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NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION IN SOUTH ASIA AFTER MUMBAI

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PETER LAVOY: Okay, well, finally, the moment everybody at this conference has been waiting for. (Laughter.) We actually have an outstanding panel. We did have a change in the panel. Rifaat Hussain was held up in his travel from Pakistan and so we have actually upgraded. We’ve got Moeed Yusuf, who will speak on Pakistan issues.

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Actually, I was talking to Moeed earlier and he asked me what I was up to, how I was doing. And I said, it’s, you know, business is tough. The world is really going to hell. And he said, yeah, but you’re a lot closer to it now. (Laughter.) I didn’t really know how to take that. (Laughter.) But it is true.

And you know it’s interesting, my experience in the intelligence community and my academic background – I actually studied with – my Ph.D. adviser was Kenneth Waltz. And some of you are familiar with his famous Adelphi Paper of a few decades ago, where he said the spread of nuclear weapons – more may be better. Very provocative thesis, particularly for people that come to this kind of conference. But there is very compelling logic and I think what we’ll see in this panel is that people will be probing that logic and see if it really holds up based on several decades now of practical experience in South Asia and other parts of the world.

And if I look at my experience in the intelligence community now, what I realize is the best-laid plans of leaders of countries often fall apart. And they fall apart for ways that – for reasons and ways that the leaders never anticipated. You look at a situation in the Middle East today, where a fruit seller in Tunisia sparked a, you know, widespread rebellion that’s turning into revolution, whose outcome is by far from clear and it could be spreading well beyond the Middle East.

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And you have leaders in the Middle East who were observing this initially take root in Tunisia and said, it will never happen here. And some of those – well, at least one of those leaders is out of business right now and others could be as well. I think it’s important when you reflect on experiences like that or, of course, this tragic earthquake and tsunami affecting Japan, which could have very not only – certainly is already having profound safety considerations and exacting a terrible humanitarian toll in Japan, but it could have profound geopolitical implications for Asia as well.

And I think when we turn to nuclear weapons, we – because of our experience in the Cold War, where we really, I think, did a fairly good job of insulating nuclear weapons from various shocks and problems and crises that afflicted us during the Cold War in our experience with the Soviet Union and all of the world – many of us and certainly Ken Waltz assume that there is a certain logic that would prevail over every country, every possessor, every government that obtains nuclear weapons. But again, I think that theory or that observation is certainly subject to challenge and I think we’ll hear some challenges further from the group here.

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We do have three superb speakers. We have two of the sharpest up-and-coming scholars, not only on South Asia nuclear strategic issues, but they cover a much wider range of issues as well. And we’re going to go in order of possession of nuclear weapons. Well, I guess by that, Michael would have to go first. But we’re going to start in South Asia since that’s our theme. (Laughter.) And so Vipin will lead off and then Moeed will come in and speak and then Michael Krepon will wrap up. So Vipin, over to you.
NARANG: Thank you, Peter. It’s a real pleasure to be here. I was given the task of describing India’s evolution in the past decade — now 13 years — since it tested nuclear weapons in 1998 — in particular, after the last crisis with Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks of 26/11/2008. So I thought I would discuss India’s evolving nuclear posture and demonstrate the consistency, actually, of India’s nuclear posture over the last 13 years and describe then the revisions that India is making on the conventional side to deal with what it perceives to be a paralytic position with respect to Pakistani’s subconventional attacks against Indian metropolitans in particular.

So on the nuclear side, I would argue India’s nuclear posture in the past 13 years has been a search for an assured retaliation capability. And you know, since 1998, it has attempted to improve the ability to retaliate against a variety of strategic targets, both in Pakistan and in China, and the assurance with which that would be meted out.

So you have the operationalization of the Agni family of ballistic missiles. The Agni-I, which is Pakistan-specific, was developed during the BJP years in the early 2000s. India is testing and operationalizing in the future an Agni-III system, which would give a strategic reach against Chinese targets, particularly Beijing and Shanghai. And it’s in the early stages of testing an Agni-IV system, which would give it deeper reach beyond Chinese strategic targets.

It’s developing an SSBN capability; it’s in the very early stages of that as well. Last year, the Arihant was floated in dry-dock and that was the future ballistic — or the test model for the — test vehicle for the ballistic missile submarine. And that eventually when it goes online — the Indians say several years, probably more likely a decade or so before India has an operational SSBN capability — will impart India — ensure the ability to retaliate from sea, which would give it, you know, assured second-strike capability against a Chinese arsenal.

There is increasing consideration of deemphasizing the Prithvi family of missiles. This discussion has emerged, I’d say, in the past several years in Delhi partly for crisis stability issues. The Prithvi is a short-range ballistic missile family. It’s dual use for both conventional and nuclear missions, but increasing consideration is being given to deemphasizing the Prithvi family for nuclear missions, so that there is less potential for miscalculation and misperception in a crisis with Pakistan, particularly since India has aircraft and the Agni-I, which gives it strategic reach against Pakistan.

India views Pakistan as a more likely nuclear threat, China as a more capable nuclear threat. This suggests that in the past seven or eight years, the Agni system may be quicker to be operationalized in the Indian case. If Pakistan is a more likely threat, the Agni-I is a Pakistan-specific capability.

So you can imagine that, although India still demates warheads from delivery vehicles — and in some cases, I still believe that India disassembles warheads — it may have some preassembled warheads that may be mated with the Agni-I. But the Agni-I is probably designed to be operationalized much quicker than the rest of the Agni family to meet a potential crisis with Pakistan.

There is still — you know, the two — the hallmark of the Indian nuclear posture is still no-first-use. It has an official no-first-use policy, although in the past six months there have been two notable controversies surrounding
the official policy: One was National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon’s speech to the National Defense College in October 2010 where he used – the text of the speech employs a different formulation than India’s traditional doctrine, which was no-first-use and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon states.

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In October, the formulation that appeared in the text of the speech on the Ministry of External Affairs website was no-first-use against non-nuclear weapon states, which has a different implication because it suggests by implication that nuclear weapon states would not be included in India’s no-first-use policy.

That seems to have been nothing more than a typo in the text of the speech because Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao and even as recently as last week, Shiv Shankar Menon, again reiterated India’s commitment to no-first-use, despite former defense minister Jaswant Singh in parliament raising the issue of India revising its no-first-use policy.

All evidence suggests that India’s official policy is still no-first-use – rhetorical or not, the official policy seems to persist – and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, the caveats about use in response to chemical and biological weapons notwithstanding.

And the command-and-control procedures that India seems to take correspond with this no-first-use policy. There is a stovepiped command-and-control between conventional and nuclear operations. The strategic forces command operates in parallel and the nodes meet at the PMO or the national security adviser’s office. So that there is no integration of conventional and nuclear operations would suggest that India’s is a retaliatory nuclear posture.

So India’s response has mostly been at the conventional level. The perceived inability to respond during the Kargil War, the 2001 parliament attack and then the Bombay attacks in 2008, led to India thinking about revising its mainstay conventional retaliatory option, which is often called the Sundarji Doctrine, even though it actually preceded General Sundarji in the ’80s. And it involves the mobilization of massive strike corps which are located in the interior of India during peacetime on the order of 800,000 forces.

