ROOTS OF RADICAL ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA

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INTRODUCTION

The history of the development of Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan, and in Central Asia more generally, is a potentially contentious one. There is very little agreement either within the policy community in the United States or in Central Asia itself as to what Islamic radicalism is and who among devout Muslims should be considered as posing a threat to the secular regimes.

This paper will provide some answers to the question of what Islamic radicalism is. It offers an in-depth look at a number of prominent clerics from Uzbekistan—who have been labeled either “fundamentalist” or “Wahhabis”—who have been instrumental in the development of radical Islam in Uzbekistan. It looks at their teachings, their teachers, and their influence on political and social behavior in Uzbekistan.

This paper describes the roots of radical Islam and provides some background into the ideological role played by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the development of Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan, leading to the question of whether the IMU is likely to have any intellectual influence in the future. Materials used in this analysis include films, documents seized by U.S. journalists, documents secured through contacts within the Uzbek security forces, and material from in-depth interviews with six former members of the IMU who returned to Uzbekistan through the amnesty program. These former members of the IMU were active during the period of 1994–2003. Also included are the author’s brief contacts with several member-fighters (including Juma Namangani) of Adolat at the very beginning of that movement.

The evolution of radical Islam in the years just prior to and immediately following the collapse of Soviet rule has its roots in earlier decades. Radical Islam represents both a battle between Islam and outside forces that seek to transform Islam’s sociopolitical role and doctrinal disputes within Islam that have been characteristic of the practice and teaching of the faith for more than five hundred years.

Central Asia’s Muslims have traditionally practiced Islam as it is interpreted by the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, which is known for its liberalism and respect for personal freedom. Although there have been Salafi Muslims—those who reject all four schools of Islamic jurisprudence—in the area, historically they have not played a strong role in the region. This creates an uphill battle for modern-day proponents of a return to the caliphate.

Over the centuries, however, many have been critical of how traditional Hanafi Islam has been practiced in Central Asia, and many of these critics can be, and were, viewed as fundamentalists and even as Wahhabis by the clerical establishment they sought to transform.
UNDERSTANDING RADICAL ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA

For more than five centuries, Sunni Islam in Central Asia in general and in Uzbekistan in particular has been dominated by a formal religious hierarchy appointed or sponsored by a secular ruler. Thus, one potentially useful government approach would be to label any Muslim activist or cleric who rejects the leadership of the official religious establishment in Central Asia as a radical Muslim. Because the state appoints the official religious establishment, to reject the establishment’s leadership is to question the authority and the legitimacy of the state.

The Islamic Board of Uzbekistan has been headed by Mufti Abdurashid qori Bahromov since 1995. The mufti is appointed by the State Committee on Religion and is the senior religious leader for the whole country. The mufti is responsible for the appointment of senior clerics and for the supervision of mosques and religious schools. Bahromov is the third mufti to hold this post. From 1989 to 1993 Muhammad-Sodiq Mamayusupov—now more commonly known as Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf—held the post, and from 1993 to 1995 the mufti was Muhtarjon Abdullaev.

The current administrative structure is directly analogous to the structure that was in place during the Soviet era, dating from the time of the formation of the Muslim Spiritual Administration of Central Asia in 1943. The first three Soviet-era muftis came from the same family: Ishan Babakhan bin Abdul Majid Khan (1943–1957); his son, Ziyauddin Khan Ishan Babakhan (1957–1982); and the latter’s son, Shamsuddin Khan Babakhan (1982–1989). Shamsuddin was ousted, largely by pressure from within Uzbekistan’s Islamic elite, and replaced by Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf in 1989. All the Soviet-era figures were appointed by the USSR State Committee on Religion.

The Soviet-era structure was a modified version of a system introduced during Russian colonial rule. The first Muslim Spiritual Administration, which served as a prototype for regulating the affairs of Muslims throughout the empire, was established in Kazan at the end of the eighteenth century. The Central Asians, who lived under direct Russian rule, were subject to the Muslim Spiritual Administration in Orenburg and the local qadi-kalan, the senior judge. Unlike during the later Soviet period when Sharia law was completely banned, the Muslims of the Russian empire were free to apply Sharia law to regulate family and other social relations.

Most of Central Asia’s Muslims subscribe to the teachings of the Hanafi mazhab (theological-juridical school). Mawara’an-nahr, or Transoxiana (as that part of Central Asia that lies between the Syr-darya and Amu-darya rivers has been traditionally known), was a major center of Islamic learning at the time of the Abbasids. As early as the writing of al-Aqaid (Dogmatics) by Najm ad-Din Abu Khafs Umar an-Nasafi (1068–1142), Hanafi-Maturidi theologians in Central Asia accepted the idea that Muslims could be ruled by someone who was either a ghayr-i din (nonbeliever) or a kafir (infidel) so long as the leader allowed mosques and madrassas to remain open, allowed Muslims to observe their rituals, and allowed Muslims to be judged by Sharia law. Although the Hanafi school was predominant in the region, the Shafi’iya school dominated in Tashkent, and it too allowed a large role for salat-namaz (customary and ritual) practice.

While Islam came to most of the territory of Uzbekistan at the time of the Arab conquests in the eighth century, many of the attitudes toward the relationship between mosque and state date from the time of Timur (1336–1405; ruled 1370–1405). Timur sought to use religion as a critical
part of the ideological glue that held his disparate empire together. He also took definitive steps to begin institutionalizing Islam, and in so doing, he subjugated it to the control of what was effectively temporal power. While Timur ruled as Sultan zul Allah (the shadow of Allah on earth), he also created the institution of sheikh ul-Islam (head cleric), who named the qadi-kalan, the imams of the main mosques and madrassas, and even the heads of the Sufi tariqats (orders of spiritual development or learning), whether or not he himself was a Sufi. The institution of sheikh ul-Islam was preserved until the time of Soviet rule.

The Islamic Spiritual Administration, established by the Russians and retained by the Soviets, was in part an effort to redefine the institution of sheikh ul-Islam and make it serve the needs of a non-Muslim (and in the case of the Soviets, an anti-Muslim) state. This created tension with Muslim religious leaders, who had to be convinced that their acceptance of rule by a kafir was still consistent with their religious obligations.

The religious administrative structure introduced by the Russians was much easier for Central Asian clerics to accept than was the later Soviet version, because Russian rule left a large role for the Sharia. As a result, the majority of the region's Hanafi clerics, known as traditionalists or conservatives, accepted Russian rule as legitimate. So too did the modernists, including the jadid (new method) reformers. For them, the focus was on innovation in religious education and theocratic thought to stretch the adaptive capacity of the faith and enable Muslims to compete successfully with others in the empire.

Religious ferment was also present in those parts of Central Asia that were not directly subject to Russian rule. The Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva were both reorganized as protectorates of Russia, in 1868 and 1873, respectively, so in fact Islam's principal religious center, Bukhara, was still formally self-governing and still headed by the sheikh ul-Islam. Bukhara, however, was no less a target of criticism from other Muslims than the religious establishment found in the Russian-ruled cities that were headed by the local qadi-kalan and the sheikh ul-Islam based in Tashkent.

In addition to the criticisms of the modernists, Central Asia's religious establishment was subject to attacks by fundamentalists who objected to the religious leadership for its lack of purity and deviation from the true path of Islam. Some of these critics were Salafi Muslims who rejected the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence and accepted only the teachings of Islam that dated from the time of the first four caliphs and early Muslim society. Salafi clerics were always present in the region, but the Salafi movement never played a major role in shaping the religious life of the majority of believers and clerics in Central Asia.

The more serious criticism that the religious establishment faced always came from within the Hanafi community, sometimes from adepts of Sufi tariqats and other times not. As early as the first decade of the twentieth century, the critics of the establishment were sometimes termed Wahhabi. Sometimes this term was used correctly to denote people who were in fact advocating a Salafi reformation—people who, like the original followers of Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1791) in Arabia, sought to return Islam to the single Islam of the Prophet's time.

The term was also used (somewhat incorrectly) to refer to local theologians who criticized the excesses or corruption around local practices, such as the saint worship that was prevalent at a number of shrines in Central Asia. Much of the practice of Islam in Central Asia was a fusion of
pre-Islamic and Islamic practices that, during the preceding five hundred years, local jurisprudence had come to justify as acceptable.

This kind of tension between conservatives and fundamentalists—those who argued for going back to the strict adherence to one’s own mazhab—was a normal feature of life in a Muslim society. Increasingly in Central Asia, from the late nineteenth century on, the demands of reformist elements were also added into this mixture. The tensions among these forces would likely have remained a feature of Central Asian religious life as long as Sharia law served as a basis of jurisprudence, even if its scope in society continued to be reduced.

But the situation in Central Asia changed dramatically in the 1920s. As part of their consolidation of power, the Bolsheviks eliminated any formal and public role for religion. Sharia law was banned as a basis of jurisprudence in the early 1920s, all the madrassas were eliminated, and only a handful of mosques were allowed to remain open. Literally thousands of mosques were destroyed or, worse yet, used for sacrilegious purposes. For example, the Juma (Gumbaz) mosque in Namangan was made into a wine factory. In the immediate aftermath of the civil war in Central Asia, untold thousands of believers fled and made hijrat, fleeing their homes in what was now dar al-harb (territory of nonbelievers, with whom Muslims are always at war) in order to live in dar al-Islam, the world of Islam. Their path took them through China, Afghanistan, or oftentimes on to Turkey; and, although few succeeded, the goal of many was to go all the way to Saudi Arabia.

The majority of believers, though, remained in Central Asia, and during the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s untold tens of thousands went through the machinery of Stalin’s purges. For all intents and purposes, Islam effectively disappeared, although the possibility of religious continuity was insured through the survival of a handful of people with religious education and the internal disposition to become spiritual leaders. In addition there was a small community of Central Asians with religious education, mostly Uzbeks, who lived in Saudi Arabia and managed vaqf property (religious endowments) in or near the holy cities.

In 1943, Soviet authorities permitted the reestablishment of Islamic institutions and the creation of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia (SADUM), which eventually established ten mosques and two institutions of Muslim education (the Mir-i Arab madrassa in Bukhara in 1945 and the Imam al-Bukhari Higher Islamic Institution in Tashkent in 1971).

This created a religious life that reproduced on a reduced scale the kinds of complexities that existed in most other Islamic communities. The number of religious institutions in the region was a small fraction of what had been in place prior to Soviet rule, when in Bukhara alone there were several hundred madrassas. Similarly, the fatwas issued by the official religious hierarchy were scrutinized by ideological workers in the state and Communist Party apparatuses in order to insure that they were not potentially seditious in content. Islamic clerics were prohibited from delivering sermons that might be construed as proselytizing among the population. The clerical establishment also included individuals with close ties to state security, both informers and actual employees of the security services.

At the same time, SADUM was an instrument of religious enlightenment, albeit on a highly restricted stage. The two madrassas were authentic religious institutions, staffed at first by clerics with a local religious education and, as time passed, with increasing numbers of individuals with foreign training. The existence of the madrassas restored traditional Hanafi religious education in the region.
The interpretative tilt of these years was that of accommodation to the secular (in the case of the Soviets, atheistic) rulers who served as Central Asia’s overlords. In the context of Islam, however, the atheism of the Soviet authorities was not of doctrinal interest, no more than that of any unbelievers would have been. Rather, the focus was on what the attitude of the state was to Islam, and that was much improved over the decades of the 1920s and 1930s.

Nikita Khrushchev’s antireligious policies did make it harder for the Central Asians to practice what some have called everyday, or household, Islam—religious rituals that surround the life cycle of birth, circumcision, marriage, and death—but at the same time Khrushchev’s policies opened the door for more linkages between SADUM and the greater Muslim world, as well as more informal contacts between Central Asian Muslims and their brethren in the Middle East, in particular.

There was also another side to Khrushchev’s policies toward religion. Despite his belief that religion was antithetical to communism, Khrushchev also believed that Soviet ideology had no current competitors, that it had won decisively, and that religion as a spiritual competitor was not dangerous to Soviet rule. He already referred to religion as a “survival of the past” (his comment in a speech to the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress). Khrushchev’s pronouncement served to reduce the pressure on religion in the USSR and in some ways managed to facilitate its renaissance. One reflection of this was the decision to allow SADUM and other religious organizations to open new mosques, churches, and other places of worship. Some 70 new mosques were opened in Central Asia (bringing their total number to 112 in 1962).

At the same time, very little came of Khrushchev’s efforts to reinvigorate ideological education, especially in the area of antireligious propaganda, which was received as little more than empty rhetoric. In its place, especially in Central Asia, the spiritual content of sacred texts offered a fresh view of the world.

The spread of such sacred texts was also inadvertently stimulated by Khrushchev’s opening to the peoples of Asia and Africa. Delegations from the Middle East were invited to the Soviet Union; clerics were included in the groups and they often visited Central Asia. The Saudis, in particular, during all their visits donated literature to the library of SADUM, literature that seems to have been freely available to all those with access to this library.

