension is that NATO has to cooperate on the collective security basis; a point raised by Ashley, but it also needs to keep its core values because it was, in the end, created to also represent and fight for certain values. The third strategic tension is the new global outlook – I think Afghanistan is a compelling case for that . The next threats are even more global than Afghanistan, because they are not even territorial. To sum it up, there is a global outlook but an increasingly fragmented world and a trend of regionalisation.

I am going to turn now to our first commentator, R. Andreas Kraemer, who has been the Director of the Ecologic Institute since its creation in 1995. Andreas is going to be our energy security and climate change voice and will paint a picture of the current outlook from a security point of view of climate change and energy and what this would mean for NATO today, but also tomorrow.

R. ANDREAS KRAEMER I was asked to answer the question whether NATO could afford the 'luxury' of studying a new threat such as global warming. The question needs to be turned on its head: With an enemy like global warming, how much can NATO afford to expend in Afghanistan, and for how long? At the same time, it should be clear that the projection of military forces will rarely be a suitable response to the consequences of global warming.

In addressing global warming, climate change, sea-level rise, the attendant impacts on human security, destruction of habitats and livelihoods, and radicalisation, NATO should: Research, analyse, understand, and discuss the issues in the nexus; invite non-members to participate, and share insights with them; raise awareness in the military, defence and security policy communities, and trigger debates in member and non-member countries alike; drive technological development and deployment through procurement, focusing on low-carbon technologies; talk to civilians about how to build redundancy and resilience into structures; and help to redirect development policy and capacity building for climate adaptation and the transformation of energy, transport, industry, settlement, and food production.

The involvement of NATO in understanding the security threat of climate change and formulating responses should include the military and the civilian and scientific structures of NATO as well as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. NATO is not yet adequately prepared to address climate change as a new security threat. Some members are ahead – notably the United Kingdom and the United States – while other members lag behind and need encouragement.

Environmental scientists and policy-makers may have a better understanding of the threat, yet they cannot do much but raise alarm. Through NATO, critical capacities for strategic thinking can be mobilised. Most people stop thinking about where the evidence will lead them as soon as it becomes unpleasant. There are only a few exceptions: the re-insurance industry, epidemiologists and emergency relief professionals, and of course military strategists. Together, they must think through the medium and long-term consequences of global warming, inform civilian policy-makers and the media, and thus raise public awareness about the threats we face.

I was also asked to address the question of how nuclear facilities can be protected and how the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism can be addressed. Here I will speak only about the civilian facilities

and installations that provide the technological basis, the expertise, and the fissile material for weapons programmes and terrorists.

We need to be clear and acknowledge that nuclear proliferation is first and foremost a civilian phenomenon, albeit with a clear military intent. There can be no significant reduction in the twin threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as long as civilian nuclear programmes continue.

Civilian nuclear programmes are uneconomic; no civilian reactor runs without government subsidy or legal protection from liability for damages. Were the U.S., France, Japan, and others, to admit this, the civilian cover for nuclear weapons programmes would be withdrawn and their underlying military intentions exposed. The move would change the terms of the negotiations with Iran, North Korea, Pakistan and all the other problematic countries. The contribution of nuclear power to energy supply is negligible and the electricity supply systems of the nuclear states can be transformed within a decade or two to compensate for the nuclear phase-out.

This is true even in France, which is endowed with large potentials for renewable energies and storage. The introduction of smart-grid technology for load-variable tariffs for power use and feed-in would greatly facilitate the transformation of the sector. Used in the right way, smart grid technology has large security-policy benefits.

The answer to the question: "How to protect us from nuclear facilities?" is simple: Shut them down! Phase out those along the coastlines, as they will be taken by the sea and coastal erosion before long, and those in areas of "limited statehood", in countries with weak or fragile governments. The consequences of such action for energy supply are limited and manageable. The security contribution of such action would be immense.

Finally, let me thank NATO and Carnegie Europe for launching this timely and relevant new series of events, and for inviting me to speak to you at the inaugural seminar. In the short time available, I hope I provided you with clear answers to the questions given to me and stimulated our discussion here today.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Mr. Kraemer. Let me now turn to Garry Hindle from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. Garry is Head of Security and Counter-Terrorism at RUSI. He has been in the field for years. Before joining RUSI he was political researcher on international affairs. So, Garry, I turn to you to hear your commentary on the question of terrorism, cyber terrorism and what should be NATO's role on those questions.