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And the problem in the past decade has been particularly after the 2001-2002 crisis, Operation Parakram, it simply took the Indian Army too long to mobilize its strike corps. And that led to two things: One, it led Pakistan to play what the Indians perceived to be the nuclear alarm bell. And correlated with that, the second thing was international pressure was brought to bear as it took three weeks to mobilize the strike corps.

So after the 2002 crisis, the army started thinking about revising its mobilization procedures in particular to reduce the time to mobilize its armored and offensive capabilities. Shortly thereafter, some of the terminology used by Indian Army officials included starting operations from a “cold start,” which is how the term first emerged and then was seized upon by the media.

And there was a concept developed by a quasi-official think tank, the Center for Land Warfare Studies, that was an extreme version of this “cold start” doctrine. It envisioned breaking up the strike corps, pre-positioning them on the border, deploying eight to 10 integrated battle groups to launch offensive operations against Pakistan quickly – a timeframe envisioned to be somewhere on the order of 48 to 96 hours or two to four days after a terrorist attack against the Indian state.
The Indian Army doesn’t refer to these revisions as “cold start” and so we’re kind of playing who’s on first with the Indians. The Chief of the Army Staff V. K. Singh, you know, denied that anything called “cold start” exists in army doctrine. That’s true; nothing within Indian official army writings uses the term.

The term that seems to be used in the Indian Army is “proactive strategy options.” And this is a seemingly different configuration out of CLAWS, or the Center for Land Warfare Studies. This involves less aggressive prepositioning of assets. It envisions converting India’s holding corps, which were developed and raised in the ’80s – IX, X, XI and XII corps – which are largely defensive.

But the move in the army seems to be imparting some offensive capability to these holding corps and converting them into pivot corps. Usually this seems to involve attaching an independent army brigade so that there is some offensive capability in these pivot corps, so they can pivot between defensive and offensive operations quickly.

And then the idea would be to use surge capabilities from the strike corps, keeping them in their peacetime locations in the interior of India – Ambala, Bhopal and Mathura. The idea would be you would have the pivot corps potentially being able to launch operations quickly and then you would elements of I and II corps, potentially XXI Corps, follow on as surge forces to provide an offensive retaliatory capability for the – in the Indian military.

There are a couple of problems: One, it’s not clear whether the Indian Air Force has bought into this. This is largely – (inaudible, background noise) – to be an army creation so far. The other question is what would the aim be. The aim, at least as far as my own research suggests, would be it would have to be some sort of degradation of Pakistan army reserves, Army Reserve North and South – maybe air force assets as well. Seizing territory may be a political objective, but it’s not clear what that would achieve. So it seems like the objective from the Indian military side would be to degrade the Pakistani forces in some way or another.

Now, obviously if this is authorized, this would be a built-in escalation ladder to nuclear exchange. An indicator after a potential attack – it would probably have to be on the order greater than the Bombay attacks. But you would – the kind of indicators we would have would be, you know, some Union War Book activity, which has basically been India’s tip fit (ph) effectively.

So you would have some sequestering of railway heads. You’d see some mobilization of the pivot corps. But you wouldn’t necessarily see the strike corps being broken up, which is what I think the – you know, the U.S. believes that, you know, as long as the strike corps aren’t broken up and predeployed, India doesn’t have a “cold start” option. That may not be the case. It seems like this configuration would be consistent with the indicators that we have now. And so you might see some pivot corps activity and then strike corps being moved afterwards. And that this would impart India quicker mobilization time than after the 2002 crisis.

There is a misconception, then, that “cold start” is a doctrine. It seems rather to be one of several potential op plans that would be presented to a political leadership on the heels of a crisis. In fact, one of the key indicators after the 2008 crisis was that the army was represented in the deliberations after the Bombay attacks by Lieutenant
General Naidu. General Kapoor was out of the country and he said that the army needed seven days to mobilize an offensive capability against Pakistan. This is down from the 21 days it took in 2002.

So it suggests that the army has already made revisions to improve mobilization times and provide the political leadership with options between do nothing and the so-called Sundarji Doctrine. It’s not on the timeframe of 24 to 48 hours, but it seems like timeframes have compressed.

And you know, the big question is obviously, would a political leadership in India ever authorize even limited offensive operations? Especially since, you know, Pakistan has always said that there’s no distinction in the Pakistani case between limited and total war, given the depths that we’re talking about – 30 to 50 kilometers in the desert, several kilometers maybe in the plains and in Punjab. And if Indian forces were operating in Pakistan, you know, obviously those are the scenarios under which Pakistan’s first-use posture become credible against Indian forces.

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So the, you know – after Bombay, the deliberations involving the Cabinet Committee on Security and the army, you know, passed on offensive land retaliatory options, partly because of the threat of nuclear use. There’s an Indian Express investigative report on the two-year anniversary of the attacks, which outlined some of the deliberations.

And you know, the problem is who would authorize these conventional retaliatory options? In the current configuration, the distinction between the prime minister and the party president, Sonia Gandhi – it’s not clear what kind of consensus there would have to be there before authorizing offensive operations.

And you know, the ultimate problem in that case seemed to be the uncertainty of the Pakistani response. Pakistan has done a good job, it seems to me on the Indian side, of convincing the Indians that their threshold for nuclear use lies somewhere between tripwire and last resort. So anywhere, basically. And that has enhanced deterrence on the Pakistani side because it suggests to the Indians that the response would be uncertain as soon as India were to launch any offensive ground operations on Pakistani soil.

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And you know, if the Pakistanis engage in graduated escalation, the Indians – or you know, would the Indians retaliate with a strategic strike on Lahore, Islamabad or Karachi? It’s not clear. And would that be a war-terminating event? How this would play out, you know, is something that I think seizes the Indian political leadership’s mind.

In terms of de-escalatory steps – and then I’ll close – it seems like there needs to – the Indian political leadership and army should clarify exactly what kinds of options they potentially envision in the event of – in terms of retaliatory strikes after a terrorist attack. It seems like they are in the worst of all positions now, which is that the international community is worst-casing the Indian potential response without them believing that India has that capability.

So if India has options in the middle, which it currently believes could be plausible retaliatory options, then it should probably clarify those. You know, what’s the point of having a deterrent option if it’s not communicated? So some clarification of exactly what India’s proactive strategy options are, so that, you know, Pakistan and the international community can calibrate accordingly would be a useful de-escalatory step. So I’ll stop there.
LAVOY: Okay, Vipin, thank you very much. Moeed? And you can see Moed’s bio is in the insert in your book.

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YUSUF: Thank you. Thanks, Peter. Thanks, thanks again for inviting me. This is actually rather short notice. I was just told this morning that Rifaat Hussain is not going to be able to make it. But as Peter told me before we started, when I was chatting with him, he said, well, you wouldn’t have prepared any more even if you knew four months ago. (Laughter.) So I guess I have no excuse here.

