

**CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION  
CONFERENCE**

**THE NUCLEAR ORDER – BUILD OR  
BREAK**

**WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS:**  
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JESSICA MATTHEWS: Can I ask everybody to take their seats, please?

Thank you. Good morning, everyone. It's my great privilege to welcome you to the 16th Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, and to welcome our C-SPAN audience as well. We are more than 800 strong this year, but more important to us – and I hope to you – coming from 46 countries, representing just about every state – with a few key exceptions – whose leadership matters for our concerns, for nonproliferation and disarmament, either in a positive or negative sense.

When we sat down at Carnegie about, oh, eight months ago to think about the theme for this session, we were struck by two sets of conflicting trends. One, quite depressing, threatening – signs of cracks in the nuclear order; spreading threats to the stability and sustainability of the regime. And, on the other hand, some signs of hope and of reason for optimism of a commitment by many states in the world to rebuild and strengthen the regime. And so we came up with the nice alliterative but also accurate title for this session, Build or Break. And we think we are at such a moment when there are two paths open ahead, and which one will be taken depends on a lot of policy decisions that are in the offing.

We try very hard to be prescient, but we could not have imagined that in the 24 hours before this meeting we would see clear signs of both these two trends: a North Korean ballistic missile test on the one hand – another sign of breakage – undertaken in the face of a chorus of international pleas and threats not to do it; and on the other hand, President Obama's ringing call for major commitment to rebuilding.

But there are other things to think about as well to remember. In addition to North Korea's confusing but certainly not optimistic set of decisions, we have Iran continuing to enrich uranium, and importantly, continuing to defy the U.N. Security Council. And, no signs from the U.N. Security Council that it intends to press for compliance with its own legally binding decisions. We have seen for years now U.S.-Russian relations deteriorating to the worst situation since the Cold War, with the arms control regime in particular – at best, suspended; at worst, in some respects, unraveling – with unilateral abrogations and tit-for-tat threats.

We see China rebuild – or building up its heretofore small nuclear arsenal, both quantitatively and qualitatively. We see India and Pakistan expanding their stockpile of nuclear weapons material. There are reasons for concern that states in Northeast Asia and the Middle East may move to hedge their nuclear bet. And there are other signs that you know well that the nuclear order could break down.

But there are also now some encouraging signs. We will hear later this morning how President Obama intends to move, both with respect to nonproliferation and disarmament. The U.S.-Russian joint statement that was released last week commits the two countries aggressively to resume arms control diplomacy to reduce their nuclear arsenals. I'm very proud to say that my admired colleague, Rose Gottemoeller, the former director of the Carnegie Moscow center, was confirmed in the wee hours of Friday morning last week by the Senate to lead this effort. She's the right person in the right place at the right time. (Applause.)

We have had at Carnegie ideas about how this renovation and rebuilding should proceed. The central theme was put forward in 2005, and we still see it as the central idea for what needs to

happen; and that was the phrase “universal compliance,” which we set out in a book by that title. The idea here was that a rules-based regime faced with selective compliance could not possibly be sustained. And therefore we wrote that the advantaged minority – the nuclear weapon states – would have to ensure that the majority sees it as beneficial and fair, and that the only way to achieve this was to insist on universal compliance with equal attention to the obligations that nuclear states have taken on themselves.

Many of the policy recommendations in that report will be part of the global debate in the coming years. Many are not ideas unique to Carnegie, of course; and many were the product of collaboration with colleagues in this room. Today we are releasing another important study, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate” by George Perkovich and James Acton. It contains the IISS study that was released last September, plus 17 critiques of that study written by leading experts from 13 countries. The book is available on the table here. The entire book is also available on our Web site for free download.

Because this is going to have to be a global process, the idea was to lay out in some painstaking detail what it would take to create a world free of nuclear weapons, how states would have to set about doing it, what verification would be required, what enforcement measures would be needed and have to be overcome, the changes in the way the nuclear industry would be managed, and so forth. Because there is also no official forum where substantive work on disarmament is done, we hoped that this book – and do hope – will jumpstart the process.

We are also very mindful in designing this year’s conference that the so-called third pillar of the nuclear order – the use of peaceful nuclear energy and its relationship to nonproliferation – is often neglected. The conference program therefore reflects our determination to correct this, to integrate all three in sets of interests that will have to met; namely: those of the nuclear industry and the use of nuclear power, those of the developing countries and the non-nuclear weapon states, and those of global security in order to successfully renovate and strengthen the nuclear order. On this point of the nuclear industry, we have also just released Sharon Squassoni’s study on the prospects of a nuclear power renaissance, which attempts to identify the key steps that would need to be taken to ensure that such a rebirth does not lead to proliferation. It too is available outside.

All of these issues will, of course, come to a head next year at the NPT review conference in May. The track record of recent NPT review conferences suggest that we should keep our expectations under a pretty strict (curbrane ?). The common practice – but not, I should add, the rules – by which the conference operates, enable one country to block all the rest. And so among other things, this means that states that are currently not complying with their obligations, such as Iran and Syria, can block any result from the conference. This is a silly situation that governments should look to correct.

But nonetheless, I think we have to expect that intellectual breakthroughs, breakthroughs in developing ideas about moving ahead are going to be – are going to need to come both before and after the NPT review conference. And this offers those of us gathered here an additional opportunity and a challenge. If official forums cannot produce the rigorous give-and-take that – on the issues that confront us, then motivated people will have to find other ways to make this happen. And our event today and tomorrow is just such an opportunity; for hard work, for considered debate, and perhaps I hope for some creative problem-solving. We have gone to some lengths to ensure that this group includes people who disagree with each other, because singing to the choir is

not something that will lead us forward. It is an important time. The risks of breakdown in the regime are real. There is no lack of ideas and energy and reason for hope. But there certainly is a daunting task ahead of us.

Before I close, I want to personally thank the funders who make our work in this field possible, and therefore this gathering. They are the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-government of Norway, the New Land Foundation, Plowshares Fund, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. I hope you will join me in thanking them for their commitment to these issues, which means everything to all of us. Thank you.

(Applause.)

So now I wish you good conferencing and I will turn the podium over to George Perkovich.

GEORGE PERKOVICH: Good morning. Thanks, Jessica. It's a pleasure to see all of you here.

How we thought we'd like to kick off the conference is a discussion amongst the four of us – and I'll introduce my colleagues momentarily – but a discussion focusing primarily on the role that the U.S. can and perhaps should play in rebuilding the global nuclear order; and in particular, taking off from the reality that President Obama made a speech that addressed heavily the subject yesterday. There are several commissions in the work. And so not only must the U.S. by law and by policy re-address its nuclear posture and its position on arms control and nonproliferation, but the rest of the world will be looking to see how that goes. And that's how we wanted to kick off the conference here this morning.

So let me introduce my colleagues. And we're going to do this as a discussion. We're not going to go stand at the podium and so forth. We're going to converse and then we're going to open it to discussion with you all. I want to start to my left with Morton Halperin, who's a commissioner for the Congressional Commission for the Strategic Posture of the United States. He's also a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. He's held a number of positions over the years in Washington. But I want to remark on is that Mort wrote his first article on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1960. He was only 15. He's a very smart guy – (laughter) – and so, was a little precocious. And then the next year, because that was so good, he and Thomas Schelling co-authored a book, "Strategy and Arms Control," which many people here, those of us who are willing to admit having reached a certain age, we read in college or – (inaudible). So it's great to have Mort here.

