Twenty-five years after Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became independent states, the South Caucasus remains a strategically sensitive region.
Azerbaijan’s suspension from a coalition of energy-extracting countries will harm Baku’s international brand and image as a reliable place to invest.
The U.S.-Russian relationship is broken, and it cannot be repaired quickly or easily.
Please join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs for the launch of a report on the findings of a high-level bipartisan task force on U.S. policy toward Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.
Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes.
A descent into renewed fighting in the South Caucasus is the last thing anyone wants—least of all the ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis who will be caught in the middle of it.
The EU’s policy of non-recognition and engagement in the South Caucasus has been modestly successful and may offer useful lessons for other parts of Eastern Europe.
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to the creation of a territorial reality characterized by new states with uncertain security status, separatist armed conflicts, and ethnic strife.
The sustainability of Armenia’s model of partial democracy is being challenged by growing popular dissatisfaction and a looming generational turnover.
Despite their appealing promises, oligarchs do not offer a viable form of governance in countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.