Let me then, I was asked to talk about risk reduction in the South Asian context – nuclear risk reduction post-Mumbai. But I am not going to speak from a Pakistani perspective. And the reason for that is fairly simple: I am not sure how you do risk reduction from one or the other side’s perspective. If risk reduction has to be successful, I think it has to be where both sides are on board with whatever agreements or decisions they make. So what I want to do here is to talk a bit about what risk reduction in South Asia – first of all, what the risks are, and second, what it may look like.

Let me begin by saying that I have always treated risk – nuclear risk in South Asia in two baskets: One is peacetime and the other one is in times of crises. And I don’t want to talk about peacetime here because my view on that is that we are fairly stable at this point in time given the recessed postures of the two sides. Survivability doesn’t seem to be too much of an issue. But I don’t want to get into that too much. Where I want to focus here is on crisis-time risk and stability or lack thereof.

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And I think there is no better way of discussing this but to play out the next Mumbai. If you think about the next crisis, the most likely scenario seems to be another Mumbai. Peter here may be in a better position to tell you if it will happen or when, but let me just hypothetically presume that if we go down that road, what are the kind of risks we are talking about and then how does South Asia come out of that in preparation for something like that?

So the very first thing is, if there is a Mumbai, there is a lot of talk of what the Indian response will be. And from my interesting, the majority sense seems to be that India will have to do something. There is too much of a reputational issue attached here, bordering on impotence and irrelevancy of the deterrent in some ways if India does not respond.

Now, if India responds – let’s say there is a surgical strike somewhere – Muridke, something across the border – the next question is, what will Pakistan do? And from – if I understand the Pakistani military thinking even a little bit, my sense is that there will be a response in kind.

And so if you have this one short exchange, from this point on, both sides are in completely uncharted territory. Escalation control comes in, there’s a lot of theory about this, a lot of people have written about it, people sitting on this panel. But in reality beyond this point, neither side has actually been in this situation before. So you’re getting into a dynamic which hasn’t taken place to this point. Neither in Kargil, nor ’01-’02, nor post-Mumbai.

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If you ask people who study this in South Asia – or even perhaps the establishments on both sides – what will happen next, I think the most frequent answer you’ll get is, well, somebody will step in and tell both sides to cool it off. Maybe Washington perhaps will say, you know, enough, boys. Let’s back off. And if you look at ’01-’02 – I have done a case study of that crisis – that’s exactly the reaction that you got from South Asia. And there is an expectation attached to the next crisis by both sides that somebody else will actually come in.

Now, this is not to say that both sides would want that or like that perhaps. But if that is the case, then you’ve got to look at history to realize that these two South Asian countries have basically mortgaged crisis stability to a third party. There is no direct communication that takes place – ’01-’02 is a great example of that. And they are more worried about trying to get signals out indirectly through a third party – and Washington was the one that played a major role and a fairly positive one in ’01-’02.

The problem now is that there is expectation on both sides not only that perhaps Washington will come in, but both sides warn that if Washington does come in with its diplomacy, it weighs in on each side’s favor. So India would probably look at Washington giving some guarantees of punishing Pakistan. The Pakistanis basically would look to cool off the crisis.

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And the problem for U.S. diplomacy to my mind is if you look at ’01-’02 through today, the U.S.-India strategic partnership makes it very difficult for anybody in Washington politically to go out, tell India to back off and yet only promise that we’ll deal with Pakistan in the future, we’ll do something to make sure this doesn’t happen – because it’s happened before, it will happen again. And so this expectation may be very, very dangerous on both sides. Washington may – simply may not be able to play the role that either side wants it to play.

Now, if that is taken for what it is, you are then seeing the two sides having received the first shock – this is the first node of instability to my mind. There is no direct communication. You have got a third party which is unable to play the neutral broker. And thus you have now got to engage in a bilateral equation, which neither side has done so far in a scenario where escalation seems inevitable.

Once you move towards this escalatory ladder, I think survivability of both – weapon systems on both sides is fairly well-held, despite the fact that neither side has a triad, I am at least not too worried. Preemption doesn’t seem to be a realistic option either for India or Pakistan given the kind of mobile delivery systems and the arsenal that both sides have.

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But I think there are two issues here to worry about – and this is the second node of instability – dual-use missiles and aircraft. Given the geographical proximity – that is something many have talked about, including Michael – but this is something that keeps playing out. Do you have enough confidence on the other side to know whether something is being used for conventional purposes or nuclear? Especially Pakistan, which keeps all options on the table early on in a crisis, what is the incoming missile or aircraft? You don’t have early warning – in fact, early warning probably won’t work just given the geographical proximity. So that’s one.

Second, while I say that preemption of the arsenal is not a worry – I think even the Indians would not be able to attempt that – what about preemption of Pakistan’s nuclear chain of command? Now, there’s a very interesting dynamic here where the Pakistani political and military leadership sits within 15 miles of each other – or kilometers. In Islamabad, Rawalpindi.
Now, one could argue, well, this is really far-fetched. Why would India actually try and decapacitate the Pakistani chain of command, when that would only mean a greater likelihood of predelegation or unauthorized use? Well, the point here is not that the Indians would try that, but the point is that this is in the Pakistani mind. So the contingency planning may be taking place in any case.

And the obvious contingencies here would, one, be dispersal of the leadership geographically, and second, devolving of use of nuclear weapons. You know, one is not saying that this is happening or is in the plans – I don’t know. But just thinking through this, these may be two options that are being considered. Both of them, then, are extremely – well, they induce further instability into the equation. So that’s the third node.

Then you come to this issue of unauthorized and inadvertent launches in South Asia’s case. The first one here is miscalculation. That’s clearly a risk – again, because of dual-use nature, one just doesn’t know. And you haven’t played this out before. Second, if you do escalate, then both sides are going to move towards deployment. At least there are going to be sort of a hyperactivity around nuclear installations. You may move towards transportation, dispersal, mating, you know, what have you.

Again, none of this is necessary, of course. But I’m playing out what the worst-case scenario may be. Now, here again, neither has South Asia ever experienced this, nor have we ever tested if the command-and-control communication infrastructure is robust enough to manage this in the South Asian context – especially in a fog of war. So that’s another area.

I think one of the most positive aspects of the South Asian nuclear equation has been the recessed postures. The fact that they’re demated, de-alerted and stored separately as far as I understand. And if that changes, you’ve got another node of instability coming into the equation.

And then may I also mention that if we do talk about terrorism, you know, in the Pakistani context – if a terrorist has to make a headline, what better opportunity than when he is going to be most believable because things are dispersed, because things are moving, because there are nodes of instability? It won’t take much for Washington Post or New York Times to put that as the headline story if anything minor comes out of that.

So while peacetime may be a very different ballgame, if you play out the next crisis, the expectations attached with a third-party role – failing which, the kind of moves that an escalatory ladder entails for both sides really bring you to a point where you see extreme risk involved in the situation.