Next is my friend, Brad Roberts, who's a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Virginia. Brad is widely regarded as a most thoughtful nuclear analyst and writer. He has a very interesting contribution in the book that Jessica mentioned, which is just being released today – "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate" book. I urge you to read that chapter.

Then to my right is Achilles Zaluar, who is a minister-counselor at the Brazilian Embassy here in Washington, where his portfolio includes nonproliferation, nuclear and defense issues. Achilles also wrote a very interesting chapter in the new book, "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons." He previously served as deputy head of the Brazilian mission – or the United Nations division at the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But also in the early '90s, early in his career, was part of the team in Brazil that worked through Brazil's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. So he's been working on these issues for almost 20 years.

Finally, Ambassador Linton Brooks, who describes himself sometimes now as a semi-retired elder statesman. (Laughter.) Linton is involved in lots of contemporary work on nuclear weapons policy. From 2002 to January 2007, he was in fact the head of the U.S. nuclear weapons program and of the Department of Energy's nuclear nonproliferation program. So he knows what he's speaking about here. He also earlier was the chief negotiator of the START-1 treaty. And so we're delighted to have Linton.

First question I want to ask the gentlemen – and I'll start with Linton, refers to President Obama's speech in Prague yesterday, a clip of which we'll see shortly. But the president stated that clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. And among the concrete steps toward that goal, President Obama said that he wanted to put an end to Cold War thinking – we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same.

Anyone who thinks seriously about this challenge, of course, knows that eliminating nuclear arsenals would require reciprocal action by all nine states that possess nuclear weapons today; and it would require much higher confidence than we have today that additional actors would not seek to acquire nuclear weapons – or if they did seek to acquire nuclear weapons, wouldn't get away with it. It would require unprecedented verification systems, much more robust and reliable international enforcement of international agreements and also most stronger, more stable security relationships. All that's a given and will take a very long time, as the president himself says, as we'll hear later this morning.

But the question I want to start with concerns near-term steps towards this vision the president has outlined. And there we have the Congressional Commission for the Strategic Posture of the United States, which I mentioned will release a report in the next few weeks. We have a U.S. nuclear posture review that'll be done in the next year, I believe. And all of these will wrestle with this challenge of preserving deterrence as long as nuclear weapons do exist, and simultaneously trying to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.

So my question is – and starting again with Ambassador Brooks – is what can and should the U.S. do now to lower the value and the role of nuclear weapons? How should the president explain to the U.S. and the world why we have nuclear weapons today?

AMBASSADOR LINTON BROOKS: Couple of things could be done. First, obviously moving to the next step in the arms control process, and moving quickly. I think that'll happen fairly straightforwardly this year and then we'll get into a much harder second step. Second thing we could do is look ahead to that next step and put some serious money behind verification. People like me say we can't verify at the warhead level. But the truth is I have no idea whether that's true because we haven't tried. We haven't spent the kind of effort on that that we could and should. So those are two things that'll happen this year.

In addition, the nuclear posture review could walk away from a couple of the secondary uses of nuclear weapons. The last administration – and I would argue its predecessor in different words

– talked about reassurance or extended deterrence, and I think that stays for quite a while. It talked about dissuasion, which is a euphemism for preventing somebody who is not now equal to us from becoming equal. It's not clear to me there's anybody who wants to do that. So one could walk away from that term.

There's an internal debate on exactly how you characterize the obvious fact that if it turns out that biological warfare allows you to kill hundreds of thousands of people there will be some call for a very robust retaliation. But how you phrase that is not clear, and I think terms like "last resort" or "only when all else fails" need to find their way into the lexicon of nuclear weapons a good deal more than they have.

And finally, the president may as well say what the practical fact is, which is nobody has thought of any new military capabilities for nuclear weapons. And if they had, nobody has any ability to get that approved, either on the Hill or in the executive branch.

So if you package all those, those are things could be done in the next few months, which collectively would downplay – in what I at least would consider a responsible way – the relevance of nuclear weapons.

PERKOVICH: Anybody – Brad?

BRAD ROBERTS: One of the questions George put to us as he warmed us up for this discussion was: what's the role of declaratory policy? What does the United States say about its nuclear weapons – the circumstances in which it might employ them – and whether no-first-use wouldn't be an appropriate way to signal the declining emphasis on nuclear weapons in U.S. military policy?

And I just wanted to bring into this discussion the message that our declaratory policy reaches a lot of different audiences. And we may have an intent to signal one message with no-first-use and have it consumed in other ways. Permit me two short vignettes to make the point.

One, I was recently in a discussion with some Japanese experts on your question, and when it came to no-first-use, they said – one individual, not speaking on behalf of the Japanese government, said—so what you want is for us to absorb the first blow before you're obliged to do something about it. Then there was a Chinese participant in a related discussion who said, okay, what you'd like to do is draw another bright line for Kim Jong Il to understand and walk right across? This, after all, is a man not known for his respect for the lines in the sand that the United States has drawn.

So I just want to bring home the message that what we say about the role of nuclear weapons in our national military strategy is heard by different audiences, and we have to make a choice about which is the audience we most seek to influence with that policy.

PERKOVICH: Great. I'm going to turn to Mort, but before I do that I want to say something I forgot to say, which is that each of these gentlemen is speaking in his private capacity and not for any government or pseudo-government agency. And of course, that's what I always do. So, Mort.

MORTON H. HALPERIN: The president talked in his speech about what is the bargain in the NPT. And my own view is that the bargain of the NPT is that the non-nuclear states will refrain from getting nuclear weapons, and the nuclear states will refrain from seeking to use nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy; as they move toward this eventual goal – which I give everybody credit for believing that they know is not going to happen in anybody's lifetime; not only the president's, but his grandchildren.

But it is moving away from a reliance on nuclear weapons. And that's, I think, the context in which no-first-use ought to be seen. We in fact made that promise when the treaty was signed, and we've inched away from it; and I think it's time to move back to it very clearly and very certainly. And that is to say that any country that is in compliance with the NPT can be assured that no nuclear state will threaten them with the use of nuclear weapons or use nuclear weapons against them and will come to their assistance if any other nuclear state seeks to do so. Those assurances I think are central to the bargain and central to our reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

I think – I agree with Brad. There are lots of audiences and they all hear things differently. There are 25 different audiences in Japan. There are 25 different audience in the Japanese foreign ministry who hear these slightly differently. But I think if we say that we contemplate the use of nuclear weapons only in response to nuclear attacks or nuclear threats, they'll be some negatives – but overwhelming positives. And I think most importantly it sends the right signal of what American policy really is.

PERKOVICH: Thank you. Let me turn to Achilles. And for those of you – and I think C-SPAN's here – who may be watching at home and don't follow these issues that closely, may not know that Brazil had a nuclear weapon program, a nascent one – that it stopped in the early 1990s and then decided to join the nuclear nonproliferation regime which Achilles was involved in managing. So from a country like Brazil, how does all of this sound?