This literature seems to have had some impact on the thinking of Soviet-era clerics. Fatwas issued by Ziyauddin Khan Ishan Babakhan bear some influence of Saudi writing, as he appears to have grown less tolerant of Hanafi acceptance of local (adept) customs over time. These fatwas have been rather problematic to interpret because, at casual glance, they appear to reiterate the Soviet state’s position opposing the perpetuation of religious practice regarding life-cycle rituals. But the fatwas were also consistent with a more conservative (or fundamentalist) strain in Hanafi law, historically less frequently encountered in Central Asia, that eschewed such practices as being in violation of Sharia law (if they were practiced by people who otherwise had no formal ties to the faith).

Similarly, Khrushchev’s foreign policies brought opportunities for those tied to SADUM to study in the seminaries of the Middle East, and some even were able to make a pilgrimage. The Soviet students and clerics who went to study abroad were viewed as “authentic” by their coreligionists abroad and were not seen as having been compromised by their potential or alleged association with the organs of state security (something that made these same clerics the object of potential distrust by some of the believers in their home republics).
The Soviet-era clerics who received foreign training, especially those who went abroad during the Brezhnev years and later, were exposed to the intellectual (or fundamentalist Salafi) ferment going on in Islamic seminaries of the Middle East as well as to the teachings of the other traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence, all of which were more conservative than Central Asia’s own Hanafi tradition. Although figures like Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf and Akbar Turajon-zade, the Tajik cleric and civil war figure, could not put these teachings into practice upon their return to the USSR, these ideas clearly influenced them, a fact that became apparent in later years.

Other Central Asians, most particularly those presumed to be secular and with Arabic-language skills, also began traveling to the Middle East in order to improve their linguistic skills to better serve the Soviet state in diplomacy, trade, and security organizations. Many of these travelers were exposed to the same intellectual and religious ferment and brought back books from their time abroad, including the works of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) and Sayyid Abu-l-Ala Maududi (1903–1979).

Some of this literature began to circulate, going from the hands of secular individuals to those who sought these books because their interest in religious themes was being reawakened. The same opening that brought Soviets to the Middle East also brought limited numbers of foreign students and technical specialists to the USSR, including to Central Asia. At least one fundamentalist study group was set up at Tashkent University in the late 1970s to read the works of brethren Muslim writers.

Taken in total, the Soviet experience with Islam was sufficient to produce the preconditions necessary for an Islamic revival, even though this of course was not its intended effect. The current leaders of Islam in Central Asia—those advocating traditionalist as well as those advocating fundamentalist solutions—all received their training in the Soviet period, and they are advancing both causes in a vocabulary that is fully consistent with and comprehensible to a global Islamic audience.

BEGINNING OF RADICALIZATION OF REFORMIST ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN, 1920s TO 1960s

Despite the best efforts of Stalin’s terror machine and Soviet antireligious propagandists, illegal—hujra—schools continued to survive throughout the Soviet period in Tashkent and in even larger numbers in the Ferghana Valley. These schools continued to educate people in a curriculum that compared favorably in thoroughness with what was eventually introduced in the two madrassas run by SADUM.

The bulk of instruction in these underground schools was in traditional Hanafi Islam as had been practiced in Central Asia since the Middle Ages. In addition, the teachers in these schools perpetuated the debate over religious purification as well as the need for reform that had been going on in Islamic circles in Central Asia in the decades before the Russian Revolution.

Western and local post-Soviet scholars have focused on the more Western oriented of Central Asian religious reformers, those associated with the jadid movement. But the very Western orientation of the jadid intellectuals led to their doom in the first years of Soviet rule, for both they and the Bolshevik regime viewed each other as potentially co-optable. Obviously the Bolsheviks were not interested in being co-opted, and they physically destroyed most of the jadid movement.
Ironically, it turned out to be easier for the Islamic purists to stay below the Soviet radar screen, even though they too faced a great deal of persecution: they were under little illusion about the definitional danger that Bolshevism posed for them. They too, like most fundamentalists, saw themselves as reformers and viewed the return to the doctrinal purity of the period of Islam’s founding as giving it the strength to respond to external challenges. They saw themselves as no less spiritual enlighteners than do today’s reformers who seek to modernize Islam.

Throughout the Soviet period, underground schools pressed for the purification of locally practiced Hanafi Islam as they reemphasized neglected texts or rejected the Hanafi school of law in its entirety. Such fundamentalist teachings were also propagated by a series of small groups of Islamic thinkers whose activities fed on one another and who became increasingly more politicized in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

The first of these radical groups was formed by a cleric who was known as Shami domullah (Said ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Bakhid ibn Ali al-Asali at-Tarablusi). Shami domullah was born in Tarabulus, better known as Tripoli, Libya, in the late 1860s and died in 1932 in Khorezm, following his arrest. Before coming to Central Asia, Shami domullah spent fifteen to twenty years in eastern (Chinese) Turkestan, where he was a strong proponent of Salafi Islam, trying to replace local practice that was heavily influenced by the teachings of the hadiths. Shami domullah first came to Tashkent from Beijing in February 1919, in large part because of the good auspices of the Russian consul in Kashkar. Shami domullah quickly established himself as one of the leading religious authorities in Tashkent by besting the leading local cleric, Sheikh-Maksud-qori, in a theological dispute. As a result, he was able to rise from his position in a second-tier religious post in the mahalla Uzbek community mosque to the Dasturkhanchi madrassa in the old town area or quartal of Tashkent.

The substance of Shami domullah’s writings focused on the lack of (or the poor) doctrinal bases for most religious practices in the region—pilgrimages to holy sites, wedding and funerary rites, for example—that he claimed were supported by Sufi clerics or proponents of traditional Hanafi jurisprudence. The only solution, according to Shami domullah, was to base religious practice on the Quran and those hadiths that could reliably be linked directly to the Prophet.

For this reason Shami domullah’s followers were known as the Ahl-i Hadith movement, and they included many of the most influential clerics of Soviet Uzbekistan during the decades just before and after World War II. Included in their number were Jamal Khodzha Ishan (killed in 1937), Said Abu Nasr Mubashshir at-Tarazi (1896–1977), Mullah Yunus Khakimdjanov (1903–1994), Abd al-Kadir Muradov (1893–1976), Ibrahim-qori Iskhakov (Sheikhim qori), Shakh-Ikram Shakh-Islamov, Mullah Abd as-Samad (killed in 1937 at age 26), Zain ad-din qori (died in 1983), and for present purposes most importantly Ziyauddin Khan Ishan Babakhan (1908–1982) who served first as deputy and then from 1957 to 1982 as mufti of SADUM.

It is quite clear that Shami domullah’s teachings, which emphasized the irrelevance or danger of the traditional schools of Islam for the proper worship of the faith, fit in well with the mission of SADUM. It made the mission of SADUM consistent with that of the Soviet state in that it tried to reduce or eliminate the use of traditional religious rituals at life-cycle events. Whereas the Soviets saw this as promoting atheism, some in SADUM at least saw it as promoting the true faith of Islam.

In the 1920s and 1930s, some of the Ahl-i Hadith members split off to create another fundamentalist group, the Ahl al-Quran. Sabircha-domullah, who had been a student of Mullah
Abd as-Samad, Baduh-hazrat, and also of Hasan-hazrat, saw Ahl-i Hadith as too accepting of Soviet rule and its clerics as too complicit in it. Hasan-hazrat, whose full name was Hasan-hazrat Akhmadajan Ponomarev al-Kizil-djar, was a Tatar from Petropavlovsk (Kizil-djar) in northern Kazakhstan who had been a student of the Tatar Jadid Shihab ad-din Marjani (1818–1889). Hasan-hazrat was exiled to Tashkent in 1933 and died in the prison hospital there in 1937, but in this short period he managed to have an impact on Uzbek fundamentalist thinking.

Nonetheless, Sabircha-domullah became convinced that the Ahl-i Hadith clerics were putting too much faith in the validity of the hadiths, and he advocated exclusive reliance on the Quran. But most of the members of Ahl al-Quran (compared with those in Ahl-i Hadith) had poor Arabic skills and were pushing reliance on the Uzbek-language translation of the Quran. This was a rather unusual phenomenon for fundamentalists, most of whom advocated the use of the vernacular Quran solely for self-education. They also advocated the reciting of namaz (one of the daily prayers required by Islamic tradition) twice a day rather than the prescribed five times daily; this later would also become one of the characteristics of the Marifatchilar, or Akramiya, movement.

As already noted, the Ahl-i Hadith movement remained more influential than Ahl al-Quran, and it was spread not only in Tashkent but also in the Ferghana Valley. Shakh Rahim qori Sheikh Kamalov, who returned to his native Kokand after studying with Shami domullah, played a major role in the dissemination of the ideas of Ahl al-Quran. Yunus qori (who died in the mid-1970s) was another cleric in the Ferghana Valley. Both men served as teachers of Hakimjon qori Vosiev Margilan (Ferghana Oblast, Uzbekistan), who was the formative influence on the young fundamentalists who were trained in the 1970s. At the time of writing, Hakimjon qori is still alive, is said to be 106 years old, and is still an important symbolic figure to the fundamentalists in the Ferghana Valley.

**RADICALIZATION OF REFORMIST ISLAM, 1970S TO MID-1980S**

It is impossible to understand the evolution of radical Islam in contemporary Central Asia without knowing something about the way it developed in the late 1970s.

Parallel to the very limited number of formal institutions of Islamic learning, there was a growing number of underground religious circles that influenced the religious thinking in the Central Asian region, in particular in the Ferghana Valley. Two of these efforts are worthy of particular attention: the study circles surrounding Muhammadjan Hindustani in Dushanbe and other study circles around Hakimjon qori Vosiev Margilan. Without question, Muhammadjan Hindustani was the more profound of the two men in terms of the depth of his religious knowledge and the sheer legacy of religious writings that he produced. He also produced more students over the course of his lifetime than did Hakimjon qori. Both were critics of the Soviet religious establishment, and both enjoyed a degree of local protection that allowed them to continue their work. But Hindustani worked much more within the Hanafi tradition, while Hakimjon qori seems to have been much more shaped by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, which made him more of a disciple of the Salafi tradition.
Muhammadjan Hindustani and Hanafi Traditionalism

Muhammadjan Hindustani had a great deal of formal religious education and was unusual in that he survived the purge and was able to provide students with illegal religious instruction. He was without question the best educated of all the underground teachers in Central Asia, with a degree of formal Islamic education that was almost unheard of during the Stalin years. Hindustani was able to use his position at the Institute of Oriental Studies as a krysha (a cover) as he sought to educate a new generation of Islamic theologians in Central Asia. For his extensive efforts, Hindustani received a number of honorifics, and he is known as Domulla Hindustani, Hindi domla, Hajji domla, Mawlavi, and, to his students, as Hajji dada.

Hindustani’s full name was Muhammadjan Hajji-domullah Rustamov. He was born in 1892, in the village of Chorbog, not far from Kokand. His father, Rustam Hajji Kokandi (who taught at madrassas in Kokand and Samarkand), sent his eight-year-old son to study with two well-known local clerics for four years (Muhammad Amin and Toshbolta domullah). The youth went to Kokand in 1904 to study Quranic syntax and Arabic grammar and sarf va nahu (syntax) with Zikriye-qori and Mullah Eshonqul. He then pursued formal religious education at the Ming-ayim madrassa in Kokand and the Khanakah Eshon Sayakhshin madrassa in Bukhara, where he was studying when World War I broke out. He fled the country to avoid being drafted into labor detachments of the Russian army.

Hindustani was one of a number of students who left Bukhara for Balkh, in Afghanistan, where he studied a wide variety of disciplines, including fiqh (Islamic law) and the mystical poetry of Rumi, Hafiz, and Bedil, with Hazret Muhammad Gavs Said-zade. But the deteriorating political situation in Afghanistan led Hindustani to return (with his teacher) to Bukhara in 1916, and both then went on to Tashkent, where Hazret Muhammad Gavs Said-zade began teaching at the Kukaldosh madrassa. The two left Tashkent for Jalalabad, Afghanistan, shortly after the October Revolution, and in 1919 Muahhad Ghaws, now qadi (judge in Islamic legal system) of Jalalabad, sent the young scholar to India—hence the sobriquet “Hindustani”—to complete his studies in the Usmaniya madrassa in Kashmir. While in India, Hindustani is said to have mastered both Hindi and Urdu, and he also performed hajj in Mecca with his father, who died during the pilgrimage.

Hindustani returned to his home village of Chorbog in 1929, allegedly as part of a promise to his dying father, and then settled in Kokand at the height of the Stalinist repression. His effort to evade arrest through hiding out in a small village (Abligh, in the Akhangaran region), proved fruitless, and he was arrested in 1933 and sentenced to two years of forced labor. In 1937 he was arrested again while living in a settlement outside of Tashkent and was sentenced to three years in Siberia. He returned to Kokand in 1940, working in an oil-processing factory for three years until he was drafted and sent to fight in World War II. Although he was severely wounded in battle, he was not sent home until 1947, when he moved to Dushanbe to take up an appointment as imam-khatib of the Mawlana Yaqub Charkhy mosque in Dushanbe. He was arrested after little more than a year at this post and spent four and a half years in prison, but he was fully rehabilitated after Stalin’s death in March 1953.