Let me also add here that this may not happen two or four years from now. But in the future, you have at least three other things to worry about. First of all is doctrinal asymmetry between Pakistan and India. The first-use versus no-first-use; the low threshold, which Pakistan must maintain if it has to have a credible deterrent –

And you know, I don’t really buy this argument that some have made that this shows the belligerence on the Pakistani side. This is really classic deterrence 101. They need to keep all options open or at least signal so to keep their threat credible. And that’s exactly what they’re doing. So this idea of trying to push Pakistan to sign a no-first-use – to me, I think we need to have a debate whether that is stability-inducing as some have argued. I am not sure.
Second, new technology will change things. A BMD capability for India, whenever that comes, may push Pakistan to increase its own offensive capability. And then also this question of just how much is enough. And this is something that worries me quite a bit because now I see both sides at a point where the Cold War rivals were in the same kind of tit-for-tat. If you talk to Pakistani strategic thinkers, they’ll tell you, well, it’s minimum, but it’s dynamic. We’re looking at India. If you talk to Indians, they’ll tell you, well, yes, but China is the real worry.

The question is, where do you stop? And the argument I would make for Pakistan at least is that, you know, you’ve got to figure out what exactly you need for your own purposes to have countervalue targeting. I’m not sure counterforce business really works for a country that’s only trying to deter by denial. And after that, whatever the Indians are doing, it shouldn’t bother you. But this is not the mindset that prevails in South Asia. Both for Pakistan and for India, they keep looking at each other.

Now, I do hear that internally both have decided, you know, what level they want to go to. Maybe. But I think this needs to be a much more candid discussion on just how much is actually enough for both sides. And again, for the weaker party, Pakistan – I think if you’re only looking for, you know, deterrence in terms of denial to India, then all you should be doing is calculating on your own beyond a point on what you require. How many times do you want to blow Delhi over and you’ll be fine – you know, or whatever. But looking at India is really a slippery slope for Pakistan because then where do you stop? India is looking at China and so on.

Let me then, quickly – if I have a couple of minutes – you said one, okay, two minutes that is in South Asia. (Laughter.) Let me quickly give you a few specific sort of risk-reduction measures. And nothing new here, but let me nonetheless through these out.

First of all, as much as I have studied this, I am a – I am convinced that if you want South Asia’s risk to be minimized, you need to work on crisis prevention, not crisis management. Once you are in a crisis, well, you know, odds are you’ll still be able to maintain a fairly low level of escalation, but that’s not really anything anybody wants to test. What does crisis prevention entail? It really entails the larger issues – the trust deficit, the K-word – i.e. Kashmir – these deep-rooted issues, which are then causing these two countries to maintain postures that they are. I see no way around that, quite frankly.

Second, I think these limited war doctrines – they really need to be shelved. Yes, “cold start” – you know, okay, fine. I understand that there is a problem with the Sundarji Doctrine and something has to be developed. But if it’s really “cold start,” quite frankly, this is drawing room gossip. I’m sorry. It’s simply not workable without the kind of risk which will put both countries and peoples on both sides in completely uncertain and uncharted territory. And same for Pakistan I think. If there are any aspirations of using subconventional methods of limited wars, I think these need to be shelved completely on both sides.

Also, I am a big fan of this idea of dialogue no matter what. So I think this is a counterproductive position that, well, another Mumbai, we won’t talk again – because ultimately what you’re doing is playing into the hands of the very people who want to create mayhem on both sides. And again, yes, there are political sensitivities attached to that, but I think there is, again, no way around that.
More specifically, the ideas that I want to throw out, there is an idea of a common lexicon on both sides. You know, they use different terms for these things – even on nuclear matters, what one side means by something is not what the other side means. So coming up with a common lexicon. Perhaps even binding protocols, which force these two sides to communicate directly with each other during crisis time, rather than, you know, trying to find a third party. Nuclear risk reduction centers have been mentioned often.

This discussion about transparency: I am not sure where that – you know, where the optimal level is, but certainly complete opacity needs to be revisited. And I am not a fan of complete transparency at this point in South Asia and, you know, the reasons are many, which I don’t have time to go into. But more transparency than you have at this point is certainly desirable.

And a couple of other agreements – one – also, sharing of best practices between the civilian nuclear establishments on both sides is another thing. And finally, I think, controversial as it is, perhaps it is time to think about things like a no-deployment agreement, at least in peacetime. And perhaps a no-preemption agreement, both of the arsenal and of the nuclear chain of command in peacetime. The bolt-out-of-the-blue kind of scenario.

I think both sides are saying they don’t want to do this, both sides are saying this is counterproductive. So why not think about a way where you can actually bind the two sides, even if it’s lapsable and time-bound, to think about these two agreements and perhaps come to some common understanding. Let me stop there.

LAVOY: Okay, thank you very much. I think what united each of these presentations is a rather sort of depressing state of affairs currently, but you had a number – you left – you closed on a number of ideas for the future, to manage the risk. I think, Michael, it’s your job to, you know, bridge that gap. (Laughter.)

KREPON: Well, Peter, the good news is that cricket diplomacy is back on – in the Punjab, no less, which is a good place for any movement through reconciliation. The home ministers are meeting today. The atmospherics are good. There are some specific steps, minor steps that have been taken to improve the atmospherics. That’s the good news. The bad news is that the big explosions happen when there is positive momentum in India-Pakistan relations.

So we don’t know when the next crisis is going to be, but I think these gentlemen are correct in assuming that there is likely to be another crisis, sparked by a mass casualty attack at an iconic Indian target. The target, if the last two crises are continued in the next crisis, the target will be not in Kashmir, but in Delhi or Bangalore or Hyderabad or someplace where India has a great deal of pride that is embodied in a structure of some kind, a structure that relates to India’s economic growth and international connectivity. That’s the target. And regrettably there are a lot of these targets in the cities that I have mentioned and in other cities that are extremely open to attack.

When the next crisis occurs, it will occur in a very fluid nuclear environment, one in which production capacity for fissile material – for bombs – is on the rise, one in which the nuclear programs of both countries are being modernized. We’re looking at the introduction of cruise missiles as well as ballistic missiles that could be nuclear capable.

It’s a triangular competition. China, we don’t mention so much but is very much there. And it’s extremely hard to stabilize three legs – three uneven legs of a triangle. The country in the middle, India, is the least competitive.
of the lot. China is moving forward. There are external stimuli for China made in the U.S.A. Pakistan is the most competitive of – it seems to me – of these three states.

One thing that has not been mentioned is that nuclear capability will be moving to sea, a lot in advance of this Indian SSBN. Cruise missiles can be deployed at sea in a variety of ways. And you know, this separation of warheads and launchers that we’ve been – which has been one of the elements of nuclear risk reduction and crisis management in the past – well, it’s hard to see how that happens at sea. Command-and-control problems are going to be greater when nuclear deterrents go partially to sea.

And the overall context within the next crisis will play out – you have a greater disparity in conventional capability in India’s favor and a greater disparity in nuclear capability in Pakistan’s favor. And that is not a good equation for deterrence stability in a crisis. South Asia has experienced several of these crises, along with the advent of covert nuclear capability. Crises have become more pronounced – sharper, if you will – with the advent of overt nuclear capability. This is not really a surprise. This was utterly predictable.