ACHILLES ZALUAR: Well, George, first on your remark. If we had had in the past a dedicated nuclear weapons program, we would have had a nuclear weapon by now. We did have unsafeguarded nuclear activity for a long while.

But to go back to the question. There is indeed a contradiction between the things that you say about nuclear weapons, in order to get more money from the Hill or in order to reassure your allies, and the things that you need to say about nuclear weapons in order to shore up the nonproliferation regime. It is a permanent paradox. If you strengthen too much the reassurance and the importance and the creative missions that we can think about for nuclear weapons, you weaken the commitment that you made, which is sort of the basis for the nonproliferation regime.

The fact that the nuclear weapon states committed themselves in Article VI of the NPT and later on in other instances to work towards eliminating nuclear weapons, this is the basis and the foundation of the nonproliferation regime. And a no-first-use – a very straightforward no-first-use statement by the five recognized nuclear weapon states without legalese, caveats, ands, ifs and buts, would really send a very positive signal to reinforce the whole nonproliferation regime.

AMB. BROOKS: How would you see the value of that if it wasn't the five? I mean, at least one, our Russian colleagues, are passing through a phase where I think there's not even a debate. Would it still be valuable if it was only some of the five?

ZALUAR: I would think so, yes, if it's the United States as a country that assumes the leadership of taking the international community towards abolition. I think it would be very well received by friends, allies and others.

PERKOVICH: Well, this – that actually leads to a question that I wanted to ask, and I'll ask it – and I have a feeling it may come up in the broader discussion with the group – which is basically, how big a difference can the U.S. make in rebuilding the nuclear order? You know, how much does a declaration of policy or a move by the U.S. really affect what others do? And so, for example, you know, Brad raised this example, let's say the U.S. Senate ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty next year by a vote of a hundred to one. What would that change in terms of the behavior or attitudes of others? Would it change anything that North Korea does? I think probably, we'd all say, no here, but what about the behavior of other countries, India, Pakistan, the willingness of other countries to adopt stronger inspections procedures from the IAEA? What difference would it make, do you think, in terms of what the U.S. does? Mort?

HALPERIN: I think it would make an enormous difference, and one way to think about it is to think about the world without the Nonproliferation Treaty. We were not born with the Nonproliferation Treaty. It took American leadership to get it, and exactly the same arguments were made; it won't matter. Countries decide to get nuclear weapons based on their own national interests. An NPT won't make any difference. U.S. restraint won't make any difference.

We would have, I think, many more countries with nuclear weapons now if we didn't have that regime, and we would not have that possibility of international cooperation against North Korea and against Iran if Taiwan had nuclear weapons, if South Korea had nuclear weapons, if other countries that were allies of the United States or neutral had nuclear weapons. I think American leadership is essential to this task. It does not guarantee effectiveness, but without it, as we saw over the last eight years, what you get is further proliferation and no controls.

I think with American leadership, with policies that actually reflect the commitment from both sides, we can make an enormous difference. I think we can eventually roll back the North Korean program, although that will be very hard, and I think we can prevent the Iranians from getting nuclear weapons by the right combination of packages. But it requires American leadership and American willingness to listen to other countries and take their interests into account.

ROBERTS: It's difficult to quarrel with the proposition that American leadership is essential. As you know, my shorthand on this is that America can break the nuclear order, but it can't make the nuclear order, and it requires leadership of a much larger activity. But your question intermixed "regime" and "order." And it does seem to me that there's not a lot the United States can do alone to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and ratification of the CTBT is a good example in the sense that there are a good many complicated steps left beyond U.S. ratification to get entry into force. Now, in some sense it already operates effectively as a constraint on many states, but the step from ratification to entry into force to effective compliance policy is later. Those are many steps, and a U.S. commitment to ratification is the only way to take the first, but it's not the solution to everything else that follows. And it seems to me this is the dilemma for the United States: that we on the one hand can, through disinterest or actual contempt, break the nuclear order, but our ability to construct it, not just through a treaty regime, but through orderly international relations, is limited. We don't have power sufficient to that on our own.

PERKOVICH: So it can't be done without U.S. leadership, but U.S. leadership alone can't get it done.

ROBERTS: Right.

AMB. BROOKS: We don't know that, George. It certainly can't be done without U.S. leadership, and – but what we don't know is what will actually happen if we take some of the steps, ratification of CTBT being the most obvious. The argument as I understand it is not that it has anything to do with North Korea, but that a lot number of states whose cooperation is necessary for an effective nonproliferation regime are reluctant to cooperate while the five recognized nuclear powers are not, in their view, meeting their Article VI obligations. And the touchstone of that, at least with regard to the United States, has become CTBT.

What we don't know is whether that's a reason or an excuse. We don't know whether it's a convenient way to blame the United States for things people don't want to spend time and effort and money on. One of the reasons that, I think, we probably ought to go ahead and ratify the CTBT in the United States is it will let us find that out.

HALPERIN: Could you say that again?

AMB. BROOKS: It will let us find out whether or not this theory, which is believed by an enormous number of very smart people in this country, that the international community is just chomping at the bit to ratify the additional protocol and implement 1540 and really work on a global clean-out of HEU, but they just aren't willing to do it while we're looking obdurate. I am suspicious that that's true for at least some members of the international community, but this is something that we can find out. And I think that statements in either direction, either that it won't matter or that it will be seminal are premature when we'll actually have data if – in a year or so.

MR. PERKOVICH: Okay. Thanks, Linton. Achilles?

ZALUAR: Yeah. We already are at the point of discussing CTBT. I would just like to remind everybody that from our point of view, CTBT was promised at least four times. It was promised in the preamble to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Moscow Treaty. It was promised in the preamble of the NPT. It was promised in the 1995 indefinite extension decision. It was promised again in the 2000 Review Conference in the 13 Steps. So no ratification of the CTBT is something that affects – how would I say it? I think it was President Truman who said that trust is to politics as credit is to the economy.

In '98, '99, the India-Pakistan nuclear test, and then the defeat of CTBT in the U.S. Senate had, to the nonproliferation regime, maybe not as immediate, but as great an effect as the fall of Lehman Brothers had to the world's financial system. And what you're doing now with the CTBT would be a bail-out of the nonproliferation regime.

PERKOVICH: Keep going. Keep going. That's very good. I – you know. No. That's an important point. And your sense is that that is – that view is widely perceived internationally.

ZALUAR: Well, what can I say? I think that we diplomats are usually very polite, but if we would say what we think about non-entry into force of the CTBT it would not be fit for – to be printing, you know?

PERKOVICH: Well put. I want to shift to a point that was made by several of my colleagues a little indirectly, and I want to make it more direct, and it's this question of extended deterrence.

One of the strong reactions I imagine that we'll have to President Obama's speech, which again, we'll see, will be from those who say, well, wait a minute. If you put out the vision and say that you're going to seriously pursue it of trying to eliminate U.S. nuclear weapons, the countries that now rely on our nuclear umbrella to protect them, whether it's Japan, South Korea, Turkey, others, those countries will start saying, well, wait a minute. What's going to happen to us? They will – the argument goes – they will have more doubt about whether we'd ever be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend them. And then the argument goes further, that in that case, they may feel a need to make their own nuclear weapons – (inaudible). Now, that's an argument that we will hear, we have heard, we will hear more of it.

