

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR PEACE

U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION DURING AND AFTER BUSH

PRESENTER:

THOMAS CAROTHERS,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT VICE PRESIDENT

DISCUSSANTS:

VIN WEBER, CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, AUTHOR,
“THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN”

MODERATOR:

JENNIFER WINDSOR
FREEDOM HOUSE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

SEPTEMBER 12, 2007

12:00 – 2:00 P.M.

*Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.*

JENNIFER WINDSOR: Can everybody hear me? Welcome. If I could ask people to take their seats. I know the food here at Carnegie is good, but what we really are coming for is to be enlightened once again by Tom Carothers and a number of distinguished discussants. For those of you who don't know me, my name is Jennifer Windsor, and I am the executive director of Freedom House. I am going to be a moderator here today, so we can maximize the time for all of you to be able to have a discussion about some of the issues that Tom will pose for us today.

I have the opportunity to introduce Tom Carothers, but you don't really have to introduce Tom Carothers. He has once again written about the challenges and the future challenges for protecting the continuation of the promotion of democracy and also, advice on how to increase the effectiveness of those future efforts that I think are very, very important issues, and we need to have an honest and open debate about it here in Washington, as well as in many places around the world.

As I look through his report that we're talking about here, again, I'm reminded how difficult he makes it for the rest of us who try to write and speak about democracy promotion. His ability to articulate clearly and concisely, and I would say eloquently, the complex swirling debates and discussions that go on is really unparalleled. He will start out with an opening summary of the main points of his paper, so those of you who have not actually read his paper, but simply carried it around in the hopes that you would have read it, can actually opine on what he said.

Next, we will hear from two distinguished discussants: Vin Weber and Frank Fukuyama. Again, I think neither needs much introduction. Vin Weber is now known perhaps best as the chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy. I recognize Carl Gershman here today, which has, as you know, been around for 20 years with the purpose of strengthening democratic institutions around the world.

He actually is the only person here today, as far as I can tell, that actually has been a participant in the democratic process, actually running for Congress successfully and as a congressman from the great state of Minnesota. And he has been around the policy community for a long time, as a clear voice for, and advocate for, democracy, whether it was the Project for the New American Century. He also serves on the board of the Council on Foreign Relations and chaired a special initiative by the council to look at Arab efforts to promote democracy. So, Vin will—

VIN WEBER: With Secretary Albright

MS. WINDSOR: Yes, with Secretary Albright. Thank you.

MR. WEBER: She shouldn't get second bill (?). (Laughter.)

MS. WINDSOR: I don't think she ever has, so sorry if I did that. And then, Frank Fukuyama, who also, again, needs no introduction, the man who first told us that it was

“The End of History,” but now he’s one of the few people in Washington that’s actually able to say that perhaps he misjudged it or maybe he was just misunderstood.

But really, Frank Fukuyama has been an incredibly passionate advocate and analytic voice on democracy, where it should go in the future, and where it can go, and just most recently, put out a really terrific paper with Mike McFaul and produced by the Stanley Foundation I think on the future of democracy promotion. So he is in fact actually a neo-con in the best sense of the word, so those of you might know him in that regard. But he’s always asked the tough questions and been willing to actually put himself on the line in terms of coming up with answers to those questions, which, as we know, is sometimes the most difficult. So with that, I turn it over to Tom.

THOMAS CAROTHERS: Thank you very much, Jennifer and thanks to all of you for coming. And thanks in advance to Vin and Frank for joining me today; I really appreciate it. I was very struck the last week by the turnout for this event, and very struck that you all came today in the midst of a busy week with many other affairs on Washington’s plate. The big turnout is an indication, I think, that many people in Washington, and elsewhere in the United States, are very concerned about U.S. democracy promotion, and also that many people in Washington and the United States care a lot about democracy promotion.

This decade has been an extremely difficult one for democracy promotion. It’s been difficult because of some of the things that the U.S. government has done, which I will talk about. It’s also been difficult because some of the changed conditions on the international scene that have occurred quite apart from U.S. policy.

Many people around the world, and also in this country, feel that the United States has lost its way on democracy promotion. And there is emerging in the U.S. policy community, a desire to think about and find a way forward, a better way forward. And there is a sense that this search for a way forward obviously correlates very much with the emergent presidential campaign, and as the debate over competing visions of the future of American foreign policy are put before the American public, the role of democracy promotion in that debate is likely to be quite important.

I would like to address that question today, that is, the question of, what is a better way forward for the United States on democracy promotion? Now, when one looks forward, it’s always necessary to make sure you know where you’re starting from, and so I’d like to start with a very brief overview of where I think we are now by turning my attention first to three questions: What role has democracy promotion in fact played in Bush foreign policy? To what extent is that role something different from the past? And what have been the effects of Bush policies relating to democracy promotion?

Let’s turn first to the question of the role of democracy promotion in Bush foreign policy. Debates over this question in Washington tend to lurch between two extremes: Some people hold that democracy promotion has been, as Michael Mandelbaum recently wrote in “Foreign Affairs,” the central priority of President Bush’s foreign policy. Others take the opposite view. They believe that the Bush Administration has really not taken the subject seriously and that behind the rhetoric is very little at all.

I think the truth lies very much in between these two extremes, but it's a very complicated middle, and one that's hard to characterize very precisely. Nevertheless, to offer a general characterization, I would say that what we see is a foreign policy characterized by unusually extravagant pro-democracy rhetoric as an umbrella over a series of security-and-economic-oriented policies that are quite realist in nature. Yet, at the same time, some real attention to democracy issues in many parts of the world, alongside, sometimes on the margins of or around, the security-and-economic-oriented policies and some real pro-democracy diplomacy and democracy assistance, is part of that attention to democracy.

And then we also have the unique or singular case of Iraq, which resists categorization as either a realist or an idealist policy. Let's go through this in a bit more detail. The leading edge of Bush policy on democracy promotion has of course been the intervention in Iraq. It is what President Bush talks about again and again as the major example of what the United States is doing to advance freedom in the world. Yet there is simply no consensus in the U.S. body politic or here in the Washington policy community about the actual role that democracy promotion has played either in the motivations that led the United States to intervene in Iraq, or in the behavior of the United States in Iraq since it intervened.

And it is quite difficult to arrive at such a consensus about how serious the Bush administration has been about democracy in Iraq because the Bush team itself has not offered either very much clarity or unity on this front. We have the unusual situation of a president who appears to care passionately about the cause of democracy in Iraq; he gives every indication of doing so; yet for more than three years after the initial intervention, he was loyally supported by the secretary of defense who neither intellectually nor pragmatically ever appeared to engage seriously in the question of what the democratic transformation of Iraq would require or entail.

In the rest of the Middle East, the Bush administration has made something of a push for democracy. Starting in 2003, it did assert a new line with various components. There was some democratic, pro-democratic jaw-boning of Arab leaders. There was an important and valuable new aid program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative that was established and continues, I believe the director of it or the person who oversees it, Scott Carpenter, is here today.

There was an effort to try to create economic incentives for Arab reformers. There were some new regional diplomatic mechanisms designed to support democracy and so forth. From the start, however, this pro-democratic push in the Middle East proceeded from a divided soul. Despite this felt imperative, that pushing for greater inclusion and competition in the Arab world will be good for the United States, at the same time, the United States was constrained by the need to continue close relationships with Arab autocrats in most parts of the region for both economic and security reasons, and there was the underlying fear that rapid democratic change might bring to power anti-western Islamists who would be harmful to U.S. security interests.

The democracy drive never really overcame these countervailing interests. And in the past two years, it has faded as U.S. security concerns with respect to Iraq have led the

United States to rekindle and to tighten its alliance with Arab autocrats. The recently announced arms deal for Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region dwarfs the various modest measures to support political, social, and economic reform in the region as a statement of U.S. intentions and priorities in the region. The fear of Islamist gains came back in force in 2005 and early 2006 after the elections in Egypt, Palestine, earlier in Lebanon, and we are now back, in my view, largely, to a policy of supporting Arab autocratic stability.

In the rest of the world, the Bush administration has continued the pattern, which developed in the 1980s and 1990s of attempting to support democratic transitions in many places around the world through modest, but not insignificant, pro-democracy diplomacy and democracy assistance. Sometimes, this has been towards dictatorial regimes, such as in Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe, in recent years, and sometimes in countries struggling with transitions like Ukraine, Liberia, Nepal, Peru, and so forth. And the Bush administration has added, I think, an innovative and valuable new policy tool, which is the Millennium Challenge Corporation, primarily designed to promote economic growth in the world, but having a serious pro-democracy component through the incentive methods that it uses.

Nevertheless, despite this pro-democratic content of the Bush policy, the main lines of Bush policy, in most of the world, are largely realist. The U.S. relationship with its two main strategic challengers, Russia and China, is largely a realist relationship in which the pursuit of important economic and security interest is primary and concerns about the democratic slippage and deficits in those two countries is largely put at the margins of the policy.

In addition, the high price of oil and gas, a much higher price in recent years of oil and gas, has reinforced the long-standing American tendency to be differential to oil-rich autocrats. And the discovery of oil in many other parts of the world in recent years has only increased this tendency so that no longer is the United States merely holding hands with repressive regimes in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf but now in a large swath of the world that starts in Central Asia, goes through the Persian Gulf, and reaches the significant areas of Africa as well.

And third, the war on terrorism, although portrayed to the world as a global freedom agenda, has entailed an imperative of close cooperation with many non-democratic governments in Middle East, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. The embrace of Pakistan's military government over the last five to six years is a key policy element of the war on terrorism and a key contradiction to the global freedom agenda.

