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KEYNOTE

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INTRODUCTION:

George Perkovich

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

KEYNOTE SPEAKER:

Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ)

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PERKOVICH: People will still be coming in. You are all the hearty lot. It's early, but I think it's worth beginning this early in order to have Senator Kyl here.

[00:00:17]

Arms control, to the extent that it requires treaties and to the extent that the objective is to have the U.S. part of those treaties, means, due to our Constitution, that there has to be a negotiation internally within the United States before, during and after the completion of negotiations with other states.

And in that negotiation process, a great deal depends on leadership of both parties. And I think we have with us here this morning a most formidable leader in that internal process. And it's very important, therefore, to understand how Senator Kyl is looking at the issues on which everybody here works.

Senator Jon Kyl is serving his third term in the United States Senate. He previously had been a four-term member of the House of Representatives, serving the 4th district in Arizona. Since 2008, he's been the Republican whip, which is the second-highest position in the Republican leadership. He is a member of the Judiciary Committee and the Finance Committee, but on top of that, obviously, is one of the leading experts in the Senate on issues of nuclear policy and international security. Obviously that's the topic that he will be addressing with us here this morning.

[00:01:50]

So let me get out of the way and introduce Senator Kyl.

Thank you for coming.

KYL: Thank you, George. (Applause.)

Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

I want to begin by thanking Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the organizers of this international nuclear policy conference, including Jessica Mathews, the president of the Carnegie Endowment, for inviting me to speak. I think my role this morning is to be sure that everyone is wide awake. So, George, thank you for setting the stage with that gracious introduction.

And before I begin, let me just note my sorrow for the suffering and the loss of the people of Japan in the days since the tsunami and the earthquake there. The Japanese are a great people and among the most important allies of the United States. And I know they'll recover from this tragedy and that they can count on the United States in every way possible. And I know that all of us share that sentiment.

[00:02:47]

Every few decades, a movement arises to secure world peace by eliminating weapons of war. Early in the last century, it was the inter-war disarmament movement. In the 1960s, it was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, followed by the nuclear freeze movement of the '70s and '80s.

Recently, the so-called Global Zero movement has emerged to launch the latest such effort. Global Zero members describe their views as follows: "The only way to eliminate the nuclear threat, including proliferation and

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nuclear terrorism, is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, secure all nuclear materials, and eliminate all nuclear weapons,” end of quote.

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The trouble with these approaches to disarmament is, in my opinion, that they confuse cause and effect, the symptom with the underlying disease. It's not the weapons that are the cause of the problem but rather the fundamental reality of the international system. Or, as Ronald Reagan put it, we don't mistrust each other because we're armed; we're armed because we mistrust each other.

As in the practice of medicine, focusing on symptoms without also addressing the underlying causes of those symptoms can lead to all sorts of pernicious, unintended consequences that actually worsen the problem. These can be seen in past, well-intended, but ultimately self-defeating disarmament efforts.

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Start with the 1920s. The global disarmament movement emerged in reaction to the carnage of the First World War. The movement would swell to include more than 40 international, non-governmental organizations representing over a billion people of 100 nationalities to prevent yet another war to end all wars. These activists sought to reverse and eliminate the postwar arms competition they believed would lead to another war. It began with the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty which sought to limit the naval armaments of the five signatories – U.S., Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

The terms of the treaty were modified by the London Naval Treaty of 1930 and the Second London Treaty (ph) of 1936. But by that time Japan was already secretly not complying with it. In 1927, nations would actually outlaw war as an instrument of politics with the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But within two years, Germany would launch its first battleship. Two years after that, Japanese troops would begin their march through Manchuria. In just over a decade, the nations signing the treaty would be at war with each other.

The global disarmament movement reached its peak when the war disarmament conference convened in Geneva in 1932. But by June of 1934, the disarmament conference would end in failure after Germany's refusal to accept a plan put forth by Britain, France and the United States. Italy would invade Abyssinia in 1935. Germany would remilitarize the Rhineland in '36. And Hitler, of course, invaded Poland in 1939 to begin the Second World War.