After his release, Hindustani took up a post in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences in Dushanbe, teaching Urdu and producing annotated manuscripts of Arabic-language texts. It was at this point that Hindustani began offering illegal religious instruction in a hujra school (named for the cells in which madrassa students used to live), with the tacit approval of some local authorities. The existence of Hindustani’s school was a well-known secret, and no one denied its
existence when I began asking about it during my first trip to Dushanbe in 1984. At the same time, my local interlocutors refused to introduce me to Hindustani, lest the presence of a Westerner put his enterprise at risk.

Unlike many of the illegal religious schools that were organized in Central Asia, Hindustani’s school followed a formal and extensive curriculum, quite similar to that which might be offered at a normal madrassa. Dozens, and possibly hundreds, of young men studied with Hindustani. It is possible to reconstruct the course of instruction because of interviews with his former students as well as colleagues’ access to Hindustani’s library.

Hindustani’s better students spent several years in study with him, receiving lectures on the Quran, studying the hadith, learning about fiqh, *Fiqh al-akbar, Aqida an-Nasafi* (the doctrinal system of Islam), adab (ethics), nutq (oratory), Islamic cosmology and narrative history, Islamic medicine, astrology, astronomy, and of course advanced Arabic grammar, syntax, and morphology. This course of study was designed to parallel what students would have received in a madrassa. While for some it was their only religious education, for others it was a form of preparation for other, more formal instruction.

Hindustani provided the first exposure to Islamic teachings for many of Uzbekistan’s and Tajikistan’s most prominent religious figures, those who can be considered fundamentalist or radical because of their desire to reinterpret or break with traditional Hanafi Islam as well as those who accept the primacy of Hanafi religious continuity.

Among Hindustani’s first generation of pupils was Hakimjon qori, who broke with Hindustani over questions of the relationship of Islam and politics although the two scholars maintained a polemical dialogue for much of Hakimjon’s life. Hindustani’s pupils also included several prominent students of Hakimjon qori—Rahmatullah-alloma; Abduhvali qori; Said Abdullah Nuri, leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Tajikistan; and Hikmat-zade, also a member of the IRP of Tajikistan. All these individuals eventually rejected what they saw as Hindustani’s excessively conciliatory attitude toward secular authorities.

Even more significant are the clerics that Hindustani trained. These men continue to exemplify Central Asia’s Hanafi tradition and seek to extend it. They include Ismail qori Kokandi, the imam of a major mosque in Kokand, whose opposition to the Wahhabis in 1992 was so strong that the Wahhabis held him captive. Ismail qori Kokandi is currently writing his memoirs about his study with Hindustani.

Hindustani’s students also include Muhammad-Sodiq Kasym Andijani, known as the last student of Hindustani, who is the imam of the major mosque in Andijan. Muhammad-Sodiq Kasym Andijani is currently staking claim to be the major Hanafi figure in the country and has pitted his religious learning against that of Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf. Muhammad-Sodiq Kasym Andijani’s elder brother, Abdulatif Kasym Andijani, who was a very vocal opponent of Abduhvali qori, also studied with Hindustani. Abdulatif Kasym Andijani, who lost his position as imam around 2000, has remained active in the struggle against Wahhabis in Uzbekistan as well as the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement, mostly through his writings. He also wrote a short memoir about his time of study with Hindustani.

Abdulkhay domullah, who is currently the imam in charge of the Gumbaz madrassa in Namangan, the former center (during the early 1990s) of the Wahhabi movement in Namangan that
was later restored to Hanafi tradition, is also a former student of Hindustani. Although Abdulkhay domullah studied with Hindustani for only six months, the Namangan cleric considers Hindustani to have been his spiritual leader.

Kimsanbai-azhi, currently the imam of the main mosque in Shymkent, Kazakhstan, was also a student of Hindustani, with whom he studied for a year. Kimsanbai-azhi previously served as the main spiritual leader of Kazakhstan, having been appointed to that post by Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf. Hindustani also had a number of students from Tajikistan who accepted his Hanafi teachings. They included Hikmatullo qori, who is an imam of a mosque in Dushanbe and is an important ally of Akbar Turajon-zade (and a major opponent of Said Abdullah Nuri).

For this group of Hanafi clerics in particular, Hindustani’s writings remain a source of inspiration. His best-known theological writings are his *tafsir* (extensive commentaries) and translation of the Quran into Uzbek (six volumes in all) that he completed in 1984 as well as his series of philosophic essays (*Isharat as-Sabba’a, Pand-nama-iy Hazrat Mawlavi*) and various religious translations and commentaries.

Hindustani’s students maintain that their mentor’s writings belong to the larger Hanafi tradition of seeking to balance the teachings of Sharia law with traditional local practices. By contrast, his religious critics argue that Hindustani was an artifact of the peculiar conditions of Soviet rule, when the need for the preservation of the faith created an atmosphere of obsequiousness and caused the subordination of religious teachings to an unlawful secular state.

**Hakimjon qori and the Young Wahhabis**

Mullah Hakimjon qori Margilani, born 1898, ran a *hujra* school just down from the main market in Margilan at a site well known by everyone. Hakimjon qori had studied with local clerics associated with the Ahl-i Hadith movement, but his primary religious instruction came from his father, Abduvosiy qori, who was also an adherent of this movement. He and his father fled Margilan (going to Uzgent) to avoid arrest and returned to the Ferghana Valley only after World War II. In 1959–1960, Hakimjon qori went to study with Hindustani; however, the two did not get along. While Hindustani maintained that he threw Hakimjon qori out, the latter claimed that he left of his own accord because he rejected Hindustani’s conformist tendencies. “Mullah Muhammadjan [Hindustani] is like a poplar in the field,” Hakimjon qori is reported as saying. “He blows in the direction of the wind.”

Religious life in the region was, by the Khrushchev era, changing and normalizing, making the doctrinal differences between traditional Hanafi religious thinkers and their fundamentalist critics of greater consequence. A battle for defining Islam was enjoined, and the competition was heightened because now both groups had greater (albeit limited) contact with the larger Muslim world.

Hakimjon qori began to ask those performing hajj—admittedly a small group—to take advantage of being in the “holy land” and bring him back religious literature in Arabic. Over a period of seven to ten years he slowly collected a substantial library, including multivolume works of Ibn Taymmiya and the fundamentalist commentary of the Quran written by Ibn al-Kathir.

The course of instruction for students at Hakimjon qori’s *hujra* appears to have been less systematic than the curriculum of Hindustani. Given that Hakimjon qori is still alive and his former
pupils largely represent an oppositionary trend in Islam, he has not yet been the subject of the same kind of systematic study that Hindustani has. Hindustani has become almost a cult figure in Dushanbe and his heirs have only occasionally granted access to his library.

A living but revered figure, Hakimjon qori is also a remote figure. One trusted informant who met with Hakimjon qori on two occasions was not granted full access to the latter’s library, but the informant noticed Ibn Taymiya’s writings on the shelf. The nearly deaf cleric was willing to confirm him as his primary religious inspiration. This would establish Hakimjon qori as a classic fundamentalist.

By the late 1970s, some of Hakimjon qori’s pupils were beginning to break with him, claiming that he was not sufficiently political in his orientation and that he was not willing to urge direct engagement with the authorities in defense of the faith. This seems to have been the major reason that Rahmatullah-alloma (1950–1981) and Abduhvali qori (born in 1952 in Andijan and presumed to have died in 1995 after disappearing during an airline journey to Moscow) parted company with the Margilan cleric. Both men are said to have been especially influenced by Abd Al-Wahhab’s *at-Tawhid*, Sayyid Qutb’s *Fi Zilali Quran*, and Maududi’s writings that were studied in the underground schools in the Andijan region in the late 1970s. In fact, both Abduhvali qori and Rahmatullah-alloma are reported to have traveled to Tashkent regularly in order to participate in an underground study group run by Egyptian exchange students in Tashkent in the late 1970s. Rahmatullah-alloma’s students during this period also included Radzhab Ali Kokandi, who sparred with Ismail qori Kokandi for influence in Kokand, took him captive in 1992, and subsequently received a lengthy prison sentence.

In addition to Arabic language texts (which would have been inaccessible to most young Central Asians), there were also samizdat Russian-language versions of the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Maududi, which were found in the library of Rahmatullah-alloma. While the Russian language translations of these works were crude, they nonetheless would have made the ideas of these men accessible to a much wider group of Central Asian readers.

Rahmatullah-alloma, Abduvali qori, and their pupils had been socialized in an era very different from either the times of Hakimjon qori or Muhammad Hindustani, and for that reason they had trouble understanding the caution of their elders, although their disagreements with Hindustani were theological as well. A student of Rahmatullah-alloma later reflected:

> Allah aided Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in his work because Wahhab set before himself the task that God wished: to cleanse Islam by any means necessary of intolerable innovations and the domination of unbelievers.¹⁰

For Hakimjon qori, the point of contention was not the need to cleanse Islam, but the injunction to do so “by any means necessary.” It was this argument that eventually led disciples of Abduvali (Rahmatullah-alloma died in 1981 before the collapse of Soviet rule) to eventually advocate the use of force. For these young disciples, Islam could only be present in its pure form if it was a state religion, something that was impossible under Soviet rule, a fact that turned the Soviets into their enemy.

We learn a lot about the point of view of the fundamentalists from the record that was kept of Hindustani’s debates with them. In fact, Hindustani’s own writings give us the best introduction to the ideology of the fundamentalists who opposed him. These are contained in a series of
audiocassettes of debates between Hindustani and his pupils Abduhvali qori and Rahmatullah-alloma that occurred in 1980 that we have obtained copies of as well as in his “Letters in response to those who are introducing inadmissible innovations into religion,” in which Hindustani answers “unknown” critics. These were probably written in stages during the 1984–1989 period.

In one of the surviving audiotapes of his 1980 debates with Rahmatullah-alloma and Abduhvali qori, Hindustani accuses them of trying to “cleanse Islam from innovation.” For Hindustani, as for so many Hanafi theologians, Islam’s strength was its capacity for innovation.

Hindustani considered his young critics to be dangerous; he spoke of the “alienness” of the “school (mazhab) of those who have strayed, those who have lost the true path.” He too considered them as Wahhabi who risked dividing the community of believers and who thus should be considered an enemy of Islam. This was a term that neither Abduhvali qori nor Rahmatullah-alloma ever used as a description for themselves, but it largely stuck after Hindustani made this accusation.

Above all, Hindustani feared the impact that Wahhabi demands and proposals would have on the local Islamic way of life and Hanafi daily customs, which followers of the Wahhabi school complained were in direct violation of the true way that the early Arabic texts they had been reading said that these rituals should be performed. Hindustani strongly opposed changing the ritual surrounding the namaz among local Hanafi Muslims: the placement of the hands during takbir (praise of the greatness of Allah) and qiyam (night prayers), and the pronunciation of “Amin” to oneself (mahfi) rather than aloud (jahr) as the young fundamentalists preferred. Hindustani was also sharply critical of his opponents’ attempts to pronounce as un-Islamic or heretical the following customs and rituals: the recitation of certain ayats from the Quran at funerals, for healing sick people, and even for healing animals; the widespread practice among believers of worshipping vali and avliya (saints) and treating their gravesites as shrines or holy places; and the local practice of accepting payment for recitation of the Quran.

The war in Afghanistan was another area of disagreement between the Hanafi school around Hindustani and those who studied with Hakimjon qori. Hindustani’s opinion about the war was characteristic of the opinions of Hanafi clerics more generally:

You praise the Afghan mujahidin, believing that they are waging a true jihad. But their jihad is the destruction of Muslim mosques, the murder of those who pray, the confiscation of people’s property, the murder of women and children. Is this truly jihad? This is nothing other than the destruction of holy places and the annihilation of sacred things.

In particular, an ancient robe of Allah’s Prophet was preserved in Kandahar—may Allah bless and preserve it! And they burned it! Is this really holy jihad? No, not by any means! Why did they not accept Najibullah’s peace proposals? Indeed, in the Quran it is written: “But if they incline toward peace, make peace with them.” [Quran 8:61] That is, in this ayat addressed to [the Prophet] Muhammad, it is said that if the unbelievers are inclined toward peace, then you should work for peace. So, even if you claim that those who live in Afghanistan are unfaithful, the [above-mentioned] command remains unchanged!

For the elder generation, even older fundamentalists, the war in Afghanistan was but another pebble put into the shoes of believers by the Soviets. Even the younger generation of fundamentalists saw it as a further argument for jihad but not as a reason for a call to immediate action. Its eventual impact would be profound, not only because it strongly influenced the thinking of certain people (like Juma Namangani who served with the Soviet troops in Afghanistan) but also because of the way in which the civil war in Tajikistan played out.
Moreover, as Hindustani’s “Answers to those who are introducing inadmissible innovations” also makes clear, these young Wahhabis attacked anyone who did not accept their position as a collaborator, a charge that Hindustani vigorously rejects:

It is a shame that you do not know our biography; if you knew, you would be more discriminating and just. In my life, I have been deprived of my freedom three times on the charge that I was inciting the people against the Soviet government. The first time I was sentenced to a year in prison, the second time to three years, and the third time—to twenty-five years. I suffered such deprivations for this antigovernment activity! And yet you call on me to take up the jihad. You admonish me, as if I were lost in ignorance (jahl). But I have searched for twenty-five years to find knowledge. How long have you studied to call me ignorant? Shame on you and on those who taught you!16

For Hindustani, both emotion and dogma were at issue. He believed that the young fundamentalists took no heed of the distance that the country had come during the past twenty years, as believers were now able to recite salat-namaz and offer janaza (prayer for the departed) without fearing arrest. For Hindustani it was impermissible—according to the teachings of the faith—for believers to be pressed toward jihad when there was no prospect other than slaughter before them for their efforts. He chastised his young critics for extolling Duchi Ishan (Muhammad Ali), a well-known Sufi leader who led a jihad in 1898, when two thousand poorly armed men attacked the czarist garrison in Andijan, resulting in the execution of all the leaders and the exile of hundreds of their followers. Hindustani’s criticism was also doctrinal because, according to local Hanafi interpretation, Muslims could tolerate a non-Islamic ruler that tolerated Islam, and modifications of Soviet policy toward religion had led some to be optimistic that further improvements in the treatment of believers were possible.

