A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame?
Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy

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Ankara’s new diplomatic activism represents a significant transformation of Turkish foreign policy that merits a more thoughtful analysis than the simplistic accusation that Turkey is moving away from the West.
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Summary

Turkey’s vote against additional UN Security Council sanctions on Iran this year was viewed by many observers as a sign that Turkey is drifting away from the West. In reality, Ankara’s relationship with the United States and the EU is much more complicated. Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy and growing influence present the West with an opportunity to demand that Turkey play a more constructive role in the international community.

There is no doubt that a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy is under way, an evolution that began after the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) rose to power in 2002. This transformation was underpinned by the strategic vision of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who pledged to establish Turkey as an important player in international diplomacy. Turkey’s new foreign policy has been driven by three key factors: reconceptualizing Turkey’s identity and international role, desecuritizing its foreign relations, and increasing its strength as a trading state.

As a result, Ankara has become a more confident and assertive international player, vastly improved its relations with Arab neighbors, and grown its economy to the sixteenth largest in the world. With a balanced web of relations with other countries, the EU and the United States no longer occupy the central place in Turkey’s foreign policy. While this does not mean that Turkey is moving away from the West—or that the West has lost Turkey—Turkey is striving to create more space in its neighborhood to further its ambitious foreign policy position.

As the West accepts Ankara’s new approach and growing stature, the challenge for the EU and the United States is to ensure Turkey remains anchored to Western interests. For the EU, this includes adopting a more welcoming attitude toward Turkey, such as jump-starting the stalled EU accession process. The EU should also seek an institutionalized foreign policy dialogue with Turkey to address their shared desire for regional stability.

For its part, the United States must accept that its interests and Turkey’s are more likely to diverge in the future—as is the case with Iran. In this instance and in others, as the United States grants more leeway to Turkey in pursuing a broader foreign policy, it must ensure that Turkish policy makers share the costs and benefits of providing solutions to global challenges.

By insisting that Turkey adopt this more normative approach to foreign policy, the West can help Ankara become a true international partner and serve as a role model for other emerging powers in the future.

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Recent incidents have raised questions about Turkey’s foreign policy approach. As Ankara has adopted a new diplomatic activism in recent years, it has also split with traditional partners on a number of issues: Turkey’s policy toward Israel (especially after the May Gaza flotilla incident), its engagement with Hamas, its initiatives toward Syria, and its complex role in Iraq. This shift has not gone unnoticed by Turkey’s Western allies.

Still, Turkey’s attempts to craft a multidimensional and more ambitious foreign policy approach do not mean that the West has “lost Turkey.” Instead, Turkey’s power relationship with Brussels, Washington, and other NATO allies is likely to become more balanced in the coming years as all sides adjust to new global realities.

The Iran Example

On May 17, 2010, the international press carried pictures of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan holding hands with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The global commentariat widely viewed the photo-op as a sign of Turkish drift away from the West. This perception was further strengthened a few days later, when Turkey used its seat on the UN Security Council to vote against imposing additional sanctions on Iran. Nevertheless, the resolutions passed with the support of twelve UN member states, including all NATO members save Turkey. There was, of course, a context to Turkey’s desertion of its NATO allies during a crisis pitting Iran against the international community. Turkey’s Security Council vote came in the wake of unprecedented diplomatic activity culminating in a deal for supplying nuclear fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor.

Ankara’s active involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue began in 2009, after the collapse of a deal brokered by the United States, Russia, France, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—known as the Vienna Group—to swap a substantial part of Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium (LEU) with nuclear fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor. Iran essentially rejected the proposal when it refused to transfer the LEU to Russia in one shipment before it received the fuel rods. In November 2009, after the original deal fell through, then-IAEA Secretary General Mohamed ElBaradei floated the idea of Turkey as a caretaker for Iran’s LEU. He thought that Iran might be persuaded to agree to the deal if Turkey were to play the role of middleman, holding the LEU in trust until France delivered the promised nuclear fuel rods to Tehran.
From November onward, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu made settlement of the Iranian crisis one of his country’s primary short-term objectives. He shuttled back and forth between the various capitals in an attempt to carve out a role for Turkey as a mediator between Iran and the West. Understanding that Tehran would never allow Ankara alone to reap the benefits in prestige of brokering a deal, Turkey enlisted Brazil in its efforts to convince the Iranian leadership to make a deal.

Turkey’s efforts were met with ambivalence in Western capitals. In April 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama sent a letter to his Turkish and Brazilian counterparts stipulating a set of conditions for a deal acceptable to the United States: Iran had to ship 1,200 kilograms (about 2,600 pounds) of its LEU to a third country; it would need to cooperate more fully with the IAEA; and it would need to increase the transparency of its nuclear activities. The Obama letter, however, proved to be a momentum-booster for Ankara’s efforts, eventually leading to the jubilant May 17 announcement by Erdogan, Ahmadinejad, and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva that they had come to a deal. According to this agreement, Iran would send 1,200 kilograms of its LEU to Turkey in a single shipment and receive the fuel rods for its nuclear research reactor from the Vienna Group within a year. Turkey had thus achieved what the Vienna Group had failed to do a year ago.

Davutoglu defended the deal from its detractors by emphasizing what he considered the breakthrough nature of the agreement. It was the first time that Iran had committed itself in writing to any obligation regarding its nuclear program. He characterized the deal as a confidence-building measure that would in time lead to the settlement of all remaining issues with Iran’s nuclear program.

Western capitals had an altogether different interpretation of the Tehran Agreement. The United States had just convinced Russia and China to back a new round of enhanced sanctions against Iran. It saw the deal as a threat to the fragile unity of the P-5. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton opined, “Buying time for Iran and enabling Iran to avoid international unity with respect to their nuclear program makes the world more dangerous, not less.”1 Washington wasted no time in responding. Only a day after the Tehran Agreement went public, the Obama administration announced that the P-5 members had agreed on a new sanctions resolution against Iran. In France, the Quai d’Orsay openly criticized the agreement for reflecting “a complete lack of progress on the various subjects that are at the core of the international community’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.”2

The U.S. response to the Tehran Agreement deeply frustrated and angered Turkish policy makers. They believed that it was fully in line with the requirements set out in Obama’s letter. They also maintained, in private, that they had communicated to Washington the details of the negotiations with Iran in almost real time.
The fallout thus exposed a clear case of miscommunication between two allies over an issue at the very top of their respective foreign policy agendas. How did it happen? One explanation is that each side was only hearing what it wanted to from the other. The Turks were convinced that the deal would scuttle the need for sanctions by opening a new channel of communication with Iran. The West, needless to say, did not share this assessment—and in its favor, this point was not to be found in the Obama letter.