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While we cannot ascribe sole responsibility for the Second World War to the disarmament movement between the wars, historians have concluded that these treaties helped to lull the great democracies into a sense of complacency, which, along with other of their own self-deception about Germany's true aims, prevented them from taking early actions to address the threat posed by Germany's rearmament. And this absence of early actions to prevent aggression led later to the need for far greater action, accompanied by terrible suffering.

As American statesman George Kennan put it, “I know of no sound reason why, even in 1925, anyone should have supposed that there was any likelihood that general disarmament could be brought about by multilateral agreement among a group of European powers whose mutual political differences and suspicions had been by no means resolved. The evil of these utopian enthusiasms was not only or even primarily the waste of time, the

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misplaced emphasis, the encouragement of false hopes. The evil lay primarily in the fact that these enthusiasms distracted our gaze from the real things that were happening.”

[00:07:21]

In the 1980s, the disarmament impulse returned in the form of the nuclear-freeze movement, which was clearly aimed at President Reagan’s strategic modernization program. Had it succeeded, the freeze would have locked in place Soviet nuclear advantage and would have stalled the momentum behind the forces arrayed against the Soviet Union, forces which ultimately led to its demise. And ironically, as former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle has noted, a freeze would have killed any possibility of a treaty to eliminate all medium-range missiles, something President Reagan proposed and eventually achieved. And that is now regarded by the so-called peace movement as the most important arms control agreement signed.

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Well, today it is the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism that has become the public focus of the disarmament movement, though I suspect that even without these current threats, it would still argue for nuclear abolition. But Global Zero frames the issue, I believe, as a false choice, that nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation and terrorism will lead to nuclear catastrophe unless the United States leads by example to ultimately and completely eliminate nuclear weapons.

Leave aside for a moment the dubious assumption that our moral leadership could sway immoral regimes. The problem is that the motivation for nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism are explained by factors other than the existence and size of great-power nuclear arsenals and so cannot be resolved by a U.S. disarmament example.

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The U.S. nuclear arsenal could be half the size mandated in the New START treaty or eliminated entirely, and the drive for nuclear weapons by some countries would continue unabated, and perhaps pursued with even greater vigor. Indeed, this modern-day disarmament movement could actually increase the spread of nuclear weapons and perhaps even increase their use.

How so? First, as soon as the United States begins to take concrete steps toward eliminating its nuclear arsenal, some 30-plus nations that depend on the United States’ nuclear security assurances will begin to question whether a greatly reduced U.S. arsenal will be sufficiently credible to protect them against growing WMD threats that they face. They will respond to preserve their security. And in so doing, some will choose independent nuclear capabilities.

Beyond limitations in numbers is limitations in effectiveness. The disarmament community is calling for steps that could further undermine the credibility of our deterrent. During the Cold War, the U.S. had a variety of nuclear weapons of various types able to fulfill a variety of different military missions. Such diversity of capability helped to ensure that we had a force posture that could properly be tailored to a variety of deterrence requirements. And this provided the president highly flexible options for response.

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Today, with only a few types of Cold War-legacy nuclear weapons in the stockpile, the military flexibility is quite limited, and thus the credibility of a U.S. nuclear response is reduced. The disarmament community is so opposed to any change in our weapons that it even opposes a reduction of their lethality. This reduces the credibility of our deterrent.

As Eric Edelman and Andrew Krepinevich and Evan Montgomery noted in a recent Foreign Affairs article, “Because the U.S. has thus far chosen not to design a new generation of nuclear weapons, this may create the perception among both its allies and its adversaries that the United States is self-deterred, that it will not be willing to employ nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack on one of its partners because of the enormous collateral damage and high number of civilian casualties that would result.”

Third, some nuclear-capable nations may be encouraged to acquire or expand their nuclear arsenal should global zero gain traction in the West. If the United States is determined to take concrete steps to reduce and ultimately eliminate its nuclear arsenal, then why not view this as an opportunity to acquire leverage that resides in a nuclear arsenal? China, for example, has some 400 nuclear weapons today. Why wouldn't the prospect of deep U.S. nuclear force reductions provide an incentive for it, and perhaps others, to become peer competitors?