And I'd like to have you guys address it, but in a positive way in a sense of trying to look at it and say, are there ways that the U.S. could proceed in leading this global effort to reduce the role of nuclear weapons that would reassure allies at the same time that U.S. security guarantees would be upheld? That it's not an either-or proposition. And I'd like you guys to take that one on. I don't know who wants to go first.

ROBERTS: I'm happy to start.

PERKOVICH: Go ahead. Thanks.

ROBERTS: How does that saying go? Fools rushing in... In my experience, U.S. allies have many viewpoints – Mort was right. In Japan, there are 30 viewpoints on these questions. We hear from allies a lot these days about these questions. That in itself is interesting as that dialogue wasn't much there before. Now we hear both from Europe, where there are multiple camps, and from Asia. And I think they have, so far, expressed universal support for the proposition that the United States and their alliances with it should be about reducing global nuclear dangers in some way, and indeed see a long tradition of that in these alliances and in U.S. strategy.

What they also see ahead are opportunities to put the cart before the horse, which is to say that, in the name of taking interim steps that might accelerate the arrival of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we might prune off the pieces of our deterrent that are of high salience to them. And this is an easy thing to see in NATO, with the ongoing discussion about withdrawing the remaining nuclear-sharing arrangements and capabilities, and in the Asia Pacific, the withdrawal of analogue capabilities, although different in character. And I think they're concerned that these would be unilateral steps.

Reductions, great. Reductions in Europe with Russia, great. Reductions with Russia that only deal with the strategic weapons and leave all of the non-strategic weapons there in their neighborhood, not such a good deal. And similarly, in Asia, reductions with China that bring to an end the build-up and promise some reductions, great. But simply a retraction of the U.S. extended

deterrent at a time when China's building, not so great. So I think the short answer to your question is yes. We can square this circle, but there are many ways to not square the circle, and our allies are keen for us to avoid those mistakes.

PERKOVICH: All right.

HALPERIN: I agree with that. I think I'd have a slightly different view of what fails to square the circle. I think the first thing is we need to take this seriously. I've been surprised at how much allied governments care about nuclear weapons now. Their position is not, you know, we didn't know you guys still had nuclear weapons. Just do whatever you want. They are concerned. They're following it very closely. They care a lot about it.

Some people in each of these countries are worried that we're not doing enough to get rid of nuclear weapons. Some people in all of these countries are worried that we may do too much, although we're not yet close to that line. I do not think the actual deployments make as much difference as the political relationship and the assurances that we should give. One thing we should learn to do is not make demands on other governments in this area which hurt them domestically in their own politics, and then we can't deliver on. We've just done that again with the ballistic missile defense. We did that from the beginning of NATO with a series of demands which have undercut the domestic politics of countries for, in my view, no good reason. I think the political relationships, the confidence that we give them, the consultation that we do.

They should not read in the newspaper about any changes in the American nuclear posture. I hope even this speech was, in fact, discussed in advance, not only with our European allies, but with our Asian allies, as well, so that they know where we're going. I also think the president went about as far as he should go on elimination of nuclear weapons. He laid it out there as an aspiration, as an objective, as something that will happen, he hopes, some time in the future, but I think the critical point is that the steps we take now have to be steps that enhance our security and that of our allies, whether or not we get to zero in any reasonable time, or whether or not we know how to go to zero. They need to be able to be supported and endorsed based on the notion that they improve our security even if zero never turns out to be a reasonable objective.

PERKOVICH: Thank you. Do you want to jump in on this or – Linton?

AMB. BROOKS: We always talk about deterrence being a function of capability and will. Nothing we're going to do in the next several years, as just a practical matter, is going to take away the capability to offer extended deterrence, even if the START follow-on goes quickly, and we immediately move to a much more dramatic level. So the question is how do we convince our allies that we still have the will? Things like weapons in Europe are symbols, but they're not the only way. I agree completely with the point about consultation, and I'd go further. We in the '80s, when I was doing arms control, we would wind up Paul Nitze and Ed Rowney, and we would put them on planes, and they would go to every capital you've ever heard of.

And they would say, we're here to consult; tomorrow we're making an announcement, and here's what it is. And so what our allies got was they weren't surprised. They didn't do what Mort said. They didn't read our position in the paper, but they also didn't influence our position. I think those days have to be over. That's going to be hard, because the new administration, like all new administrations, wants to do things quickly. And consultation with allies, as many in this room

know, whatever else it is, is not a “quickly” kind of thing, but I think we are going to have to do more of it so that we do not have our allies misinterpret where the president is going.

I don’t think there’s anything that risks the security of our allies at least in what the president has outlined so far, but I think it is entirely possible to do this wrong and leave that impression. And so I think we’re in the need to build in time for genuine consultation with allies, or we’re not going to like the way this works out. We are going to trade one set of problems for another.

PERKOVICH: Here’s what I want to do now. We are going to open the discussion, but since it’s going to take a while for people to queue, I’m going to ask one more question myself and ask people to quietly get to the microphones. And then, because it’s just a thing I have, I don’t think it’s always right to reward the first person to the microphone. So I’m reserving the right to call on people kind of randomly in the line. That’s deterrent of a different sort, but go ahead and start proceeding that way.

And the question that I want to ask, and again, it’s been pointed to a little bit, which is, let’s say the second step in the process that the president outlined, can that be done without a different kind of level of strategic understanding and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on one hand and the U.S. and China on the other hand? In other words, to move in this direction, doesn’t that have to be kind of a focal point of kind of getting those two strategic relationships in a different way? Or is that too simplistic?

HALPERIN: Well, I think there are actually three levels, and the president actually sort of anticipated them in the speech. The first is to get back on the track of strategic arms control with Russia, and that we’ve committed to do, both presidents committed to do. But it will not be trivial, and I think it is right to focus on getting an agreement before the end of the year, even though that agreement’s going to seem very modest to people who want very substantial reductions. The second step, which I think still can be done with Russia and still can be done without involving the tactical nuclear weapons is a longer term, larger reduction of U.S. and Russian strategic forces.

When you get to then the next level – and you can argue about whether those numbers are 1,500, 1,000 and 600 or some slightly lower version or slightly higher version. When you get to the third level, then you’ve got to engage the Russians’ tactical weapons, and I think you have to begin engaging – the president talked about the other nuclear powers in the process. So I think we’ve got to go through those three steps. I think they’re all doable. They’re all very hard. They all will require a lot of hard, analytic work, and my hope is that both inside and outside the government, those are the three sets of problems that we focus on.

PERKOVICH: You want to jump in on that?

ROBERTS: Yeah. That’s a good answer about the arms control dimension. To cut it a different way, my perception is that the United States essentially knows what kind of strategic relationship it wants with Russia. Russia knows what kind of relationship it wants with us. We’re all pretty clear about that. It’s working out the details now. We also know what kind of strategic relationship we don’t want to have with, quote, “rogue states.” We’re not willing to have the kind of relationship where they can coerce us in – by holding us vulnerable in some way. Hence missile defense.