Let's turn now to the question of continuity and discontinuity. A striking and somewhat puzzling feature of the Bush approach is the apparent belief among members of the Bush team that their attention to democracy promotion is something new. They sometimes talk and act as though they have discovered this field. Now, in fact, as I don't need to tell this group, they haven't. Democracy promotion has been a substantial concern in the 1980s and '90s. Although I would also say I made the same charge about the Clinton people in the 1990s, and I was struck by how many of them, in the 1990s, serving in the State Department and USAID and elsewhere, also seemed to think they had discovered this

field. So I think this is a bit of a tendency of people who arrive in government and get excited about a new priority.

But in the case of the Bush administration, the basic configuration of the Bush approach, the overarching rhetoric, the semi-realist policy with main lines of realist concern with some democracy sprinkled in around the edges and trying to force its way into the intricacies of policy, is really very familiar in the Reagan administration, Bush I, and Clinton. There is a significant degree of continuity in terms of the basic place of democracy promotion in U.S. policy.

Why then do they tend to think that it's new? I think the belief that they're in uncharted territory is driven by two things, first, the fact that democracy promotion is now attached to the war on terrorism. This is a different driver for democracy promotion in U.S. policy, one that did not exist in the 1980s and 1990s. And the intensity and urgency of the felt need to combat the threat of radical Islamist terrorism infuses some people with a sense of discovery about democracy promotion on a level of intensity that's something different in some ways.

In addition, the Bush push on democracy in the Middle East, to the extent that it did exist, and it did, was also new. No previous administration tried to take on the challenge of promoting real political change in the Middle East, so that there were significant new elements here: the new driver, the push in the Middle East, and holding out to the world year after year a case of U.S. military intervention as the leading example of U.S. democracy promotion.

What is unfortunate, I think, is that these three distinctive elements, the three things that make Bush democracy-promotion policies different from those of its predecessors – the attachment to the war on terrorism, the push on the Middle East, and the use of military intervention as the main case – are all things that the world finds either unsuccessful, objectionable, or even worse. And so, what is distinctive about the Bush administration's approach is what the world sees as most objectionable.

What then about the effects? Now, there's always a tendency to overestimate the effects of U.S. democracy-promotion efforts. And again, in a similar session we had here at Carnegie seven years ago assessing the Clinton record on democracy promotion, I was fairly tough on Harold Koh at the time and Elliott Abrams, who was the commentator then, quite agreed with me – (laughter) – he might less so today – that the Clinton people were taking too much credit for some of the democratic trends of the 1990s.

In the case of the Bush administration, the sense of falling short is so acute because the expectations were so high. Just as Iraq has become, incorrectly and almost tragically, a short-hand for many people in the world about U.S. foreign policy in this decade, so too the falling short on the political transformation of Iraq has become, for many people in the world, a short-hand for assessing U.S. democracy promotion in this decade.

Expectations were high not just for Iraq but for the whole of the Middle East. It was just two years ago, two-and-a-half years ago, that some people, serious people in

Washington, were talking about a Baghdad spring, looking at the events in various countries in the Arab world and pointing to what they hoped was the democratic wave.

In fact, there has been very little democratic progress in the Middle East, to put it mildly. The U.S. push for democracy in the region has run up against the reality of entrenched semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes whom we need and whom we're close to, and against the profound unpopularity of the administration in the region and the rejection of its message. Yes, there has been some stirring up of democratic thinking about political reform and political change in the region, and the administration gets some credit for this, but it is difficult, if not impossible, today, to point to an Arab country and say that it is on a fundamentally different and more democratic political trajectory than six years ago.

In the rest of the world, the United States has made some positive contributions to democracy in quite a few places. These are the small, but not insignificant, kinds or forms of progress, that don't make the newspaper, that are hard to point to as any singular policy success: supporting civil society, fortifying some governmental reform processes, helping some elections hold together, and so forth. And one can find them, but they are not major gains. And when we look at the world, we do not see an advance of democracy in this decade. Freedom House surveys indicate a rather flat pattern over the last 10 years.

Now, we could point to the color revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, and certainly there was some credit taking that went on in Washington for those positive events. But U.S. policy, although helpful, particularly in Ukraine I would say, was not the driver of these events, and the U.S. policy in the earlier part of this decade was to a large extent an extension of U.S. democracy-promotion efforts that were established in those countries in the early 1990s.

Unfortunately, the sharpest effects of Bush democracy-promotion policies have not been on democracy in the world, but democracy promotion itself. Bush policy has done serious damage to the legitimacy of democracy promotion in the eyes of the world and the U.S. public. The constant identification of democracy promotion with the war on Iraq, a war on terrorism that seems to involve and does involve serious abuses by the United States of the rule of law, and U.S. security-oriented regime-change policies in a number of countries, as well as an enormous gap between rhetoric and reality, has contaminated the whole domain.

Now, many people I think, particularly in this room, are aware of this damage, but I don't think the full extent of it is really grasped and it's hard to, if you spend most of your time in Washington, as most of us do. But if you doubt it, I would propose a simple test. I think if you, any of us, went to a majority, a vast majority, of countries in the world, and were asked to give a talk entitled, "How the United States Promotes Democracy in the World," before a foreign audience, made up of some spectrum of people within that country, not grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy – (laughter) – or of USAID or the State Department, but some spectrum of people in that country, try that out. I've done it. It's not easy these days. You're not simply met with skepticism and suspicion; you are met with anger, bitter laughter, and contempt.

Let's turn now to the way forward. As debates emerge about the future of U.S. democracy promotion, they're taking the familiar form of debates about realism versus idealism – should the United States be more realistic, should it be more idealistic, and so forth. I don't think this is a useful framework, though I know it's almost embedded in our genes here in the Washington policy community to argue back and forth along this imagined spectrum. The United States is not going to embrace a substantially more idealist position with respect to democracy promotion in the world in the next five to 10 years. It has too many substantial realist interests in Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, and so forth that it is not going to turn its back on. It's that simple.

At the same time, the United States is also not going to turn its back on democracy promotion in some kind of stern realist realignment. Democracy promotion isn't as institutionalized within the U.S. policy bureaucracy, and I mean that in good ways. And democracy does correlate with U.S. economic and security interests in enough places that even stern realism has to take account of the necessity of attention to this topic.

So I think the argument should not be about realism versus idealism, but how to do this work more intelligently and more effectively. And in this regard, I would highlight and advance for you three concepts. The first is decontamination. Now, I know that's a harsh word, and various people have said to me, oh, Tom, that's a little bit beyond the pale. But I think it's necessary to crystallize our thinking about the damage that has been done and what is necessary to do to reach the point where in 10 years some of us could go abroad and give a talk called, "How the United States Promotes Democracy," and we would be met with interest and even respect from influential foreign audiences. Why does that seem like such a difficult goal?

By decontamination I mean several things: First, I mean ending the close association that exists in the world's mind between U.S. democracy promotion and U.S. military intervention and regime change. The Iraq intervention will likely continue for some time to come, and I leave it to the really startling number of military experts in Washington to come up with the answer for what lies ahead of us in Iraq. (Laughter.)

But whatever the path in Iraq, the next president must stop holding out the Iraq intervention as the leading example of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the world. It would also be useful to say that this was an unusual case, that by democracy promotion, the United States does not basically mean overthrowing other governments by military force or even by other means.

The next administration should also stop using democracy promotion as a way to describe regime-change policies. Now, this is a complicated area conceptually because when the United States or other countries press dictators to make positive changes, whether it's in Belarus, or Zimbabwe, or Burma, or elsewhere, that could be called a form of regime-change policy. We are trying to help effect changes in those regimes.

But when the United States seeks to solve certain security problems, whether in Iran, Palestine, Syria, or elsewhere, by quieter or noisier policies of trying to force governments out of power, and calling this democracy promotion, and using some of the tools of

democracy promotion like special funds for democracy promotion, it does considerable damage to the field.

Another part of decontamination is reducing the abuses of the rule of law in the war on terrorism. The United States cannot be an effective promoter of democracy if it is seen in the world as abusing the rights of others in the name of the war on terrorism. Every democracy faces terrible tensions between maintaining human rights, civil rights, and legal rights, and fighting terrorism. But we can do better. The United States can fight terrorism without being known around the world for secret prisons, ghost prisoners, forcible rendition to torture-practicing foreign intelligence agencies, and many other regrettable things.

The Bush administration's failure to draw the connection between its practices on the rule of law and its desire to be a global promoter of democracy is genuinely mystifying to me. This has to change if the United States is to regain credibility.

Another part of decontamination is reducing the glaring inconsistency of U.S. democracy policies. Inconsistency is a fact of life, given the diversity of U.S. interest, but there is a level of inconsistency beyond which you simply lose audience in the world, and we're at that point.

To reduce this strong sense of U.S. hypocrisy, we need to start by toning down the rhetoric, but then showing beyond that a willingness to push on at least a couple of helpful autocrats and show that we're serious about the need for a possibility of democratic change.

We are not suddenly going to turn our back on the Saudi regime, or the Kuwaiti, or many others, but if we can show in a few countries where we do have real influence and where democracy really is at issue today that we are serious about this subject, we will begin to gain back some credibility. I happened to have in mind Pakistan and Egypt, and would be happy in the question and answer session to talk about it. Those are countries where we have influence, where democracy is very much at issue, and where in fact I believe democratic change would be good for U.S. economic and security interests over the long term.

