The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has recently taken a significant step in its nuclear research and development program that at the same time illuminates Riyadh’s best route for demonstrating transparency in nuclear safeguards.
Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict.
The chance to end North Korea’s test program should be seized and, if successful, could form the basis for expanding direct contact and trust between Washington and Pyongyang, while expanding the global norm against nuclear testing.
Over the next decade, the spread and maturation of additive manufacturing could challenge major control mechanisms for inhibiting nuclear proliferation.
The practice of active cyber defense moves the debate over the role of and limits on corporate self-defense in cyberspace beyond the theoretical and into reality.
Thomas Wood, Robert Otto, and Tristan Volpe will discuss their recent articles in The Nonproliferation Review on positive inducements for nuclear proliferation, safety, and security.
Enforcing compliance of nuclear rules works when the non-compliant actor changes its objectives and/or military force is viable. In other cases, bargaining is necessary. This makes justice, not compliance, the framework, which has implications.
To ensure a broader conclusion for Iran is justified, the IAEA must adhere to a set of guiding principles and procedures and disregard political considerations or pressure from member states.
Five months into the Iran deal’s implementation, the IAEA reports that Tehran is in compliance with its obligations. But there are some potential problems on the horizon.
An upcoming meeting will decide whether India will be allowed to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Member states should think carefully.