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Fourth – and this is analogous to the inter-war years – as nations come to view global zero as a sort of solution to their problem, they're less likely to take more specific, concrete actions to deal with the proliferation threat now. Despite repeated statements from U.S. leaders that North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons are unacceptable and that transfer of nuclear-weapons technology is similarly unacceptable, we have faced and failed to counter the development of nuclear-weapon capabilities in North Korea, in Iran, in Syria, for years.

The response thus far has been chiefly to rely on United Nations sanctions and the supposed power of behavioral norms to enforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an approach that's not been successful to date, nor is it likely to keep these and other states from acquiring or expanding their nuclear capabilities.

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The truth is, countries with bad leaders are not going to follow the moral example of good countries like the United States. Even when sanctions are added to the moral example, rogue nations do not respond. We now have perhaps the strongest sanctions ever on Iran and North Korea, and yet the IAEA reports that Iran has actually increased its production of low-enriched uranium. North Korea was able to develop a clandestine uranium enhancement program, and, according to press reports, actually moved from plutonium to uranium for its nuclear-weapon productions.

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Could it be that our collective willingness to wait for the next IAEA report, the next meeting of the U.N. Security Council and international norms to have their effect is displacing real, tangible actions against these rogue proliferators?

Finally, nuclear weapons, and, by extension, nuclear deterrence, have imposed a certain restraint on the outbreak or escalation of war. We know that the last time that the world was at nuclear zero, it suffered approximately 110 million casualties over the course of just 10 combined years of warfare in the first half of the 20th century.

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What will happen without that restraint? As long as nations know how to make nuclear weapons and our security is threatened, we will need a nuclear deterrent. This much was acknowledged by President Obama when he pledged in Prague that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.

It follows, too, that an effective nuclear arsenal discourages challenges to the United States and its interests. After conducting considerable research on dozens of case studies, Georgetown Professor Matthew Kroenig concludes, and I quote, “that American nuclear superiority has helped to deter adversaries from initiating militarized disputes against the United States in the past.”

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Now, while they would not deny the past effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, some who are advocating nuclear disarmament contend that it is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective and that unless we eliminate nuclear weapons, such deterrent policies will make it more likely that nuclear weapons will be used. Their solution is to find what they call more stable forms of deterrence, even while acknowledging that current problems must be addressed before the conditions can be established which permit the elimination of nuclear weapons.

[00:15:43]

As Global Zero explains, and I quote here, “In pursuing global zero, nations will confront profound and complex political and security issues. Before signing and ratifying a global-zero accord, nations will assess whether going to zero will serve their national interests, taking into consideration the state of various geopolitical, regional and national-security issues at the time.”

In a similar vein, four prominent U.S. statesmen have written, “While the four of us believe that reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is becoming increasingly hazardous, some nations will hesitate to draw or act on the same conclusion unless regional confrontations and conflicts are addressed.” They do not explain precisely how to deal with these profound and complex security issues and suppose that somehow all of the regional conflicts and animosities and ambitions that currently exist could be resolved promptly.

[00:16:43]

How could the world avoid new conflicts in the future? Realists must surely agree it’s hard to see a world without conflicts. They can’t be outlawed. What new system-changing factors will forever change the basic character of the existing international system so that nuclear zero becomes possible and prudent? This is the fundamental question that nuclear-zero advocates have yet to credibly answer. In fact, note how simplistic and superficial these statements are.

The Global Zero action plan, and I’m quoting here, says, “The commission will continue to examine these issues and their interrelationship with our strategy for the elimination of nuclear weapons.” The four statesmen suggest, and I quote, “We must therefore redouble our efforts to resolve these issues, recognizing the need for greater cooperation, transparency and verification to create the global political environment for stability and enhanced mutual security.”

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Redouble our efforts? Recognize the need for greater cooperation? Continue to examine? What problem hasn't been attacked by these faux solutions? These statements trivialize or ignore the enormous difficulty in creating the conditions necessary to achieve their goal. And I might note that if we were able to create the global political environment for stability and enhanced mutual security, we wouldn't have the global-zero movement because states would no longer need nuclear weapons. This has always been the fundamental paradox of disarmament.