Now, in general, with decontamination, there's no one action that will do it. There's no sharp turn in the road. Instead, there's a slow healing process, step by step, small steps leading to bigger steps. But if we begin to reduce the association of democracy promotion with military intervention, if we begin to improve U.S. practices on the rule of law, begin to reduce the inconsistency, the world will begin to listen to us again.

The second concept I wish to highlight going forward is repositioning democracy promotion in the war on terrorism. The Bush administration has put democracy promotion as a rhetorical centerpiece in the war on terrorism. It has done so both because it is very attracted to the idea intellectually, that promoting democracy is a way of undercutting political radicalism that can lead to terrorism. It has also done so because it sees it as a better way to package and sell the war on terrorism. And if you look at the preparations for the second inaugural address, what people are saying about that speech now, you'll see there was a concern about how do we put forward the war on terrorism in a positive rather than what seems to be to some people in the world, a scary way.

It's a very appealing idea that democracy promotion is the central long-term solution to the threat of terrorism coming from political radicals around the world, but I believe trying to make this the centerpiece, either intellectually or practically, the policy is the wrong way to think about the struggle against terrorism and the wrong way to think about democracy promotion. The cause, the causes of terrorism in the world cannot be boiled down to the lack of democracy; it's simply too complicated for that. And we can go further into that subject if you want; there's been some interesting writing about that in the last several years.

And furthermore, the solution to terrorism is not necessarily democracy promotion. Again, it's simply more complicated than that. Ask the British government how it is dealing with the problem of domestic Muslim radicals. Its anti-terrorist policies are taking place in the framework of a democracy, but its anti-terrorist policy is not about democracy promotion. The same is true if you talk to the Indonesian government and its struggle with Muslim radicals, or the Philippine government, or the Thai government, or many others.

This does not mean that democracy promotion is irrelevant to the war on terrorism and can never be helpful. It is generally good in the Middle East if we are able to promote more inclusive pluralistic politics. It will be good I think for the region and for this problem of political radicalism over time. But there is no straight line between democracy and anti-terrorism in the way in which it's being presented, and the association of democracy promotion with the War on Terrorism has been very harmful, and it's confusing us and thinking about renovating the war on terrorism by a bit of transfixion with the idea that democracy promotion is the central long-term key.

Third concept I put forward is recalibration. Now, it's a more general concept, and you could say that everything I've been talking about up to now is a form of recalibration. But what I'm talking about is something a bit broader; let me describe it. The intense concentration in these last few years on the problems of the Bush administration with respect to democracy promotion have obscured the fact that with or without the Bush administration, even with or without the United States in a certain sense, this would have been a tough decade for democracy promotion.

Larger trends in the world, that have very little to do with the United States, at least some of them, have changed the positive climate of the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s for global democracy. There is a slowing down of the third wave. It is reaching natural limits of what occurs after a large political expansion in the world. There is a tendency towards regrouping in a number of countries as citizens confront the weaknesses of democracy in their countries and the dissatisfactions that they have with it.

The success of some un-democratic countries like, especially, Russia and China, are giving rise to an alternative model of, quote, "authoritarian capitalism" that is certainly attractive to power holders in a number of countries and in some cases publics. The rise in the price of oil and gas does benefit many non-democratic governments and has been a tremendous boon to the non-democratic governments in the world and so forth.

Democracy promotion generally, not just from the United States, is only starting to shift gears and I think we are now operating in a fundamentally less-favorable context than we were 10, 15, 20, and 25 years ago. There is no one thing that can be done with democracy promotion; there is no magic bullet that will readjust us to this context, but we need to recognize it, recognize the basic features of this new framework, and begin to act accordingly.

In my report, I suggest several ways of thinking about this, and I'll just mention them very briefly here. We need to respond to the sense of disappointment about democracy that has occurred in many parts of the world. We can do that in different ways. One way, I think, is to start to look for ways to draw a more direct connection between democracy promotion and good socioeconomic performance of struggling democracies. There's a lot to talk about this and there's a new conversation starting to occur in Washington about that, and I think we're just at the start of something that could be good.

We need to respond to the rise of rivals by making clear to the world that democracy promotion is not primarily a U.S. endeavor, but an act of broad consensus on the part of many actors, and we need to look to increase the number of partnerships in U.S. democracy promotion.

The establishment of the U.N. Democracy Fund is very good. It's a very positive step in this regard. And the fact that India and Japan are the two biggest contributors to that fund next to the United States say something about the possibility of a different and broader consensus on democracy promotion. We need to follow that line in our thinking and get away from the lone eagle circling the tyranny-infested desert in the world, and realize that we are working side-by-side with international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other governments as one of many partners in a broad democratic consensus and coalition.

And finally, we could do more with respect to energy policy. Again, the disconnection here between energy policy and our ambitions to be a global democracy promoter is, again, something on the part of the Bush administration that mystifies me. The high price of oil and gas, as I mentioned, is a fundamental boon to non-democratic states, and unless we draw this line and begin to take energy policy seriously as part of our politically transformative ways of thinking about the world, we are not going to make much progress. This has to do both with the possibility of lowering the price of oil and gas through lower global consumption as well as lowering U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources.

And finally with respect to recalibration, I leave it to the end, since I don't have that much time left, what I know will stir people up the most here, which is talking about the specific sources of funding of U.S. democracy assistance in Washington, since that affects so many of us in our day-to-day lives. Despite 25 years of activity and work in this field, the U.S. government is still surprisingly unsettled about how it thinks it should and wants to fund democracy assistance. The basic institutional arrangements for democracy aid are still evolving and still in a sort of state of unsettled change.

Now, I believe that diversity of sources is good. I do not believe there should be a centralized source of democracy-assistance funding. I think that would be a mistake along many dimensions. Nevertheless, there does need to be a clarification of roles. And the tendency of this administration has been to try to move democracy aid under or into the State Department. I don't agree with that tendency. I think it sends the wrong message to the world about the relationship between U.S. security policies and how democracy promotion is sometimes used or misused as a cover for other policies. And I also think that at heart the State Department is not an organization well-designed for handling aid, even though there have been valiant efforts on that part in recent years.

The State Department does have a major, in fact fundamental, role in policy development, policy coordination, and diplomacy, and interagency process, and other things on democracy promotion, but I believe democracy aid should largely, not exclusively, but largely, come from a combination of a U.S. development agency. I leave its name unspecified because I think USAID needs such a fundamental transformation that we need to think aggressively in the next few years about a fundamental transformation of the U.S. development agency, as well as potentially more funds to the National Endowment for Democracy, and that this balance between a development agency, and a more independent and more political, in some ways, democracy promotion organization, is basically the right balance to pursue.

In conclusion, democracy promotion is troubled, but not doomed. But it's not going to fix itself. We have to diagnose its ills carefully and we have to develop plans for a corrective path. That is true whether the next administration is Republican or Democratic.

I have offered here a diagnosis and a few suggested elements of a remedy, and I'm sure what I have said is fully open to questioning and criticism, and I look forward to such a process here today and forthwith. But what I'm really trying to do here, above all, in this report and in this session and elsewhere, is not to provide definitive answers and diagnoses, but to rouse our energy and attention to the task. The fact that you are all here today means, I think, that you share this concern and desire to move forward more positively. I'm glad for that and hope that we can all view it as a collective effort and purpose. Thank you. (Applause.)

MS. WINDSOR: Thank you, Tom. Vin, do you want to speak?

VIN WEBER: All right. Well, thank you very much. First of all, Jennifer, thank you for the nice introduction. When you introduced Frank as the neo-con in the best sense of the word, I'm glad you didn't say, and Vin's a neo-con in the worst sense of the word. (Laughter.) But it's nice to be here. Tom, thanks for your comments. I also want to say I'm glad to see so many people from the NED world here, including my friend, colleague, and mentor, Carl Gershman, as well as I see Ken Wollack from NDI. I didn't see Lorne Craner, but I think I did see Georges Fauriol from IRI somewhere in the room today. A lot of other NED people. Welcome, welcome all.

Well, I read Tom's report a couple of times actually, but I didn't have to read it twice to come to at least one immediate and, I'm afraid, Tom, fairly harshly negative conclusion, and that is that you are not going to make the cut for the first director of the George W.

Bush Presidential Library. (Laughter.) Unless they name the foreign policy section of it the decontamination ward, which I doubt, but, beyond that, I want to begin by saying, although I have, as I mentioned, Tom, before I got here, the rhetoric that he uses is not to my liking.

Really, I read the report a couple of times and if I was to say something on balance, I would say, on balance, I share most of his conclusions. Some specifics I disagree with rather strongly, but, on balance, there's a lot to agree with there. It was my privilege to introduce the president at the 20th anniversary of the NED, when he made his first major pro-democracy speech, and I remember very well, as I'm sure a lot of people in this room do, the tremendous excitement, across party lines, across ideological lines in the pro-democracy community, for what the president said that day. Tom Lantos came up to me after the speech and said he was going to put the speech in the congressional record, an historic speech, and things like that. And a lot of us were very excited. So how did we get from that point to the point today that Tom gives us a fairly negative assessment and a lot of other people give us a fairly negative assessment?

I'm not – as I said, I don't dispute a lot of the things, or the underlying themes that Tom talked about, and I'm going to talk about some areas of agreement. But I do disagree with the sort of bottom line negative assessment about this administration's impact on democracy promotion around the world. I think that even this administration is going to be known eventually as having moved us to a higher level in terms of democracy promotion at, admittedly, a very, very difficult time in American history.