Let’s talk about the common elements of these crises and then talk about crisis management. The perpetrators in the past have had links to Pakistan’s military and intelligence services – training, equipment, basing in Pakistan. For some of these crises – the last two, in fact – it’s been hard to pin down how much involvement there has been, how much foreknowledge there has been at the highest level of the Pakistani military establishment.

What is clear is that the authorities in Pakistan did not take serious preventative actions before mass casualty attacks occurred on iconic targets on Indian soil. It’s also clear that the authorities in Pakistan have either been unable or unwilling to take significant actions against the perpetrators and planners after the mass casualty attacks on Indian soil. There have been temporary and polite house detentions, lingering court cases, no convictions.

The government of India – third common element – has demonstrated uncommon restraint after these attacks. Kargil, a very special crisis, unlikely to be repeated in my judgment. Very limited military means and military objectives were employed by New Delhi. Might have been different if the Indian forces had been less successful.

As for the mass casualty attacks directed against targets in Delhi and in Mumbai, very different Indian coalition governments came to exactly the same conclusion: that the benefits of striking back would likely be modest and the risks would likely be great. Among those risks, uncontrolled escalation, as Moeed has said.

Changes in civil-military relations within Pakistan that would not be to India’s benefit, changes in Pakistan’s domestic politics which would not be to India’s benefit and very negative repercussions for U.S. forces and allied forces in Afghanistan which would not be to India’s benefit. So all of these calculations have combined to result in uncommon Indian restraint in the past.

As Moeed has said, the U.S. has served as the indispensable crisis manager in the past. No one else can play this role. Nobody else can play this role. It’s us or nobody. But the U.S. effectiveness as a crisis manager has depended entirely on New Delhi’s wishes. So we are very effective as a crisis manager when New Delhi does not want to kick back at Pakistan. And we’re very good at engineering outcomes that New Delhi wants.
How do nuclear weapons figure in to these crises and this progression of crises? They’re a big part, obviously, of India’s concerns about uncontrolled escalation. They are a big and growing part of Pakistan’s deterrence calculus. So as the conventional imbalance grows and after every crisis Pakistan becomes more concerned about India’s conventional capabilities, the nuclear piece becomes more important to Pakistan’s military leadership.

Nuclear requirements in Pakistan appear to grow after every crisis. Although there are lots of questions about requirements and how Pakistan would actually meet those targeting requirements in the fog of war, it’s clear that Pakistan’s military leadership wants India to think twice and three times about hitting back because their nuclear capabilities are growing.

What does this mean for the future? I think I have said that Kargil-type crises are unlikely to be repeated. Unconventional attacks on Indian soil by outfits and individuals trained and equipped in Pakistan are likely to be repeated. The U.S. government will then resort to a familiar crisis management playbook developed after the last two crises and refined in the last two crises. But how effective this playbook will be depends upon what outcome the government of India wants.

If anything, the risk-benefit calculus as perceived from New Delhi is no different from the risk-benefit calculus from the last two crises. It could indeed be far riskier for New Delhi for the reasons that have been discussed here. And I think those reasons are pretty obvious. The domestic political situation in Pakistan, civil-military relations in Pakistan, the uncontrolled escalation piece – there are a lot of reasons still to think twice about striking back.

Trendlines associated with mass casualty attacks on Indian soil: After each crisis, India rebounds. India rebounds economically. Pakistan doesn’t. After each crisis, Pakistan’s domestic political environment also deteriorates. After each crisis sparked by a mass casualty attack on Indian soil, U.S.-India relations improves, including U.S.-Indian military relations. After each crisis, U.S.-Pakistani relations becomes more problematic.

And after each crisis, U.S. crisis management becomes harder because the deliverables are so suspect. There have been promises that have been extracted from Pakistan’s leaders in past crisis. The government of India has really not believed that these promises would be met, but they were satisfactory because they didn’t want to hit back militarily.

So I mean, after you’ve been through this drill a couple of times, you know, what – I mean, how many times can you go to this well when you know the bucket you pull up is kind of empty? And with each crisis, the U.S. remains the only conceivable crisis manager, but the U.S. is less of an honest broker. So this is hard.

Bottom lines. Number one: You can’t ask of a chief of army staff in Pakistan to know about every single action that is carried out on Indian soil by folks who are trained and equipped in Pakistan. You can ask of a chief of army staff in Pakistan to know in advance when really big explosions are being planned, trained for and equipped on Pakistani soil. So a chief of army staff in Pakistan that is unaware of a major crisis-generating mass casualty attack on Indian soil is ill-serving Pakistan’s interests. That’s number one.
Number two: Another crisis will play out against the backdrop of growing asymmetries in the region – conventional and military – and that is going to be very, very tricky. So far the stability-instability paradox has held, thanks to uncommon but not uncharacteristic Indian restraint. Thank you.

LAVOY: Michael, thanks for ending the presentations on that uplifting note. (Laughter.) We’ve got a lot of expertise in the crowd and a lot of experience. The floor is open. In fact, I’ll stand up here so I can see. I have a few questions as well, but I’ll wait until we hear from people in the audience. And if you could please introduce yourself before asking a question.

[00:53:15]

Q: Yes. Thank you, Paul Meyer, currently with Simon Fraser University and the Simons Foundation. Mr. Yusuf, you referred to the trust deficit and the lack of direct communications. I am aware there has been over the years a series of bilateral confidence building measure agreements concluded between Pakistan and India and some seem at least to be actively complied with. But I’m curious if you or the other panelists could speak at all about the compliance record and what that suggests for future pursuit of confidence building between the two countries.

LAVOY: Michael, do you want to take that first and then – because you’ve looked at the documentary evidence – and then if Moeed or Vipin want to comment.

KREPON: The compliance record isn’t bad, Paul. Prenotifications of missile flight tests – ballistic missile flight tests; certain-sized military actions; the data exchanges first of the year on nuclear facilities. It’s not bad. But both countries are bad-mouthing these agreements. They don’t really matter. They don’t get to the heart of the problem.

I don’t like it that these agreements, modest though they may be, are being bad-mouthinged. But maybe when political relations improve, maybe – because there are a couple of others that are just waiting in the wings. Moeed has mentioned some of them. But if you’re taking the public position that this stuff is really cosmetic and immaterial, that’s not good.

LAVOY: Moeed?

[00:55:07]

YUSUF: No, I just wanted to add, I think I agree they have been fairly good at that. In fact, nuclear CBMs are one which have held the test of all political tensions in some ways. But what you really need and what hasn’t happened is an agreement to at least continue talking about the nuclear issue no matter what happens in the relationship. There is no nuclear strategic dialogue which will discuss these issues over and over again if need be. We’re just completely – on a completely different track than the comprehensive dialogue or whatever you call the political one. Every time the relationship breaks down, this is also a casualty.

So you know, neither side has really taken this out of that political basket and talked about these issues. That’s where you will have the opportunity to talk about no deployment, no preemption, you know, the China factor.

In track IIIs, quite honestly, this is now becoming the mantra. I mean, people are saying we need to have this and continue discussing this. But how do you bring that track II into track I is really the question. And I think nothing exists at this point.
LAVOY: Next question.