Despite mounting pressure from its Western partners, Turkey felt obliged to protect its diplomatic initiative. On June 9, it voted against the UN sanctions resolution in the Security Council. When the Security Council voted to approve the resolution anyway, Turkey declared that it would comply with the provisions of the sanctions resolution but would not follow the separate, additional sanctions imposed by Washington and Brussels. Recently, Prime Minister Erdogan re-stoked the debate on Turkey’s role by stating that he expected a proposed preferential trade agreement with Iran to triple bilateral trade between the two countries within five years.

Turkey’s Iran diplomacy and the rift it has opened between Ankara and its Western partners is far from an isolated incident. Over the past five years, frictions have emerged between Turkey and its traditional partners in the West over a multitude of issues: Turkey’s policy toward Israel (especially after the May 31 Gaza flotilla incident), its engagement with Hamas, its initiatives toward Syria, and its complex role in Iraq, as well as other matters like the dispute over the election of a new NATO Secretary General, cooperation in the Black Sea, and on missile defense plans.

Ankara’s new diplomatic activism represents a significant transformation of Turkish foreign policy that merits a more thoughtful analysis than the simplistic accusation that Turkey is moving away from the West.

The Drivers of Change

Several distinct but interconnected drivers of change lie behind Turkey’s new foreign policy, including a reconceptualization of Turkey’s identity and international role, the de-securitization of Turkey’s foreign relations, and Turkey’s growing strength as a trading state.
The reconceptualization of Turkish identity and Turkish foreign policy: Turkey as a central power

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002 promising change and challenging Turkey’s domestic power structure with aspirations to dominate the state bureaucracy while reducing the political influence of the military. This mandate for change, however, also carried over to Turkish foreign policy, as evidenced by early moves like Ankara’s rapprochement with Syria and its opening of dialogue with Hamas, both of which were stark departures from the long-standing practices in Turkish diplomacy. These somewhat uncoordinated early steps were eventually folded into a strategic vision articulated by Davutoglu, who had spent the early part of the decade as an adviser to Prime Minister Erdogan before becoming foreign minister in May 2009.

Davutoglu is shaping the transformation of Turkish policy in accordance with his “strategic depth” doctrine. This doctrine is based on a comprehensive historical-cultural reading of Turkey’s position in international politics that highlights the country’s Ottoman legacy and Islamic tradition. In Davutoglu’s reading, Turkey is a “central country,” blessed with multiple identities and a location at the heart of Eurasia. These identities yield a multidimensional foreign policy that seeks to avoid privileging one relationship over another. Turkey should thus “provide security and stability not only for itself but also for its neighboring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs.”4 To the extent that Turkey accomplishes these goals and commands more influence in its own near abroad, it will have a stronger position with respect to other power centers as well as global powers.

The objective of Davutoglu’s strategic doctrine is therefore to establish Turkey as an important player in international diplomacy. In many ways, Turkey already fits the description of a regional power. It counts as one of the indispensable security stakeholders in several interlocking regions: the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea. In addition, Turkey has already assumed significant responsibilities, underwritten by hard and soft power capabilities, for governance and security issues in those regions.

A fundamental consequence of this vision is that Turkey “is no longer perceived as a state at the periphery of the European system or as a front state firmly rooted in the West.”5 As Turkey’s Western orientation loses primacy in its web of relationships, the necessity that its policy choices line up with Western priorities diminishes. Turkey thus increasingly filters cooperation with the United States and the European Union (EU) through the prism of its regional priorities.6
Alienation from Europe

The foreign policy shift described above has been intensified and accelerated by the country’s alienation from Europe. While the goal of Turkish membership of the EU remained credible, Ankara focused its foreign policy on working toward that objective. The prime directive of Turkish foreign policy was to keep the country on course to EU membership. Domestic challenges prevented Ankara from reaching this stage for many years, but in 2004 the EU finally decided that the time was right to start accession talks. Support for EU membership in Turkey at the time had peaked at 74 percent.

A combination of developments squashed those dreams, however: rising skepticism of Turkey’s fitness for membership in Europe, the intractability of Turkey’s problems with EU member state Cyprus, and the politicization of Turkish accession in acrimonious debates in countries like France and Germany. Today membership negotiations have stalled, Turkish public support for EU membership has dropped to around 30 percent, and there is widespread belief among Turks that Turkey has been and continues to be discriminated against.

In short, the dream of EU membership has dissolved so thoroughly that it no longer anchors Turkish foreign and domestic policy. For instance, Turkey moved recently to remove visa requirements with neighboring countries like Syria and Russia, a policy that is incompatible with the EU Schengen system—a system that Turkey must comply with as a precondition for EU membership. While there might be other downsides to these developments, they have clearly been conducive to gaining the popular and political support necessary for transforming Turkey into a central power.

Turkey’s manifest destiny?

The vision of Turkey as a central power is most clearly manifested in Turkey’s activism in the Middle East, where Davutoglu has positioned Turkey as an “order setter.” The term means something akin to a benign regional hegemon with the influence and desire to reshape the political and security order of the region. The Turkish political elite sees Turkey as the leader of the Islamic world and its involvement in the Middle East almost as the country’s manifest destiny. This mind-set represents a sharp break from the past, when Turkey consciously chose to keep its distance from the Middle East. In the early days of the Republic, this distancing act served to maintain Turkey’s Western orientation and allowed it to make a clean break with its Ottoman heritage. In later years, Cold War polarization prevented any credible discussion of an alternative approach.

The power vacuum resulting from the U.S. intervention in Iraq and rising anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East also facilitated Turkey’s shift
in outlook. Whereas in the Balkans the EU presence was a check against the extension of Turkish influence and in the Caucasus the Russian presence plays the same role, Turkey found more fertile soil for its activism in the Middle East (the same has proven true for Iran, as well). Today Prime Minister Erdogan is arguably the most popular political figure in the Arab world and the increasingly anti-Israel tenor of Turkey’s official rhetoric has only increased this popularity.