[00:18:24]

Reflecting on the unsuccessful conclusion of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1934, Salvador de Madariaga, the chief of the disarmament section of League of Nations, wrote, and I'm quoting him here, "The trouble was that nothing to do with disarmament ever makes sense, since either the general state of the world adds up to dissent or to consensus. And in the first case, disarmament is impossible; and in the second, disarmament would be spontaneous."

Let's for a moment assume that the lamb has lain down with the lion, that we've transformed geopolitical realities, created the conditions for a nuclear-free world and safely navigated from today's nuclear force levels to zero. What then? What happens when geopolitical tensions once again surface? How will nations settle their disputes -through the United Nations? By relying on conventional arms? Or would they begin a nuclear mobilization?

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Here's how Nobel laureate and arms-control pioneer Thomas Schelling describes such an environment: "A world without nuclear weapons would be a world in which the United States, Russia, Israel, China and half a dozen or a dozen other countries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons. Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis. Any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate. Whoever gets the first weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world."

[00:20:03]

Last year's consideration of the New START treaty is likely to be remembered as the opening round of a more profound debate about President Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons and of the policies he will likely propose in pursuit of that dream. Senators could not ignore the fact that New START would be the first step toward that vision, a vision many of us do not share.

No one denies the desirability of dealing with potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat that is posed by nuclear terrorism. The question, of course, is how best to deal with those threats. The great intellectual flaw in the global-zero vision is that it does not explain how we can move in practical steps to reduce nuclear threats or why we should expect a more peaceful and secure world absent nuclear weapons.

Further treaties that take us closer to nuclear disarmament will not help address these threats and may likely exacerbate them. Instead we need real realistic policies, including maintaining the stability of a strong nuclear deterrent.

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In his last address to the United States Congress, Winston Churchill said, “Be careful, above all things, not to let go of the atomic weapon until you are sure and more than sure that other means of preserving peace are in your hands.” We would do well to heed his advice. Thank you. (Applause.)

As I said, it was my function to get your blood going this morning. So I’m happy to stand for a few questions here till the time expires.

Yes, sir.

Q: Senator Kyl, thank you. I’m Tom Collina with the Arms Control Association. I appreciate your time here this morning. Thank you.

KYL: You’re welcome.

Q: (Inaudible.) My question is not on global zero but on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which I know you know quite a lot about, and, as you know, led the opposition in 1999 to reject the treaty in the U.S. Senate. My question is that a lot of time has gone by since then – about 11 years, by my count – and whether your views have changed at all.

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And I’ll preface it by saying this. Two years ago, former Secretary of State George Shultz said, and I quote, “Republican senators might have been right voting against the Test Ban Treaty some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now.” He said that referring to things that have changed over the last 11 years. For example, when the last vote happened in ’99, only about 20 percent of the global verification system was in place; we now have over 80 percent in place. And we now have another decade of experience with the stockpile stewardship program, giving us high confidence that weapons can be life-extended and kept reliable and effective without nuclear testing.

So my question to you is, do either of those facts and others bear on your current opinion of the Test Ban Treaty and whether it’s in the U.S. national security interest? Thank you.

[00:23:30]

KYL: You’re very welcome.

The two facts that you mentioned do bear on my conclusion, and it is that today there is even less reason to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or to ratify it than there was when it was roundly defeated about 11 years ago.

[00:23:48]

To take the two things that you noted, first of all, it is the quality, not the quantity, of measurements or devices that could theoretically detect a nuclear explosion that really matters. And I would note that even if you add the sophisticated United States capabilities beyond the international capabilities, we were not even able to verify the test that was announced in advance by the North Koreans in 2009.

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But apart from the fact that it is still not possible to ensure that we could detect a test that was conducted in violation of the treaty, because there are mechanisms available to mask those tests, the question is whether or not the treaty's regime for enforcing its terms could be utilized effectively at all. And the answer is no. The treaty has not changed in this regard at all. You still would have to convince a large number of countries of the world to move forward with, in effect, an investigation. And the idea that you could get 51 nations of the world to agree on such a thing in any kind of timely situation to take action and then get the resulting resolutions adopted by the 15 nations that would have to do that is, I think, beyond -beyond a doubt would not be achievable. With respect – so it's not just that it's not verifiable. It's that it's not enforceable.