Q: Michelle Dover, American University. So my question is, you were talking about crisis prevention versus crisis management. And so, if the U.S.’s role as a crisis manager depends on New Delhi’s good graces, how does the U.S. create the communication channels and the expectation that the two countries will resolve these problems, these crises without the third party being there? So how does the U.S. create those channels and thereby remove themselves from the – (inaudible) – ?

[00:56:49]

LAVOY: Who wants to tackle that one? Vipin, you look like you’re – (laughter).

NARANG: I’m not going to tackle that one. (Laughter.)

LAVOY: Okay, Michael first.

KREPON: The key for me is probably the hardest and that is cooperation on counterterrorism. So if the two countries are not cooperating, as difficult as this may be, on counterterrorism before an explosion happens, it’s hard to see how they can cooperate usefully on counterterrorism after an explosion happens. The hardest – it’s so hard for them to do this because from Delhi’s perspective – and it has some basis in fact – the folks they would need to cooperate with to prevent acts of mass casualty terrorism are the folks who are in cahoots. So that’s really hard.

The U.S. is also handicapped now in terms of working – how shall I put this? I think the level of effort that we’re committed to in Afghanistan and the reliance necessarily that we have to reside in the government of Pakistan for logistical support for those forces in Afghanistan make it – kind of remove leverage that the United States might have on Pakistan in other areas.

So prevention is the key and prevention is extremely hard.

[00:59:15]

NARANG: You know, the reason I hesitated is because I think the ultimate solution is one that’s very difficult to achieve: It’s the – how do you reorient an entire institution’s worldview? The Pakistan army’s raison d’être was anti-India. It was founded on – it was founded – it was born out of conflict with India and has, you know, there has been persistent conventional conflict with India.

And you know, part of the problem that Michael alludes to is that, you know, some of these organizations, Lashkar in particular, is viewed as a strategic asset of the security forces – you know, with enough plausible deniability yet, you know, still related to the security forces to be able to bleed India by a thousand cuts as General Zia once said.

So how do you get an entire institution to reorient its worldview that India is not an existential threat to it or its state anymore? That ultimately to me is the ultimate crisis prevention solution, right, because then you wouldn’t have a security force training and supplying militants who would then hit India’s metropoles and you could erect a lot of the nuclear and conventional CBMs and, you know, get to stability, stability.

LAVOY: Tesi.
Q: I think that a lot of the questions we’ve been talking about in the Q&A and just before really relate to a distinction that Moeed made very early in his presentation – the distinction between working in peacetime and working in crisis conditions. India and Pakistan have a very good record of observing their CBMs in peacetime.

It’s in crisis conditions that they fall apart. And they fall apart in the sense of hotlines being unused because there is no part and that sort of thing. And so I think you need to refine the question: How do you make the habits that are sometimes painfully built up in peacetime actually carry over into crisis conditions?

I also wanted to comment on – and I’m not sure who mentioned this – the utility of the nuclear risk reduction centers as a device that might be used in India and Pakistan. I was part of a group that actually looked seriously at this over the course of three meetings involving Americans, Indians and Pakistanis.

And basically we all came to the conclusion that the way the U.S. and Russia had done nuclear risk reduction centers was kind of not relevant to the way a crisis was likely to manifest itself in India and Pakistan. Not that there is necessarily nothing to learn from that, but this is not a cookie cutter that can simply be used to stamp out a new confidence building measure.

You put that together with what Michael just said about antiterrorism cooperation being the ultimate potential crisis preventer – well, they’ve actually tried that and it went nowhere for all the reasons you said, plus the fact that the people engaged in the dialogue were basically the foreign offices, which are not the implementers of whatever one might wish to do by way of crisis prevention.

I have been working in or on South Asia for long enough that I feel I ought to be able to pull a rabbit out of my hat to solve this problem, but I can’t. What I am suggesting, though, is that Moeed’s idea of keeping a nuclear strand of the dialogue going, which of course would involve creating one in the first place, is going to be part of the answer. And ultimately you’re not going to get a complete cultural shift in a whole institution – nice as that would be, Vipin.

NARANG: Of course.

Q: But if you can get the top leadership of the government – and I include in this the army – on board for long enough to get some negotiations to take place and to go into the political realm, then the cultural shift can then follow over time, which is the only way it’s going to happen.

LAVOY: That, of course, is the challenge. In the Indian government system, getting the military in is the challenge. In Pakistan, getting them out, of course, is the challenge. (Laughter.)

LAVOY: Anybody care to comment on Tesi’s observations?

KREPON: Well, you notice I didn’t mention the hotlines when I was talking about a good record. Even during crises, the hotlines are not properly used. Sometimes they’re not used at all in crises. But the other CBMs
that Moeed has mentioned actually have stood up pretty well in crisis. And as far as a serious effort to renew cooperation on counterterrorism, we can know if this is real by who is heading up the two delegations. If these two countries put – no disrespect – MEA and the MFA in charge, we know it’s not real.

YUSUF: Could I just add on this, I think there is also this – at least I think there is use – I haven’t got much receptivity from my Indian friends on this – but maybe an intel-to-intel dialogue. You know, that may be something to start off with. Now, again, the argument there is, well, there’s nothing comparable to the ISI on the other side. Fine, but we live in a real world and perhaps that’s a start.

[01:05:23]

Any place where you can have dialogue candidly about terrorism or this cooperation – if the joint mechanism hasn’t worked, that may be something to think about. And you know, from what I understand there was an attempt to do that as well and it sort of fizzled out, but perhaps we’ll start again.

LAVOY: Next question.

Q: Karthika Sasikumar. I have just one basic question actually: So is there a hotline between the political leaders? I know that there’s a DGMO hotline, but I seem to remember someone pretending to be the Indian foreign minister – (laughter) – calling up, you know, a few days after Mumbai. So I’d just like some clarification on that.

And my second question is more conceptual. If we – panelists have hinted that the United States is like an insurance company. People do strange things and then, you know, hope and assume that the United States is going to come in and stop things before they get too bad. So insurance companies have, you know, two kinds of incentives:

There are some people who actually want to set fire to their houses and you punish them by increasing their premium. But there are also people whose houses catch fire because they have not really been paying attention and what insurance companies do is reduce your premium if you take certain steps to make your house safer.

So I’m wondering if the panel can come up with some ideas for conflict prevention which include giving incentives to both sides to actually strengthen, you know, maybe make it easier for them to know about terrorist, terrorist activities in each other’s countries or educate the public what the actual consequences of a nuclear exchange would be, so things that the U.S. can do before things get ugly in South Asia.

[01:07:02]

KREPON: Well, there are hotlines between political leaders. The call screening could be improved. (Laughter.) And there are still some people in this audience that have not heard this anecdote, so I’m going to say it one more time. I try to interview the Pakistani DGMOs about this CBM business. And I interviewed one who shall remain nameless.

