Twenty-five years after Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became independent states, the South Caucasus remains a strategically sensitive region.
Territorial conflicts in Southeastern Europe have hampered the implementation of international agreements on arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in disputed territories under the effective control of de facto regimes.
The EU’s policy of non-recognition and engagement in the South Caucasus has been modestly successful and may offer useful lessons for other parts of Eastern Europe.
Despite their appealing promises, oligarchs do not offer a viable form of governance in countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Antipopulist liberals in Georgia and other Eastern European countries have lost voters’ support. They need the wheel of history to turn again to realize their potential.
Georgia’s parliamentary election on October 8 will be the first in the country’s history in which no big charismatic figure is dominating the headlines.
In countries with compounded violence, political elites enjoy extreme privilege and the state apparatus becomes highly politicized. Reducing such violence follows a spiral, not straight line, trajectory.
If Georgia’s prime minister wants to be reelected later in 2016, he’s going to need something from the EU and NATO.
Georgia’s ruling party desperately needs something from the West to spur growth and employment, especially as disillusionment with NATO and the EU grows.
Efforts by Berlin to deny Georgians visa-free access to EU countries damage Germany’s credibility as the union’s leader in its Eastern neighborhood.