What the stockpile stewardship program has done – and it has been effective in a couple of senses – is to provide us a lot more information. And that's been both good news and bad news. It has enabled us to see a lot of things about our nuclear stockpile that we didn't realize before. That's the good news.

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The bad news is a lot of those things are bad. They reveal problems with our weapons that we hope, through life-extension policies, we will be able to correct so that the life of these weapons can be extended far beyond their projected lifetime when they were developed. And we hope that that can be done. But without adequate funding for stockpile stewardship, which has been lacking in the past, and the modernization program, which you're familiar with as part of the START treaty debate, those life-extension programs and the other things that are necessary to complete the modernization of our stockpile will not occur.

So I've seen nothing in the ensuing time to suggest that if we forever give up our right to test -and that's what the Test Ban Treaty is – we agree that we will never, ever again test, no matter what, even though we've had an 18-year moratorium and none of the nations that we've been concerned with have given up their weapons, so nothing to suggest that if somehow we put ink to it rather than simply not test that it's going to make any kind of a difference, but I'm not prepared to forever give up our right to do that in view of the circumstances that exist in the world today.

Yes, sir.

[00:26:55]

Q: Senator Kyl, my name is Stephen Young. I work with the Union of Concerned Scientists.

And I'm sorry to say that I was deeply disappointed by the speech you just gave. I think your focus on the bogeyman of global zero is essentially inappropriate and entirely unnecessary. That's a long-term vision that many people share. It's not the question we face at all today, as you well know. We face many more important questions, say, about what to do next on national security issues. How can less make us more secure? And the issue of global zero is (a possibility of ?) debate, but not (wasting ?) our time on today at this point. There are more important questions for us to think about today.

[00:27:36]

And my disappointment is even furthered by your actions around the New START treaty, which you mentioned very briefly. As you know, essentially the entire national security establishment supported New START, from President George H.W. Bush, every living secretary of state, almost every secretary of defense, every living national – nuclear commander of the United States all supported New START. You initially said it was benign, and

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then you negotiated with the administration for months. At the very end, after saying you were holding your opinion because you knew it would make you irrelevant, you said your opinion. You came out against the treaty and listed a long list of reasons why you opposed it.

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That, to me, strikes at me as entirely politics. Somehow security is about politics. You opposed it because it was a Democratic treaty, not because it was a good treaty or a bad treaty, given the fact the entire national security and foreign policy (establishment ?) supported the treaty. How can you, in good faith, oppose that treaty?

KYL: Well, I appreciate your question. You mischaracterized my view in the Wall Street Journal article in which I said if various things were done, Republicans might view the treaty as relatively benign. That's what I actually said. And my concern was that we wouldn't do the things that I outlined in that op-ed and in subsequent and other forums, speeches and so on.

The primary things that I felt we had to do were, A, to deal with modernization. And very late in the day, the administration came to the table and did some of the things that a lot of us had argued for a year were necessary to do to enhance the modernization program. And effectively we called the administration out and said, "Your plan is inadequate." And eventually the administration agreed with that. And the funding, which will be very difficult every year to achieve, was finally agreed to by the administration. That was one of the things that we said that we needed to do.

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The other had to do with the resolution of ratification and things that we felt that were necessary to assure both ourselves and the Russians of before we could agree to it. And my concern was that in the time that we were not given to do complete action on the treaty in the lame-duck session of the Congress just before Christmas did not give us adequate time to debate and resolve those issues. And it turned out that that was correct.

The rather tepid resolution of ratification, I think, did nothing to clarify the issues that existed between the United States and Russia, and, in fact, to some extent exacerbated the difference of view that the two countries share with regard, for example, to missile defense. And I think it's a very bad practice to have two parties to a contract enter into that contract knowing that there is a disagreement about basic terms. We talked about CTBT before. Many of you are know, I am sure, that the one thing that the CTBT would outlaw, namely nuclear tests, is never defined in the treaty. It is not defined. And Russia and the United States have two very different views as to what constitutes an illegal test under the CTBT.

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Likewise with respect to missile defense, Russia and the United States have very different views as to what an appropriate U.S. missile defense program would be. The Russians believe that anything that they interpret as inimical to their interests would give grounds for them to withdraw from the treaty, the START treaty. President Obama disagrees with that proposition. I think it's a bad policy to knowingly embark upon a new era, which is supposed to be a reset, knowing in advance that there's a fundamental disagreement between the parties about something this important.

