Europe’s commitment to the Eastern Partnership region has been cemented by Russian aggression. Yet, for internal reasons, the EU is trying to avoid the costs linked to the countries’ integration.
EU association deals with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have proven to be key drivers of reform in all three countries. The emphasis should now be on implementation, not simply legislative adoption.
NATO and the EU are failing to address the fundamental weaknesses of their policies toward Eastern Europe.
With Russia pursuing integrationist schemes and the EU seeking to sustain its engagement in Eastern Europe, Moldova’s tangle of history, economic ties, and domestic politics presents a unique challenge.
Moldova, which used to be perceived as one of the most democratic post-Soviet countries, has come to be dominated by one politician.
The EU’s policy of non-recognition and engagement in the South Caucasus has been modestly successful and may offer useful lessons for other parts of Eastern Europe.
A recent decision by the OSCE to revive arms-control talks is unlikely to achieve much without simultaneous efforts to resolve protracted conflicts in Eastern Europe.
Despite their appealing promises, oligarchs do not offer a viable form of governance in countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Moldova’s election of a pro-Russian president may be symbolically important but is unlikely to assuage the conflict in the country’s breakaway region of Transdniestria.
A prerequisite to building an effective anticorruption approach is an intimate—and unflinching—examination of the specifics of corrupt operations in the individual country of interest and its physical and electronic neighborhoods.