Moreover, there was a core doctrinal question at issue: how to understand the obligation of jihad. Hindustani wrote:

Do you know how many parts the jihad for the faith consists of? If one part is the jihad against unbelievers on the field of battle, then another is to cleanse oneself of evil thoughts and deliver oneself from ignorance. The Lord Prophet of Allah called this second part jihad-i Akbar, the greatest jihad. I, praise be to Allah, have also waged the “jihad of the tongue,” and for this have been deprived of my freedom many times. And I have also imparted [religious] knowledge to so many people, delivering them from ignorance and turning them away from evil behavior.17

As Soviet rule decayed under Brezhnev, however, the younger generation of fundamentalists grew bolder in their efforts to propagate the faith, and both Rahmatullah-alloma and Abduhvali set up study groups of their own in Andijan. Regardless of all their complaints about the compromises made by their elders, both men did seem to enjoy a degree of local protection.

It is not possible to know at what price this protection was purchased, and whether it came from local KGB, or republic security forces, or even KGB headquarters in Moscow. Certainly, there have been rumors that Hindustani was not averse to dropping in at the local KGB office and sharing at least some information with them about his students.

Although the Uzbek KGB officers were obviously aware of the activities of Hakimjon qori, Rahmatullah-alloma, and Abduhvali, it is interesting that they do not seem to have been aware of or particularly concerned about Hindustani. Hindustani’s activities were the concern of Moscow and
the KGB of the neighboring republic of Tajikistan, with the former to pick up the pieces if the latter lost control.\textsuperscript{18}

The local Tajik KGB was certainly aware of Hindustani’s activities and likely even knew the identities of his pupils, but Hindustani undoubtedly enjoyed local protection, which probably went back to the former Tajik Communist Party first secretary, Babajan Gafurov, who was retired to the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, where Hindustani was employed. Certainly, everyone with ties to the institute, in both Tajikistan and in Moscow, was well aware of Hindustani’s existence.\textsuperscript{19} Like so many other clerics, Hindustani undoubtedly justified a certain degree of friendliness with those who worked for the organs of state security as a way to continue his religious activities, but no credible evidence shows that he was an active collaborator or an employee of state security.

Abduhvali qori’s relationship with the KGB is less clear. There have been persistent rumors that in the late Soviet period Abduhvali cooperated with the KGB as part of an effort to split the growing number of Islamic activists. It certainly would have been in keeping with the tactics of the KGB at the time to try to recruit him, and Abduhvali was a complex enough figure that he might have believed that he could outwit the KGB by collaborating with them.\textsuperscript{20} There are even rumors (not quite credible) that the KGB caused Abduhvali qori to disappear in the fashion of extracting an agent; this contrasts with the more common explanation that the KGB beat Abduhvali qori to death (or nearly to death).

The writings of Hindustani make clear that it would be a mistake to minimize the anger that the Hanafi Muslims bore to Hakimjon qori, Rahmatullah-alloma, and Abduhvali qori and men of their ilk:

I have cursed no one,\textsuperscript{21} except Rahmatullah-alloma. For his discourteousness, like yours, was beyond the patience of God. He died young. Now I hope that your affairs are resolved for the better. “Allah indeed is mighty, and capable of retribution!” [Quran, 5:95] And may Allah help us!\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{RADICAL ISLAM, LATE 1980S THROUGH EARLY 1990S}

Abduhvali qori and Rahmatullah-alloma also began to distance themselves from Hakimjon qori, but they continued to accept his teachings. They grew impatient with his complacency and the fact that he was unwilling to move toward public demonstrations of his Islamic faith. Rahmatullah’s open criticism of Hakimjon qori in 1979 was a display of that very rudeness of which Hindustani accused him.

Rahmatullah-alloma and Abduhvali qori argued that Islam would not be preserved in Central Asia unless the proponents of the faith were more aggressive. Rather than hiding, they had to actively seek new supporters through the printing and distribution of religious literature that they would conceal within covers that featured proregime titles.\textsuperscript{24} They also advocated that believers return to the external demeanor of the religiously devout: \textit{hijab} (veil) for women; long hair, beards, and no ties for men, even if this drew attention in the secular schools.
The loosening of Soviet control—first through the growing gray economy in Uzbekistan and then, in the mid-1980s, through the introduction of limited cooperative-based trade and private enterprise—provided the opportunity for these groups to make the money needed to support their activities. It also gave them the ability to use corrupt Soviet institutions for their own purposes. Local institutes of atheism—in 1989, they became institutes of religion—were, for a price, amenable to allowing their printing presses to be used for producing religious literature.

It required enormous changes in the Soviet Union—the fracturing of authority and the country’s collapse from within—to politicize Islam. When a political void was perceived to be forming in the collapsing Soviet Union, both the Hanafi clerics and their fundamentalist rivals became politicized in an effort to define how the void would be filled.

Both Andijan and Namangan developed strong, politicized Islamic presences. In Andijan, politicized Islam centered on Abduhvali qori and the Wahhabis, but in Namangan both Wahhabi and radical (but doctrinally more traditional) Hanafi and Sufi clerics were also highly politicized and played the more critical role. In Namangan, in particular, for much of 1991 the Islamists posed a real threat to secular authority. It is unlikely that this politicization would ever have occurred if Soviet rule had not collapsed or if a strong secular alternative to these Islamic groups had existed in the Ferghana Valley. Even Adolat (Justice) and Islam Adolati (Islamic Justice), the Islamic paramilitary groups active in Namangan and to a lesser extent in Andijan, seemed to fold under the threat of an effective use of force.

The rise of Islamic activism in this period speaks more to the collapse of Soviet institutions, the weakness of Birlik and Erk (the two secular opposition parties), and the initial failure of the Uzbek Communist Party to fill this gap than it does to the strength of Islam.

**Andijan**

The spiritual leader for the Andijan Islamists was Abduhvali qori, who secured control of his own mosque in Andijan in 1990 and preached in it through part of 1994. During this period, he recorded some eighty-seven audiocassettes of his maruzalar (lectures), which include commentaries on the Quran and on several hadiths. Some of these lessons have been posted on Salafi-supported web sites (although with considerable editing to make Abduhvali qori’s teachings appear closer to a classic Salafi interpretation). Collections of his sermons have also been published in book and audio form in Central Asia and are sold clandestinely in Uzbekistan and openly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Finally, in 2002, a shortened version of these lessons was issued on a compact disc by his son, Ibn Abduhvali qori. All these efforts are presumed to have been underwritten by the Uzbeks living in Saudi Arabia.

Abduhvali’s Quran interpretations in particular drew heavily on the interpretation of the Quran offered by Sayyid Qutb (called *Fi Zilali-l-Quran*), and Abduhvali called his work *Fi Zilali az-Zilal*—a play on the title of Sayyid Qutb’s commentary. Many of the discussions also offer critiques of the various innovative local interpretations of Islam, including those practiced by local Sufis. As Abduhvali qori complains in cassette number 44, those who identify with Islam in this way are unlikely to engage in the political struggle necessary for its proper status to be restored:

> Some of our brethren, brothers and sisters … have made pilgrimage to the graves of our ancestors, who they consider to be “holy,” offering sacrifices and praying for them to
intercede in their problems.... In their celebrations [stoi] they permit every sort of innovation [bidat] and prohibited practices [haram]. These coreligionists include those who without self-consciousness perform customs and rituals of the world of customary law [urf va odat]. We cannot expect active participation in the rebirth of the political status of Islam. We can only expect such active participation from young people, who have still not been poisoned by practicing customs and rituals that are forbidden by Islam.

Abduhvali’s major rival in Andijan in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the newly appointed mufti, Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf, whose activities during this period are described at great length in an accompanying paper. While Muhammad-Sodiq clearly favored political Islam—Islamic values and institutions filling the growing void left by the collapse of Soviet institutions—he wanted to do this in a way that maintained his personal control of SADUM, an institution that was growing in importance irrespective of the political collapse going on throughout the Soviet Union. The political liberalization of the late Gorbachev years created new opportunities for religious believers of all faiths to reclaim the running of the state-sponsored religious institutions, as well as the perceived freedom to establish religious institutions that were fully independent of the state.

As head of SADUM, Muhammad-Sodiq had his people in place in all the principal cities of the Ferghana Valley, but the nature of the times was such that their domination of the religious scene was far from assured.

Abduhvali qori also had an ambition to become the mufti, and he sought to gain the post by destabilizing Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf. As such, Abduhvali qori was one of the key people making accusations of corruption against Muhammad-Sodiq, bolstering the accusations made by the former mufti, Shamsuddin Khan Babakhan, who also saw Muhammad-Sodiq’s ouster as a means of securing his own return to his former post. The joint actions helped bring together the Wahhabis of Andijan and Namangan, who were vying for the mantle of spiritual religious leadership, with the disaffected part of the Tashkent religious elite, who were angered by the various financial machinations of Muhammad-Sodiq, most especially the way he had carried out the sale of Qurans supplied by Saudi Arabia.

In Namangan the Hanafi Muslims were far more politicized than those in Andijan although Andijan was something of a radical Islamic spiritual center, especially because it was the location of the madrassa of Abduhvali qori. Nonetheless, Abduhvali did have numerous opponents, including most prominently of course Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf but also local clerics such as Abdulatif Kasym Andijani.

**Namangan**

The situation in Namangan was much more complex than in Andijan because in Namangan several powerful personalities, representing different strains in Islam as well as enormous egos and personal ambition, vied for control.

Muhammad-Sodiq exerted control over the religious situation in Namangan through his various close associates, including Umar-khon domulla, the qadi in Namangan. Umar-khon domulla was also responsible for providing Muhammad-Sodiq with a personal security force of some twenty people, all with black belts in karate. These individuals were not dissimilar from the so-called fighters who later gathered around Tahir Yuldashiev, a founder and leader of the IMU.
Umar-khon domulla. Umar-khon domulla had only a limited secular education, but he had extensive religious training. He had four years of religious instruction in a hujra school run by his relatives in Namangan, and then he studied with Hakimjon qori in Margilan, where he was reputed to have been one of the top students in the hujra. He then went on to study with Zokirjon domla, a well-known Hanafi theologian who also served as a teacher for Obid-khon qori in Tashkent for nearly two years, until 1982. Zokirjon domla urged Umar-khon domulla to forget the Wahhabi lessons he received from Hakimjon qori, and he tried to prepare Umar-khon domulla for admission to the Mir-i Arab madrassa in Bukhara. However, Umar-khon domulla failed to pass the secular subjects of dictation and history.

Despite failing at school, Umar-khon domulla was able to establish himself as a figure of considerable religious presence in Namangan. Failing to gain admission to Mir-i Arab, he worked there as a handyman for a year and a half, satisfying himself—in his own words—that he “knew more than any graduate.” He then went on to work as a baker and to run his own small enterprise, which expanded at the time of perestroika. This was his primary occupation until 1986, when he became imam of a mosque in Namangan. During his years as a baker he also ran his own hujra school, providing young children and adolescents with basic instruction in the Hanafi school of Islam.

He began to increase substantially the scope of his religious activities in 1990, at the very same time that Wahhabi groups were expanding their activities around the Gumbaz mosque in Namangan. Subsequently, he began organizing training in karate and kung fu for young men studying in his mosque, in large part because he claimed that he wanted to make them capable of defending themselves against the group that developed around Abduhakim (Hakimjon) Sattimov, the founder of Adolat, and against others allied with Tahir Yuldashev. This justification could have been somewhat disingenuous, however, because Tahir Yuldashev’s people seem to have been controlled in part by Umar-khon domulla himself.

Umar-khon domulla was obviously a person of great importance in the religious world of Namangan, and it was for this reason that Muhammad-Sodiq made him qadi (his representative) in Namangan after assuming the post of mufti.

Umar-khon domulla’s closest followers called him shir (tiger, or brave one) because in 1986 he demanded that the first secretary of the regional communist party return the former main mosque of Namangan city (then used as a winery) to the community of believers. Eventually it was returned.