GARRY HINDLE: I want to start off by saying that I'm broadly in agreement with the idea that military power, collective security and Article V should remain at the core of NATO's justification in future operation. I think I'm a bit more cautious than some of our speakers about the degree to which it should include some of the wider threats that we've discussed today.

I think there is a need to avoid fragmentation in addressing some of the human security issues that have been raised, climate change for one, and terrorism for another. The recent trend of securitising everything and I think that has been particularly evident in United Kingdom, could lead to an undue fragmentation in terms of what the NATO alliance is trying to achieve.

In terrorism I think there is a risk that a greater role for NATO, a too greater role for NATO, that is potentially too wide and potentially too deep risks reaching into the domestic political security agenda to a degree that would put the alliance at risk in some cases. I think there is a consideration that should be given to climate change also that is a significant one, which is that of the timeline consideration – how is NATO expected to adapt and incorporate considerations relating to climate change? That very much depends on the timeline that we're thinking about in developing the strategy for NATO going forward.

I don't think that terrorism is a suitable foundation stone for the NATO alliance in the long-term; disagreements over its definition remain the lowest common denominator and that will continue to be the case. NATO peacekeeping stabilisation operations are an important function for NATO going forward

and, to some degree; they are likely to come into contact in theatres where terrorism is a significant factor. But terrorism fundamentally remains, as Jamie Shea said, a policing and intelligence problem.

There is a limited extend to which NATO can and should extend itself into this realm. There are some areas where it may be of use with regards to the problem of terrorism. For instance, patrolling the Mediterranean and other consideration which aim to interdict the spread of or the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. However, it is important to consider the political implications of NATO reaching too far into counter terrorism policy at the national level, and the effect this could have on the alliance.

FABRICE POTHIER: Let me now turn to our third commentator, Brooks Tigner. Brooks has been reporting on economic, political and security decisions in Brussels since the late 90s and is the European Defence Technology Editor with *Jane's Defence Weekly*. The EU/NATO cooperation seems to be a big question mark. How does this relate to the new threats NATO is facing? Many of them are also on the agenda of the European Union and I'm thinking of terrorism, but also climate change and migration.

BROOKS TIGNER: If you are going to talk about the EU and the NATO cooperation, you have to first decide which areas they can cooperate in. That means eliminating what NATO can and cannot do. We have heard the potential threats to be addressed: financial crisis, energy, climate change, cyber security, terrorism. To that list I would add illegal immigration, along with piracy.

With regards to energy, security - no, I don't think there is a role for NATO. I think it's very fashionable to say that there should be. Is NATO going to patrol any sort of gas pipelines? No, it's out of the question. Survey from outer space? Maybe, but there is no way that NATO will manage security and surveillance systems along those pipelines.

Sea lines? There are thousands of ships carrying energy every year. Is NATO going to patrol and protect those ships? No. It cannot; that would eat up its resources in a couple of months. People tend to forget it is extremely expensive to deploy a naval fleet. You have got all those salaries and support that have to go along with it. It is not going to work.

Will climate change become a potential threat NATO has to deal with? Maybe, but only as much as it produces a specific crisis in a specific geographical location within NATO's capacity. Otherwise, as our speakers already said, if the risks of climate change are so great that it is going to produce multiple crises everywhere, well NATO again will be stretched. So I think there needs to be some real hard thinking about such a foggy subject as climate change in the alliance.

Cyber security? Yes, it will be absolutely of concern to NATO. NATO has vast experience in command control systems; its access in air command control is nothing but software. Missile defence is software integration and the alliance works with many companies that are involved in detection intrusion out in the field and here at home. There is the NC3A (NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency), the NATO Communications Agency; they're all involved in this. NATO is far better placed to address cyber security than the EU is.

Illegal immigrants? Maybe, but that gets into politics if you really want big navy ships chasing down people in a dingy.

Piracy? They are already doing that. Maybe.

Terrorism? I would disagree with my colleague here to the right. I think that there is a role for NATO in terrorism. Yes, there is the lowest common denominator, but it's like pornography – we can't describe it, but we all know it when we see it. And I think NATO won't have a choice but to get involved in terrorism. And that raises the question of expeditionary; it already is involved in that in Afghanistan, but we have the non-military tasks that the alliance has to decide whether it's going to pursue, for instance, intelligence, as you rightly pointed out.