China is the open question for America. We have not decided what type of strategic military relationship suits our interests and serves the purposes of stability. This preempts my introductory remarks on the panel this afternoon on U.S.-China strategic stability. And I'll just leave you with two propositions. The nuclear future of the globe is more likely to be written by what happens in Asia and the transpacific dimension than by what happens in Europe and the transatlantic dimension. And the second proposition central to that will be what happens in the U.S.-China relationship. And I think we as a community spend 99 percent of our time thinking about U.S.-Russian arms control, and we need to spend a good chunk of intellectual capital on the other question. Thank you.

PERKOVICH: Anybody else on this one?

ZALUAR: Oh, just besides those needed measures that are more directly related to the nonproliferation regime, I think there is also another one that is taking place right now, and we are – I'm personally very optimistic about the way it is going on in the Obama administration, which is to demonstrate and reiterate and reassure everybody about the commitment of the United States to a rules-based international order. The more the international community is convinced of that, the more safe and sound everybody will sleep with the fact that, as Ambassador Brooks correctly mentioned, the United States retains the capability to destroy the world several times over, and it will retain its capability, even if it cuts its nuclear weapons by 80 percent.

Why is it that we – myself, I don't lose any minute of sleep because of that? Because we know that it's not threatening us. But that's not the case with every state in the world. There are states in the world that are tempted to – to proliferate, because they are actually involved in challenging security relationships with the United States, and this is an important driver in proliferation. And that's something that goes beyond the domain of the nonproliferation regime and goes into the overall realm of international security.

PERKOVICH: Which is – I mean, I just – we're going to turn – I mean, and that's an underlying theme in what a lot of us are saying is you know, this broader question of order, which is what you're describing, and security relations and the general international security system is so vital in limiting what's possible or creating the conditions for what's possible in that. And sometimes, that gets lost in the context of NPT conferences and so on.

Let me start over there, sir, and then we'll – we'll work over here – (inaudible). And please say who you are and where you're from and all the usual stuff.

Q: Howard Morland. I'm from Arlington, Virginia. Actually, I've been to all of these meetings for the last 10 years. My question is the U.S. nuclear arsenal is justified on the basis of targets. The assumption is made that there are targets we need to be able to destroy which cannot be destroyed without nuclear weapons. What are those targets?

AMB. BROOKS: I actually would challenge the premise of your question. I don't think the U.S. nuclear arsenal is justified on targets. I don't think it's ever been purely justified on targets, and the last administration, whether you liked them or not, was very explicit in the four defense goals, that those were not target-based. They were based on what we've just been talking about: assuring our allies – which is a code word for second to none – keep rough parity with Russia; dissuading peer competitors, which is a code word for staying far enough above China so it wouldn't look

attractive for them to seek parity. And those two things actually set the level of the forces. Now, the precision of that methodology would not stand up to a huge degree of analysis, but the thought was there.

Nuclear weapons are not justified on – primarily on the basis of targets. They're justified on the basis of being qualitatively different, and there are very – there are targets which can only be destroyed with nuclear weapons, but there are very few targets that can only be destroyed with nuclear weapons. The purpose of a nuclear deterrent is that it is qualitatively different. Every nuclear state has sooner or later gone through the, "This is just another way of packaging the delivery of energy," which was kind of the U.S. position in the '50s, to a view that there is something fundamentally different about nuclear weapons, and that they impose a caution on potential adversaries that no other use of power does. Now, that may be completely wrong, but that's the philosophy that I believe has underlined American nuclear policy in different words for a very long time.

PERKOVICH: Let me – I'm going to stop the lines back there, because the people who are now standing in line, each one of them could, like, run every panel of this conference and then go teach graduate seminars anywhere in the world. So we're already kind of overwhelmed by quality if not quantity there. So I want to make sure everybody gets a chance. And so let me start – go here, and I want to do two questions at a time just to try to expedite it. So you, sir, and then Dick Garwin.

Q: Bill Sutcliffe, Lawrence Livermore Lab. It seems to me that since the end of the Cold War, we should not be talking about just deterrence or extended deterrence, but always say who are we deterring from what actions? And in particular, the threats now seem to be terrorists. And so the question is what's the role for nuclear weapons in deterring terrorist attacks? And if there is a role, how does it work?

PERKOVICH: Great, succinct question. Dick?

Q: Richard Garwin, IBM fellow emeritus. Would somebody please briefly explain why the two U.N. resolutions that are much in the news these days, 1685 and 17-whatever, about North Korea are warranted? That is, did North Korea detonate a nuclear explosion while being a member of the NPT? Why is it warranted to prevent them or enjoin them from testing missiles into the ocean? Thank you.

PERKOVICH: Nuclear terrorism, relevance in U.S. nuclear weapons. Anyone on –

ROBERTS: I'll take that one if we can –

AMB. BROOKS: I'll take the other one.

ROBERTS: All right.

(Laughter.)

PERKOVICH: All right. Well, I'll let – I'll – okay. Go ahead, Linton.

AMB. BROOKS: There's no direct relationship between nuclear weapons and the deterrence of nuclear terrorism. There is an arguable relationship between the deterrence of state sponsorship. That is, if you believe that one way terrorists gets weapons is somebody gives them to them, then it would be useful for that state to think that they were conducting an attack on the United States and would thus be subject to retaliation. To turn that bumper sticker into something real is kind of hard, but other than that, you deter nuclear terrorism through denial. You don't deter it through the threat of retaliation.

PERKOVICH: Good. Mort, Dick Garwen's question.

HALPERIN: In the very intense competition for the most disastrous policy of the previous administration – (laughter) – the way they dealt with North Korea is a very close competitor for the first spot. We went from an agreement under which the North Koreans had shut down the only reactor that they – we know they had to make nuclear weapons-grade material because of a theory that they had started another program, which some time in the future might make nuclear weapons. We now confront a North Korea with some nuclear capacity. My view is that we need to try to keep in place this regime of sanctions, but that it's not going to either stop the nuclear program or roll it back, that in fact, if we press ahead with this, they will end the limits on their reactor and try to start it up again and will go from one or zero nuclear weapons that we had eight years ago to now six or eight will go to 20 or 30. That would be a disaster.

What we – I think – we need to do is to focus on a step-by-step process of rolling back the program, and the first step in that process is to complete the disabling of the reactor we know exists and then to move on to the dismantling of it. Both of those will be very difficult, but in my view, they're both doable if we stick to what agreements we reach with the North, if we meet our side of them, and then rally the world to insist that the North Koreans meet their side of those agreements. And when we have this reactor dismantled, then we can begin a discussion which will be even harder of how to get them to give up the nuclear weapons that they have.

PERKOVICH: Thanks. Tarcro (ph).

Q: Tariq Rauf speaking, – (inaudible). Some of us were in the Atlantic when the president gave his speech. So I don't know whether he touched upon this, but there is a trilateral initiative that's left over from a few years where both the Russian Federation and the U.S. agreed to put materials coming out of military programs under IAEA verification. And I was wondering whether there has been any rethinking about that, and this would be an easy step to take by both the U.S. and Russia while they're in the process of negotiating their next treaty.