In 1990 Umar-khon domulla organized a debating club in his mosque. Every Saturday his radical Hanafi supporters debated religious questions with those youths termed “Wahhabis.” Those who attended these forums maintain that Tahir Yuldashev was a frequent participant and that he often took Umar-khon domulla’s part in the argument. Umar-khon domulla is said to have been a strong influence on the evolution of Adolat from its early form as a self-defense group into Islam Adolati, which inflicted punishment on small-scale criminals and racketeers according to Sharia law. After Adolat changed, it is said that Umar-khon domulla even wrote some of the verdicts that were pinned to the bodies of those who received punishment in public places by Islam Adolati.

We do not have access to Tahir Yuldashev’s version of the relationship, but Umar-khon domulla maintains that he always viewed Tahir Yuldashev as having “excessive ambition and love of authority,” and that he wrote these verdicts at Tahir Yuldashev’s insistence. Others, however,
maintain that Umar-khon domulla was a strong presence behind Tahir Yuldashev, who was merely doing Umar-khon domulla’s bidding by putting Islamic law into practice. In fact, at least one of the regular participants in these Saturday meetings maintains that the very idea of pressing for the establishment of an Islamic state came to Tahir Yuldashev from Umar-khon domulla at one of these sessions.

A great deal of controversy surrounds the relationship of the various religious personalities in Namangan, who included Muhammad-Sodiq, Umar-khon domulla, Dowud-khon, and the grouping of young soldiers around Tahir Yuldashev. A lot of what we know about the various actors plays out around the seizure of the regional committee building in Namangan that had been occupied by Tahir Yuldashev’s soldiers (lashkarlar). While under occupation, this building was the site of an election meeting with president Islam Karimov on December 19, 1991. In addition to the film (and transcript) of Karimov’s meeting there, we also have interviews with eyewitnesses to the event. Some claim that Karimov’s antipathy to the Islamic radicals was a result of their having humbled him in Namangan, but it may simply be that Karimov came away from Namangan with a new appreciation of the strength of those committed to radical Islamic causes.

In his public presentation, Karimov certainly sought to characterize himself as very supportive of Islam, promising to use the Quran during his swearing-in ceremony as president (he did this) and to allow his presidency to be blessed with prayers. At the meeting, he even opened the door to the creation of an Islamic republic of Uzbekistan as long as that is what the country’s elected officials (and the reference here is clearly to parliamentarians who would be elected after the parliament of that time was disbanded) called for. For Karimov, however, the first step was clearly to sustain Uzbekistan’s sovereignty, which he believed could only be accomplished through his election.

Obviously, Karimov had no intention of establishing an Islamic republic in Uzbekistan, but he took away from this meeting a strong sense of the depth of support for this idea among those assembled. Who was responsible for the creation of this impression: those in the room, of whom Tahir Yuldashev was most vocal, or those who seem to have been active behind the scenes?

Eyewitnesses to a meeting between Umar-khon domulla and Muhammad-Sodiq in Namangan shortly before the December 19, 1991, assembly with Islam Karimov say that Muhammad-Sodiq displayed nervousness about Tahir Yuldashev and his followers and warned Umar-khon domulla that Tahir Yuldashev could lead to the Islamic establishment being discredited before the authorities:

… I am telling you that we are still weak, but they [the secular authorities] are still strong and tomorrow they can break your horns. So be careful. Understand that right now our main task is to learn to be more skillful, in order to be able to return Islam to its true home. Forceful actions on your part can discredit us, making them [the authorities] afraid of us. Islam must be introduced quietly.

Umar-khon domulla nonetheless decided to attend the December 19, 1991, meeting with Karimov, which may well have led to his later arrest. Umar-khon domulla was arrested in November 1993 for abuse of official position, and he was released in November 2002. He now is formally employed as a farmhand but, in reality, is very much a gentleman farmer–cleric, with followers and students working his land. He still seems to enjoy a great deal of respect from devout Hanafi Muslims in the Namangan region. Ironically, Umar-khon domulla served his sentence in the same prison as Abdulahat, the Wahhabi leader, and upon his release Umar-khon domulla commented that
only in prison did the two come to understand that the split between them had worked against the interests of Islam.

Rahimjon Akramov, 36 who was serving in 1991 as the provincial monitor on religious questions, seems to have arrived at the meeting between Umar-khon domulla and Muhammad-Sodiq shortly after this discussion about strategy in the face of the forthcoming meeting. Obid-khon qori, also native to Namangan, was also present. Although Umar-khon domulla and Muhammad-Sodiq seem to have been silenced by Akramov’s arrival, Obid-khon qori was willing to continue the discussion. According to Akramov, Obid-khon qori broke the silence by saying, “I think that we shouldn’t be afraid to show them our strength.” This was sufficient for Akramov to pick up the thread of the preceding conversation, and he then asked Muhammad-Sodiq directly, “Do you think that it is right for you [meaning the religious elite, and not just Muhammad-Sodiq] to interfere in politics at a time when the country is going through difficult times?”

Those who were there recall that everyone turned to Muhammad-Sodiq, who answered, “No, better to refrain from politics.” Akramov, however, maintains that the startled looks on everyone’s faces were proof enough for him that Muhammad-Sodiq had offered the opposite conclusion prior to his arrival in the room. Moreover, Akramov continues to believe that despite Muhammad-Sodiq’s absence from the December 19, 1991 Namangan meeting, the mufti was nonetheless a main force behind the scenes.

Akramov argues that Muhammad-Sodiq was absent because he did not want to do anything that would undermine his primary goal, which was the unification of all the Islamic groups (including the so-called Wahhabis) in the region in order to create a united force.

But Muhammad-Sodiq’s public position at this time was that, if the Uzbek government bodies would stop interfering with him and accusing him of intrigues and various measures designed to instigate the Muslims against the regime, he would be able to do a lot to “pacify the Muslims.” This quote comes from a conversation between my Uzbek interlocutor and Burgutali Rafikov, who served as secretary of the Communist Party of the Pap region (Namangan) from 1985 to 1991. 38

Rafikov is a rather unusual figure, someone who described himself as having had “communism in his head and Islam in his heart.” In 1990–1991 in his home district of Pap he sponsored the opening of a mosque that held between four and five thousand people, and he used funds from the regional budget as well as income from local state enterprises, kolkhozes, and donations from individuals for its construction. At the time of the ground breaking for the mosque, in August 1990, Rafikov was invited by the local mullah to read the first namaz along with him. Rafikov demurred, claiming he was unable to do so, and so a group of local elders and local party officials went off into a room on the side to provide some rapid religious instruction and work out a solution that allowed the party official to participate as a leader in the religious service.

Abdurauf-khon Gafurov. Abdurauf-khon Gafurov was another important actor in the religious life of Namangan during this period. He was a close associate of Muhammad-Sodiq, serving as the formal representative of SADUM in Namangan during much of this period. The two began their association in 1986. Gafurov was born in 1947 in Namangan and grew up in a religious family. His secular education was in the field of trade and finance, and he held the post of director of a wood shop and wood storage facility. This was a very desirable job during the Soviet period, as it provided
access to deficit materials that could be sold privately to enterprises throughout the oblast, enabling the facility to meet state quotas. Thus, at the time of the collapse of Soviet rule, Gafurov had become one of Namangan's underground millionaires.

Gafurov was a member of the Communist Party, something that was definitional in the post that he held, and until 1985 he also served as a member of the Soviet executive committee in Namangan. He was a close associate and supporter of Shahrrulla Mirsaidov, who served as prime minister of Uzbekistan in the early 1990s, and he was one of the intermediaries between Mirsaidov and the group around Muhammad-Sodiq. Gafurov was also on good terms with Burgutali Rafikov, the hakim of Namangan. Gafurov used these ties to build a light-industry empire for himself in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with ventures in furniture building, textiles, and sweets.

It was his financial might rather than his religious training, which was minimal, that brought Gafurov into contact and association with Muhammad-Sodiq, and from 1989 Gafurov was given a post of financial responsibility in SADUM. In 1989 he was named qadi of the Ferghana Valley, which included all three oblasts.

He was said to have received this post for a series of reasons: his knowledge of business and finance, his ties to the local power structure, his ties to the power structure in Tashkent, and the fact that he was on good terms with the various Hanafi and Wahhabi leaders in the region. In fact, Gafurov tried to bring a number of key Hanafi religious figures—Umar-khon domulla, Abdulatif Kasym (of Andijan), Ibrahim qori (of Kokand)—together with Abduhvali qori, but he had little success.

Gafurov was the effective chief financial officer for the region. The full flow of donations from local mosques—both the regular tithe plus additional donations at the time of personal and religious festivals—passed through his hands, and the bulk of the funds for SADUM came from the Ferghana Valley. In addition, Gafurov had the responsibility for compiling the list of those who would make pilgrimage to Mecca and also for collecting their fees, which came close to mirroring the actual cost of the pilgrimage (although technically all pilgrims from Uzbekistan from 1989 to 1991 were guests of the king of Saudi Arabia). Gafurov also had access to all the bribe money paid to get on this list, and because these were the first years that pilgrimage was widely available to ordinary citizens, the amounts were considerable.

In fact, Gafurov accumulated so much money that he was able to rent a Tu-154 to take his own family on hajj. In 1990–1991 he also paid for the construction of a huge mosque in the Namangan suburb of Nurabad; the building of the mosque was said to have cost an amount equal to two annual budgets of the Namangan region, and it was to speak at the opening of this mosque that Islam Karimov originally consented to come to Namangan in December 1991. Karimov used his speech at the mosque to address the issue—expropriation—that was at the heart of concerns of the local businesspeople, and Karimov tried to convince them that the regime that he headed would be friendly to entrepreneurs. Karimov's address must have been viewed with sympathy by Gafurov because it is said that he supported anyone who promised the protection of private property.

Through much of 1990, those who protected the concept of private property included the various Islamist groups in Namangan, but by 1991 Gafurov seems to have understood that the Communist elite provided a better chance for the protection of private assets. It is also believed that Gafurov argued with Muhammad-Sodiq over the need to give strong guarantees to holders of private property. Gafurov also probably used his resources to defer much of the cost of Tahir Yuldashev’s
Islam Adolati patrols, although allegedly on the advice of Muhammad-Sodiq he most likely transferred the funds through middlemen.

Gafurov seems to have been concerned initially that Muhammad-Sodiq was not willing to offer sufficient guarantees for private property. In fact, Gafurov’s hesitations appeared similar to those of entrepreneurs in Namangan, Margilan, Kokand, and even Tashkent, as they vacillated between supporting the Hanafi SADUM or the Wahhabi teachings represented by Abduhvali qori, who seemed to enjoy widespread support from the business community of Andijan. Eventually Gafurov decided that the ideas of Abduhvali qori were too close to those of the Bolsheviks; what seems to have convinced him was a Friday sermon by Abduhvali qori in which he preached that the Bolsheviks stole their egalitarian ideas from the teachings of Islam.

Gafurov was jailed in the mid-1990s on charges of financial machinations, and he served three years of a six-year term. He was released early because of his exemplary behavior and presumably also because of the payment of a large bribe. Today he lives quietly in Namangan, having lost his largest holdings (a textile factory that was run as a joint venture with Turkish investors) in the aftermath of legal proceedings against him.

Abdulahad Barnayev. Namangan was also the home of Abdulahad Barnayev, the imam of the Wahhabi Gumbaz mosque from the time of its opening to his arrest in 1993. Abdulahad was born in 1959, in Namangan, and graduated from secondary school in 1976. He was described by his classmates as a bad student who was physically weak but who had aspirations to be a leader, and, as a result, he was someone with frustrated ambitions. It is said he tried to advance his leadership claims by playing the leaders of various groups off against each other, and he earned regular beatings for his trouble.

Abdulahad Barnayev seems to have turned to religion for comfort. His initial religious education was provided by his grandfather. After army service from 1977 to 1979, Abdulahad returned home and went to work in a local automotive repair shop, remaining there until he went to Andijan in 1985 to study with Abduhvali qori. After two years in Andijan, he returned home to open his own hujra school, which received financial support from Abduhvali qori.

In 1988, Abdulahad and his students were instrumental in the successful attempt to gain control of the Gumbaz mosque in Namangan—in 1986 Umar-khon domulla had requested it be returned to believers. Thus, the mosque came under Wahhabi control rather than control by SADUM; armed supporters of Abdulahad physically barred supporters of Umar-khon domulla from taking control of the property. The Wahhabis were able to use the central location of the mosque to gain physical control of much of downtown Namangan. It is not certain, however, whether the youth associated with Adolat—followers of Abduhakim (Hakimjon) Sattimov and Tahir Yuldashev—were directly supported by Abdulahad or whether the young armed supporters were simply quasi-independent actors who enjoyed easy access to the Gumbaz mosque.

Although Abdulahad and his supporters were directly involved in the large demonstration in front of the Namangan regional committee building in 1990, when the goals were the legalization of the wearing of hijab and banning of women in the workplace, it is less likely that Abdulahad and his supporters were directly responsible for the seizure of the regional committee building in Namangan in December 1991. Certainly Abdulahad was not an immediate target of arrest by the authorities. He
was not arrested until 1997, when he received a sentence of seventeen years in a maximum security prison. He lost control of the Gumbaz mosque shortly after the disappearance of Abduhvali qori in 1995, when the mosque was returned to the Uzbek ecclesiastical administration.