The flipside of terrorism if you're back home – and indeed this does raise the issue of to which degree do Article V and terrorism get intertwined and what you do about it. And there I come back to your original question, if we are going to see NATO address terrorism regarding Article V then there has to be much closer cooperation between the EU and NATO. And NATO has its defence against terrorism program, a wide range of technologies it's pursuing; the EU's doing the same thing with its security research program which I've followed very closely for my own publication. There's already growing duplication between the two; they're not coordinating and they should. Maybe the French presidency will help address that. Thank you.

FABRICE POTHIER: Let me now turn to our last commentator, Pierre Goldschmidt who is a Non-resident Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Before joining Carnegie, Pierre was Deputy Director General at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna where he was headed the Department of Safeguards. Pierre, you certainly have a great deal of expertise on the question of nuclear proliferation. If you could draw us the picture of what are the main challenges and threats when it comes to weapons proliferation between now and in the next years and how NATO could fit in this picture. Thank you.

PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT: Good afternoon, everyone. I want to focus on nuclear proliferation. The main issue is what is happening under our noses in Iran. Honestly if things continue to go the way they have been going for at least the last five years, the non-proliferation treaty will be in very bad shape. This will have far-reaching consequences. I'm not going to analyse all the problems here, but we need to focus on solutions and solutions where NATO has a possible role to play.

There will be no solution to the Iranian nuclear program without the full cooperation of Russia. I think the real question is: Is it more clever to build missile shields in Europe against a potential threat from Iran, or is it better to get Russia onboard to increase pressure on Iran? I would opt for increasing the pressure. Iran has been the subject of four Chapter VII UN security resolutions saying that they should suspend their program. They just disregarded it.

When it comes to sanctions towards Iran decided by the Security Council, Russia is watering them down (and also China, but China is a different story). It might be in the Russian interest to act in the short-term way; but I'm sure it is not in their long-term interests. Therefore, without Russia nothing will change and we are heading to very bad times.

The missile shield and the enlargement of NATO to Ukraine are the real questions. What will you have to pay in order to get Russia onboard? When I say to pay, I am not only talking about money, I am talking more about political compensation. This is the real question. But I'm hopeful, because from what I hear, Obama is saying that Russia will be a top priority. Russia is important for Iran, Russia is important for Syria, but Syria is another state of concern.

If you want to solve the Middle East problem, the Palestinian/Israeli problem, I think you should first deal with the weaker link which is Syria: To have Syria and Israel settling a peace agreement and recognising each other. Syria should recognise the existence of Israel, and get away from supporting Iran. Everything is linked and it's far-reaching. I think these are things NATO should think about when we are talking from the vision of what are the challenges of the future.

FABRICE POTHIER: I'm going to turn to Jamie and Ashley to gather their reactions to those different commentaries and then I will open up the floor for questions. Without falling into the debate of which issue is the right one for NATO, it seems that a common point is how NATO is going to work with non-NATO countries and regions.

There are two obvious candidates: Russia, which was very rightly raised by Pierre. Russia is a key partner on Iran, key partner on terrorism, key partner on Afghanistan. Another country is Iran, which is also an important partner on Afghanistan, including on the problem of narcotics trafficking, which is, in a way, an indirect threat to what NATO is trying to achieve in Afghanistan. So my question is: how do you envisage NATO's modus operandi with the new regional players and the new regional organisations?

JAMIE SHEA: I realise that there are lots of discussion points, so I will try to make these telegraphic answers. The first point is that I believe that a serious organisation like NATO should discuss everything and try to know everything, even if we work on the assumption that we can't and shouldn't do everything. I think that sometimes we put a little bit, to be perfectly frank here, the cart before the horse. We tend to send troops to a region and get involved militarily and only thereafter realise that we must sort out the politics and then develop more of a regional focus.

To take Afghanistan as an example: If we'd spent more time looking at the place and analysing it, we probably would not have done ISAF in the way we did, with a very small deployment in Kabul, a slow build-up to other regions, giving the Taliban a strategic holiday for three years in the south in which to regroup and organise. We have been rather slow to start training the Afghan National Army or engage with Pakistan. Obviously, as Churchill said about the United States, we tend to do the right thing having exhausted all of the alternatives but, obviously, a strategic organisation with limited resources needs to get it right from the very beginning.