However, in addition to these external factors, several domestic developments have also driven this transformation. In contrast to their predecessors, Turkey’s new AKP ruling class has a much greater cultural affinity for, and more extensive personal contacts in, the Arab Middle East. Whereas past lawmakers felt more at ease in the corridors of European palaces and parliaments, the current crop of leaders feel more at home engaging the Arab body politic. For Turkish leaders, dealing with EU leaders means annoyance, frustration, and disappointment; interactions with the Arab world hold the promise of personal admiration and adulation.

There is also a political-economic rationale behind Turkey’s Middle East activism. The emergence of the “Anatolian tigers,” the small- and mid-sized, yet dynamic, enterprises of the trading cities of inner Anatolia, represents a growing political constituency in favor of a Middle East rapprochement as a way of opening new export markets. The transformation of Turkey into a “trading state” is another element that bolsters Ankara’s Middle East agenda. In light of these trends, Turkey’s newfound interest in the Middle East is revealed as a structural phenomenon—the creation of a new normalcy in Turkey’s relations with its Southern neighbors.

The paradigm of Turkey as a “central power” is the backdrop against which we ought to understand Turkey’s active involvement in the Iranian nuclear standoff. Given all of the preceding facts, there was no way that Davutoglu could have kept, or would have wanted to keep, Turkish diplomacy disengaged from a diplomatic crisis involving a neighboring country. Whereas traditional Turkish diplomacy strove to stay within the limits of the Western consensus, the new Turkish diplomacy is moved by a different self-perception that demanded a much more active role. Since Turkish policy makers view their country as a central power with an important regional role to play, they are willing to remain at odds with the West on certain issues. As President Abdullah Gul said recently, “If you look at all the issues that are of importance to the world today, they have put Turkey in a rather advantageous position”—an eloquent description of the centrality argument.
The de-securitization of foreign policy

Another important driver of Turkey’s foreign policy transformation is the process we might call a “de-securitization” of the country’s international situation. Security concerns once played a dominant role in traditional Turkish foreign policy and so the defense partnership constituted a fundamental pillar of Turkey’s relations with the West. This was an asymmetric relationship: Ankara, as a consumer of security, was dependent on the West as a supplier of it. As a result, Ankara’s foreign policy choices were constrained by the practical necessity of keeping Turkish foreign policy aligned with Western foreign policy priorities.

However, this vision has gradually eroded over the past decade. External factors leading to its erosion include geopolitical shifts like the end of the Cold War and the push for democracy in the Middle East. Internal factors include Turkey’s desire to get to a point where it can say it has “zero problems” with its neighbors. As political scientist Saban Kardas argues, “Declining threat perceptions have diminished an important rationale of Turkey’s Western orientation: the defense partnership whereby Turkey sought to solidify its security through aligning with the Western political and security community’s priorities in the Middle East and Eurasia.”

Ankara’s lessened preoccupation with issues of survival and territorial integrity has thus significantly reduced the West’s leverage over Ankara’s policy choices. Turkey now enjoys a wider array of options for its foreign policy and it is eager to take advantage of them.

Turkey’s opening to Syria was the harbinger of this shift. After decades of tense relations, caused largely by the Assad regime’s support for Kurdish armed separatists and its claims to the Turkish territory of Hatay, Ankara decided to try a rapprochement with Damascus, beginning with the visit of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to the Syrian capital in 2005. Despite mounting U.S. criticism of its diplomatic gestures, Turkey persevered in its efforts to befriend the Syrian leadership. These efforts paid off as Turkey began to gain the confidence of the Syrian authorities. The process culminated in the central role that Ankara played in initiating a new round of peace talks between Syria and Israel in 2007.

Turkey’s success in mainstreaming relations with Syria provided the momentum for similar overtures toward “unfriendly” neighbors. On Iraq, Turkish leaders stopped talking about the country’s instability as a threat and started to treat it as an opportunity to extend Turkish influence in the region. In particular, Ankara’s decision to engage the leadership in northern Iraq on non-security issues such as trade, investments, large-scale infrastructure projects, and energy and transportation cooperation is a sign of this new approach. Turkey’s organization of joint cabinet meetings with Syria and Iraq is also a
recent initiative that was unfathomable only a few years ago. And finally, one can interpret Ankara’s decision to lift visa requirements for citizens of formerly “unfriendly” countries like Russia and Syria as yet another component of the ongoing de-securitization of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkish foreign policy rhetoric has also changed in tandem with these concrete achievements. “Threat”-based foreign policy language has given way to talk of win-win scenarios and mutual benefit. One substantial consequence of the de-securitization of Turkish foreign policy was the change of the power relationship between the military and the civilian establishment in the conduct of foreign policy. A second and no less important consequence is the change in the power relationship between Turkey and the West.

The speed and severity of this break with the past begs an important question: Has the de-securitization of Turkish foreign policy gone too far? Recent press reports have stated that Ankara intends to strike Iran and Syria from the formal list of threats included in its National Security Document, which forms the basis of Turkey’s national security strategy. While this move may be just a logical extension of Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbors” doctrine, it may nonetheless create a new source of tensions between Turkey and the West, which continues to view these countries with deep suspicion at best. NATO is now poised to announce its support for an ambitious missile defense plan. Will Turkey’s less sensitive threat perception regarding its neighbors to the south hinder Allied efforts to establish these costly defense systems? Given that they are designed to counter common threats as identified by a consensus of NATO members, it is hard to see how Turkey’s new outlook won’t pose a problem.

**Turkey as a “trading state”**

A further driver of change behind Turkey’s new foreign policy is its emergence as a trading state. The concept of the “trading state” was first introduced by Richard Rosecrance, but more recently, political scientist Kemal Kirisci applied this concept to Turkish foreign policy. Trading states emphasize the role of economic interdependence in their foreign policy, in contrast to states that rely on military capabilities and hard power. For trading states, national interest cannot be determined solely by narrowly construed national security concerns; economic considerations such as trade, the expansion of export markets, and foreign direct investment (FDI) are just as important.