And I asked – this was before the ceasefire, across the line of control – and I said, so how are things going? How many times have you heard this story? (Chuckles.) So how’s it going? Well, you know, firing over here. These guys jumped on a post over here. There’s this going on, there’s that going on. So I said, well, did you pick up the phone. And he said, no. I said, why not? He said, because it would give him – the Indian DGMO – more satisfaction than it would give me. (Laughter.) So there are hotlines, but they could use work.
YUSUF: Can I just add one thing – this thing about the insurance company – and I think it ties up with something that was said earlier, who said, you know, what can the U.S. do? I think, let’s not presume that the only thing that the U.S. can do positively is to play an even greater role. I have argued that pulling back may be an option. I think we need to really consider just how much we think we can do.

And if we are really the only broker – and I mean, one thing that one can do without getting into the counterterrorism, et cetera, is to signal differently, is to at least start, you know, telling these two sides that we may not be there – because the signals we send is, yeah, well, we may be there; we’ll need it. And thus both sides prepare for that. So I think maybe we should also start thinking about whether too much is counterproductive and maybe find a way of starting to pull back a bit.

[01:09:06]

LAVOY: You know, Moed, I think intellectually that’s appealing, but, you know, our relationship with India and Pakistan is like a marriage; it’s for better or worse. It’s very hard to make it conditional, you know – we’ll be with you only under these conditions – because it becomes immediately politicized – and it’s probably not in the nature of how governments interact with each other anyways, even though logically or intellectually it might –

YUSUF: I think, Peter, let me just add that the confidence I see in Delhi and Islamabad that U.S. will come and bail us out is problematic. I am not saying, go and tell them, sorry, we won’t show up. But at least this idea on both sides – they’re must be something in signaling which is telling both sides – it may be cognitive dissonance – but both sides believe that we’re going to show up, we’re going to do what they want us to do. And I think at least that signaling should change.

LAVOY: Well, I just – we’ll turn to – people have been standing for a long time, so we won’t get into a dialogue between ourselves, but I’m not sure that everyone here would agree with your observation that the Indians are confident that the U.S. will be there.

[01:10:08]

NARANG: I also think that – can I just add –

LAVOY: Vipin, go ahead.

NARANG: – I think that the U.S. intervention has also provided face-saving mechanisms for both sides to de-escalate in ways too, so our involvement has stabilized independent of – (inaudible, cross talk) –

LAVOY: That’s a very good point. That’s an excellent point. Next speaker. Question.

Q: Stanley Riveles, IDA. I want to thank the three presenters for very rich and thought-provoking presentations. And it provokes a lot of the following question: If we take the, kind of the approach that you three have laid out and put it against the changes that we can see in the future – and I’m focusing primarily on the expected U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan – it seems to me that that may represent a very major change in the strategic relationship in the region.

[01:11:02]
My uninformed impression is that the U.S. presence has been a restraining factor in Pakistan, that it’s been a source of great financial aid and that the withdrawal of the U.S. will have a great impact on Pakistan and make – reduce the role of the U.S. in Pakistan. So question one, is this now the calm before the storm, a period of kind of a phony peace, so to speak? (Laughter) And the second question is what should the U.S. be thinking about in terms of withdrawal in its India-Pakistan relations?

LAVOY: Stan, great questions. But if this is the calm, I really hate to see the storm. (Laughter.) Who wants to tackle these really important issues?

KREPOON: I’m going to start. Stan, if you believe as I do that the enormous presence we have now in Afghanistan and reliance upon Pakistan for logistical support reduces our leverage on Pakistani choices, then it may follow that if we’re not in Afghanistan in anywhere this presence, we might actually have more leverage on Pakistan’s decision-making.

If one of Pakistan’s calculations is that as long as there is such a heavy U.S. presence in Afghanistan – which India is fine with – that it serves as a restraining factor on India hitting at Pakistan, then it would follow that the removal of those forces might make the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus try to restrain mass casualty attacks on Indian targets a little bit more after we’re gone.

But we’re not planning to go, as far as I can tell, for a while. And the next mass casualty attack is going to happen before then. But you’re absolutely right that we ought to be thinking hard about the consequences of withdrawal in terms of crises, crisis behavior and crisis management.

LAVOY: Vipin and then –

NARANG: I think two questions about our potential eventual withdrawal: One is, if that gives Pakistan its much-vaunted strategic depth – whatever that means – in Afghanistan, might that ameliorate the army’s perception towards India? All right, probably not. (Laughter.) I mean, I think that’s – that will be a critical test of whether what they claim now about strategic depth ameliorating their threat perception will actually bear out. I’m skeptical.

And the second question is, what happens with the domestic political context in Pakistan as the U.S. withdraws? Has some of the militancy in Punjab pushed out to Afghanistan or does it get pushed back in from Afghanistan? And I think that will have significant implications for stability in Pakistan and then whether, you know, militancy gets exported out to India.

YUSUF: Just two things without tackling that directly. I think we’re talking about these issues in a broader framework, but let me just go back to the issue of deterrence for a second and this idea of India hitting back what happens with the withdrawal or not. I think, deterrence in terms of the reason number one that India is not hitting back is not the Pakistani civil-military or, you know, anything to do with domestic politics, but the fact that deterrence has helped. It’s as simple as that.

I mean, if you are India, you’re looking at the next Mumbai and saying, we have to do something and if that something is responded by Pakistan in kind, then what? It’s a one-shot and you’ve again stopped. So either you’re willing to go up the escalatory ladder or you don’t do anything to begin with. So I think we should also consider this
idea that in plain and simple terms, deterrence has worked. And one of the reasons India may not be doing anything in the past and perhaps even in the future is deterrence. And “cold start” to me is not really the answer because it will find a response.

[01:15:51]

The other thing I want to say – and this always turns out to be more controversial than I want it to be – but I think we also need to start understanding what is happening within the Pakistani military more. It’s all well to keep on talking about strategic depth and the idea of the military and yes, it’s in their focus and it remains very much where it was.

But I think there is significant evolution at the top level on how they’re thinking of these terrorist groups and what they’re thinking for the role of these, you know, old proxies and what they can do and what they can’t do. I don’t think it’s that black and white anymore, that here are the groups, we’ll use them and then put them in cold storage. So I think that also needs to be studied very carefully to know just how much Pakistan will do versus what it can do, et cetera.

LAVOY: Yes, sir.

Q: Thank you. William Walker from Saint Andrews University of Scotland. An observation and a question. My observation, really, is from the speakers and what they’ve said, it seems to me we could have a great tragedy ahead of us and we could have some terrible, you know, nuclear exchange and something might happen down the line.

[01:17:02]

But in India I find that it’s impossible to find anyone who would be prepared to accept they might have made a mistake in 1998 and there might have been an alternative future. And here it seems to me very much a matter of pride and a question of India’s status is the way in which they look at nuclear weapons. They don’t think about really the enormous risks around South Asia, that it’s very much a question of pride. And I just wonder if you have any comment upon that.

But my question really is to do with touching on Moeed Yusuf’s comment about what is enough. And it does seem to me this is a very, very important question. What is enough in the South Asian context? And perhaps you could comment on who actually decides the answer to that question? (Laughter.) Is it the military? Is it the production system? Is it the politicians? Who decides what is enough? And is there any communication between the two sides of what might be enough?