So those are some of the reasons that I opposed the treaty at the end of the day, while having hoped earlier on that we could come to terms with the differences of view, and therefore enable us not to be divided on the issue.

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Yes, sir.

Q: Good morning, Senator.

KYL: Good morning.

Q: Thank you for a very interesting talk.

KYL: That's better than disappointing, but – (laughter).

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Q: Well, I wasn't disappointed, because I knew I would disagree with you.

KYL: (Chuckles.) That's all right. (Laughter.)

Q: However, it was a very interesting talk.

KYL: I appreciate that.

Q: And I've always felt that you're a very honest man in your views.

KYL: Thank you.

Q: But I was surprised by your continuing skepticism about international – and I forgot to introduce myself; I'm sorry. I'm Ed Aguilar with the Project for Nuclear Awareness. And I was surprised by your skepticism, apparently – correct me if I'm wrong – on the possibility of international collaboration, cooperation, in resisting aggression and in sanctions, including, if necessary, military coercion, in the face of – since the Soviet Union retired from the field, in the face of success, I would say, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Serbia, Iraq – the jury is still out on Afghanistan – but now Libya. So there's been a lot of successes. The international community has, in fact, come together, is applauding what we're doing in Libya. And there are many different tools in our toolkit. They're not all hammers.

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But my main question is, don't you agree that there has been success in resisting aggression and that that can continue if we keep a clear head?

KYL: I absolutely agree with that proposition. And I think it makes a very important point and distinguishes between a paper treaty to preserve peace, on the one hand, and coalitions of willing partners, willing even to use force when appropriate, on the other hand. And that's been the distinction here that I'm trying to make.

[00:33:39]

I am dubious; you are correct. I'm very dubious of peace through paper. It turns out to have all of the flaws that I discussed in here over history. It doesn't work very well. Now, that isn't to say that treaties and

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international agreements and coalitions aren't important and potentially effective. I mean, NATO, for example, is a very good agreement of a construct for nations to come together in a cooperative way and potentially to act.

But the key to all of the examples that you gave was action. And one of the things I was warning about here is that sometimes the paper treaty can lull you into inaction or action that comes too late. And in the cases that you mentioned, we decided to act. We had support for that action with other willing partners. And I think, in most of the cases, it did have a salutary effect.

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So I am in no means suggesting that we should not have coalitions of countries willing to respond to crises, willing to anticipate crises and plan in advance on how to deal with them, and to impose a variety of – the term now is in favor kinetic – hopefully a lot of non-kinetic activities before you finally have to result to kinetic, but not to keep that off the table; the use of sanctions, embargoes, the Proliferation Security Initiative that John Bolton began, for example. I mean, those are examples of things that countries can do to try to help halt this march toward proliferation or potential nuclear terrorism.

So all of those things need to be explored, and frankly are the kind of thing that I was referring to when I – and maybe my phrase was too – maybe it's too early in the morning, but I talked about real realistic policies. (Chuckles.) And that's what I mean, not just the faux realism of "We can all work together; let's sign a treaty," but "Let's roll up our sleeves and see how we can affect world conditions today, acting together-"acting, not just signing paper.

Q: Let me just say one quick thing.

KYL: Sure. Well, no, would you allow him, because it was –

Q: If you don't mind –

KYL: – a very good question. I appreciated it.

[00:36:00]

Q: OK, thank you.

KYL: You can do a follow-up.

Q: Let me just say, each one of the examples that I gave and that you just agreed with was based on a paper document, a resolution of the United Nations, based on a treaty, the United Nations Charter. So thank you, Senator.

[00:36:16]

KYL: Well, sure. (Chuckles.) And I'm not saying that we should not act sometimes, and if you can get the world community, through the United Nations, to support what you do, that that's a bad thing. What I am saying is that it is not – that that doesn't, in and of itself, guarantee the conditions which are going to create the environment in which, as one of the previous speakers said, the eventual dream or vision of Global Zero could be achieved. That was my point.

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Yes, sir.