Several ongoing trends point to Turkey’s new identity as a trading state, beginning with its economic development and integration with the global economy. In 1980, Turkey abandoned its import substitution strategy, which aimed to protect domestic industries behind high tariff barriers, in favor of...
an export-oriented growth strategy. In 1996, it concluded a customs union agreement with the EU and expanded a network of free trade agreements to consolidate this transition. As a result, trade growth underpinned Turkey’s transformation into a liberal market economy and its eventual inclusion in the group of successful emerging markets. In the past decade, Turkey’s GDP has increased from U.S. $192 billion to $640 billion in 2009, making Turkey the sixteenth largest economy in the world. During the same time, per capita incomes tripled from $3,000 to $9,000 per year. The share of national income deriving from trade grew from 38 percent to 48 percent. Exports grew significantly, from $28 billion in 2000 to $132 billion in 2008. FDI increased from a paltry $800 million in 1999 to a record high of $22 billion in 2007.

But perhaps the most important indicator of Turkey’s arrival as a trading state is to be found in its economic relations with its neighbors. Turkey’s trade and investment links with bordering states have grown faster than those with any other state or group of states. Turkey’s trade volume with its immediate neighborhood increased from less than $18 billion in 2000 to more than $53 billion in 2009 (Table 1). Exports to Turkey’s neighbors increased by a factor of 3.4, while exports overall grew by 2.7, and to the EU by only 2.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Turkey’s Foreign Trade (million USD)</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>Import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>6,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>3,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,683</td>
<td>13,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>14,510</td>
<td>26,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>3,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>27,775</td>
<td>54,508</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Exports to Turkey’s neighbors have grown from 16 percent to 20 percent of all exports, and there is plenty of room for that share to grow. Turkey maintains its largest trade deficits with Russia and Iran, which, not coincidentally, are markets where Ankara is especially keen to expand its exports.

Over the past five years, FDI flows from the states in the Near East and Middle East increased sixfold from $918 million to $6.7 billion. As a result this region edged up to second place among the top suppliers of FDI to Turkey, relegating the United States to third place with FDI flows totaling $6.3 billion. Nevertheless, EU countries remain in the lead with $47 billion in FDI for the years 2005–2010.

The transformation of the Turkish economy and its new orientation have led not just to the emergence of a new political constituency in favor of maintaining and increasing trade opportunities, but also to the widespread acceptance of a new foreign policy calculus that takes into account this economic reality. Indeed, as Kirisci argues, “this economic reality, the growth of foreign trade, has a direct bearing on employment, growth, investments, tax revenues, and wealth generation in Turkey and inevitably enters the decision-making matrix of the government as well as traditional foreign policy-makers, such as the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Moreover, it can be argued that the economic structure of Turkey’s southern neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, necessitates a government-to-government approach to improving trade flows. In top-down economies such as those to the south, helping Turkish companies get a foot in the door means establishing close relations with whatever political power structures and regimes that circumstances present.

The emergence of the “Anatolian tigers” presents an interesting phenomenon from a foreign policy perspective. The term “Anatolian tigers” is used to denote the small and mid-sized, yet dynamic, enterprises of the trading cities of inner Anatolia. These businesses are much more conservative politically than the established captains of Turkish industry, and they constitute the backbone of support for the ruling AKP. Handicapped by a lack of economies of scale and by the structural difficulties of penetrating the more mature markets of the West, these emerging industrialists have found their comparative advantage in Turkey’s eastern and southern neighborhoods. Thus these businesses have pushed the government to open up new spaces for them to sell and buy, including newly friendly neighbors Iraq and Syria, as well as countries all over Africa.

Finally, the country’s economic transformation allows the “interdependence” approach to be used as a tool of Turkish foreign policy. It is interesting to note that, while Davutoglu’s book *Strategic Depth* contains few references to economics, he has nevertheless elsewhere highlighted economic interdependence as a means of creating “order” in the Middle East and that this order “cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of isolated economies.” In this context, we can interpret interdependence as serving two functions: First, it is a tool for
conflict resolution and peace building, and, second, it creates and sustains new markets for Turkish exports and businesses.\textsuperscript{21}

In the same vein, growing economic affluence has helped Turkey become a much more visible player in the area of international aid. Growing economic assistance budgets have helped to extend Turkey’s soft power further and further afield. The official aid figure for 2008 was $780 million spread over 98 countries. A major recipient of this aid was Afghanistan, which receives almost 45 percent of the overall funds. The next sixteen major recipient countries are all from the Balkans or Turkey’s immediate neighborhood (with the exception of Ethiopia and Sudan).

\textbf{Interim Balance Sheet}

Assessing the impact of any foreign policy is a tricky task, especially when one does not have the benefit of hindsight. This is particularly true in the case of Turkish foreign policy, which in many ways is still in flux. However, a provisional evaluation can be made by answering whether Ankara’s economic success and diplomatic activism has translated into a real capacity to influence regional politics.

\textbf{A glass half full?}

The positive evolution of Turkish policy in the Middle East provides the strongest case in favor of Turkey’s new approach. In the past decade, Turkey has vastly improved relations with its Arab neighbors, including Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Commenting on the results of a public opinion survey on Turkey’s image in the Middle East, international relations expert Meliha Altunisik notes, Turkey has been able to transform its problematic relationships with its Middle Eastern neighbors and emphasized diplomacy, dialogue, and economic interdependence in its engagement with the region. Ankara has also become more eager to play third party roles in regional conflicts and is generally perceived as an impartial and constructive actor. Overall, Turkey began to promote a vision that emphasized a stable, peaceful, and prosperous region that demonstrates the capacity to tackle its own problems and argued that such a region is in the interest of Turkey as well.\textsuperscript{22}

This improvement gave Turkey the leverage to help resolve a range of regional problems. For instance, Turkey was influential in breaking the political deadlock in Lebanon, helping the different factions come together to set up a government. And its rapprochement with Damascus radically transformed the bilateral relationship, facilitating Syria’s renewed engagement with the United States and the EU. It is on the basis of this new era of trust with the Assad regime that Turkey mediated indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. We should also take special note of the evolution
of Turkey’s position on Iraq. Whereas Turkey used to view Iraq through the lens of hard core security concerns, seeking to limit the political influence of Kurdish leaders, the new Turkish policy is about extending Ankara’s influence over Iraq’s economic and political future. As a result of this evolution, Turkey can now claim to have played an indispensable role in convincing the Sunna to support the Status of Forces Agreement, which allowed U.S. troops to begin withdrawing from Iraq.