I believe that talking about climate change, all of these other issues, is rather like a doctor who needs to know about all diseases in order to be able then to do a diagnosis and decide which disease you have and how to treat it, we should have a much larger role in scanning the horizon in the Alliance. We should look at climate change and other issues.

In other words, the function of NATO should not only be to send forces but to act as a kind of hub, a strategic hub of generating international pressure, of generating momentum, even if subsequently the job gets passed on to other organisations who might be more competent. My view at the moment is that NATO should be ahead of its member states in analysing these issues and pushing the member states then to take these more seriously in their defence planning.

But if you look at something like climate change, our nations are way ahead of us. The U.S., the Pentagon, and the UK MOD have done far more detailed work on this than we have at NATO headquarters. We need to use our Allied Command Transformation, which is now in its Multiple Futures Project starting to look at future challenges, to look at these things more systematically. I do agree very much with Brooks Tigner and I try to bring this out that we need, when we look at security challenges, not to try to think we need a role everywhere or we risk being irrelevant, he who knows his limits is more effective. We should identify those things where our military assets are more than 50% of the solution. If they're less than 50% of the solution, then somebody else should be in the lead.

NATO and its neighbours: My sense is that we have been very good at developing relations with individual countries; we have been not so good at developing relations with organisations. UN – I know it's better now. We now have a NATO UN declaration that's been signed. EU – Brooks mentioned that. The Shanghai Corporation Organisation is a good way of reaching out to China as well as Russia. Russia would like a dialogue with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in NATO. With the African Union things are developing. And to the extent that international security is increasingly focussed on organisations, not individual nations, then we have to be better able to link up with organisations and not just with individual partners.

The relations with the Arab states you asked. It's a paradox. On the one hand Iran and the Iranian missile programme are making the Arab countries much more interested in co-operation with NATO. On the other hand, the emotions caused in the Arab world over Gaza has obviously made them hesitant to what degree they want to sit down with Israel around a NATO table. Peace in the Middle East would certainly help on the one hand but there's no denying that the Iranian nuclear programme is having an effect in driving those countries closer to the West.

Partners in the long run: Obviously it depends very much to what degree we want to go beyond operations. I feel that one of the challenges we face is that we have very close relations with partners that contribute troops to NATO operations. But a lot of partners who are also potential security contributors to the Alliance, and I mention Israel again which has a tremendous degree of experience in terrorism, drones, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), all of these things, or the Central Asian countries which are very keen partners, are not necessarily in our operations. We need to find a better way of developing a

long-term relationship with them and not just giving people the impression that if you're in an operation, you're a real partner, if you aren't, you're not.

Finally, Russia: I understand what Pierre Goldschmidt said about Russia being instrumental but we cannot... Pierre, if I can say so, frankly, I don't think we can go around giving the impression that we need Russia more than Russia needs us and that Russia is therefore in the driving seat and we're simply the *demandeur*. The fact is, is that Russia also needs us to solve many of its problems and I think in the wake of the financial crisis and the way that's impacted on Russia, their sense that interdependence affects them too is probably much higher now than it was six months ago. It really does take two to tango and it's got to be a balanced relationship.

The second thing is, is we need to co-operate with Russia but not at the price that NATO stops being NATO and that therefore we turn a blind eye to our objectives, our obligations to other countries in Europe, the values that we defend. I think that may gain us a short-term advantage but I don't think in the long run it would make Russia take NATO more seriously than it takes it today. So, co-operation with Russia, absolutely but NATO should not give up its values in the process.

ASHLEY J. TELLIS: The first point, I think, is to affirm that NATO's core mission capabilities cannot be compromised, whatever its responses to the emerging security environment and new threats are. It will be fatal if NATO's core competencies and capabilities are compromised. That is the surest guarantee of irrelevance.

We can have debates about what NATO's response ought to be to the challenges and the periphery, both in a functional and a geographic sense, but I do not think that we can reach the point where we in a sense denude the organisation of what it does best.

The second point I would make is that the new emerging threats need not be securitised. There's always a risk that this happens. But I think that we need to be alert to the challenges they impose to NATO's core military obligations. We need to be cautious about looking for new security threats because it is perceived as the fashionable thing to do – this will heighten the danger of omission. That needs to be balanced against the risk of vulnerability if there is a failure to anticipate how new developments will pose new challenges. There is a balance that will need to be maintained. If that balance is not maintained, then challenges will increase.

