Incidents involving Iran have been among the most sophisticated, costly, and consequential attacks in the history of the internet.
The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.
The Iran nuclear deal is merely the cornerstone of a broader, longer-term strategy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to diminish and counter Iran’s threatening behavior—from its growing ballistic missile arsenal, to its dangerous use of regional proxies, to its human rights abuses at home.
International calls for bilateral engagement are actually counterproductive because they embolden Pakistan to persist in a fruitless strategy of coercion.
Faced with limited capacity and resources, governments need to develop a complementary, legitimate space for private sector active cyber defense.
In some five dozen countries worldwide, corruption can no longer be understood as merely the iniquitous doings of individuals. Rather, it is the operating system of sophisticated networks that cross sectoral and national boundaries in their drive to maximize returns for their members.
The closing of civic space has become a defining feature of political life in an ever-increasing number of countries.
Case studies from eight countries show how civic activism across the world is evolving and reveal crosscutting themes relevant to the future of civil society support.
At the current juncture of global uncertainty and diversified threats to prosperity, the United States and Japan should work to incorporate their full range of cooperation in more direct service of comprehensive national strategies.
Despite India’s impressive economic growth rates in the mid-2000s, the long-term magnitude and sustainability of this progress remains uncertain.
Critical differences between Chinese and U.S. thinking about nuclear weapons and deterrence result not merely from differing security environments and levels of military strength; they also exist because China and the United States have developed their own nuclear philosophies in implementing their security policies over many years.
The Western Pacific is experiencing a fundamental and potentially destabilizing military and economic power transition driven primarily by China’s economic and military rise and a corresponding relative decline in American power
Fragile states may seem like a distant and abstract concern. They are not. They are at the center of much of today’s regional disorder and global upheaval.
Because of the growing chemical and geological diversity of the new oils, the lack of alternative liquid fuels for transportation, and the size and global scope of oil production and trade, a tax is most needed in the oil sector.
The global nuclear order appears increasingly tense, primarily because many states feel that the structure and distribution of benefits is unjust. Among the states that will determine how the nuclear order will adapt, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan are particularly important.
The Indian Air Force’s falling end strength and problematic force structure, combined with its troubled acquisition and development programs, threaten India’s air superiority over its rapidly modernizing rivals.
Cybertechnologies are rapidly changing the international landscape, but weak international governance of cyberspace stands in stark contrast to the accelerating pace of challenges.
Japan has pledged not to produce more plutonium than it can consume. Serious questions are emerging, however, about whether it can uphold this commitment.
The underlying beliefs that people in the United States and China hold toward each other in the security realm are likely to influence, directly or indirectly, each side’s foreign policy with regard to the bilateral relationship.
The U.S.-India relationship was often distant during the Cold War, but the partnership is now critical for both countries’ strategic aims.