Some local informants argue that the lack of direct engagement between Abdulahad and the youth mobilized by Tahir Yuldashev and Sattimov was a question of perception rather than reality. Their version claims that Abduhvali qori urged Abdulahad to preserve the seeming independence of the Gumbaz mosque and madrassa so that the large basements in the building that they occupied before 1989 (when they moved completely into the former winery) could be used for paramilitary training of youth. It is possible that the facilities were used for the training of the first group of Tawba, the paramilitary arm of the Uzbek branch of the IRP. Regardless of the suppositions, eventually the Uzbek branch of the IRP came under the direction of Abdullah Utayev, another former student of Abduhvali qori, and the IRP’s activities were largely centered in Tashkent.

While he was in prison, Abdulahad seems to have completely gone over to supporting the Uzbek authorities, and he obtained an early release after serving only about two years in all. Although his trial was depicted in near hagiographic terms in one of the training films of the IMU that is in my possession, in reality Abdulahad seems to have collapsed almost immediately after incarceration. His sister reports that when he heard the length of his sentence he screamed out, pleading for mercy, “I am guilty of nothing. Muslims take pity on me! Take pity on my old mother!” He seems to have become so hysterical that he had to be carried out of the courtroom, and he then fell unconscious with a severe nosebleed. He now runs a small shop that makes and sells halvah. He seems to be shunned by believers and is never greeted when he enters his local mosque.

**Dowud-khon Ortikov.** Dowud-khon Ortikov was another very prominent cleric in Namangan, and he is the only one of the clerics born during the Stalin era who were active in the Ferghana Valley during that period, having been born in 1931. He is a supporter of Hanafi teachings but is no less radical in his worldview than many Wahhabi. He is also a supporter of Sufi teachings of the Qadiri order and maintains that he is the descendant of the well-known hoja (blessed teacher) from Kashkar, Affak-hoja, who lived in the seventeenth century. He is also the descendant of two famous Soviet-era Sufi figures, Mawlon-khon tura, who was his grandfather, and Eshon-khon tura, his father. Because his father was exiled in the 1930s to Omsk, transferred to Orenburg, then sent to Kokand prison, released in 1933 only to be rearrested in 1937 and executed, Dowud-khon had a deep-seated hostility both to the Bolsheviks and to communism.

Dowud-khon’s madrassa, Aziz Hoja Ishan, became a well-known meeting place for opposition figures. The mosque and madrassa were restored through collections taken throughout the city; methods used included strong-ararming neighbors who had been settled by Soviet authorities in adjoining courtyards and buildings on what had originally been vaqf (clerical) property. These residents were pressed into returning property in an effort to create an Islamic republic in Uzbekistan. The mosque was reopened in 1990.

Dowud-khon quite quickly established his mosque as a highly politicized place by using his Friday sermons to press his congregation to rid themselves of Communist rule and claiming that the time of Islam had returned. Dowud-khon was also a frequent visitor to Umar-khon domulla’s mosque. He was reported to have invited Tahir Yuldashev to come forward during these Friday services and sit with the elders and authoritative ulema. According to Rahimjon Akramov, Dowud-
Khon supported the 1991 seizure of the regional committee building and was an active supporter of the creation of a so-called Islamic region, complete with its own army.

Throughout the early 1990s, Dowud-khon was arrested and released numerous times, and in 1994 he was held in jail for three months. He has not been jailed since. Some claim this is because he was willing to provide evidence in cases against other clerics from Namangan. Dowud-khon claims that shortly before this last arrest the authorities came to him and tried to get him to emigrate to Turkey, but he refused because, as he said, all of his ancestors are buried in Central Asia.

Dowud-khon now expresses confusion and some remorse about his political activities during the period 1990–1991, claiming that it was partly the product of the times:

> Then we were all fighting roosters. We tried to finally remove Communists from everywhere, as we thought that the time of Islam had arrived. But I did not understand anything, although clever people warned me that all our rash steps and actions would end badly.

The reference here is to his teacher (and uncle), Abdulboki-khon turah, who had warned Dowud-khon: “I tell you this. They [the authorities] will fertilize you with saltpeter, and then when you grow, they will cut you under the root.”

Dowud-khon’s current belief is that he should have listened to his teacher, which is quite consistent with his current age and relative frailty. As a result, despite his dissatisfaction with the current situation regarding Islam, he has substantially limited his potential for being a mobilizing force in the future.

At the same time, Dowud-khon has not fully repudiated his commitment to Islam playing a political role in Uzbekistan. When asked whether Sufism should be occupied with political activity and concern itself generally with world matters, he answered, “Sufis are obligated to be concerned with Sharia law and press for Sharia to be the law of the country.” He maintains and believes that this should be done by working with rulers and pointing them on the way to the Sharia, much like Hoja Akhrar, “who was adviser to many padisahs (sheikhs), and even Timur listened to him.” But he is not optimistic that the current rulers will pay attention, as he complains that they do not go to the mosque, even on holidays.

**Radical Islam, Mid-1990s**

Much has been written on the Tajik revolution, and although that is not the focus of this paper, at least a brief foray into it is necessary because of its deep connections with the development of radical Islam in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s Islamists—the circle around Abduhvali—certainly did sympathize with the IRP of Tajikistan and did see their battle as a form of jihad. The anarchy surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union created a sense of timeliness for this jihad. Moreover, going to Tajikistan gave the Islamists the opportunity to be part of an armed struggle for Islam, an opportunity that would be denied them in Uzbekistan.

Muhammad-Sodiq—our interviewing shows he continued to serve as mufti until February 1993—also seems to have had strong ties to the IRP, in part because of his friendship with Turajon—
zade and also because of his sincere conviction that a victory by the Tajik Islamists would serve as an important precedent for Uzbekistan and prod that country’s much stronger secular leadership into some sort of power-sharing relationship with Muhammad-Sodiq and other moderate Islamists. Eyewitnesses in Namangan argue that Muhammad-Sodiq organized the collection of money, food, and durables to be sent to “the aid of the Tajik brother Muslims” through the auspices of Umar-khon domulla. At least one eyewitness, Rahimjon Akramov, who served in the local administration during these years, maintains that guns were included in these shipments. Muhammad-Sodiq’s involvement with the IRP at the time of the civil war in Tajikistan was also reaffirmed in an interview with Saifullo Dalilov, who worked as a prosecutor in the Siab region of Dushanbe between 1981 and 1992. In 1992, Turajon-zade took Dalilov as a hostage as punishment for arresting and beating Islamist demonstrators (something Dalilov admits with pride).

Dalilov relates that, after he was captured, he was put into a small, homemade iron cell, denied food and water, beaten, cauterized, and tortured in other ways to get him to agree to publicly acknowledge that he used illegal methods in his interrogations of arrested Islamists (something that Dalilov claims he refused to do). A week into his captivity, Dalilov reported that Turajon-zade arrived with Muhammad-Sodiq, whom Dalilov knew because Muhammad-Sodiq had lived in Dalilov’s parents’ apartment during part of Muhammad-Sodiq’s residence in Bukhara while he taught at Mir-i Arab madrassa. Dalilov sweepingly asked that Muhammad-Sodiq secure his release. Dalilov reports that Muhammad-Sodiq responded: “... the punishment of people like you [those who abuse believers] historically was and will continue to be such as this. And when we win, those of your ilk will simply be hung or shot.” Despite these harsh words, Muhammad-Sodiq apparently pressed Turajon-zade to release Dalilov, who was given twenty-four hours to flee Tajikistan. Dalilov, who now lives in Bukhara, showed my local interlocutor his wounds as evidence of the torture that he received.

It is important that Muhammad-Sodiq’s actions and statements during the Tajik civil, not be taken out of context. His seeming support for the IRP should not be confused with an endorsement of the IMU. It was the attack on Tajikistan’s Islamic establishment, as represented by Akbar Turajon-zade, that made Muhammad-Sodiq believe that the use of force was likely justified as a defense of Islam, a defensive jihad. This was not a jihad that was effectively expansionist, such as the IMU’s call for the creation of an Islamic republic.

Much has been written about the participation of both Juma Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev in an Uzbekistan detachment in the army of the Tajik IRP. These troops were based largely upon the foundation of Adolat and Islam Adolati, but their numbers were augmented by other young Islamists.

Dowud-khon mentions being present at the time of Eid al-Qurban at a meeting organized by Umar-khon domulla at his mosque. The meeting included many prominent theologians of the Ferghana Valley, including the well-known Sufi leader, Odil-khon Andijani. The goals of the meeting were to collect money, food, and weapons for the Muslims of Tajikistan, and Odil-khon Andijani promised that he personally would raise five hundred mujahidin from among his students. This caused others to get up and promise that they, too, would raise fifty, one hundred, or more fighters from their students as well. The actual number of seminarians sent from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan is not documented, however, and the motives of the seminarians clearly varied.
TAHIR YULDASHEV, THE IMU, AND JIHAD, LATE 1990S TO 2001

From the mid-1990s until late 1999 or early 2000, radical Islam was either forced underground or driven out of Uzbekistan. The retreat of well-established radical groups in the Ferghana Valley created the vacuum in which Hizb ut-Tahrir was able to spread. The spread of Hizb ut-Tahrir (as well as the growing strength and international terrorist support for the IMU) led to the decision of the Uzbek government to reach out to so-called good Muslims—those elements of the suppressed religious establishment from the Ferghana Valley with whom the regime in Tashkent believed they could deal effectively. Thus, Muhammad-Sodiq was allowed to return and preach again in Tashkent and several prominent figures from the Ferghana Valley clerical establishment were allowed to return home from jail, some received shortened terms, and others simply did not receive new terms.

The ideology of the IMU evolved beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing through early 2001, but never at any time did it offer the kind of intellectual or doctrinal weight provided by clerics from the Ferghana Valley such as Obid-khon qori or Abduvali qori. The structure of the IMU was little suited to ideological innovation, and, despite Tahir Yuldashev’s theological pretensions, it was a group of fighters, not clerics. In Tajikistan, the ideology of the IMU was heavily influenced by the atmosphere of politicization of the late Soviet years and the first years of independence.

Although some of the IMU fighters attended madrassas in Pakistan in the mid-1990s, their understanding of jihad was still simplistic, a cross between jihad and Soviet guerilla-war handbooks. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the IMU started propagating lessons on jihad throughout the Ferghana Valley.

We were able to find two types of handwritten documents, a computer printout, and two audio-tapes containing only four of the lessons (starting approximately from the middle of the second lesson). Information we compiled indicates that there were up to ten of these types of lessons, which local informants argue were prepared by either Tahir Yuldashev or Juma Namangani. It is possible that both men had a hand in authoring them, with Juma Namangani writing the military lessons and Tahir Yuldashev the religious lessons. Regardless of the identity of the author, who is termed the “lecturer” in this analysis, there is little question that these lessons were distributed by the IMU and represent the group’s thinking.

The almost complete similarity of all versions available to us suggests that originally the lessons were distributed in the form of audiocassettes, in hand-written versions, and in a Microsoft Word Uzbek language variant. The diacritical markings help date the lessons as earlier than 1999.

The lectures contain many grammatical and stylistic errors, including slang, nonliterary neologisms borrowed predominantly from Russian slang, and phrases intelligible to only a limited circle of dedicated persons or members of the organization. It is possible that the speech was simplified and delivered in a colloquial manner to match the thoughts and low levels of education of the potential audience—probably not fully literate young people. It is also possible, however, that the author of the lessons was not able to produce a more polished piece. The language of the text on the audiocassettes is the spoken language of an Uzbek who grew up in the Ferghana Valley, and some from the Ferghana Valley who have listened to the tapes even claim that Juma Namangani himself is reading the lessons.
From the text it is evident that *dava*—involvement in the Islamic community of new people—does not necessarily embrace the propaganda of Islam or Islamic values. The lecturer understood this term in a new way, a way that is used by Islamic political parties in recent times. In fact, the lecturer uses *dava* to convey an even more political message. His use of the term refers to the first (almost the most basic) stage of jihad against the government. It is not by chance, therefore, that both concepts—politics and *dava*—are united in the same paragraph and explained together.

The propaganda is directed mainly at villagers. The lecturer explains this focus by stating that they are “distant from the luxurious life and the parasitism, and their hearts demand justice.” In addition, the lecturer knows the villagers are Muslims, but he considers them “only formally” as Muslims and intends to reeducate them in the spirit of “pure Islam.” Those who do not want to be reeducated are simply to be destroyed. The same lot awaits the “temporary allies”—Christians or Jews; after the victory of the mujahidin, they are also to be destroyed.

After winning authority (as the “champion of justice”) among the people, the author of the lessons thinks that the time will be ripe for more active action against the government. This fight assumes the continuation (and even the strengthening) of propaganda with active disinformation [information designed to deliberately mislead the population through the use of mobile radio stations, newspapers, and leaflets]. Such disinformation extends to terrorist acts against members of government and the planting of explosives at power stations and factories, among other targets. The lecturer does not hide the main purpose of similar diversions: to blow up the economy of the state and thereby exacerbate the worsening of the lives of the common people, thus causing their increased dissatisfaction with the state.