On the third issue, Russia, I agree with Jamie's point completely. There is a definite need for a strategy of reassurance towards Russia. However, I am not convinced that such reassurance should come at the cost of doing what is necessary for the common defence. Issues like missile defence, for instance, I see as part of a longer-term evolution of trends in the international system where there is going to be the proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles.

There is going to be some seeping leakage of weapons of mass destruction capabilities appearing in bits and pieces in places all over the world. When I think of missile defence in this context, I see this as an evolutionary response to these long-term threats and, of course, the ideal is to be able to do this co-operatively with the Russians. We ought to work towards that end. But, if there is a solution that is available to the Alliance in the interim, I'm not convinced that forgoing that solution is necessarily the best way forward because. Vulnerability may increase at both ends. That is, there may end up being the sacrifice of improvements with relationships with Russia as well as the sacrifice of the common defence. Trying to bridge that tension will, of course, be a challenge. If forced to it, I would come down in favour of doing what is necessary for the common defence.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much. We will now open the floor.

IOAN MIRCEA PASCU: I am Ioan Mircea Pascu, vice-chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament.

NATO has been preserved because the member countries decided so. I attended the last meeting of the Warsaw Pact in which the member countries decided to dissolve it. As such, in the 90s there was a change

of the security environment here, NATO was moving from a collective defence, alliance type of organisation, towards a security type of organisation. It added the function of crisis management to collective defence and I think that basically, and I agree here with the other speakers, we should preserve the tradition of NATO as the last guarantor of our security as an alliance providing for collective defence.

The new dimension which was appealing to the old members was not so much appealing to us. To us it was the same old function of an alliance protecting our security what attracted us to NATO. But in the meantime, while NATO was changing, we tried to change ourselves and ended up trying to fulfil both functions, crisis management and collective defence.

I think that this will stay because we will have to keep something in NATO but at the same time modernise it. We need to adapt NATO to the new challenges around and that will probably mean some new mandates for NATO which will not come out of the blue.

If cyber security is a threat, then I think it should be evaluated as such. Cyber threats could be a problem for the Alliance. If this is the case, it is a part of the collective defence of the Alliance. Therefore, we have to look at the security concept, not the strategy, which is evolving and then we have to derive here what are the threats and how the Alliance should respond to that. We should be aware of the fact that some people would like to see the new dimensions of NATO while others, for instance, Georgia or Ukraine are interested more or less in the traditional function of the Alliance.

ANGELIKA BEER: My name is Angelika Beer and I'm a member of the European Parliament as well as co-chair of the Parliamentarian Network for Conflict Prevention and Human Security. I have two questions for Jamie Shea. In your first statement you were speaking about the possible role of NATO in the question of human security. What should that be?

My second question is concerning the question of the Middle East and the case of Iran. In the past five years we have had several discussions with the president of the Iranian delegation of the European Parliament, as well as with the Iranians. When we begin discussion the Iranians and start with the issue of its nuclear capabilities, the doors close. But, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation all have an interest in discussing security policy in the Middle East. Is there the possibility that NATO could propose to engage in a dialogue about security involving these players about the Middle East, without mentioning the nuclear question?

PIERRE GOLDSCHMIDT: Many speakers have mentioned today the concept of 'collective defence.' My question is, quite simply, against whom is this defence?

JACQUES ROSIERS: Jacques Rosiers, Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium. Just to the two speakers which speak about challenges, short and long-term, could you for the sake of the strategic process in writing a strategy, define what is your short-term and what would be the long-term? Is it possible, in discussing NATOs future strategic concept, to think 2030, to think 2050? Is climate change urgent or is it a longer-term problem? Is terrorism today, tomorrow and longer-term? Is demography...? How do we put a timeline in the strategic process that NATO is undertaking?

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you. Two final questions and then I think we can close the round. So, there is the gentleman here and then the gentleman there.

TOM SAUER: Tom Sauer from the University of Antwerp. Imagine this, a country or group of countries serves notice that they plan to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in order to acquire nuclear weapons citing a dangerous deterioration in the international security situation.

Don't worry, they will tell the shocked world, "the firmament of purpose of our nuclear forces is political, to preserve peace and prevent coercion in any kind of war. Nuclear weapons provide a supreme guarantee of our security." We won't like that answer but that's exactly the same rationale that is used by NATO in its strategic concept. Mohamed ElBaradei recently used this comparison in one of his opinion articles.

