India is not opposed to infrastructure development in the region, but it is concerned about the strategic implications of certain Chinese-led initiatives.
The period known as the “Emergency” in India—June 1975 to March 1977—is widely recognized as one of the darkest episodes in the nation’s 70-year history.
Former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s “relaxed realism” on external issues stands in marked contrast to the liberals on the left and the nationalists on the right, who framed India’s international policies in extreme terms.
If China returned to genuine neutrality on the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan, it could make it a lot easier for New Delhi to set aside its sovereignty argument on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
The BJP is the front-runner in India’s 2019 elections, but its political standing suggests that dominance could be a liability rather than an asset.
With an assertive China and uncertainty of U.S. policy under the Trump administration, Europe and India have realized they have much to offer each other.
New Delhi, Canberra, and Wellington did not appreciate China’s aspirations to become a great global power and thus did not assess the strategic consequences for their own respective regions.
Muslim MPs currently occupy 19 seats of the Lok Sabha (or 3.5 percent of its members), the lowest figure since 1952.
Electoral finance reforms could relax limits on expenditures, but should also feature full transparency with adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms.
The rise of wealthy candidates is driven by the weak representative role of India’s elected politicians, which discourages quality governance and leads elected politicians to view their election campaign as an economic investment in the future.