The issue of corruption should be central to foreign and international trade policy development and should inform the way U.S. assistance—military as well as civilian—is shaped.
A prerequisite to building an effective anticorruption approach is an intimate—and unflinching—examination of the specifics of corrupt operations in the individual country of interest and its physical and electronic neighborhoods.
In countries with compounded violence, political elites enjoy extreme privilege and the state apparatus becomes highly politicized. Reducing such violence follows a spiral, not straight line, trajectory.
If Georgia’s prime minister wants to be reelected later in 2016, he’s going to need something from the EU and NATO.
Georgia’s ruling party desperately needs something from the West to spur growth and employment, especially as disillusionment with NATO and the EU grows.
Renewed fighting in Nagorny Karabakh has raised the stakes for international actors. The main choice now is between serious peace talks and the risk of dangerous spillover.
Efforts by Berlin to deny Georgians visa-free access to EU countries damage Germany’s credibility as the union’s leader in its Eastern neighborhood.
Even if there is a certain historical resonance to Germany’s resolution on the Armenian genocide, the real battle over Turkey’s responsibility is still being fought in Ankara and Diyarbakir.
Despite Georgians’ best efforts, some NATO allies do not seem ready to let the alliance bear its share of the responsibility for nurturing Georgia’s future.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are two or three steps away from a Bosnia-style conflict that could be deleterious for the wider region. What can be done to stop that from happening?