My question is rather straightforward. Is NATO going to change its declaratory nuclear policy or change the sentences that I have just read?

PASCAL LAFFONT: Pascal Laffont from the Energy Charter Secretariat. Is there a need to revisit the 1949 Treaty in the context of a discussion of NATO expanding into further roles?

ASHLEY J. TELLIS: I think that the question about collective defence against whom goes to the whole question of NATO's persistence as a security organisation. The fact that the member states want to maintain this, I presume, suggests to us that there is a need for the security functions offered by NATO against a whole range of threats, both, specified, unspecified, explicit and implicit.

As NATO expands I think these threats will become more diffuse and, as the organisation builds on its core collective defence mission in other directions, moves in the direction of co-operative security, moves in the direction of collective security. I think there will be certain diffusion in the threats that can be identified. I think this is the nature of the beast. It's not something that should surprise us.

The alternative is the answer that I gave when I started the presentation, which is if you want clearly specified national threats and don't have them, and then the alternative is to dissolve the Alliance. But the fact that we don't have these clearly specified national threats shouldn't frighten. The Alliance does serve a purpose and so if these are implicit, diffused, I can live with that reality. I suspect the Alliance can as well.

On the question of nuclear policy in NATO, this is a trickier question because it goes to the issue of whether the reliance of the United States and then NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons in some sense exacerbates the problems of proliferation. I don't think there's an easy answer to this question. What you will get at best is a temporary solution and that temporary solution might be today to reduce our reliance on nuclear forces, maybe deemphasise the questions of nuclear guarantees because NATO has conventional supremacy in most situations that one can imagine.

I don't think the solution is simply to eradicate the nuclear component of the security relationship. Firstly, nuclear weapons are not going to go away, the best efforts made by the Carnegie Endowment notwithstanding. Secondly, they will remain the ultimate guarantee of protection for the Alliance.

There can be modulations in how those guarantees and the role of nuclear forces are perceived. I'm all for minimising grounds for giving offence. But I don't think the solution is simply to take them off the table. Even if we do, the very fact that these weapons will continue to exist will have a residual political quality. Whether it's stated or unstated, nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in the Alliance's defence.

JAMIE SHEA: Fabrice, thanks. Again, I'll try to be brief. And I must say Ashley answered a couple of the questions much more eloquently and intelligently than I could.

Nonetheless, the first question on human security. I believe that NATO cannot ignore the fact that we have had, for the last 15 years or so, a security debate that's moved increasingly from defence of territory, defence of countries, defence of sovereignty to defence of individuals and populations and to some degree that's what we've been doing in the Balkans. Obviously, where it was the humanitarian impulse rather than the strategic impulse that got us involved, the ethnic cleansing in particular, the Pakistani earthquake and the support, for example, to the African Union. If the humanitarian aspect had been absent, I think NATO would have taken far longer to have become involved.

There have also been a lot of big issues where I feel we could perhaps have been more active in thinking about banning certain types of weapon for example. Admittedly, I'm not going to be a hypocrite, some of those weapons are used by our own forces. Obviously one thinks of cluster munitions or whatever but where many allies individually, like Canada and Norway, have taken up the task or these ideas of banning

small arms or at least, if not banning but regulating the traffic in small arms, conventional weapons, fissile material and so on.

I'm not suggesting all of these issues are going to be easy for NATO because, as I mentioned, certain allies, like on landmines, have different positions according to their security commitments. The United States, because of its commitment to Korea, as you know, found it impossible to initially sign the ban on landmines. But there are, I think, certain areas which are perhaps easier for us to handle, like small arms, destruction of surplus stocks of munitions, retraining of retired military officers, these kinds of issues, and I think that NATO can't ignore this agenda.

Iran negotiations: I think the second thing there is that I personally don't see NATO substituting itself for the EU 3 and the United States and the six-power talks handling the Iranian issue. That will stay essentially with the European Union. But my boss, the Secretary-General, as you know, in a speech in Brussels recently at the Security Defence Agenda (SDA), did float the idea that the dialogue on Afghanistan with Iran would make sense and that might have been a difficult thing for him to say a few months ago but many people in the U.S. administration have been saying the same thing and Iran also has been putting out feelers that it would be interested now in participating in a regional framework for Afghanistan and if that were the case, that might be the way in which we would come into contact.