But let's talk about some of the areas we agree on. First of all, I think it's important to understand. Tom talks about, this tension between idealism and realism, but also points out that every administration ultimately pursues a degree of real politik. The people in this room, and I count myself as one of them, have the mission in life of making sure they don't pursue that too aggressively, to the exclusion of ideals and to the exclusion of our basic values. But we've not had, and we're not likely to have, an administration that pursues a purely idealistic foreign policy, and this administration is no exception to that.

What Tom seems to be more concerned about, as I read through his report, more than anything, is the soaring rhetoric, the grandiose rhetoric, as he talks about, that the president has used, and then finds out of course at odds with the practice of foreign policy, which is much more, quote, "realistic." Let me say a word on behalf of grandiose rhetoric for a minute. I'm not in favor of hypocrisy any more than anybody else, but I was inspired by the president's words.

I can sort of imagine my friend Tom being around with the Founding Fathers and saying, that's a pretty good document, but let's cut that stuff out about all men are created equal. You know, it's really at odds with that real politik you're practicing down in the South. Let's get it out there; it's only going to encourage cynicism and things like that.

I think people are inspired by words. And I think it's quite appropriate and fair for us, for Tom, to point out when the words fall short of reality. But in the long term, words inspire future generations to follow their ideals.

So I'm a defender of the president's rhetoric. I want to see us come as close as we can to meeting that. I don't like charges of hypocrisy, but I want the next generation of political leaders to also try to inspire us and future generations to pursue democracy around the world. If I have a concern about rhetoric, it's concern that the rhetoric in favor of democracy has been toned down too much by the next generation of presidential candidates in both political parties.

I've watched all the debates in both political parties; I have not heard a lot of talk about democracy. I've been involved in a lot of private discussions. I hear a little cynicism by people in both political parties about promoting democracy. Excuse me as between a president who reaches too far rhetorically and national leaders who are afraid to try to inspire us to pursue democracy, I'll take the excessive rhetoric of this president, and I think that that's an important thing for us to think about. But we don't disagree on the notion that there's always a tension and that this group of people and others should be trying to reduce the distance between the rhetoric and the practice.

Second, I do agree with him strongly that democracy was not invented by the Bush administration. Our friend, Secretary Albright, likes to tell the story that when she and the other secretaries of State were invited in by this president to meet with him to discuss things, which I wish he's done more often, to be candid, she said to him, walking out, Mr. President, one of the things I have argued with you about is that you seem to give the impression that you created democracy, when in truth, I created democracy. (Laughter.)

And I think that makes an important point. Every administration, as Tom points out, maybe with a little exception of this president's father, has done – has moved the ball forward, if you will, in different ways consistent with the different values that the parties bring to the White House, but it is – we ought to as a group, in my judgment, be looking for ways to establish continuity with the positive things this administration has done rather than trying to look for ways of breaking with this administration as we go forward, because I think that there are, there has been a lot of institution building that can be helpful going forward, regardless of which party wins.

Third, just to state the obvious, I agree it's tough sledding for democracy right now. We talk about that a lot – a lot of places that are backsliding; the biggest ones: Russia, China, some parts of South and Central America. The only point I would make is, I have a hard time connecting those biggest examples of democratic backsliding with anything at all to do with this administration.

You know, there was an announcement on the news this morning that Putin announced that they have exploded the largest conventional bomb in existence in Russia, 40 times larger than the MOAB or something like that. That is no more connected to the Bush administration's policies than is his tightening of the authoritarian grip on Russia.

It's deeply rooted in the historical experience of Russia and the disillusionment of that country after the fall of the Soviet empire. Do we like it? No. Do I think that the administration should do more? I do. I think they should be more forthcoming in criticizing what's going on in Russia. But it's hard to say that these biggest examples of

backsliding, in my judgment, are related to anything that this administration has done; we're living through a tough period and we need to figure out together how to address that.

Finally, in terms of agreement, and this is an area where I know some of my friends in the administration would not agree with me, I do understand that the Iraq invasion has really hurt America's image around the world. And I think that that's a problem. And I very much agree with Tom that in the promotion of democracy, we need to separate the idea of promoting democracy from the idea of armed invasion. I am a supporter of the invasion of Iraq but not because of promoting democracy.

On the other hand, I am glad that once we had removed a dictator we thought was a threat to us that we did not try to install a military dictatorship or a shah, but we tried to build a democratic government in that country and that we continue to try to build that. That is not the same, in my judgment, as saying that this should stand out as the primary reason for the invasion. I didn't believe that; I don't believe that. But it's quite different than saying that we're going to put strong men in power as we might have done in the past.

This administration has done many things that I think we will want to pursue and deepen and broaden in the next administration. I'm not going to go through the list, all of them can be criticized as having fallen short of the mark, but all of them are moving the promotion of democracy forward, the Millennium Challenge Account that Tom mentioned, MEPI – and Scott Carpenter is here today – other things that are not directly U.S.-government related, but the U.N. Democracy Fund, the communities of democracies. Around the world, we find NGO's like the NED emerging all over the world. We have dozens of them. Carl could tell you exactly how many, but Taiwan and Japan. There is more NGO activity in promoting democracy today than there has ever been in the past.

That's not this administration's direct result – a direct result of their democracy promotion, but certainly, the administration has encouraged the promotion of democracy in a way that has helped spawn a lot of these activities. And that, again, going forward – because that's what we're talking about here today – we want to strengthen, deepen, and broaden, and not simply reject in a reaction against the Bush administration.

Finally, and then I'll sit down, I could have gone right to Tom's last point and we could have gone right to an area of greater agreement because on the way in which we fund democracy assistance around the world, it should come as no surprise to you that I, as chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, fundamentally agree with Tom.

I don't think that it should be done primarily through the State Department. Carl is laughing; he agrees too. I don't think it should be done primarily through the State Department or AID. I think the model that we have, that's pursued by the core-affiliated agencies of the NED, is the right way to promote democracy. I do think, as we move forward – and it seems now that we have an administration that has been supportive of NED funding; we now have a Democratic Congress that we hope and think is going to be supportive as well.

It's reasonable to talk about a ramping up of funding for the NED going forward, even more than we have over the last few years. We do think that we need to talk about

limitations of that for precisely the reason that Tom cited the NED, as a good example, of how we should be promoting democracy. We need to promote democracy, as he indicated, with the greatest possible distance from the formal foreign policy apparatus of the U.S. government.

It seems to me that, at some point, if you expand the size of the NED, the bureaucracy of the NED, the visibility of the NED, you get to a point where you start working against that fundamental strength of the NED because a great, big, large, bureaucratized, multinational organization is going to have a hard time claiming that it is not a part of the U.S. government. But having said that, we agree on the way in which democracy promotion should go forward, and that's an important part of the dialogue. I look forward to discussing it further. Thank you.

(Applause.)

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA: Well, thank you. Jennifer mentioned that Mike McFaul and I had done a report on the same subject, on the future of U.S. democracy promotion for the Stanley Foundation. And it actually tracks a lot of what Tom said in his report, so I'm going to be a little bit more supportive of Tom's point of view overall.

I think it's worthwhile to begin by reflecting a little bit about why it is that American presidents and leaders refer to democracy, the global struggle for democracy, so frequently. I think it's an element of what Marty Lipset called American exceptionalism because other democracies do not take democracy promotion nearly as seriously as part of their national identity.

But I think it's generally been the case, not just recently, but over the decades or generations, that Americans find it very hard to justify international involvement, particularly if it's costly or entangling in realist terms. And therefore, in the political rhetoric, American leaders, to generate support for a strong internationalist policy, fall back on moral reasons for doing things.

And you see this over and over again: Roosevelt's use of the four freedoms in bringing the United States into World War II, the democracy rhetoric surrounding the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, in Bush "41," if you remember, in the first Gulf war, there was an attempt to justify the intervention in strategic terms, and that was met by charges of "no blood for oil," and then it was the older Bush that began talking about Saddam Hussein as another Hitler, and, again, making this moral justification.

And in each case, it's been a very powerful way of motivating the American public and Congress to support costly foreign involvements, and I think that's exactly the same way that the Bush administration got into the particular rhetoric that it did.

Actually, democracy promotion was the third of three, and the least important of the three major motives, the others being WMD and terrorism, on which it justified the Iraq intervention. But after the legs of the first two were shot out from under the arguments, they redoubled it; that has been characteristic over time with this administration and loaded

everything up on this one rhetorical platform as the grounds for justifying the project as a whole.

And I think Tom is actually quite right when he talks about the devastating effect that this has had that although, substantively, democracy promotion without question is good for the United States, this instrumentalization of democracy promotion as an instrument of American national security policy is not good for American foreign policy and I don't believe it is good for democracy promotion. It makes us look inevitably hypocritical because, as he said, we have other strategic interests other than these idealistic ones, and it loads up pro-democracy people around the world with this association with an extremely unpopular policy.

It is a little bit hard, I mean, in listening to Vin, you know, if you say, well concretely where – the world was going to hell anyhow – and concretely where has this association really hurt us? It's hard to point to concrete cases.

And this is why I think the people in favor of torture inside the administration have always won those arguments because if one guy gets out of Guantanamo and shows up in a suicide bombing somewhere else in the world, they say, a-ha, that's really bad; that hurt our interests. Whereas, what's balanced against that on the intangible side is really the image of the United States that other people have and the degree to which it's an inspiration.