Q: Senator, thanks. I actually wanted to ask you another question about paper treaties.

[00:36:46]

As I'm sure you know, the U.S. is a party to the Non-Proliferation treaty. And as such, the sort of famous wording of Article 6 promises to undertake negotiations in good faith on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Now, if, in your view, general and complete disarmament would be destabilizing, a bad thing, does that mean that the U.S. should then withdraw from the NPT? Thanks.

KYL: No, I think it's very much like the previous question about a vision on down the future. And I would answer it the same way the previous questioner did. Don't criticize me for dealing in today's world. I mean, this is, after all, just a vision. That's exactly how I view the disarmament vision within the NPT, which, by the way, has had limited effectiveness, I might add.

Go ahead, sir.

Q: Thank you. Good morning, Senator.

KYL: Good morning.

[00:37:39]]

Q: I'm Stephen Schwartz. I'm the editor of the Nonproliferation Review, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. And it occurred to me while you were talking, since we know you'll be leaving office in a little less than two years, and you talked about getting our –

KYL: Hold your applause. (Laughter.)

Q: You talked about getting our blood going. You might want to record this talk and market it as Kyl's cardio workout, just to kind of get us all –

KYL: (Chuckles.)

[00:38:01]

Q: – get us all going in the morning.

Just a couple of quick points. What, in your mind, is more important? You talked about the difficulty, or the impossibility, really, of creating weapons with reduced lethality. What's more important, giving ourselves new options to deal with current and potential future threats, or reducing existing threats around the world that we face from countries that have or are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons? Because I don't think you can do both at the same time. What we do does have direct consequences in the rest of the world, and I'm wondering how you square that.

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Also, you worked very hard last year, at the end of last year, with the New START ratification debate, to secure as much or to lock in as much as you could money from the administration and from future administrations for the nuclear weapons complex and the nuclear arsenal. And now your work is threatening to be undone by members of your own party in the House, for whom reducing the deficit and reducing military spending – or not military spending, but spending in particular – is sort of a sine qua non. And I'm wondering how you're dealing with that.

And, last but not least, as you said, you are leaving. And I'm wondering, since, apart from Senator Lugar, who's facing a challenge next year, you're really the only person in the Congress who cares deeply about these issues and knows a great deal about them, certainly on your side of the aisle, in the Senate, so are you worried what's going to happen once you step down?

KYL: Thanks. Now I can sympathize with the president trying to remember the first question after all of that. (Chuckles.)

[00:39:33]

Let me take the second one, and it relates to the third. I don't think that the House of Representatives members, while very focused on reducing federal spending to try to get the deficit under control, will shortchange national security generally. And I've had enough conversations with some of the leaders there to believe that they will not shortchange the modernization program specifically. I will certainly work toward that goal. And I think that we can preserve that funding. It's something that Republican leadership, Democratic leadership and the president are all very supportive of, so I think that can be preserved.

It is true that there aren't as many leaders that have been perhaps as deeply involved in the nuclear weapon program as I have been over the years, but there are people who are very interested in it. And I think you'll find, maybe to your displeasure, some of you, that there will be people that will share the same view that I do and be actively involved. And I certainly hope to cultivate that field, if it were, before I go.

[00:40:35]

To your first question, actually, I think that by having – I mean, one can either have a philosophy that bears on the old Reagan aphorism of peace through strength or have a different point of view. I believe in peace through strength, that having the means to defeat or deter military aggression is probably the best way to ensure that it never occurs in the first place. And having the kind of weapons that are suitable toward that goal, I think, does preserve the peace. It does deter.

[00:41:13]

And what I fear today is that some of the old Cold War relics – and this is the great irony, it seems to me – that can – and even the return of the policy of mutual assured destruction by some people – we can reduce our weapon numbers down to the point where they're still effective because we can blow up all the Russian cities and they can blow up ours – my goodness, is that going to be our new doctrine? That's immoral and it's wrong. And I guess that's redundant. But the fact is, that should not be our policy.

If we can design weapons that, like conventional global strike, for example, can be used to achieve a specific and very limited military objective without having to use a nuclear weapon, why wouldn't we want to do that? It seems to me that if our big challenge now is that there is a deep underground nuclear capability of a rogue nation,

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that would make sense for us, if we're going to deal with it effectively or deter its use, to have a weapon which could invalidate that capability.