A recent public opinion poll designed to gauge Turkey’s image in the Middle East proves that its new foreign policy is paying dividends. The “Image of Turkey” survey was conducted in seven countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq) with a total sample size of 2,006 individuals. The survey found that Turkey ranked second after Saudi Arabia in the list of positively regarded countries, with 75 percent of respondents expressing either favorable or very favorable views. It also found that 79 percent of respondents agreed that Turkey should play a mediating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that 77 percent supported a bigger role for Turkey in the Arab world. The survey also showed that the public in these seven countries perceives Turkey as a major, influential actor. Clearly, the Arab constituency is also beginning to recognize the changes in Turkey’s policy.

Turkey’s regional influence has become visible not just in the Middle East and Near East but in the Balkans as well. Political changes in Serbia—namely, the rise of a pro-EU constituency led by President Boris Tadic and a history of mistrust between Belgrade and Sarajevo—gave Turkish diplomats a chance to play a constructive role in the Balkans. Having traditionally supported the Bosnians, Turkey readjusted its policy toward Belgrade and rebuilt its ties with the new Serbian leadership. At the same time, Ankara launched a tripartite consultation mechanism between the foreign ministers and presidents of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Turkey, and it used its chairmanship of the South-East European Cooperation Process as a regional framework to bolster this novel consultation mechanism. Ankara believes that this initiative was instrumental in the Serbian parliament’s decision to apologize for the crimes committed in Srebrenica, as well as Serbia’s and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s decisions to open embassies in their respective capitals.

The growing portfolio of Turkey’s mediation efforts in bilateral and regional disputes is another indicator of its regional influence. Ankara has led efforts in and around Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between Bosnia and Serbia, Georgia and Abkhazia, and Israel and Pakistan. Turkey’s third-party involvement in regional disputes has consolidated its role in the region and bolstered its image as a constructive player. To be sure, there are potential problems with Turkey’s assuming this new role: There remain ongoing internal (ethnic)
and external (Armenia, Cyprus) conflicts that undermine Ankara’s credibility as a mediator.

Ankara has sought to complement its mediator role by pursuing a number of multilateral initiatives. Turkey was elected in 2008, after an absence of forty-seven years, to the UN Security Council for 2009–2010. It is now co-chairing (with Spain) the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, an endeavor aimed at building tolerance among cultures and overcoming radicalism. It retains the chairmanship of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Having launched an “Outreach to Africa” policy in 2005, Ankara convened the first-ever “Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit” last year, which was attended by the heads of state and government officials of almost all countries on the African continent. Turkey is also an influential member of the Organization of Islamic States (the body is currently led by a Turkish secretary general), and it recently established the Turkish-Arabic Forum under the Arab League and the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism under the Gulf Cooperation Council. In 2010, Turkey also held the UN Conference on Somalia, and it is getting ready to host the UN Conference on Less Developed Countries.

**A glass half empty?**

The most notable exception to this generally positive track record is Turkey’s relations with Israel. Whereas the two countries had established a strong alliance in the mid-1990s that culminated in close military and intelligence cooperation, the heavy-handed Israeli intervention in Gaza, combined with the AKP leadership’s proclivity to pile on criticism of Israel in order to boost Turkey’s popularity in the Middle East, led to a serious deterioration in the bilateral relationship. The Gaza flotilla incident, which resulted in the killings of nine Turkish citizens by Israeli forces, led to even more acrimony and downgraded diplomatic relations. The costs this has incurred for Turkey have been not only the loss of a privileged relationship with Israel (and the points Turkey thereby won in the U.S. Congress) but also the end of the mediation role that Turkey had aspired to play in the Middle East peace process. Unless there is a drastic improvement in the relationship, Turkey will be sidelined in the most important dispute in the Middle East. More generally, the Turkish government has so far ineptly managed the strategic challenge of improving relations with the Arab world without upsetting the relationship with Israel.

Relations with the Turkic-language countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia have also tipped over to the wrong side of the balance sheet. Turkey’s mismanagement of its rapprochement with Armenia led to the estrangement of Azerbaijan and a loss of confidence between Baku and Ankara. Turkey and Armenia negotiated and signed in October 2009 a series of protocols to normalize their relationship, but the process stalled, due in no small measure to
the negative reaction of the government in Baku. Interestingly, Ankara is now dependent on third parties to regain lost ground in the relationship. It has now fallen to the Minsk Group, which includes Russia, France, and the United States, to force a deal on Yerevan and Baku on Nagorno-Karabakh. Similarly, Turkey’s relations with the countries of Central Asia have not improved. These strongly secular regimes continue to view the AKP government as a backer of Islamic-leaning political movements. Finally, the sustained Russian influence represents a structural impediment to Turkey’s ambitions in the region.

Despite these negatives, however, the balance sheet of Turkish foreign policy still adds up to a positive figure. Turkey’s growing footprint in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in the Balkans, its emergence as a responsible aid provider and an active participant in multilateral diplomacy, and the number and scope of its mediation efforts in the Middle East and beyond, are all indications that Turkey is firmly on a path to increased influence and recognition.

**Change and continuity**

The desire to create a more ambitious, diverse, and multi-regional foreign policy cannot be attributed solely to the AKP leadership. Previous Turkish leaders, including former presidents Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel, charted similar courses for Turkish foreign policy. Ozal wanted Turkey to acquire a more influential role in the Middle East, while Demirel wanted to develop a larger role for Turkey in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Former foreign minister Ismail Cem spoke of Turkey’s destiny as a bridge of civilizations. Taking this past into account, one can see how the new Turkish foreign policy fits into a historical continuum. The differences this time are Davutoglu’s much broader take on the idea, coupled with Turkey’s newly de-securitized international context and its economic growth. So while one cannot really say that Turkey’s new foreign policy is original, one can say that its time seems to have finally come.