And you inspire people by lofty rhetoric; but I think you also inspire people by the kind of image that they have in their minds about what kind of a society you represent. And I just think there's absolutely no question that Tom is right, that that's taken an enormous hit over the last few years.

And so, I do think that you do have to engage in this long-term process of disconnecting the American foreign policy from this longstanding interest in the idealistic agenda. And as people know, if you've ever had to get rid of asbestos or lead in a house, it's much easier to contaminate that it is to decontaminate; and it's something that is going to take a fairly long time to do.

I'm actually not sure that maintaining – I mean, there's no question that there's going to be this backlash against democracy promotion. Tom, I think, cites one of several polls that show that among Democrats, democracy promotion, if you ask them – do you support democracy promotion – the number's fallen from like 70 to 30 percent over the last several years.

I wouldn't put too much stake in that though, because I just think Iraq has completely distorted everything. You get all these red-state Americans that are basically Jacksonian nationalists that have bought into this freedom agenda; and then you get all of these Democrats that were supporting humanitarian intervention in Africa in the 1990s, you know, are probably some of those that said that they don't support democracy promotion now. And my sense is that this is all going to disappear once Iraq is off the table as a major issue and everybody's going to go back to their natural political positions.

And in fact, if you look at the actual support for democracy promotion programs in Congress, I don't really see any evidence of a serious erosion of support in either party – it was Senator Kennedy that stuck funding for NDI and IRI in Iraq back into some other spending bill as an earmark. And so, I just think that this issue is one in which, you know because it reflects basic American values to such an extent, I just don't see it as having been politicized.

I just want to say, I guess, since everybody agrees with this general view of Tom's in terms of the bureaucracy that the organizational counterpart to this separation of democracy promotion from American foreign policy is a good thing; it needs to be embedded organizationally in a separation of the organizations that do development and democracy promotion from the State Department; I think we're all agreed on that.

I would say it's broader than that; I think that the reason we support development in general, including economic development as well as political development, is partly that it's a good thing to do in itself, but also it builds the reputation of goodwill for the United States. But, in this paradox, it's much more effective in building goodwill if you do not slap a Made in USA sticker on everything you do in either the economic or the political realm. And so I think to the extent that you can separate the two of those, the better.

And I, you know, McFaul and I recommended a new cabinet-level agency or department of development to handle both the economic and political sides. I don't think this has a snowball's chance in hell of ever being accepted by anybody, but I think that's the theoretical outcome of our – you know, if you take seriously that separation, I think that's what you are driven to.

But the last issue I wanted to touch on was one that Tom mentioned, which has to do with substantively, what is it the political agenda that Democrats around the world need to focus on in this period of backlash against democracy promotion in general? And I think that if you do not engage in a more serious effort to re-look at social policy, it is going to be very tough for our friends around the world to hang on.

And I think one of the problems is that we like listening to ourselves but we've gotten, as Americans, very bad at actually listening to what people around the world want. And if I look around the world today and I look at all the anti-Democrats: Ahmadinejad in Iran, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Hamas, Hezbollah; all of these organizations derive a tremendous amount of their political support not from their anti-Americanism or nuclear weapons or anything having to do with foreign policy; they derive that support because they administer to the bottom half of the socioeconomic spectrum and they have social policies that appeal directly to poor people.

And I think, quite honestly, if you think of who NED grantees are or AID rule-of-law people or any of the clients that people in this room serve, they tend to be more educated, middle-class people that are interested in procedural democracy; but they have not had an agenda that appeals strongly to poor people. And I just think that in this era where, in many countries, the principle of democracy has been established and now it's really a contest for power; the people that are most deeply concerned with democracy are going to lose those contests unless they have something a little bit better to offer.

I'll just give you one example of where I think this can work very powerfully. Ernesto Zedillo, when he was president of Mexico as the head of the PRI, initiated a conditional cash transfer program called Progresa that gave direct benefits to poor people if they were pregnant mothers, if they got prenatal care, and if they had young children, if they put them into school. It was designed by Santiago Levy, an economist with double-blind testing features built in. And there's a lot of econometric studies that have shown that this has been an extremely well-designed social program.

Very popular in Mexico, it was expanded as Oportunidades under Vicente Fox. It now reaches a tremendous number; and the Mexican rate of poverty over this period has fallen in half. I am told that there is some significant part of Felipe Calderon's vote that came not from his traditional middle-class constituents in Northern Mexico, but a certain important number among poor people in Mexico. If you remember, he won that election over Lopez Obrador by something like 250,000 votes and he, I suspect, got probably a few million votes as a result of his support for this program.

And so, I just think that we have after a generation of fighting back social programs in the United States under the rubric of the Washington consensus broadly in international development policy, I just think that politically, we've got to rethink this a little bit. It is possible, and it is in fact necessary to have well-designed social policy because, you know, people have to get educated and you've got to take care of their healthcare; and if we only focus on judicial rights, human rights, voting, access to media, I mean, that's a perfectly legitimate agenda; but I just fear that we're going to lose the political battle that we're all engaged in. Thank you.

(Applause.)

MS. WINDSOR: Thank you to all of our speakers for staying within their time limit. I didn't even have to appear to be a tough moderator. We will now open it up for questions and again I reiterate that I actually am a tough moderator. So, if you go on and on and make a statement as opposed to a question, then I will rudely cut you off, because the idea is here to get as much of a dialogue as possible. The people that are standing in the back, actually you might want to come up and through here and sit down; there's a bunch of chairs up here in the front. And I promise I won't call on you unless you want me to.

So, okay. Questions? Comments? Yes, please identify yourself. Yes, Carl.

And wait for the microphone, which is now –

Q: Thanks very much. This is kind of a conversation within the family, but the way that the conversation has been posed, I think, has a tendency to distort the nature of the issue and the work that we do. It's posed; as you know, how should the United States promote democracy? And it becomes a debate about ourselves and our foreign policy. And I understand that; that's perfectly appropriate. But Tom, you know, when you were trying to broaden it out, you said we should think of this more as a partnership and to make it multilateral. And so, you said the U.N. democracy fund is great and other countries joining in is great.

But there is a part of this partnership, which is just left out in the way that we pose the question; and that's – you know – the people who are in the struggle for democracy. It's almost like, it's all about what we do for them; they're not actors in this. And Tom, I know you didn't mean it this way, but you were even a little bit contemptuous of them when you talked about going out into the big world.

And you know we're not talking to NED grantees; we're talking to a larger majority – the suggestion being that the kind people that we work with are somehow unrepresentative of their societies, when in fact – and I think Amartya Sen has talked in this way more clearly than others – I mean democracy is wanted by these people; they don't want it because we want it for them, that we make them democratic because of our policy. We're responding to some demand, some need on the ground, and they want this for the reasons Sen has talked about – its protective function. You know, you're not going to get good social policies if you don't have a democratic system where people can demand that and there's pressure on the government, or human rights, or corruption, or famine, and all those reasons; and I just think we're leaving the people out of this equation, which is quite ironic.

MS. WINDSOR: Let's see, yes, right here. On the aisle, yes.

Q: Thank you, Tom Carothers, for a very provocative and interesting presentation, as always.

MS. WINDSOR: You're going to introduce yourself.

Q: I'm sorry. Christina Cerna, with the Organization of American States, but I'm speaking in my personal capacity.

I've been listening to Tom for decades now and I'm always challenged and interested by what he says. But I always feel that there's one element left out, and the language even of human rights is not included in his analysis.

It seems to me that it was only the Carter administration that really made human rights the soul of our policy and that with Reagan, democracy promotion became the new language of our interaction with the rest of the world. And I almost wonder if the invasion of Iraq was really the problem, and if it wasn't much more Abu Ghirab and Guantanamo.

We invaded Panama and took out Noriega, and although there was some criticism of that in some elements, Panama has become, if you will, a democratic government since then. And I'm wondering if, unless we adopt more strongly the whole package of human rights, of involvement in international institutions, and adherence to human rights norms, aggressively defending human rights, if we will ever get this decontamination that you talked about.

MS. WINDSOR: Great. Yes, here in the middle. And then I'm going to let Tom and others respond.

Q: Howard Wiarda from CSIS and author of too many books on this theme.

I think we're missing something here in Tom's presentation, and I'd really like to direct my question at Vin in his former capacity as Congressman rather than as chairman of the boards post-Congress. And that is, I think we make a mistake if we separate realism from idealism, as Tom did, or advocate that democracy promotion ought to be separated from American policy. That seems, to me, a very academic position; I don't know if that will work in the United States Congress or in the political arena, because if we think of the most successful of the democracy promotion efforts, they all involved realist conceptions of foreign policy.

I'm thinking of Central America in the 1980s, for example, where we were faced with a choice between a guerilla triumph on the one hand and military dictatorship on the other, neither of which was successful from the point of view of American foreign policy. And when we promoted democracy in Guatemala and El Salvador, we ended up with a more or less middle-of-the-road, centrist, effective government that could not only improve human rights and democracy in those countries, but also resolve this terrible dilemma for American foreign policy, which is that we could not be seen as supporting either the guerillas or a military dictatorship.

So, democracy promotion, frankly, saved our skin in terms of policy in El Salvador, which I think then was already in Congress at those times; and the same thing with the Soviet Union. When Mr. Reagan talked about democracy promotion, part of his advocacy was aimed at undermining Soviet legitimacy, which over a period of years had some considerable effect. That is, when Mr. Reagan and Mr. Carter talked about human rights in the Soviet Union, they were really talking about the absence of human rights in the Soviet Union and over a period of time, that undermined legitimacy in the area.