So – and ironically, one of the things stockpile stewardship has shown us is that we can reduce the lethality of our weapons, and thereby maintain their life. What's wrong with that? We can even do some modifications to the design that enhance their life and reduce lethality. What's wrong with that? But still having the kind of weapon available to deter the aggressors' intentions. I think it makes a lot of sense to have a deterrent.

[00:43:03]

I mean, if you agree with President Obama that as long as these weapons exist, we're going to have United States weapons as a deterrent, why doesn't it make sense to have the best that we can that are most suited to the challenge?

I think perhaps time for one last question.

OK. Yes, sir.

Q: Senator, thank you for your remarks. I'd like to go back to your point about whether the United States and Russia agreed in the test-ban negotiations to the scope of the treaty. I was involved in those negotiations in the Arms Control Agency at the time, and you may recall from the hearings that both Secretary Albright and Ambassador Ledogar testified to the fact that there was agreement.

The text of the treaty's precedent is in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which has stood the test of time. And neither of those treaties have a technical definition of a nuclear explosion, but both of them, I think, are quite clearly on their scope. It's sort of like the Nonproliferation Treaty, which prohibits those states from having nuclear explosive devices – (inaudible) – where, again, there's no technical definition.

[00:44:18]

If, indeed, the issue arises from allegations that Russia has not been observing what at the moment for them is really a moratorium, namely that somehow people think they're doing testing at very low yields that would be a violation of the Test Ban Treaty, I think it would be incumbent on the administration now and should have been incumbent on the previous administration to deal with that, if indeed we think that something untoward is going on and would be inimical to our security. I'd be interested in your views about that.

KYL: I agree. I think, before the Clinton administration asked that the treaty be ratified and before the Obama administration does the same, the issue needs to be addressed. The Perry-Schlesinger commission noted precisely – noted the problem with the definition; said that they did not believe there was a clear and precise definition of what prohibited activity under the treaty was.

[00:45:19]

And any fair appreciation of what Russia has been doing over the last couple of decades, compared to what the United States believes is appropriate, reveals a very stark difference of opinion. It is not something that's hidden or denied. And, in fact, it's impossible to say that the Russians are wrong or that the United States is right, or vice versa. It is simply a decision that we have made that there can be zero yield, period, period. And the Russians don't agree with that.

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Q: No, they do, sir. They -

KYL: I'm sorry?

Q: They do agree.

KYL: Well, if they agree with it, then they're violating the terms of what they themselves have agreed to.

Q: I understand. And that's something that the administration should take up.

[00:46:05]

KYL: Well, OK. Great. Good. OK, I think I've made my point here – (chuckles) – that here you have – I mean, the very basic thing of a contract is the definition of terms. You have an issue here of whether we agree or not. Well, now my interlocutor says, “No, we agree. It's just that Russia is going beyond the agreement, and we need to deal with that.” “Yeah, and exactly how are we going to deal with that?” I'd be fine to have the Russians called in and say, “All right, you must agree with our interpretation.” My guess is they'll say, “No, we like doing what we're doing.” And we'll say, “Well, we're not going to do that.”

I mean, that's been going on for two decades now. And it just reveals some of the difficulties when you get right down to national interest and what the two countries believe is appropriate to advance their goals here. There's going to be a disagreement.

[00:46:51]

And it's not been resolved in the decade since the signing of the CTBT, and I would seriously doubt that, at least based upon what I know, that the Russians are going to come to our way of thinking about what it means. You know, maybe what we could agree to is that we would urge the administration to agree to the Russians' view and begin doing the kind of activities that the Russians are doing today. Would the disarmament community be OK with that? Maybe we could have a vote on that.

[00:47:18]

Well, perhaps that's the question to leave you with. I think my talk this morning had the intended effect. And I must say that I appreciate very much not only your courteous response, but the good and courteous questions that were asked. And I certainly, in the remaining 20 months or so that I have in the United States Senate, will look forward to working with all of you in discussing these really important issues. And I appreciate the way that you do it in this forum and look forward to visiting with all of you in the future.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)
(END)