**Implications for the United States and the EU**

The transformation of Turkish policy has important implications for Brussels and Washington. First and foremost is the fact that the West no longer enjoys a sacrosanct place in Turkish strategic thinking. The new Turkish foreign policy has no such (mis)conceptions about the West. Instead, its objective is to establish a sound and balanced web of relations.
Implications for Europe

In practice, the revolution in Turkish policy now means that Ankara can instrumentalize the objective of EU membership. This was always an overriding foreign policy goal for past governments, its eminence stemming from its importance to the overarching goal of constructing a primarily European identity for Turkey. The AKP government has no such hang-ups. For them, the European identity is just one of Turkey’s many identities, and there is no reason why it should be at the top of the hierarchy. Once robbed of its identity dimension, the EU objective becomes a mere instrument for anchoring domestic reforms. In a recent interview, the chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish parliament and former foreign minister Yasar Yakis clarified the role that the EU now plays in Ankara’s strategic thinking. He stressed that EU membership is now considered a mere instrument for anchoring domestic reforms, concluding his remarks by stating that, if Turkey is able to carry out the reforms, then EU membership will become a “secondary” issue. Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s allusions to Norway, which rejected European Community membership in 1972 and EU membership in 1994, underline the extent to which Turkey has started to downplay the importance of the ultimate goal of EU membership. In short, Yakis, Gul, and many others now see membership as less important than transforming Turkey in such a way as to be ready for membership. When the time comes, perhaps Turkey would even reject EU membership just like Norway did in 1972 and 1994.

The logical conclusion to draw from this assessment is that the loss of EU membership is now a manageable destiny for a newly confident and assertive Turkey. To follow the train of logic even further, one could well imagine the Erdogan government eventually negotiating an alternative framework with the EU to fulfill the anchoring function that the accession process once served. Nor is it likely that this new outlook is a mere bluff or stratagem: Speaking to a convention of conservative business leaders in early October, Erdogan called on the EU to clearly determine its stance on Turkey. He said, “If you don’t want us, say it clearly. Don’t waste our time. They are concocting new formulas and saying that they are not keeping us waiting.” It is unusual for a Turkish prime minister to adopt such blunt rhetoric toward Brussels or to force Europe’s hand at a time when the political situation is so unfavorable to Turkish accession. Until now, Turkey’s approach had been to manage the relationship and hope that Turkey’s emergence as a regional power would convince the Europeans that they could be a valuable asset. Thus Erdogan’s recent statements may herald a clear shift in the Turkish government’s EU approach. One important caveat, however, is the domestic reaction to such an outcome. A shrinking but still substantial portion of the Turkish population still treasures the goal of EU membership; if the dream were to die, they might lash out and accuse the government of breaking a sacrosanct bond with the West. The
second important consequence of this analysis is the change in the power relationship between Ankara and Brussels. The EU has lost a significant degree of its leverage on Turkey. As membership fell in importance for Turkey, the credibility of the whole EU process was severely undermined. This means that, in spite of ongoing negotiations with the EU, Ankara will insist on a much more equal relationship with Brussels. This shift in attitude will have consequences for settling the remaining disputes between Ankara and Brussels and between NATO and the EU. Cyprus remains the biggest bottleneck with respect to both relationships.

As Turkey starts to pursue a more visible and vigorous regional engagement policy, its concerns will begin to overlap with those of the EU in many regions. Indeed, there are already some signs that Turkey’s newfound activism has raised hackles in Brussels at the possibility that Turkey might become a rival to EU influence in certain areas. Over the past five years, Turkey has moved from a policy of aligning itself with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy to one of neutrality, letting circumstances determine whether or not to align itself with Europe. It is something of a paradox that, just when Turkey began to acquire the capacity to become a valuable partner for EU foreign policy, Ankara and Brussels started to grow apart. For instance, the chapters under negotiation on external policies and the Common Foreign and Security Policy remain stalled over Greece’s bilateral disputes with Turkey, and Cyprus’s veto of EU-NATO cooperation, respectively.

In practice, however, Turkey shares the EU’s preference for stability and the status quo. One could therefore argue that Turkey’s regional engagement is an opportunity for the EU. The challenge will be for the two sides to bypass problematic areas of negotiations and seek an institutionalized foreign policy dialogue. From this perspective, the structural changes taking place within the EU as a result of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty should be seen as a real opportunity. A new diplomatic service is being set up under the guidance of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton. This new structure should allow the EU to engage with Turkey on issues related exclusively to foreign policy. Until now, the existing platforms such as the Association Council or the intergovernmental conferences have not been conducive for a dialogue focused on foreign policy. More often than not, they were marred by mutual recriminations about the unfulfilled expectations of the accession process.

For the United States

For the United States as a global player, Turkey’s foreign policy transformation has different but no less important consequences. As an actor deeply involved
in the Middle East, where its interests overlap with those of Turkey, the United States will feel more pressure than Europe to adjust to the new Turkey. The challenge is at first a conceptual one, concerning how Washington will relate to emerging regional powers. Indeed if the coming world will be characterized by the emergence of new regional powers, U.S. foreign policy faces a fundamental challenge. In a setting where local powers take up more elbow room, the United States will have to devise new ways to leverage its own strengths with those of its regional friends. The challenge for the United States will be accepting that its interests and those of its friends in a given region will not always converge. It is not surprising, therefore, that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton chose to flag the challenge of new regional actors when she introduced the new U.S. National Security Strategy in May 2010. She presented the growing diversity of actors with influence in the world as a challenge, but also as an opportunity to develop “new modes of cooperation, new capacities to improve lives, some tangible efforts to bridge great gaps in understanding.” In all likelihood, the re-balancing of the power relationship to accommodate the aspirations of these emerging powers will become an even more prevalent theme in strategic thinking about the global order.

Taking this perspective into account, the U.S.-Turkey relationship can actually provide a blueprint for adjusting to this new global reality. The United States needs to come to a deeper understanding about the drivers of change in Turkish foreign policy to ensure the smoothness of the transition. Focusing on these drivers and successfully differentiating between contingent and structural features of the new world will minimize the level of friction in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. The United States will have to accept as inevitable the need to work with Turkey on a diverse and wide-ranging set of issues: The Iran nuclear crisis, the Middle East peace process, energy policy, the Black Sea and the Caucasus, Iraq, Russia, Syria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—all will certainly be part of the common U.S.-Turkish agenda for years to come.