And the other big success, of course, is Eastern Europe, where United States' strategic and realistic interests coincided with our promotion of democracy and human rights. So then –

MS. WINDSOR: Okay. The question – I'm just trying to move us along here. So is the question sort of the realism vs. the idealism? I'm sorry, but I'm trying to get everybody here.

Q: No, no I understand and I'm done.

MS. WINDSOR: Great. Tom?

MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you. Carl, I mean, I'm sorry; I wasn't intending to be contemptuous towards NED grantees. What I meant was – no, I wasn't – if you go to Egypt and you hold a meeting with NED grantees, I suspect they really appreciate what NED has done for them genuinely and for good reasons. But it's precisely because what Vin was talking about; some elements of U.S. democracy promotion are somewhat separate from the U.S. sort of security policies in the region and people are happy to be part of it and appreciate it.

But if you talk to a larger audience in Egypt about, do they want the United States promoting democracy in their country, you'd get a negative reaction. And those grantees do,

in a sense, probably represent the aspirations and strivings of an important part of Egyptian society, but there's something wrong when NED grantees get colored by the fact that they have to deal with this other sentiment. And when they tell people, well, we're getting money from the United States, actually it's a good thing. But they have to be part of a broader framework where people say, are you therefore the agents of U.S. foreign policy and so forth? I think that's what I was trying to express, maybe not very artfully.

Christina, I guess I keep leaving out human rights because I'm afraid if I put it in, you'll stop coming to the events. (Laughter.) So – I don't think it's the first time you've said this.

But seriously, I think I leave it out because I believe it's implicit. I guess I've believed in and tried to write a bit about and work for a synthesis of these two things over the last 20 years. And if I leave it out explicitly, it's because I believe it's there implicitly, and maybe I need to learn to change that so that audiences hear that message. But I really believe that basic political and civil rights are a fundamental part of democracy and that in promoting democracy in a thoughtful and deep way, you have to give significant attention to them.

I mean, you posed an interesting question, I mean, which is tempting to think about is what really is it about the intervention in Iraq that bothers people so much? When you say, maybe it was really the abuses of the people in the detention camps and so forth, and not the invasion itself – I don't think that's the case. I mean, I think the intervention itself really bothered people a lot for a couple of different reasons.

It was different from Panama or Haiti or Grenada, the three other times in which in the last 20 years the United States has invaded and overthrown a government in another country. First, because it was not in the, quote, "U.S. backyard." Now, those who are in the U.S. backyard don't accept the conception of a U.S. backyard for good reasons. But, a lot of the rest of the world has gotten kind of used to it to some extent and cares a bit less, to be honest, about that.

Secondly, Iraq's a lot bigger in several senses. It has other interests in which the world could be a lot more skeptical about what U.S. intentions were. It's hard to invade Haiti and be accused of going after oil, national wealth, whatever. Most people weren't sort of scratching their head, you know, sort of why do you care so much exactly, whereas in Iraq they spent all their time debating about what was the real U.S. interest; they're still debating.

I mean I gave a talk in Budapest a couple of years ago – no, it was actually the month after the intervention – and the talk was entitled, why is the United States in Iraq today? And I was trying to explain what led to the intervention, partly to try to work it out for myself. And I gave this talk to this audience, about this size, mostly Europeans, and I tried to argue that it wasn't about oil. That was kind of my basic thesis was that it actually wasn't mostly about oil or even very much at all about oil. And I laid out a series of, I must say, very articulate reasons. (Laughter.) And I finished the talk and I went out afterward to a café with a head of a department there at the university and he says, that was such a fascinating talk, such a subtle analysis, he goes, I really appreciated it. But it was really about oil, wasn't it? (Laughter.) And that's actually still the view of a lot of people in the world.

MS. WINDSOR: Vin, do you want to address the – (inaudible).

VIN WEBER: Sure, I think Howard's point is right when we talk about the American promotion of democracy around the world, remember that Congress has a shorter attention span than most people in this room probably do. You have people in Congress who – there are some leaders there – who, of course, have a very long view, who understand the history of democracy promotion, who have a rather nuanced understanding of its place in U.S. foreign policy. But most members of Congress are there thinking about short-term problems. And I don't count this as a negative, by the way. I think Howard made a point that, you know, the promotion of democracy in Central America may have been a short-term tactic, if not strategy, on the part of many in the Congress who supported it. But it, you know, served the purpose properly. I don't think you're ever going to get away from that.

We, right now, could probably get most anything we wanted out of the Congress to promote democracy in Iran, because they see this as a huge, intractable problem; people are desperate that we're going to end up bombing Iran or at war with Iran or that they'll invade Iraq. What's the alternative to that? Well, the best of alternatives available to policymakers is to find some way of promoting democracy, so that we can see real change within Iran. And that is tactical; it is short-term; but I don't think you're going to get away from it.

And I think El Salvador was a pretty good example. I remember going down – some of you remember – when Duarte was president there was an off-year election in which the ARENA party was expected to win. They made very strong gains.

And I went down there to observe the election with a small group of people. And we met with the ARENA party people and I said, what is this election all about? And the ARENA party people told me, this election is about stopping communism. And we went and met with the Christian Democrats, the Duarte people, and I said, what is this election about? They said, this election is about stopping right-wing death squads and terrorism. And I went to the first polling place in some little village in El Salvador and group of women were in this sort of a square and I asked them, only ones who could answer, what is this election about? And they talked among themselves and the leader said to me, we think this election is about a new sewer. (Laughter.)

So, it says a lot to me about – the point I make is, our promotion of democracy may have been about stopping communism, but it ended up helping that woman get her sewer. So, I think sometimes the means do justify the ends.

MS. WINDSOR: I want to take the prerogative of the chair just to maybe pick up a point that Christina said. I actually do believe that despite Tom's, Mort Halperin's, and other sorts of viewpoints about the centrality of human rights in the democracy promotion concept, that that actually hasn't been implemented very well in practice. Not the NED, which I do think has always looked at human rights defenders, as well as sort of broader democracy promotion; but actually I believe in USAID.

And I say that as somebody that worked in USAID for nine years because I think the politics of the fact that the U.S. human rights groups wanted to stay as far away as possible

from democracy promotion when it started and even during the Clinton administration when there was attempts to bring them in.

I think that in the USAID construct of what makes for good democracy promotion, there was not enough attention, and there still is not enough attention, on the role of human rights defenders, which I take as, you know, in a very broad sense, in terms of not only human rights groups, but journalists, lawyers, others that actually really promote human rights.

Freedom House – this seems sort of biased, because Freedom House does do this kind of work, though not exclusively – but I am actually just struck, again and again, when we've had USAID missions that actually have wanted to do human rights defender work, they kind of lose interest because it's not change-oriented enough. And what it does, I think, is just as dramatically deteriorate and sort of affect the credibility of new democratic leaders as not delivering on social gains because if you've got a democratic government that's systematically abusing human rights, and continues to say that they're democracies, it's going to erode their legitimacy.

So I do think it's something that's extremely important. DRL, of course, and the State Department are trying to position themselves as the human rights defender support unit but they're very – you know, it goes back to sort of delineating roles – they're very interested only in short-term support. And they're also, I think, getting increasingly interested in branding, which I think is actually counterproductive, particularly to working with human rights defenders.

Yes, I'll take a couple more – Jack, on this side.

Q: Thank you. Jack Goldstone, George Mason University.

Certainly, a lot of what you've talked about, in terms of U.S. democracy promotion, has to do with policy orientation. But you haven't talked much about money. And I'd like to hear both from Tom and from Vin, his congressional experience.

The United States, as you probably know, spends a very small amount, or budgets a very small amount, for non-military intervention democracy promotion. It's less than \$2 billion a year, which is about 10 percent of what Caltrans spends on highway construction and maintenance in a given year in California. And yet, USAID is asked to help transform governments around the world.

Do you think the amount of money spent on democracy promotion is appropriate because it's inherently just a relatively low-cost catalytic enterprise? Or do you think it's an enterprise that is substantially under-funded, and do you think funding might be increased if State Department is more active. And is that a good tradeoff, or is it better to go with smaller funds and maintain a kind of hands-off distance from State Department or foreign policy establishment?

MS. WINDSOR: Great, Ken. You had your hand up. Right next to – right there.

Q: Ken Wollack, with NDI. Tom, you made a rather bold assertion – which you said, that over the past decade that there has not been one Arab country that has been on a positive democratic trajectory. Just to defend a few places, albeit on the periphery of the Middle East, but I would like your assessment of Mauritania, Morocco, and Yemen in this regard.

MS. WINDSOR: Someone on this side, I feel like I – in the back? I don't want to be accused of only going to the right here.

Q: Joel Barkin (ph), former democracy governance advisor for USAID in Eastern and Southern Africa, and a former NED grantee.

I actually agree with Tom; in fact, I would argue that he's not only spot-on, but the situation is perhaps worse than he described in two respects that were not dwelled on. First of all, that the entire democratization effort is fundamentally an internally driven process, and I think we lose sight of that, and the fact that those of us engaged in democracy promotion, at best, operate on the margins as facilitators. Carl mentioned the partners. Indeed, the partners must be there, but we have to work with the partners on their terms. And in terms of where the interventions occur, in terms of building different types of institutions, the time varies from one country to the next.