And I also had a question for Brad and Achilles, and this is reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the non-nuclear weapons states, and the – this was touched upon a little bit in this discussion earlier, but in the NPT context in '95 and in 2000, most of the focus is on reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the nuclear weapons states. But there are some 30 non-nuclear weapons states that rely on military alliances underpinned by nuclear weapons, and we really don't hear very much about how the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of these non-nuclear weapons states would also be reduced. Thank you.

PERKOVICH: Thanks. Extended deterrence and the trilateral – yes, ma'am.

Q: I'm Jessica Varnum. I'm with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. My question picks up on something that was discussed on the panel, which was the comment that the credibility, really, of our alliance guarantees and of extended deterrence is based on our political relationships and on the assurances that we give. And if that's the case, then my question is how do we get to a point in time with countries with whom we've had extremely troubled relationships? And I want to use Turkey as an example here, in recent years where we can have a conversation with these countries and talk about the possibility of removing nuclear weapons? What do you see as the preconditions, politically speaking, to give those reassurances and have that credibility?

PERKOVICH: Okay. Any volunteers on any of these? Go ahead, Brad.

ROBERTS: I'll take that one.

PERKOVICH: You'll take that one.

ROBERTS: Well, I'm not sure what to add to the discussion. We could go on about extended deterrence for an extended period. But the message I hear from U.S. allies is yes. They want to participate in the process of reducing nuclear risks, but they don't want to be the victim of unilateral concessions by the United States that somehow singularize them as the – outside of the framework of extended deterrence that they have depended on and continue to depend on to be non-nuclear until such time as nuclear weapons are eliminated.

And the temptation they see on our part is that we would – in the name of trying to get the Russians to go further with us in reducing non-strategic nuclear forces – just unilaterally withdraw capabilities from Europe. Or in the case of Asia, that to get the Chinese to be less motivated to have a build-up, we would unilaterally withdraw the extended deterrent capabilities there. And their message to us, as I understand it, is that that's just wrongheaded and not going to contribute to their sense of nuclear security and safety. And that's not to say no time ever should these things be withdrawn, but it should be part of an integrated process.

PERKOVICH: Mort briefly, and then I want –

HALPERIN: I want to – I've been trying – struggling to try to find a disagreement on the panel, and I think we've finally found one. I – there are certainly people in allied countries who have that perspective. I think there are a number – there are other people in the same allied countries who have a different perspective, which is that the U.S. insistence on putting nuclear weapons on their territory, the U.S. insistence that the forward deployment of nuclear weapons was an important part of deterrence has vastly complicated their domestic politics and is wrong, because it is not what deters the use of nuclear weapons by Russia or China.

The notion that the Russians might be more likely to use nuclear weapons against NATO because we have or don't have nuclear weapons in Italy, when we never even say whether we do or not, because we still consider it a secret, is in my view, wrong, but not only that, I don't think it is the dominant view in these countries. There are certainly people who will say that to you, but I think the vast majority in the middle don't care, and there are as many people who would like to see us move in the other direction. I reject the notion that taking the remaining weapons out of Europe would be a unilateral move and a concession to Russia. I think it would, in fact, be a prudent move, which would reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, which is what we say we're most worried about,

which would reduce the risk of a nuclear episode, which would undercut the domestic politics of the countries where the weapons are.

Now, that is not to say that I believe we should do it unilaterally, but I think the collective decision is one within the NATO alliance and with our allies in Asia and not with Russia. I don't think there's enough to discuss either with China or Russia. I think we have to have a conversation with our allies in which we say that we believe that our security can be met without forward-deploying weapons, that we would like to adopt a rule that all the nuclear weapons states only station nuclear weapons on our own territory, but we will only do it in consultation with them, and if they agree that we can meet our security commitments without it.

I believe if we start such conversations, we will very quickly have a consensus that the nuclear weapons can be removed. Now, Turkey might be the one exception, and I would say at the end of the day, if the Turkish government, after a collective decision, says to us that it prefers to leave weapons there if there are weapons there, then that's probably something we ought to be willing to go along with, and I think a consolidation in one place might be a reasonable next step in the process.

PERKOVICH: Thanks, Mort. And this is an important topic. So let's stay with it, but briefly, because we've got a

ZALUAR: Yeah. Thank you, George. What I think is also true is that people don't like to be surprised. I mean, if nations are surprised, they expect to have – to meet more unpleasant surprises in the future. Uncertainty rises up. State leaders start to plan for worst-case scenarios, and down that road lies proliferation.

But one thing that concerns me, in the two last questions about terrorism and reassuring allies, is that it's very easy here to come up with a list of, like, 50 new missions or old missions for nuclear weapons. But the more you keep adding missions for nuclear weapons and justifications for nuclear weapons besides that single one of deterring use of nuclear weapons by others, the more you undermine the argument against proliferation.

And that's a point that – I mean, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim makes in a paper that – is in the conference materials. We should not try not to be very creative on devising missions for nuclear weapons, because if you – if we say that they are such a nice thing and so useful to have, we may make other countries jealous and willing to go that way.

AMB. BROOKS: I think Jessica asked about how you show states that you're taking them seriously. You show people you're taking them seriously by actually taking them seriously and by paying them the appropriate respect. I do not believe that the selection of Turkey as part of the president's trip was a random act. I think it recognize that there is a rebuilding that needs to be done. To Mort's point, yeah. There are – these are democracies, and therefore, there are differences of opinions. You do not consult with multiple interest groups. You consult with governments. Believe me, the U.S. military will be ecstatic the day the governments in NATO are willing to have nuclear weapons come out of NATO, but I would not advise you to have that consultation as long as Iran is unsolved.

If you are in charge of the defense of, oh, let us say Turkey, and you saw no evidence at all that the international community is going to do anything effective on Iran, then you would not want to give up any symbol of your being under a nuclear umbrella, no matter how peripheral. And so if you want to get nuclear weapons out of Europe, which it's okay by me, you're – we are going to have to solve Iran. Because I think that the governments – not necessarily the publics, but the governments of some of our allies – are going to be very reluctant to see removal happen for fear that it will be taken as a lessening of U.S. commitment to their defense.

PERKOVICH: Okay, Linton. Thanks. Because the speakers so far have been American, I want to jump the queue. Stay there, sir, because I'm going to try to come back to you. But I want to make sure we hear from Alexei Arbatov from Russia, and then we'll come over to Ambassador Ramaker.

Q: Good morning. Alexei Arbatov from Moscow Carnegie Center and the Russian Academy of Sciences. I think it's a great achievement that the United States, once again, as a leader of nuclear disarmament. But that's not enough. There are very few countries in the world that are afraid of American nuclear weapons, but there are many countries which are afraid of American conventional weapons. In particular, nuclear weapons states like China and Russia are primarily concerned about growing American conventional precision-guided long-range capability from global strike systems and ballistic missile defense, of course. Threshold states are concerned about American offensive conventional capabilities. Without addressing these issues, it would be very difficult to move forward both in nuclear disarmament, as long as we are talking about nuclear weapons states, and nuclear nonproliferation, as long as we are talking about threshold states. How do you think America would suggest addressing these issues?