The text makes it possible to note the unique self-identification of the lecturer and his followers. From one side, it is noticeable that the members of IMU distinguish between themselves (they call themselves *oila* [family]) and other Muslims of the region; they separate themselves especially from people without political aspirations, and they include Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf among those without. The leaders of the IMU advocate this categorization and division of Muslims—they divide the community of believers into supporters of political Islam and opponents of political Islam—and they consider themselves to be Hanafi Muslims, not Salafi Muslims. In these lessons, however, unlike in some of their later writings, it is obvious that they have a clear grievance with the Hanafi school of law; thus, they present themselves as something of simplistic Salafis or, even better, school-free Muslims.

For example, while arguing that work among believers must be sensitive toward the school of law they embrace, the author of the text says: “Everything must be based only on the Quran and the hadiths. If everything is not explained by the Quran and the hadiths, then many will be lost and they can make many errors.” No guidance is provided, however, on the question of by whose authority the hadiths should be read or interpreted. Nevertheless, the writings on jihad do closely resemble those of Salafi advocates of jihad, for the Hanafi tradition is much more prudent with regard to its advocacy.

Overall, as the following lengthy excerpts show, the author of the text displays very little religious knowledge. He seeks to mimic the traditional style offered in religious commentary, but he makes absolutely no reference to the classic texts on jihad, which makes this Uzbek text a much more primitive example of jihadist literature than many contemporaneous Arab works.
Commentary: The sole purpose of Muslims is for Allah to be happy with us. This means to carry out all commands of Allah, to fight to make the word of Allah above all, so that everything is managed, as directs Islam, in order to realize the command of Allah throughout the whole world.

Idea: Any command except the commands of Allah is oppression, independent of its forms. We will fight until they disappear completely.

Slogan: It is necessary to build a political and military system that would never change so that would never come to agreement with the unbelievers, rejecting their political system, their culture, removing them from all posts of authority to establish only an Islamic order. This is our slogan: “There is no God, besides Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet.”

Commentary: There must be no exceptions! Be it the television, the radio, the market, even the church. Even if everything becomes expensive! The slogan must be realized, regardless of all else! All foreign connections are broken and constructed only based on the Islamic order. Will there be a bank? It will exist only in the order established by Islam. In the Islamic state there will not be any ministry of foreign affairs. Everything will be liquidated, including the establishment at the work sites of special organizations, which will have to be reared in the spirit of the truth faith and ideology.

Commentary: Many people understand Islam, but they do not understand the final goals. They do not understand that Islam—this is life, this is the thing (narsa)—revives man. They think that this is only one of the parts of their life and, following directions, they depart from life. There is no such nation as “infidel.” Allah created all his creatures so that they would worship him. The [unbelievers] we will call to accept Islam. If they do not accept, it is necessary to kill them, to convert them into slaves, to value them not more than cattle! Israelites, Christians, and Polytheists will all become things [for sale]. They will be divided [among the believers] as things. Man must have an understanding of the true. One ought not to treat them leniently, saying: “they [unbelievers] are indeed also people.” No, since they are untrue to Allah!

It is necessary to know accurately the regulations of Islam, what are its goals, what are the unbelievers preparing against Islam, or what they do in general? All this must be known. For this we need people with the correct interpretation of things. It is not necessary to know how to offer *ijtihad*.

As to the form of government:

In the country there must be one [supreme] amir, also in each city. There must be one amir for every five to ten people. They must be selected by a specific association, which can also replace them. However, the supreme amir cannot himself assign [junior] emirs to smaller cities, without their choice reflecting local will that are subordinate to the emir’s city.

Commentary: We cannot, for example, remove the amir of a group of ten people; this is unwise because we indeed do not know all the members of these ten and do not know how they have developed their relations between themselves and with others. Such willfulness can again revive the system of the unbelievers, that is, it could lead to a dictatorship, and then the joint association will disunite.

The text continues a few paragraphs later:

Election Conditions for Amirs

1. It is necessary to possess both religious and secular knowledge.

Commentary: Is not enough to be only a *qari*, a *sheikh ul-Islam*, or to have only a college education. In other words, being a religious person, one ought not to remain without
secular knowledge, while having mastered secular knowledge; one ought not to be in
ignorance of matters of faith. There are, for example, such theologians who say that nothing
special is happening even if the interests of Muslims are being hurt. They do not know
and do not understand about the events proceeding [in the world] and they know nothing
about the jihad. Let Allah show them mercy, who knew peace, got to know Allah! In other
words, he carried out the commands of Allah in this world. Many theologians, if you ask
from them a fatwa, give it, basing it on the positions of the times of Islamic caliphate.
[Others], being in the government of unbelievers, preach in the mosque, citing hadiths of
the Prophet’s envoy who indicated that he was ready to burn the houses of those who do not
go to the mosque. This proceeds from their ignorance.

2. [The amir] must be in Islam not less than ten years and serve Islam, possessing righteous
concepts.

**Commentary:** The period can be shorter—five to seven years. But he must conduct a
righteous life; he must be subject to tests after he entered Islam. He must improve with each
day. For if he is not improving, then the people surrounding him will not improve in the
knowledge or in matters. He must have the drive to master military knowledge.

For example, the knowledge of Abduhvali qori grew with each day, and he reached the
knowledge of questions of jihad. Fazil qori did not grow this far. The unbelievers love
such people who do not improve. Therefore [the amir] must be demanding of himself and
demanding of others.

3. [The amir] must be approximately thirty to forty years old.

**Commentary:** The fact is that [an amir] who is too young does not have an experience of
life although he can possess good knowledge.

Also, the Amir must know about the family status of his subordinates and monitor their
behavior, conversations, and manners.

4. In Sharia there exist other methods of checking people. It is necessary to use these
methods to test them. For example, we recognize Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf
to be a really faithful person. But if any good theologian meets with him and has academic
conversations with him, he can prove his [Muhammad-Sodiq’s] weakness of knowledge,
his adherence [to Hanafi mazhab], and so on. Thus, his knowledge is checked by true
knowledge. Indeed the envoy of Allah—peace to him!—said: “If someone is glad when they
oppress Muslims, he is a hypocrite.”

It is necessary for the theologians of our state to be respected people. They must
participate in the management of the state, even if with them (or between them) are small
disagreements on insignificant questions.

**Commentary:** These theologians cannot be removed from matters. However, in the
matter of propaganda, if one theologian will give a decision on a specific question, another
theologian must not contradict him. Disputes on small questions will cease. These questions
must be discussed only in the councils [of amirs] and be solved on the basis of Islamic laws.
And if these theologians will not remind all about [the laws] of the religion of Allah, then
we will not differ in any way from simple hooligans.

Theologians must be at their place, God gave knowledge to them, and it is necessary to use
this. In all mosques it is necessary to conduct propaganda from the point of view of the
Quran and Sunna. And from the parishioners, after thorough checking, some of them will
be selected for our association.

**Commentary:** The principle of our school lies in selecting from the simple workers
necessary people and joining them with us. As for how to check such a person—everything
depends on his individuality.
This lengthy excerpt from the IMU’s lessons gives clear evidence of group members’ relatively low level of religious learning. This same low level of learning is also found in the various movies that IMU members produced while living in camps in Afghanistan, when the movement had already integrated a clerical presence into its daily life. This clerical presence came from the madrassas, which were opened in the camps to train the fighters and their families.

The IMU fighters I interviewed did attest to the fact that the sermons in the films were characteristic of life in the camps in Afghanistan and that Tahir Yuldashev spent much time preaching. Here, much more explicitly than in the lessons on jihad, Tahir Yuldashev argues that he is a true Hanafi Muslim. He tries, however, to derive his legitimacy from the teachings of Abduhvali qori and Obid qori, neither of whom can be considered to be closely associated with Hanafi teachings.

Many of Tahir Yuldashev’s inspirational movies brought together film excerpts of sermons by Abduhvali qori and Obid qori with sermons by Tahir Yuldashev. In one of the films, the director used film overlay to merge the picture of Abduhvali qori into the picture of Tahir Yuldashev, as Tahir Yuldashev considers Abduhvali qori to be his spiritual inspiration.

Much like the notes on jihad, the sermons offered by Tahir Yuldashev (unlike the excerpts of sermons by Obid qori and Abduhvali qori) in the films I reviewed also are primitive in their treatment of religious themes.

For example, in excerpts from the movie Ular (Them), which is an attack on the Karimov government for its treatment of religious believers and its policies toward religion more generally, Tahir Yuldashev can be seen offering his defense of his decision to make hijra, to flee the land ruled by unbelievers:

They say that we used religion for the sake of our own interests. No, it is you who concealed your goals through religion! We are here [we emigrated to Afghanistan] because we want religion to rule over everything! [Voices of listeners: “Allah the great (akbar)!”] They are those who sell their religion and accuse us of using religion to cover our goals. No!! We have taken this path to make religion dominant in our souls and then in the whole world! Mushriklar (those who believe in many gods) and those faithless (kafirs) claim we came here to earn dollars. We are here to find paradise [in the future world]. [My Allah! Is there another way to find paradise?] We are here hoping our God will be content with us. And our salary cannot be measured with dollars!

Never will anybody sell a part of his or her body even for a lot of money. For example, you are told “give me your eyes. I will give you a million dollars for your eyes.” Will you give your eyes away? You are crazy! We are ready to sacrifice our lives for this $700, which you are talking about. The regime of this disloyal Karimov claims that we get $700 a month. Could anybody sacrifice his life for $700? No!! We won’t turn off this road until we are in paradise (voices of the listeners: “God Willing Insha’ Allah!”).

We will continue on this path because we took this road responding to the call of theologians, on the basis of Islamic theology, on the basis of our concepts, and on the basis of our belief. We did not choose this way blindfolded! These disloyal men say we are left homeless and hungry! No! Among us there are those who are rich and satisfied like Musaab ibn Umar. When he went along the streets of Mecca, all women on whom he cast a glance immediately fell in love with him. And, after he walked down a street, there would be a pleasant smell left for several days because he wore so much perfume. There were dozens of his slaves and servants around him. But then he got to know the true belief. The day
he was killed in battle in Badr by the mountain Ukhud, they could not find enough cloth to make a *kafn* for him. When people covered his head, his legs were seen. But if they covered his legs, his head was seen. So he was buried with his head covered with his own clothes. We have people like Musaab ibn Umar among us. They sacrificed all their property on their way to Allah. Oh, no! You faithless, remember we are not looking for dollars. We here are not looking for Russian rubles. We are not thinking how to take away the power from a faithless figure. We chose this way and devoted all our life to it because it is the way the Prophet, his faithful caliphs, and companions devoted their lives.

In fact, former IMU fighters whom I interviewed, and who had been in the camps in Afghanistan during 2000–2001, did confirm that they were promised $700–$1000 dollars a month (the sum varied) when they signed up to fight with the IMU, but all said that they never received the money (although former commanders with whom I met did say that Tahir Yuldashev was receiving grants for each fighter he recruited). The same fighters remarked about how Tahir Yuldashev loved giving sermons and having them filmed, hence the lengthy sermons that appear on the videotapes in my possession.

By 2001, the IMU leaders in general, and Tahir Yuldashev in particular, began to incorporate current global strains in jihad literature into their movement. We have found two examples of this.

The first is a film, *The Martyr Abu Dujon*, which was filmed to commemorate the life and death in Afghanistan of the first Uzbek *shahid* (martyr), a young man from Bukhara who accidentally stepped on a mine in the camp in which he was living, near Mazar-i Sharif.

The film closely resembles other accounts done in the Arab world, in which the life of a dead fighter is described in wholly spiritual terms. Abu Dujon (the pseudonym of this young man and also the name of one of the Prophet’s companions) was remembered by his colleagues as an unusually spiritual person who was full of premonitions of the meeting hour in heaven in the days before his death.

Although the film was an obvious reconstruction, edited and put together sometime after the subject’s death, Abu Dujon’s final hours—including the attempted surgery to repair his torn limbs—were videotaped. Someone in the camp was quick to respond to the media moment that his fatal accident provided.

The second example of these trends is a copy of a notebook with only the second half of a translation of Ibn al-Nahhas (who died in 1411), which we managed to procure in 2003. It is entitled *Marketplace Roads to the Struggling Points of Lovers, and the Inciter of Desire for the House of Peace* [Mashari` al-ashwaq ila masari` al-`ushshaq wa-muthir al-gharam ila Dar al-salam], a classic work on jihad; the text indicates that the translation was completed on March 26, 2001, in Mazar-i Sharif.

It is a fair assumption that the first half of this vast book also was translated, but it is less certain whether the translation was ever published by the IMU, as we have never encountered a published version of it. Given the way we obtained this material, it is likely that the author returned to Uzbekistan and was either arrested or received amnesty. Either way, the notebook seems to have come into the hands of the local authorities.

We were able to identify the text with the help of Professor David Cook, of Rice University, who offers the following explanation of the importance of this text:
There is a rich heritage of jihad literature in Islam. Starting from the comparatively small (pamphlet-size) work of Abdallah b. al-Mubarak (died 797), *Kitab al-jihad*, it includes at least several hundred works describing the manner in which jihad should be fought, the spiritual benefits of the fighter, and the rewards due to him in heaven. Frequently this type of literature will contain inspirational stories from the time of the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate companions, from the great Islamic conquests (634–732), and from the continual warfare that occurred along the borders with the Byzantine Empire, the Turks, and other groups.