In particular, the Iran issue has the capacity to control the tenor of the U.S.-Turkey relationship for the near future. Turkey’s attitude toward Tehran has undoubtedly played a major role in undermining its support within the U.S. political establishment. But recognizing Ankara’s legitimate aspirations to be a part of the solution on the Iran issue will likely help U.S. policy makers achieve their goal of persuading Iran to comply with the transparency requirements of the international community. The differences between the United States and Turkey on Iran are not strategic; they are purely tactical. Turkey certainly doesn’t want to see a nuclear Iran. Thus Ankara’s engagement with the Iranian leadership should be counted as a valuable resource that the international community and the United States can make good use of. Turkish policy makers themselves have argued, for instance, that they can directly communicate with the leadership in Tehran and deliver whatever messages the West wishes to send. They also contend that the Iranians have become more
receptive to this approach once they understood that Turkey has no agenda besides ensuring the defusing of the tension around Iran's nuclear program.

Turkey’s role as a facilitator should thus be the basis for closer U.S.-Turkey cooperation on Iran going forward. When cooperation along these lines has broken down, it has done so because Ankara went too far and pursued an active mediation role, as it did when it concluded the Tehran Nuclear Reactor deal. There needs to be a balance between the U.S. interest in building a united front against Iran and Turkey’s interest in remaining an active member of the team of solution seekers. Both sides might strike this balance by pushing Turkey to continue its dialogue with the Iranian leadership, with the expectation that Ankara will induce them to recommence the negotiations with the P5+1 (the United States, Great Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany). Indeed there are signs that this is precisely the path now adopted by Turkish diplomacy, as illustrated by the joint press statements of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Brazil, and Iran after their last meeting on July 25, 2010.32

More broadly, to accommodate the aspirations of emerging regional powers like Turkey, the United States should raise the “normative” debate as a matter of more pressing importance. President Obama went some way in doing this when he told the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2010,

The world that America seeks is not one we can build on our own. For human rights to reach those who suffer the boot of oppression, we need your voices to speak out. In particular, I appeal to those nations who emerged from tyranny and inspired the world in the second half of the last century—from South Africa to South Asia; from Eastern Europe to South America. Don’t stand idly by, don’t be silent, when dissidents elsewhere are imprisoned and protesters are beaten. Recall your own history. Because part of the price of our own freedom is standing up for the freedom of others.33

Jorge Castaneda, former foreign minister of Mexico, recently made a similar argument when he called on the emerging powers to be more responsive in addressing global challenges.34 If emerging powers like Turkey can justly raise their expectations about re-balancing the power relationship with the global actor, then the United States can justly demand in return a more “normative” approach to foreign policy from its aspiring partners.

The term “normative foreign policy” has different interpretations, of course, but here it will be used to denote three different sets of behaviors, with the more ambitious sets circumscribing the less ambitious ones. The first, minimalist interpretation would be for states that project stability onto their immediate neighborhood. The projection of stability is the first and simplest dimension of this framework, to the extent that it requires one to foster cooperation among neighbors, create institutions, and become a responsible regional player. The second, more ambitious definition denotes states with the capacity to participate in the international rule-making process, sharing burdens, avoiding free-riding behavior, and providing ideas as focal points for cooperation, ultimately
leading to the construction of broadly shared values that define the international order. Finally, the third, most ambitious definition is reserved for states that openly espouse the objective of spreading “universal” values—in particular, democracy—through their foreign policy agenda.

When Turkey had little influence in its region, it mattered little whether Ankara had a normative foreign policy or not. Turkey had the luxury of acting without giving much thought to its responsibility to espouse a more ambitious foreign policy based on “values.” When Turkey increased in power and influence, the question of values became a much more important issue. But while Turkey has acted, and continues to act, to project stability throughout the region, it has thus far failed to move up the normative ladder and join the debate on global public goods. On the one hand, official talking points tout Turkey’s G20 membership, but on the other hand, Turkey was one of the last signatories of the Kyoto Protocol, having ratified it in January 2009, and it has not adopted a clear democracy promotion agenda. Up until now, the argument was that a developing country such as Turkey could ill afford such an ambitious agenda, and that non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations is a premise of Turkish foreign policy. A vivid example, once more, is Ankara’s policy on Iran. The Turkish government has regularly shied away from criticizing the mullahs for human rights violations, and it was even the first government to congratulate Ahmadinejad for his victory in the recent disputed elections.

The transformation of Turkish foreign policy will trigger a readjustment of the power relationship between the United States and Turkey. The United States has to recognize that the newly assertive Turkey may henceforth define its national interest more ambitiously and defend it more aggressively than before. It must also be aware that Turkey’s more ambitious approach to how it determines its national interests will increase the probability that U.S. and Turkish interests will diverge. Turkish policy makers can facilitate this adjustment period by adopting, even if only gradually, a more normative approach to foreign policy. Such a transformation would also help to dissipate the increasingly vocal debate about whether or not Turkey is drifting away from the West. It would also strengthen the legitimacy of the ongoing initiatives for addressing global problems.

Turkey’s transformation into a more visible, constructive, and responsible player in the debate over global public goods has the potential to make a significant contribution to achieving the desired level of inclusiveness in these discussions. So far the perception has been one of a lopsided effort by the industrialized countries of the West to engage the rest of the world, and particularly the emerging powers. The upgrading of the importance of the G20 as a key international decision-making body was certainly an endeavor to allow a more balanced framework for discussion to emerge. Turkey’s more active participation as an emerging power in the global discussion is the type of
leadership needed to open the terms of the debate to other emerging nations in Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey’s domestic transformation, combining democracy, modernity, and Islam, has often been put forward as a model for other Islamic nations. Turkey now has a perfect opportunity to create a similar model regarding its external policies on global issues.

A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame?

Under the AKP, Turkish policy makers are striving to carve out a lasting place for Turkey in the sunlit uplands of international relations. Whether its stay in these pleasant environs is a long one or a short one hinges on a complex set of factors. One of those factors is domestic support for the current direction of foreign policy. Davutoglu’s policy is very popular at present, but there is nonetheless occasional criticism of the rapprochement with the Middle East, which some see as a forced alternative to the Western orientation espoused by previous governments. In other words, Turks are also debating whether Turkey is moving away from the West. These criticisms, which are also a reflection of the pro- and anti-government divide in Turkish politics, are focused on its Iran policy, engagement with Hamas, and the harsh new rhetoric toward Israel. Whether this episodic criticism of current foreign policy will grow into a serious challenge to policy makers will depend on the opposition’s formulating a coherent alternative narrative for Turkey’s evolution. The current policy’s popularity has much to do with the narrative that undergirds it: Turkey as a regional/central power, capable of acting to protect its national interests even when those interests clash with the West’s. This “independentist” approach appeals to the large majority of Turks, who have an ambivalent relationship with the West. This narrative could only be challenged by a credible narrative that sees the West as a true partner. However, given the rise of anti-Americanism in the wake of the Iraq war and the EU’s loss of credibility, it has become even less likely that such a credible narrative can be constructed. The only medium-term solution to this problem is the rejuvenation of the EU process, which would require the EU to adopt a much more welcoming attitude toward Turkey.