PERKOVICH: Thank you, Alexei.

AMBASSADOR JAAP RAMAKER: Thank you. My name is Jaap Ramaker. I am at the moment a special representative to promote ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was so forcefully advocated a few days ago by the president of the United States in Europe, in Prague. I listened carefully to what Ambassador Brooks had to say, and he is absolutely right when he says that we do not know what will happen after the United States would have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as we all hope that will now be a possibility that will materialize. And of course, it's only then we have to try, because only then we will find out whether others are hiding behind the refusal so far of the United States or will follow suit.

But it is rather passive the way he put this, and I would like to submit that yes. Of all the issues that the United States has to negotiate, on this one, of course, it has first to negotiate with itself, then go and ratify the Test Ban Treaty. But then, this is not the end of its leadership role in this field but only the beginning. I think that – and I think others will probably feel the same in this capital, that once the United States has ratified the Test Ban Treaty, it will indeed be a proof of the sincerity and the seriousness of the United States in all of these nuclear matters.

But secondly, of course, then a phase of active diplomacy will start, where on the basis of its own new position on the nuclear testing, and hopefully also with China following or briefly proceeding the United States on that same path, and then the five NPT nuclear weapons states would all be on board, then a period of active diplomacy will start to bring the others on board. Some will follow more or less automatically, but others will need some nudging, and in others' case,

like in the case of the DPRK, of North Korea, of course, it may be part of the outcome of the six party talks, because by then, all five other negotiators will have ratified a prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, which is the concern we have with North Korea. So an active diplomatic phase starts in precisely once the United States has ratified. Thank you.

PERKOVICH: Okay. Thank you. Alexei's question on conventional or – and that – I don't know if –

HALPERIN: I'll do the –

PERKOVICH: Go ahead.

HALPERIN: – test ban.

PERKOVICH: Yeah.

HALPERIN: I absolutely agree with that, and I think the – even the fact that the P5 have ratified meets an important commitment under the NPT, but I think we can and should and must have a diplomatic effort that starts with India and Pakistan and then moves on to the other countries.

PERKOVICH: Okay. Brad on the conventional question that Alexei asked?

ROBERTS: Your first question to us this morning was how does – how should the United States go about reducing its emphasis on nuclear weapons and national security strategy and national military strategy? And part of the answer for the United States for the last 20-plus years has been, well, you find other capabilities to fill some of those niches.

And so the commitment to a non-nuclear strike, global strike goes back to the late 1980s, and of course, our missile defense commitment goes back a decade. And it seems to me that the – that the question can be addressed in the U.S.-Russian context, that there is a point of balance where there's not too much conventional capability from Russia's point of view in the hands of the United States, and missile defense is not strong enough to negate the Russian capability. It's a much trickier question to answer vis-à-vis China, and I don't know that there's a sound answer vis-à-vis small states who are concerned about American conventional military action against them.

After all, we want them to be concerned. We don't want them to be so concerned, they're getting nuclear weapons. But we see ourselves as having security commitments to allies which require power projection, and the role on the Security Council requiring action in certain international circumstances. So you ask a very good question, to which I don't think there's a very easy answer, except we might find a difficult answer in the U.S.-Russian relationship.

PERKOVICH: Sir. And then William, I think.

Q: Dave Thomson, Los Alamos Committee on Arms Control. We believe very strongly that you – the U.S. should start building an international – robust international regime of verification. Now, in parallel or preceding getting the agreements and treaties for reductions. We

did this entirely within the U.S. in the case of the START and even INF treaties, but we need an international regime, including a new agency. I address that to Linton or any of the panelists.

PERKOVICH: Thank you, sir. William?

Q: William Walker, University of St. Andrew's. My question is about the volatility of American policy. If you look back over the last 20 or 30 years, of course, there have been continuities, and it has been necessary to change and adapt to a changing security environment, but nevertheless, looked at from the other side, there has been these huge lurches and shifts in American policy. If you compare, for instance, the Reagan administration and George W. Bush administration, they seem to have a rather different conception of how the United States should relate to the world outside than, for instance, Carter or Clinton or even Obama today.

And it makes me wonder whether if states are being asked to buy into a kind of U.S.-led/built nuclear order, aren't they bound to ask themselves, isn't American policy likely to be just as volatile in the future? In which case, shouldn't we be very cautious in committing ourselves to further restraint?

PERKOVICH: Great questions. Order and verification and then – but let's answer them briefly, because I want to get to Amy and Patricia to close out so I'll sleep better tonight that everybody got to ask a question. Ambassador Butler, sorry. I drew the line in the sand earlier.

Q: (Inaudible).

PERKOVICH: No. Well, we'll see.

Q: (Inaudible) – George, the word is "Israel." Israel. Why has no one mentioned Israel?

PERKOVICH: Seriously, we'll see. (Laughter.) Go ahead. Either one.

AMB. BROOKS: I'll take –

PERKOVICH: You'll take the verification one?

AMB. BROOKS: Sure.

PERKOVICH: Why don't you do that first, and then Brad, you do William's volatility question.

AMB. BROOKS: Before we build an international regime, we need to start working on the technical fundamentals. I think this is a tremendous opportunity for lab-to-lab work between the U.S. weapons labs and the Russian weapons labs, and possibly an opportunity, although there's some political speed bumps, between U.S. weapons labs and the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics. I think that the next big challenge is how you verify warheads, and that before we get a broad international regime that includes people who don't have any warheads to verify, those of us who do have warheads ought to figure out how we verify them, because we don't know how to do it yet.

PERKOVICH: Brad.

ROBERTS: Well, William Walker always asks excellent questions and usually has an excellent answer to them somewhere in his hip pocket. And it would be foolish for an American to stand in front of an international audience and say, expect predictability from America. I mean, that's not who we are.

And moreover, it's fairly clear that we have passed from a moment in our national politics marked by, by and large, consensus about security policy, et cetera, during the Cold War to an era of much more open debate and discussion about purposes and means and ends. And we can't hide that from anybody, and we should expect all of the help we can find in having this national debate.

That said, I think you also should not be confused as foreign observers about the passions that grip our debates on these topics and the appearance of pendulum swings. There is a lot of continuity. We as a community of experts always debate the things we don't agree about, and that unfortunately distracts attention from all of the many things we do agree about.

And I think overall, in the U.S. sense of what it's about in the nuclear business, in your phrase, is this still America's special project? Are we still committed to doing the things we need to do to reduce nuclear dangers, to lead an effort to reduce, while at the same time safeguarding our collective interests while we try to reduce those? All of the verbiage aside, I think that's been a big continuity in American foreign policy for decades and will remain so for a long time. This is our special project, and we're going to fight a lot about the way in which we go about it, but there's much more continuity than all the verbiage suggests.

HALPERIN: There were three rogue states. One did not have nuclear weapons. It's gone. One had nuclear weapons. It still exists. The third one is, I think, reasonable to ask the question, do we need nuclear weapons to keep the Americans from attacking?