Pierre Goldschmidt, collective defence against whom: I think the first thing to say about that is that the allies join NATO for collective defence and if we are not able to assure them that we take that seriously, it's very difficult to persuade them to send troops to Afghanistan. They don't want their troops out of the country, thousands of miles away, if they feel vulnerable at home. To some degree the implicit trans-Atlantic bargain in the Alliance is that if you look after my security, I'll be better able and willing to look after your security and we have to respect that.

Of course, collective defence is no longer just the scenario of a territorial attack by a state or another. One of the things that Brooks and Garry were mentioning is that we have to grapple with is to what degree we apply collective defence more broadly against cyber terrorist attacks, biological radiological attacks, our ability to be part of the response capability, and I personally feel that we should have made more progress, really, since 9/11 in looking at these areas and defining our roles, albeit, as Brooks pointed out, in co-ordination with the European Union which is active here too.

Collective defence is not just your border coming under pressure, it's any attack on your population within the treaty area now. Having said that, though, it's obviously the case that we don't have an enemy against whom we're planning collective defence any longer and therefore we certainly don't want to have tanks on the lawn on our eastern borders or major NATO bases or facilities against a threat which our military tell us is not a threat.

The question is, is what can we do to reassure all of our members that that is still something we take seriously and that therefore there are plans, there are exercises occasionally, it's not something which exist purely on paper but we do that in a way which is non-provocative and which does not divert very scarce resources away from where we really need them today, Afghanistan? So, that's the balance that has to be struck.

On the question of the timeline, Ambassador Rosiers, a very good question: My sense is that you have to look at threats which are immediately on your agenda but you obviously have to look ahead and where you should concentrate on are the things which are difficult to predict over 15 or 20 or 30 years but which are so potentially catastrophic if you get them wrong that even with all of the uncertainties, like climate change, not knowing where and when it's going to hit you, you make your best educated guess as to, first of all, what you can do to mitigate those threats from occurring and what you need to defend yourself should they actually happen.

But here, by the way, you can be helped because although you may mention climate change as something which is potentially catastrophic but still far off, in some parts of the world, like New Zealand, it's a problem today. I had a fascinating conversation with some New Zealand officers a few days ago and they are already into contingency planning for some of the Pacific islands to go under within the next few

years and the need to evacuate these people and resettle them in New Zealand. So, what is maybe our problem in ten years' time is somewhere in the world somebody's problem today and you can gain a certain degree, in compressing the timelines, of guidance from that.

What was said on nuclear weapons by Ashley, I totally agree. I think that there is, obviously, one big question which we need to resolve, and Ashley touched upon it.

Iran: Is Iran influenced by the global disarmament trend, whatever the U.S. does, France, Britain so it can be influenced by restraint in those countries? Or is it really much more influenced by local regional factors? India/Pakistan obviously is a case in point. In this case, even if the international community made enormous efforts, it might not necessarily change the perceptions of countries that are involved in regional issues. I think that is a link that we need to understand better.

The second issue is that you probably saw, at the Munich Security Conference in the last couple of weeks, Henry Kissinger and a number of statesmen stand up and openly advocate a world without nuclear weapons which, of course, is a Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project (MPT) objective. The point is, is how do you get there in a reliable verifiable way while obviously preserving your deterrent capability against the short-term reality of a world that obviously still has nuclear weapons and where that is still a factor? I think this is going to be one of the key issues in security over the next few years.

Finally, the 1949 Treaty: Whoever drafted it was a genius. It's a great argument for keeping things short, sweet and open because the Treaty, being a very general treaty which doesn't refer to the Soviet Union or virtually to anybody else, apart from the UN, is very elastic and therefore is an excellent instrument to empower NATO to do what it has done over the few years.

The EU approach, I better say this off the record, which is, of course, to draft extremely detailed and very specific agreements means also, of course, that those agreements then become overtaken by events and need constantly to be updated. The NATO methodology of the Treaty has served us well and I don't think anybody would like to touch it today because the problem is if you start touching something like the NATO Treaty, you might throw the baby out with the bathwater in order to get something that you actually want. You might end up with the Senate saying, well, thanks very much but we'll just cancel that Article V commitment, if you don't mind.

FABRICE POTHIER: Thank you very much, Jamie. On those concluding remarks, I would like to thank our speakers, our commentators and our audience. I would also like to thank the NATO Public Diplomacy Division for their support. Thank you to the Carnegie Europe team - in particular, Kristina Klein, whose hard work and dedication made this lunch possible.