Second, where we have been successful, and countries have become more democratic in part through our efforts, we've had a tendency under this administration to then tell these countries what to do, and I'm referring specifically to the rejection of the ICC treaty, unless there's the bilateral agreement under Article 98, passage of local patriot laws, and the like. And there's a great resentment on this, and it produces the exact reaction that Tom mentioned – I think your words were anger, contempt, and bitter laughter.

MS. WINDSOR: Okay, Tom. And actually, if I could add on to the Morocco, the status of democracy, just by pushing you a little bit on what you think the future of democracy funding and attention to the Middle East should be, and particularly since there are members of Congress here. And the whole fate of MEPI, I think, is actually frankly in jeopardy, given the political climate on the Hill.

And those of us that even criticize MEPI in public also recognize the important contributions they've made, particularly because actually they've been willing to sort of, frankly, push the envelope in some areas that USAID and the State Department, in terms of regional bureaus, sort of separate from MEPI, really haven't been willing to in the past. I worry about us going backwards, in terms of actually supporting democracy in the Middle East.

MR. CAROTHERS: Thank you. Thanks for those questions.

Jack, with respect to your question about money, I don't think, either the fundamental problem right now or fundamental solution at this point is insufficient funds, and therefore we need a lot more money. I think we need to get our institutions in better order, to the point where we have a development agency which, A, people widely respect and think is capable and competent, and, B, which fundamentally accepts democracy

promotion as part of its core mission, and sees the ways to integrate that into its development mission. Until we reach that state, why give it more money to promote democracy? It's not going to spend it well.

I think the National Endowment for Democracy could get some more money, but share Vin's concern – and I think this was Charles's too – that some kind of radical transfer of funds in the direction of the National Endowment is not really what's needed, both because it would change some of the basic nimbleness of the NED, as well as its relationship to the sort of U.S. power establishment that might be problematic. And I also don't think pouring a lot more money into fairly loosely run, sort of State Department funds to support democracy – not loosely run, I don't mean in a candid sense, but that fairly general funds that make fairly large transfers – is likely to be a good idea either.

Now, if we're able to get our institutions in order over the next five to 10 years, I think enhancements could be worthwhile, but it wouldn't be radical or gradual. I mean, I have also engaged in fun comparisons of the amount of U.S. democracy aid compared to, say, spending on U.S. Halloween candy, spending on greeting cards at Valentine's Day, and so forth, and democracy assistance comes up short on all of those measures. (Laughter.)

But it is also true that I've watched too much democracy assistance get spoiled with money. It really isn't very much about the money, and when I look at a \$40-million program as opposed to a \$4-million program, I rarely feel the \$40-million program is much better than the \$4 million one. And so that's my feeling.

Secondly, Ken, with respect to your question about Morocco, Mauritania, and Yemen, let me just talk about Morocco and Yemen, because I know them somewhat better, and leave Mauritania aside for now just because I'm much less familiar with it.

I think, actually, both Morocco and Yemen reflect – I carefully use the word fundamentally different political trajectory, because I think both Morocco and Yemen characterize what's the best side right now of Arab political reform, which is somewhat more, sort of, continued political competition, or in the case of Yemen, increased political competition; some respect for political and civil rights; and genuine political parties that are actually competing, and so forth.

But they also reflect the limits of that process, and then in both cases you have an entrenched ruler – in the case of Morocco obviously a monarch and in Yemen a president – who are allowing this process of political reform, so far, largely as a way of staving off pressures for greater change, and I think this is still an example of defensive liberalization on the part of these regimes, and not a fundamental trajectory towards democracy.

And I think the Moroccan elections of a couple of days ago, unfortunately, underline this fact, that this is a system starving for political oxygen, in which people are not participating, the participation rate fell to 37 percent, down significantly from the last election in 2002 because Moroccans really have no faith in these political parties and this political competitive process, that it's going to make any difference in their sewers or other parts of their life.

And so, unless the Moroccan political establishment – by that I mean that power establishment, starting with the king and around him – decide that they're really interested in a fundamental trajectory of political change, Morocco's stuck. And being stuck is okay when you're sort of rising economically; it's dangerous when you're sort of declining economically, which Morocco's doing. Morocco's in trouble economically in various ways.

MR : (Off mike.)

MR. CAROTHERS: Well, one hates to think that people have to suffer in order for something – but not that I know you think that, but you're right. It could create pressure for change, but it's an unfortunate way to watch it happen in a country like Morocco.

And I think Yemen – the Yemeni elections, the recent elections, were a positive event, and it was heartening to see in an Arab country a real competition over presidential elections, which had an articulate process of competition in which alternatives were put forward. But I think even those in the Yemeni opposition feel that this was a process, sort of an 80-20 process at some level, in which getting to be something that might be 60-40 or a 50-50 process is not simply gains on the part of opposition but a fundamental mind shift on the part of the Yemeni power establishment that is nowhere near happening.

So I think both cases actually exemplify the limits of Arab political reform in this decade. And the fact that that pattern of liberalization from the 1990s, characterized by this defensive liberal organization, has not fundamentally shifted in this decade.

Jennifer, with respect to your question on funding of democracy assistance in the Middle East or other kinds of pro-reform assistance, I think it should continue. I think MEPI should continue. I don't – I mean, one could think back, and maybe MEPI could have been set up differently, and not housed with the State Department, however, it exists, it's useful, it should continue. I think democracy assistance in the Middle East should continue.

But democracy assistance in the Middle East is a fly on the back of an elephant. There are regional dynamics at work in the Middle East: large conflicts, rising tensions between Shi'ia and Sunni; Lebanon that's a political tinderbox; Syria, which is in a very negative and destructive state in terms of its influence in the region; Palestine, that has never been more divided, so on and so forth, that are going to determine the political future of the region, not U.S. democracy assistance.

So I think it's worth continuing to do; I don't think we should be scared away from Islamist gains in one country or another and say, let's back away from this political competition thing. But I wouldn't hold out hopes that any increase in U. S. democracy assistance is going to make any basic difference in a region which is stuck with so much bigger problems.

MS. WINDSOR: Comments by Vin and Frank?

MR. WEBER: I'm going to make a comment about the Middle East, or maybe in the form of a question. When I first came on to the NED board, it was before the invasion

of Iraq, before 9/11. And I remember trying to learn a little bit more about this institution. And one of the comments made – I asked, what’s the hardest region of the world for us to work in. And without hesitation everybody said, oh, the Middle East.

Well, since then, we’ve had 9/11, and we’ve had the invasion of Iraq. We got a lot of problems. We’ve given the Arab world a second excuse beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, why they can’t change: now it’s because we’ve invaded Iraq. Hamas has won in Palestinian territories; we’ve got problems in Lebanon; there’s all sorts of problems.

But I have to ask myself, if we asked the question today, what is the hardest area of the world in which to promote democracy, what would we say? We’d probably still say the Middle East, Arab Middle East. I’d ask this question: Is it harder or easier than it was, you know, seven years ago? I’m not sure, Tom, that the answer’s harder. I think the answer might be, as difficult as it is. It’s a little bit easier. There’s more room, there’s activity going on in all those countries.

I’m not a Pollyanna about it; don’t expect a Saudi democracy to emerge anytime – (chuckles) – in the near future. But I’m not sure, for all the problems that exist, and granting you what we talked about, in terms of the damage that the Iraq has done to U.S. prestige, I’m not sure that the Middle East doesn’t have a bit more space for us to work in to promote democracy than it did seven years ago.

MS. WINDSOR: Frank, do you have anything? Okay, another round of questions here. In front, question?

Q: I’m – (unintelligible) – Kumar (ph) from USAID. I’m – (unintelligible) – I am from USAID, but now I’m working for new – (unintelligible) – office of – (unintelligible) – foreign assistance.

I have two very technical types of questions. One question, which has been bothering me for sometime is, as one of those who has been watching democratic assistance from the inside for nearly 20 years, whether public bureaucracies are agencies or instruments for the type of democracy assistance we need in developing countries.

Being a part of a public bureaucracy I realize we have to – (unintelligible). We have to justify new budgets. We have to – (inaudible) – the indicators of performance, indicators of impact with the result that many of the documents we – (inaudible) – unfortunately, they don’t make sense to people like me. (Laughter.)

You see, at the same time they publish the requirements, you know, there are requirements imposed on us. So I have been thinking for some time, whether we have to think of ordinary mechanisms and probably certain types of assistance that can be given by public bureaucracies like elections, or for technical support for writing constitutions. But for other assistance, we are trying to reach marginal groups; we are trying to reach people who are not in the best – (unintelligible). Probably we need alternate mechanisms. So that was my question – (unintelligible).

The second thing which has been bothering me a lot is that I've visited many, many countries, and I've been struck by the dynamic grassroots organizations which are emerging in countries like India, South Africa, in Brazil and others. They have very different approach to democracy promotion. They are addressing not – they are defining democracy not in terms of abstract concepts or procedures, but in terms of the felt needs of the people. And in many cases, I am so much impressed. My feeling is that if – (inaudible) – this cause of democracy promotion in this country, is not giving sufficient attention to these new, emerging grassroots organizations, which are trying to breach the gulf between democracy promotion and social economy. Thank you.

MS. WINDSOR: Thank you. And then – we're running out of time here, so Tom, and then in the back, Larry. Please try to brief, if you can, since we're running out of time.

Q: (Laughter.) She knows me.

First, bravo to Tom for an important paper, and a compelling presentation. Thank you for that. I want to cast one vote for Congressman Weber's proposition in support of soaring rhetoric. (Laughter.) I presume, Tom, you meant that we should close the gap more by raising the performance, not really by lowering our description of the horizons we want to achieve, which President Bush has done pretty well.