The second factor that can influence the sustainability of the current foreign policy is the cost factor. The current cost/benefit analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy is heavily skewed toward the benefits. However, as Turkish policy makers adopt more assertive, if not more confrontational, attitudes as a result of their growing confidence (the Gaza flotilla incident being a clear example of such), people will be able to draw much clearer links between actions and reactions, and the costs of various policies might thus loom much larger. Turkey’s stance toward Israel, for example, has had a visible impact on U.S. attitudes toward Turkey. Ankara’s Iran policy has only compounded Turkey’s image
problem in the United States and beyond. Further deterioration with long-standing allies has the potential to dampen popular support for current policies by acquainting the public more intimately with their hidden costs.

The third factor is the geopolitical evolution of Turkey’s neighborhood. In fact, Turkey’s recent diplomatic overtures were predicated on the diffusion of military threats in the region, an outcome which necessarily requires the cooperation of Turkey’s neighbors. Thus one could argue that the sustainability of Ankara’s policy hinges on the continuation of this benign dynamic. A return to hard core security concerns in the region would impel Ankara to seek a more robust relationship with the West and considerably restrict the freedom of Turkish policy makers to act.

There are several factors working in favor of the long-term sustainability of Turkey’s new foreign policy. According to many analysts, the Turkish economy is likely to continue performing strongly. Continuing economic growth can only increase Turkey’s institutional capacity to practice a more ambitious foreign policy. Additionally, Turkey’s involvement in the Middle East has by now become a structural phenomenon. It is no longer very likely that Turkey will return to maintaining superficial relations with its southern neighbors, and it isn’t likely that Turkish leaders will lose their newly acquired verve for playing an active role at the table of multilateral diplomacy.

Finally, despite Western priorities losing ground in Turkish foreign policy thinking, there is ultimately a limit to how far away Turkey can drift. Turkey’s ties to the West are deep and manifold. At the economic level, half of Turkey’s trade is still with Europe. More than 80 percent of foreign investments in Turkey originates either in the United States or the EU. At the institutional level, Turkey is well-ensconced in almost all European and transatlantic institutions. At the domestic level, there is a sizable constituency for a Western-oriented Turkey. These elements all provide a structural barrier against a severe break with the West.

There can be no doubt that a reorientation of Turkish foreign policy is under way. This does not mean that Turkey is moving away from the West, or that the West has lost Turkey. It does mean, however, that Turkey is striving to create more space in its neighborhood and in its relations with the West to implement a more ambitious approach to foreign policy. It also means that Turkey’s national interests will clash with those of its partners in the West more frequently. Moving forward, then, the main challenge for Turkey’s Western partners will be one of accommodating Turkey while keeping it firmly anchored to the Western club.
will depend on whether the main players can strike a grand bargain, whereby the incumbent powers will give greater leeway to the emerging regional powers while demanding in return a more normative stance in the conduct of their foreign policy. The expectation will therefore be for Turkey to move up the normative ladder and demonstrate its ability to participate in the international rule-making process—to share the costs and benefits of providing solutions to global challenges. Turkey and its Western partners have a unique responsibility for setting the right example. If the West cannot harmonize its relationship with one of its long-standing members, what hope can there be for the future of the relationship between the West and other emerging powers?
Notes


3 See “Turkey’s Crisis Over Israel and Iran,” International Crisis Group, Europe Report, no. 208, September 2010.


8 For a more detailed explanation of both of these concepts, refer to the section on Turkey as a trading state.


10 Saban Kardas, “Turkey in the Middle East.”

11 The document remains classified.

12 Changes related to the public perception of NATO among Turks can also be used to substantiate the de-securitization argument. According to the 2010 edition of the Transatlantic Trends, 30 percent of Turks feel that NATO is essential to their security. The figure was 53 percent in 2004.


15 Turkey has concluded free trade agreements with the following group of countries: the EFTA states, Israel, Serbia, Montenegro, Israel, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Georgia, Albania, and Chile.

16 As a result of the global economic crisis, net FDI inflows decreased to $7.6 billion in 2009.

17 This group includes primarily Iraq, Iran, Syria, Israel, and Azerbaijan.

18 Kirisci, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy.”


21 “Democracy Diffusion: The Turkish Experience,” in a forthcoming edited publication of the Transatlantic Academy-German Marshall Fund on Turkish foreign policy.


23 For more information see Mensur Akgun, Gokce Percinoglu, and Sabiha Senyucel Gundogar, “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East,” TESEV Foreign Policy Analysis Series, no 10, 2010.

24 Ankara’s vote tally was 151 from a possible total of 192.


30 The concomitant crisis with Israel over the flotilla incident did not help either.

31 Turkish policy makers complain that the United States was unwilling to share the draft text of the UN Security Council Resolution on aggravated sanctions against Iran at a time when Turkey, as a member of the UN Security Council and a neighbor of Iran, was visibly engaged in diplomacy to defuse the crisis. It would also help if the crisis moves to the next level of containing Iran.


34 Castaneda stated, within respect to emerging powers like Brazil, China, India and South Africa, that “rising powers still see themselves as members of and spokespeople for the developing world; on the other hand, they are staking their reputations on having become major economic, military, geopolitical and even ideological powers, all of which not only distinguishes them from the rest of the Third World but also involves subscribing to certain universal values.” See Jorge G. Castaneda, “Reshuffling the Geopolitical Order,” Los Angeles Times, August 26, 2010, www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-castaneda-world-20100826,0,378406.story.


36 Called the “Sèvres” syndrome after the post World War I agreement that led to the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, it is used to explain the suspicion that many Turks continue to maintain about the ultimate motives of Western powers.
About the Author

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