Of these works, that of Ahmad b. Ibrahim b. Muhammad al-Dimashqi al-Dumyati, usually known as Ibn al-Nahhas (died 1411), entitled *Mashari` al-ashwaq ila masari` al-`ushshaq wa-muthir al-gharam ila Dar al-salam*, or *Market-place Roads to the Struggling-points of Lovers, and the Inciter of Desire for the House of Peace* (as is common with classical Arabic texts, the title is rhymed and gives little indication of what the true content of the book is) stands out. We know little about the life of the author, only that he was in Syria between 1388 and 1400, and he left at the time of Timur's attack on Damascus in 1400, at a time when Syria was still recovering from the two-centuries-long war with the Crusaders (expelled in 1291) and the conflict with the Mongol Il-Khan rulers of Iraq and Persia. He went to the port city of Dumyat (Damietta) in Egypt where he died during a Crusader raid in 1411.

Ibn al-Nahhas was a product of this milieu and felt keenly that jihad against the infidels was an important component of Muslim life. Ibn al-Nahhas was identified as having been both a Hanafi and then a Shafi‘i, indicating that he switched *madhhab* (the Muslim schools of law).

In many ways Ibn al-Nahhas was the culmination of the seven centuries of jihad writing that preceded him. His book is easily divided into thirty-three different parts, with a two-part finale that is something of a summary of the total, together with an abstract of the different strategies and tactics available for the mujahid.

The text that has been gathered from Uzbekistan starts on page 727 of the printed edition and thus about 40 percent of the text is extant, from the middle of the twenty-eighth part. The first part of the published book progresses predictably from chapters on the necessity of jihad, to the merit of jihad, to encouraging jihad, joining it early and making haste to be a part of it, dealing with specific traditions—the "going out and coming in" tradition, the "dust on the feet" tradition—to the merit of sea fighting, to spending money on jihad, equipping a fighter, and helping him.

Then the text continues speaking of the auxiliaries of warfare: the merit of horses, those that take care of horses, before switching back to discussing the actions of a guard (*murabit*) and his spiritual merit, the merits of guarding, and the merit of fearing God. Then specific tactics are described: the line [Quran 61:4], casting projectiles at the enemy, the merit of swords, the merit of being wounded, the merit of killing an infidel, and the merit of a single courageous man or a small group attacking a larger infidel one. Then the sin of one who flees from the battlefield [Quran 8:16] is described, together with the fact that the reward of jihad will not be realized until the fighter’s intentions are pure. Next there is the assurance that one who goes out with the intention of fighting and dies before he reaches the battlefield is indeed a martyr, and a section encouraging the Muslim to ask for martyrdom in his prayers (28). The last sections, extant in the Uzbek translation, deal with the rewards of a martyr in heaven, the forbidding of illegal pillaging after battle (a severe problem in premodern armies), redemption of the Muslim prisoners from the enemy, a semihistorical account of the Prophet Muhammad’s battles, and a section on the praise of courage and the condemnation of cowardice.
There are good reasons for contemporary radical Muslims to translate Ibn al-Nahhas. As the latter writes in his introduction to the *Mashari*, he wrote the book because jihad had died out during his time—a considerable exaggeration—and he wanted to gather all of the laws and ordinances of jihad together so that fighters could be encouraged by them. This is precisely how contemporary radical Muslims feel about the status of jihad during the present time. So, although this is a classical book, it has a good deal of power to speak to the right audiences.

In translating this text, Uzbek radical Muslims have antecedents among other radical Muslims. For the past decade there have been periodic citations of *Mashari* by radical Muslims; for example, the web site dedicated to the memory and legacy of ’Abdallah ’Azzam (assassinated 1989), the mentor of Osama bin Laden and the exemplar for global radical Muslim movements, has a link to the full Arabic text of the book. This link was to the site of aloswa.org (taking its name from Quran 60:4, which is one of the most polarizing texts used by radical Muslims) and is no longer extant. We find, however, that the radical Islamic news site azzam.com translated a section of the *Mashari* into English as “An Advice [sic!] to Those Who Abstain from Fighting in the Cause of Allah” (ten pages) at azzam/html/articlesabstain.htm (accessed 11/30/01).

**CONCLUSION**

Throughout Central Asia’s history, decisive events have triggered a regrouping of forces within the Islamic community. The Russian conquest was one; the Bolshevik Revolution another; and Stalin’s purges in the 1930s yet another. In this paper we have seen how events in contemporary history have also played their roles.

The stagnation of the late Brezhnev period served as a catalyst for the development of a new vitality among Central Asia’s religious leaders and a new daring on the part of their most prominent pupils.

That young generation—some of whom were taught by the clerics described in this paper, others influenced by the continued popularity of these clerics’ teachings—continue to play a role in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan. Although a younger generation of clerics has emerged—some in the younger generation are discussed in a forthcoming paper that looks more closely at the teachings and role of Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf—none of these men has been able to eclipse either Muhammad-Yusuf or the posthumous influence of Abduhvali qori.

Tensions today are relatively unchanged since the late 1980s and the key questions are still the same. How can the community of believers (and the clerics who seek to direct that community) make the state more responsive to the teachings of Islam? How should the community of believers treat a state that is both largely unresponsive and is run almost entirely by those who reject the teachings of Islam?

Those clerics whose views are shaped by the main body of Hanafi legal interpretation tend to be most accommodating toward the regime, but even Hanafi clerics (like Muhammad-Sodiq and those shaped by his teachings) seek ways to reinterpret the dominant Hanafi literature (sometimes through the use of less conformist Hanafi authors) so that it increases their ability to engage in independent political action. Thus, their attitude toward the relationship of the state to religion is often much closer to Salafi thinkers than to their own Hanafi brothers. The question of the relationship between
Islamic believers and the state is a critical one; depending on how it is resolved, it either encourages, permits, or discourages the use of violence in the name of Islam.

In the mid-1990s, during the Tajik civil war, the majority of the most prominent Uzbek religious thinkers were willing to condone (and even encourage) the use of violence against those forces in Tajikistan seeking to defeat the fighters of the IRP. The attitude of these clerics toward the use of force in Uzbekistan proper was far more ambiguous, and no cleric cited in this paper—I don’t consider Tahir Yuldashev a cleric—ever openly called for the use of force in Uzbekistan, although many took up arms in the name of the teachings of Abduhvali qori, in particular.

Since September 11, 2001, the situation has grown even more complicated, and the impact of events in Afghanistan and the Middle East since September 11 on the development of radical, or neo-Islamic, trends in Uzbekistan and Central Asian Islam is a separate problem for analysis. An elaboration of these trends clearly shows their roots to be in the periods described in this paper.
From the time of his hajj in 1929, Hindustani was well versed in the doctrinal divisions that separated Wahhabis from those who accepted the traditional Islamic schools of jurisprudence. In the 1950s, he complained of the Wahhabi tendency to ghayr-i din and kafir were, however, not dissimilar from the Hanafi rulers.

Both Rahmatullah-alloma and Abduhvali qori lived in Kokand and studied with both Hakimjon qori and Hindustani, and each of these men went on to form his own bujra (Abduhvali qori’s was in Andijan) in which dozens of men from throughout Uzbekistan, and even other parts of Central Asia, were trained.

Some students of Hindustani maintain that these answers were to letters of complaint sent to Hindustani by former pupils of the late Rahmatullah-alloma.

From the time of his hajj in 1929, Hindustani was well versed in the doctrinal divisions that separated Wahhabis from those who accepted the traditional Islamic schools of jurisprudence. In the 1950s, he complained of the Wahhabi tendency to ghayr-i din and kafir were, however, not dissimilar from the Hanafi interpretations of several questions of ritual and doctrine.

I argue this because I am acquainted with someone who had some responsibility for keeping track of Islamic activists for the Uzbek KGB in the late Soviet period, and this person was well aware of the activities of Hakimjon qori, Rahmatullah-alloma, and Abduhvali but knew little about Hindustani and showed no concern about him or in identifying his pupils.

I tried to meet Hindustani on two separate occasions in the mid-1980s, but the head of the section of the Institute of Oriental Studies in which he worked was not willing to arrange such a meeting, arguing that it would not be in Hindustani’s interest. Quite likely part of Hindustani’s agreement with the local authorities was that he would not have contact with foreigners, and all Soviet citizens were supposed to report all contacts with foreigners to state security during those years.
I do know that Abduhvali did meet with the same KGB specialist referred to in the earlier note, but this does not mean that he was a KGB collaborator.

Here, literally, “recite dua-yi bad” [anathema].

This is the only time in this essay that Hindustani uses the second person plural (shumo), often used in Tajik to refer to two or more people, to address his opponents.


Sayyid Qutb’s commentary translates as “In the Shadow of the Quran,” and Abduhvali titled his “In the Shadow of the Shadow.”

Through 1991, SADUM supervised religious activities in all five Central Asian republics.

Umar-khon domulla was born in Namangan in 1950 and finished eight grades of education; he claimed he was always more interested in religious education than secular training.

Zokirjon domla had served for a while as imam of the mosque in his native northeastern district of Tashkent (Chuqursay), but he left the post after a fight with Shamsuddin Khan Babakhan. His theological position had always been critical of both the SADUM clerics as well as their opponents. He maintained his religious school, which usually comprised about ten students, by also using the students to staff a workshop that made traditional caps (tilpak).

This meeting, as well as Karimov’s December 1991 visit to Namangan, is worth studying in order to understand the evolution of Islam Karimov’s policies toward Islam and the different forces that acted upon him.

This quote comes from an interview of my Uzbek interlocutor with Umar-khon domulla and was substantiated as basically accurate by Muhammad-Sodiq. These interviews were held in 2004 in Tashkent and in Namangan.

My Uzbek interlocutor was able to interview Umar-khon domulla after his release from prison.

Adolat was formed in 1988 to help protect local merchants and traders from local racketeers; it modeled itself on the old drenzniki, the voluntary public order squad. By 1990 the group had come under the strong influence of Tahir Yuldashev, and by 1991 it had transformed itself into Islam Adolati or Islam Lashkarlar (fighters).

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My Uzbek interlocutor met with Umar-khon domulla at his home two days after his release from prison and noted that Umar-khon domulla was quite fat and his hands were soft. He showed no signs of physical labor, giving some substance to the charges that he expropriated large amounts of money while he served in his official position because obtaining a soft berth in jail is very costly.

Rahimjon Akramov was born in 1942 in Namangan and graduated from the Pedagogical Institute in Tashkent. He worked as a history teacher and then served as deputy and finally as director of a local school. In 1989 he was appointed to the Namangan oblast department on religious cults attached to the Oblast Executive Committee, and he then moved to the Namangan hokimiyat in 1991.

Because Obid-khon qori is still in exile, we have not been able to corroborate his version of the discussion that he witnessed.

My Uzbek interlocutor held a series of interviews with Burgutali Rafikov, the hakim of Namangan, in 1994, the year before his death.

These officials included Rahimjon Akramov, who provided an independent corroboration of these events.

Material on Abdulahad Barnayev was provided to my Uzbek interlocutor by Abdulahad’s sister.

Eyewitnesses told us about the financial support.

I ran into a group of young Islam Adolati supporters, including quite probably Juma Namangani, during my visit with Dowud-khon in 1992.

Interview with my Uzbek interlocutor, 2004.

Timur actually died in 1405, before Hoja Akhrar was born.

In 1993 Namangani went to study in the madrassa of Sayyid Abdullo Nuri, on the advice of Abduhvali.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), a radical Islamic political movement that advocates the practice of pure Islamic doctrine and the establishment of a borderless, Islamic caliphate throughout Central Asia and the entire Muslim world.
The work was conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

These materials were collected by my Uzbek interlocutor and analyzed by us together.

*Ijtihad* is a theologian’s study of various questions on which he delivers verdicts. It is considered that with the addition of *mashabs* “the door of *ijtihad* were shut” and it is possible to deliver verdicts on small questions. However, some theologians of the present consider that it is necessary again “to open the doors of *ijtihad*” in order to reexamine the positions of Islam from the point of view of the contemporary situation.

Fazil qori Sodiqov was imam of the Yangi mosque in Tashkent until February 1999; he then went on to chair the Committee on Religious Cults with the Council of Ministers of the republic of Uzbekistan.

This is a reference to Karimov, who mentioned in one of his interviews that members of the military opposition fight not on religious grounds but rather because they get paid $700 a month.

Yuldashev is confusing the two different battles. The Badr battle was in the year 624. The Ukhud battle, when Musaab ibn Umar was killed, was in 625.

*Kafn* is a white cloth in which the deceased are wrapped.

This is a famous story from the early Muslim *agiographia*: On his way to Allah, Musaab ibn Umar gave his treasures to Muslims and became a martyr, finding the treasures of a different world.

Both Professor David Cook of Rice University, who viewed the film in its entirety with me, and Hussain Haqqani of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who saw excerpts of the film, concur.

The film also might have been a wholly fictitious representation of Abu Dujon. A former IMU fighter who knew him from the camps described him as a cutup and not at all spiritual.

David Cook, unpublished manuscript.
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