And it's very hard to persuade them that that's not the case, but I think if we're going to make any progress with the Iranians, we have to start with the assumption that they have legitimate security concerns, including the fear of an American attack, and we would have to deal with that in the relationship that we have with them and that the rest of the world has with them, or they're not going to give up their nuclear weapons.

PERKOVICH: Let me just add on William's question that my sense is that you would get less volatility and more stability to the degree that U.S. officials perceive that other governments were actually prepared to pitch in – you know, produce the public goods that we think we're doing, rather than what often is the case is kind of deferring to the U.S. so you can complain about it when they screw up and when it goes up and down, but not pitching in a whole lot.

And you see that in a variety of ways, including right now in the context of NATO, where you have a lot of NATO governments kind of in private saying, you know, keep the nuclear weapons; and in public saying, we're all for nuclear disarmament. Let's get rid of them.

And – which isn't a real courageous leadership position to take, and there are other examples of that. So I think, you know, the less others do, the crazier we'll be in terms of our volatility. Amy.

Q: Amy Wolf from the Congressional Research Service. One of the perils of being at the end of the line is someone's already asked my question, but I'm going to switch gears. I was going to ask about extended deterrence and positive security guarantees, but as Brad said, we've extended that discussion. If I switch to negative security assurances and no-first-use, I agree with Mr. Halperin that we have to reaffirm our negative security assurances under the NPT framework as a part of strengthening the regime. But how do you get from there to no-first-use? I – it's quite common in the arms control and disarmament community to insist that the United States adopt a no-first-use policy, but that's just rhetoric, and it really wouldn't have much effect on our planning, force, posture; anything about our nuclear weapons. How do we make it more than rhetoric? And for Ambassador Brooks, should we make it more than rhetoric?

PERKOVICH: Patricia.

Q: Thank you very much. And my name is Patricia Lewis. I'm from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute. I want to thank you, George, and all the panel for an excellent start. Just running on from that, I don't think it's about first use. I think it's about no use, and we're in the wrong debate. If the framework's getting down to zero, we have to look at how we don't use nuclear weapons at all in the future.

My question is, what about the Middle East? What approaches and solutions does the panel have for creating the conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East? Thank you.

PERKOVICH: Okay. I mean, I'm willing to take that one, but anybody want to take – anybody want to take the others or that one?

HALPERIN: I'll take –

PERKOVICH: Yeah. Go ahead.

HALPERIN: Well, my answer to that one is we should not, but on the first question, I think – I would not dismiss mere rhetoric.

I think rhetoric that says, "We do not maintain nuclear weapons to threaten them or plan to use them against states that do not have nuclear weapons," dropping that last line that was added a long time ago about, "allied with," and so on, which I think just complicates, and it is now totally unnecessary.

I also think we ought to consider a no-first-use arrangements with the other nuclear weapons states, starting with the Chinese, who are clearly interested in doing that – interested in doing that with us. Given our vast conventional superiority, it seems to me a no-brainer that it would be in our security interests to get that kind of agreement with any of the other nuclear weapons states that might do it, and I think all but the French are ultimately possible. To go beyond the rhetoric, I think, in fact, we do not, as far as I can tell, plan on the use of nuclear weapons. I think the one circumstance in which we do it, and which I would like to see it change in our policy, is the question of prompt response either to the fear of an attack or an actual attack.

I would like to see the president tell the military that he does not intend to fire our nuclear weapons because of a belief that we are confronting a Russian attack; that he will only contemplate the use of nuclear weapons when there has been an attack, and that our forces need to be designed so that they can survive an attack and retaliate carefully and deliberately rather than promptly. I think that would make a useful contribution both to the reality of our no-first-use and also reducing the risk of the dangers that come out of a deployed nuclear forces.

AMB. BROOKS: In order to demonstrate that we don't have complete harmony – let me offer a different perspective.

No-first-use is the least interesting of all the issues we'll talk about in the next two days, and I haven't looked at tomorrow's agenda. (Laughter.) The Russians had a no-first-use policy for years when they called themselves Soviets. It was not true. They changed it. And most people didn't notice, but somehow if we change ours in the other direction it will bring about Nirvana. It is inherent at the time of decision that presidents will make the decision they believe to be in the national interests of the United States, and they will not be constrained by what they said in past speeches.

What is important is what the military plans for. So you don't want the military to plan for nuclear weapons against a large-scale conventional attack, because that used to be important but it isn't important now. But it's important for some of the other nuclear weapon states. I think – I am entirely comfortable with phrases like “last report” and with assurances that we've given. The only issue here is biological weapons. Everything else is a red herring; and the last two administrations both concluded the right way to say that was “overwhelming devastating retaliation” without being precise what that meant. You can change that if you want. I just simply don't think this is an important question.

PERKOVICH: And let me – let me make some not very coherent thoughts about Patricia's and Ambassador Butler's question about the Middle East.

Seems to me that the resolution that was adopted in 1995 at the conference to extend the Nonproliferation Treaty – the Middle East resolution – was important to getting that indefinite extension. And so it can't be ignored, number one – though there's a tendency, at least, in the U.S. and maybe in other states to try and ignore it – number one. Number two, in that resolution it talks about the importance of the peace process. So there's a recognition by the states who have made that resolution that dealing with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction doesn't happen in a vacuum. It has a context of peace and security.

So it seems to me that the most productive focus would be on the context of building peace and security in the region because the rest – the weapons will come along later more likely than they'll come along at the front end of that. And there's a lot that can be done and there's a lot of pressure that should be put on all states, especially Israel, regarding the peace process. And I would like to nominate settlements as something you could focus on as not being particularly constructive to building an environment which ultimately could lead you to a weapons of mass destruction-free zone.

I also think it's not constructive to kind of like call out and talk about Israel as having nuclear weapons and that, you know, people ought to come clean and so on. Seems to me the issue

is ultimately of disarmament is you take unsafeguarded fissile materials and you try to make it all safeguarded. Whatever form it was in, you try to get it to a form where it's monitored, it's accounted for, and it's clearly not weapons. Israel has unsafeguarded fissile materials. That's known. We ought to be having a discussion about how you would verify, you know, and monitor all of these stockpiles over time. And it seems to me that can be constructive.

But the most important thing is it seems kind of – and I wouldn't be defensive about it, but that's why I'm not in the government – is you invite a regional discussion about this issue. How would we create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East? And you invite all of the states in the region, and you have the little placards there for Iran, for Saudi Arabia, so on and so forth – and Israel. And I guarantee you, Israel will show up and other seats will be empty. And at that point you say, well, gee, there isn't that much to talk about. We can't solve any problems if the states that are needed to solve this problem won't even come into a room with each other, let alone recognize their existence or have relations with them, let alone have peace treaties. And it seems to me that gets to the nub of the issue, which is you're not going to get a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in a region where people don't recognize each other's right to exist. But I could be wrong.

We are at the end of our time, and I want to appreciate the contributions of my colleagues. I thought it was personally a very interesting discussion I'm grateful to each of you for. I want to thank all of you, and I hope we're off to a good start for the conference.

We're going to take a break and then be back I guess at 11:00.

(Applause.)

(END)