And in the Indian case, is it really about Pakistan and what’s enough? Or is it some kind of notional idea about China and reaching the same kind of level of a few hundred weapons as China has. Again, does it come down to a matter of perception and pride and prestige?

[01:18:20]

LAVOY: Thank you, Will. I am going to ask each of the speakers to respond. But let me just add one more wrinkle to that. I think in India and Pakistan you don’t have within the government a strategic elite per se. You don’t have people like the person who is chairing the panel next door, Frank Miller, who played this role in the U.S. from the Office of Secretary of Defense.
You don’t have a State Department policy planning-like cell. You don’t really have a national security council – you do in India, but not with the staff that we have here. And so you don’t – and you also don’t have – certainly not in Pakistan, less so in India somewhat – independent think tanks that play this role – Stimson Center, Carnegie and so forth.

And so when you ask the question, who decides and who helps to formulate these ideas, who is it in the absence of this, sort of, strategic marketplace for ideas?

Why don’t we start in the order Vipin, Moeed and then Michael you can wrap us up. Unless – you want a quick add-on to this, if it’s related?

Q: Yes, the trilateral relationship. How does China play in this in terms of possible role to initiate a trilateral discussion, since India looks so much in Chinese – the China direction as well as northwest toward Islamabad, and taking into account China’s special relationship, if you will, with Pakistan?

LAVOY: Okay, thanks. If you can fold that in, I also know there’s a panel on that subject tomorrow, but if you could fold that in. Okay, Vipin, you’re first.

NARANG: Yeah, on the question of how much is enough, it’s a good question as to who decides that in the Indian case. You know, there is some combination of the national security adviser, National Security Advisory Board, DRDO, the Atomic Energy Commission – it’s not entirely clear.

But I think the point I wanted to make in the description of India’s nuclear posture is it’s not really about numbers so much as some assured retaliation capability. It’s a recessed posture, so numbers aren’t as big a deal of your aim is to be able to survive a first strike from China – I think they’re trying to size the force to China. But not necessarily in terms of numbers but at least in terms of strategic reach.

In the Indian case, the how-much-is-enough with respect to Pakistan is really – the focus is really on the conventional level. And you know, I have written about this elsewhere and agree with Moeed that, you know, proactive strategy options, “cold start” – whatever you want to call it – runs all of the risks of whatever previous conventional doctrine you had before about uncontrollable escalation.

And so the, you know, the real question in India is, you know, how to move forward to develop domestic intelligence and crisis prevention efforts so that you can prevent terrorist – mass casualty terrorist strikes because I don’t think this conventional response is the answer – certainly the nuclear deterrent has been neutered effectively by Pakistan’s.

And I think the question about, you know, whether overt nuclearization was net security positive or negative for India. The conclusion at the political level seems to – you know, the behavior seems to suggest that it’s been net security negative because it has taken off the table India’s conventional superiority that it had prior to nuclearization.

LAVOY: Okay, thanks, Vipin. Moeed?
YUSUF: How much is enough in Pakistan is the, quote, unquote, the military. I think the Strategic Plans Division is pretty important. The Military High Command, I’m sure. I would be very surprised if there is too much political input to that in terms of the numbers and what the program needs to look like.

In terms of this issue of trilateral – you know, I think Pakistan – my view on this is in the minority, I want to put this up front. Not many in Pakistan agree with me. But I think Pakistan needs to seriously start thinking on what it requires vis-à-vis India irrespective of what India is doing. You have got beyond the first ladder where you really had to look at each other and be dynamic in your minimum deterrence.

But once you get to a level where survivability is more or less guaranteed – yes, you can talk triad and one can get into the technicalities – but if you are assured survivability, then you really forget about what India is doing and figure out just what you need to keep your arsenal current. And I am not sure that thinking is there.

Now, the complicating factor here is of course that India looks at China. And thus the Indian side is always going to be much larger than whatever minimum Pakistan requires. So in some ways, Pakistan is, you know, playing the catching up game if it gets into that, which I think is quite dangerous and shouldn’t take place.

And finally, Peter, on this point, I think this is an excellent point to make and I think both sides need to really think about this – on how do you put this structure in place, where at least there is more input – because quite frankly my worry is that, yes, there is this idea of independence and new voices, but these independent voices are really voices that are being promoted to sustain the status quo and to promote more and more. And I think there needs to be some decision on how you enlarge this body to bring in others.

[01:23:31]

Now, in Pakistan’s case, the problem is as soon as you talk national security council, there are huge political sensitivities attached to that.

LAVOY: Thank you. Michael.

KREPON: Pierce, China does have a role to play in crisis management. It’s a supporting cast role, but when any crisis happens, somebody important from Pakistan gets in a plane and goes to Beijing, looking for help. And typically the answer is not satisfactory for the Pakistani visitor, but is helpful for crisis management. But this is a supporting role.

There is one element of crisis management that I would like to now make explicit because I forgot about it when I was talking. But you know, in past wars between India and Pakistan, breakdowns of deterrence – we sold stuff to both sides and we stopped selling. We put a hold on everything in the past.

Now, we’re selling more stuff – a lot more to India than to Pakistan. We are selling both sides maritime patrol aircraft. And we typically think of friction and crises generated on land – not necessarily in the future. It could be at sea. It would be very interesting to see whether the United States government imposes an embargo on both sides in the event of a future breakdown in deterrence.

[01:25:24]

I’m not sure that deterrence has worked so well in this region. If we define deterrence as the prevention of crisis and war-provoking events, deterrence has failed. If we define deterrence as prevention of limited war between
nuclear armed states, deterrence has failed. Where deterrence has succeeded so far is that both sides have not crossed the nuclear threshold. But this does not seem to me to be an enviable record so far. It could be worse and there could be a tragedy.

In terms of how much is enough, the decision-making body in India – excuse me, in Pakistan – in terms of nuclear requirements I am not privy to. My guess is that it is a very small number of people, all of whom are in uniform. And if, as now seems to be the case, that nuclear requirements are partly defined by how badly the conventional balance is moving in India’s favor, then nuclear requirements can grow quite a bit.

It’s obvious at this point, at least to me, that Pakistan has accumulated sufficient weapons that go well beyond a city target and a countervalue strategy. And if requirements are driven in part by every arms sale to India conventionally, then I don’t see an end to this.

[01:27:23]

LAVOY: Again, Michael, thank you for leaving us on a very high note. (Laughter.) You know, I am not supposed to make any public predictions, being from the intel community, but I am going to go out on a limb and make – well, let me just tell you. The intel community actually, I’ve found out, does a great job in predicting the future, except when things change. (Laughter.)

So we do pretty well most of the time. But I will go out on a limb and predict that these problems won’t be solved in a year’s time, that Carnegie will have another panel on this subject about a year from now. But I certainly hope that there will be progress in some of the areas that you’ve laid out and that others certainly are thinking about because really the stakes are too high not to see any progress in this area.

So with that, that concludes our panel and I hope you’ll join me in thanking the three excellent speakers. (Applause.)

(END)