A question about your discussion of the alignment of the agencies and bureaucracy, the democracy bureaucracy. You talk in a way that I think makes sense about moving the money back out of the State Department and putting it more in AID and endowment, or elsewhere. What would you have the State Department do in the democracy promotion, if not the grants managers, which I think – I agree they're not well-suited to do. Can you describe your vision of what transformational diplomacy in the Carothers administration might look like? (Laughter.)

And lastly, you teased us in your remarks about the way forward on Egypt and Pakistan. What would you do on either of those?

MS. WINDSOR: Larry.

Q: Actually, Tom stole my question, which was going to be specifically about Pakistan and Egypt. I do think that they do pose the tension that we're talking about between the realist and idealist perspectives, and the consequences in both of those countries are quite significant.

The other comment that I'd just make is in terms of the Middle East. I think we talked about Jordan, and Mauritania, and Yemen, which are really sort of outliers in several respects. The two countries – two places where there have been, sort of, democratic progress, that we don't like to talk about, are Lebanon and Palestine, and the reasons are obvious. But we need to be appreciative of that also, which is the question of outcomes versus, you know, promoting democracy, and how we deal with it.

MS. WINDSOR: Tom.

MR. CAROTHERS: I certainly agree with the inquiry that you're trying to raise about whether public bureaucracies are really well-suited for this. And I, you know, I also worked at USAID once, and I remember sitting at a desk where we couldn't get a chair ordered for the desk so people were sitting on their desk, and then we couldn't get staplers so we couldn't staple our reports, and we were working on a good governance program. (Laughter.)

MS. : That wasn't in the Reagan administration, though, was it?

MR. CAROTHERS: Why those miserable Latin Americans couldn't, you know, run their public bureaucracies effectively. So I understand both the ironies and the deeper intellectual difficulties, and I don't think that public bureaucracies are well-suited to this.

On the other hand, what my concern is, is because – well, first of all, we do have part of an alternative answer, which organizations like the NED, and NDI, and IRI, and IFES, and Freedom House, and other organizations that I think are better at it, that are not public bureaucracies but receive support. So I think we have part of an answer. But I've been hesitant to say, let's just stop doing it from the public bureaucracies until we have a better answer because then people say, oh, he says we should close down USAID being a democracy promoter.

And I do think it is capable for public bureaucracies, if they're able to A, create a critical mass of people within an organization who care, and have some responsibility, for a subject; B, a certain flexibility away from the Foreign Assistant Act, so they can do things in a somewhat more flexible and realistic way; C, you know, fighting against the results imperatives, and so forth. You know, you can fight a battle from within, and create a zone in which, you know, you can do some interesting things. I'm in OTI – I don't always agree with what OTI does, and I don't like the way it's been used in certain ways in the last five years, but the Office of Transition Initiatives, since its inception, has done some interesting things, I would say, as an example within USAID of creating a zone of flexibility.

And I certainly agree with your latter comment, about unusual organizations that are making the bridge across grassroots socioeconomic policy issues, and democracy. That's kind of one of the things that I was referring to.

Tom, with respect to your question about the State Department, and what it should or shouldn't do, I mean, as I said, I think the State Department has a very important role, because first I think pro-democracy diplomacy is very important. I mean, I think there are many cases – I mean, in the Ukraine for example, the State Department and other parts of the U.S. government played an important role in 2003 and 2004, sending some signals to the Ukrainian political lead about how the United States feels about the electoral process. One could name dozens of such examples, and I think it's important that the State Department engage, and I think diplomacy has a fundamental place in democracy promotion.

So the State Department has a fundamental role to play, but it should play that role with the tools that it's best at, which are diplomatic tools, not assistance tools. And I also think the State Department, you know, has a role in an inter-agency process, and that they're – you know, I mean obviously the White House has some role to play there too, but I think

the State Department, being a larger organization, has the ability to play that as well, as well as strategic, sort of, thinking about the issue, and so forth. So I think there's a lot of room for the State Department to do that.

With respect to Egypt and Pakistan, our time is short, but on Egypt, I mean, first I would commend to you the paper that we did our Middle East program here called "Egypt – Don't Give Up on Democracy Promotion." It identifies a series of both the imperative of why this could be good for the United States, to continue to give real importance to democracy promotion in Egypt, and some suggestions of how to do that.

I think what the paper emphasizes, and I agree with, is we need to find some key areas in Egyptian political life right now, and show that we care about them. These are things like, you know, the current crackdown that's going on, on political dissent in the country, which is quite severe and is not making the newspapers here as much as you might think, not just against the Muslim Brotherhood, but against other people as well including secular intellectuals and activists. And I don't think the State Department has been as forthcoming in its criticism of that as it could be, and I do think U.S. criticism on such crackdowns is important.

In addition, there are various more process issues in Egypt about how they're planning their next elections, for example, and whether or not they're really going to take seriously the setting up of some kind of mechanism for overseeing the elections that has some independence from the political authorities, and so forth, where we take three or four things and say, you know, we're following this carefully; we actually really care; we do not just want to see a slow, quiet slide into Gamal being president, and the continuation of the same. This is a historic opportunity for you. We can be a partner in that process; we can help; we're not just, you know, trying to be nasty to you. We believe this would be good for you, and we could be a partner in this, and help provide some of the assurances about regional security that might scare you.

And the paper also points out when we did push Egypt – and we did push Egypt a bit in 2005, certainly more so, as you know, than we ever have before – we didn't lose Egypt on helping us with the Palestinians, helping us with Iran, helping us with Iraq, and other things. And so the fact that we could be tougher on the Mubarak regime doesn't mean we have to trade off those interests.

Pakistan, of course, is a hugely difficult but important case. I mean, first of all, we're now, you know – roosters and chickens and other kinds of creatures are coming home to roost for our having taking the stance that we have over the last four or five years in Pakistan. We are closely associated in Pakistani society with unbending support for a military dictator who is largely discredited in major parts of the society and is probably on his way out in some way. So we're in trouble as a result of where we are. Yet remarkably, faced with that, our instinct is still to look for deals – sort of essentially anti-democratic deals – that will involve a shift to civilian rule that will not be a fundamental transformation or a return to some kind of competitive civilian politics in Pakistan.

So first, we have to get our principles straight, and say that, you know, we actually do believe in this, and we are disappointed with what Musharraf has done, and we think it's

been bad for the country, and it's going to be bad for the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. And I think we've never set out any real principles or guidelines that said – I'm talking about Egypt – these are the things we care most about: a timetable for elections, a legal process that would reinstate certain rights that would allow realistic elections to occur, and a series of other things.

You know, we don't control Egyptian or Pakistani politics. But those are countries in which, because of the USAID relationship, and because of the sensitivities of the local political elite to U.S. views, and other things, we do have the opportunity to have some influence.

And again, we have – sorry, I don't mean to advertise Carnegie too much – but Frederic Grare, who's our Pakistan expert at Carnegie, has just last week published something called "Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards Pakistan," and you can imagine how confused both the U.S. government elite, and the Pakistani elite, was to have a French diplomat who works for the Quai D'Orsay recommending the United States promote democracy in Pakistan. (Laughter.) That really threw them for a loop.

So he made the analysis carefully. He's a French diplomat who's on leave at Carnegie, and believes that promoting democracy, as he writes in the report and I quoted in my report, is the way to enhance American security in Pakistan.

MS. WINDSOR: I don't know if we have – do we have another round. Yeah, I don't think so.

So can I just make a point, though, on the public service – the public-sector bureaucracies, that of course, you know, the U.S. isn't actually the only public sector bureaucracy that has bizarre management practices – just try applying for funds from either the UNDP or the EU. But I also think they're incredibly important. But I would just make a plug, and maybe Frank would like to jump in, for continuing U.S. government assistance, but also I think the growth in U.S. government assistance – this is my personal opinion – has actually caused private actors within the United States to sort of step back from democracy promotion.

So you're really hard-pressed to find – other than George Soros, and a couple of other foundations – to actually find a private foundation or private individuals – you know, we don't have the Bill Gates yet – that actually backed democracy promotion. And I do think the NED plays a very important role, but it's not a purely private source of money; I mean, it is appropriated taxpayer dollars. So I still think that there's a real push that needs to be done in terms of private philanthropy, in the United States and elsewhere that would really help the legitimacy, credibility, and flexibility of democracy promotion.

Frank, do you want to –

MR. FUKUYAMA: I actually wanted to say something about Pakistan. I actually think that the problem in Pakistan is not – the short-term one – is really not that hard because the fear that we've had that this place will fly apart, you know, with nuclear-armed Islamists taking power, I think is wrong. There's a much bigger middle class, all those black-

suited lawyers represent a very powerful constituency, and I think a civilian government may actually do better as a partner in the war on terrorism.

The only problem is that if you get Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif back in power in that country, you're still back – trapped in the same, you know, social network that led to their overthrow in the first place, which is why I think that it is not just the procedural, you know, getting back to elections that is the real issue in a lot of these countries; there is a much deeper social agenda that needs to be addressed. Benazir once said that she would much prefer Musharraf to – you know, this corrupt idiot, you know, Nawaz Sharif, and you know, who are our big alternatives now? So we're still stuck in that. So I think again, we got to think a little bit deeper and harder than just getting, you know, back to competitive elections.

MS. WINDSOR: Vin, do you have any final – Tom, the last word? Thank you all for coming, and thank you, Tom, for a great – (inaudible).

(Applause.)

(END)