Geopolitical conditions in the South Caucasus have experienced a substantial shift in recent years. Washington needs to adjust assumptions in advancing U.S. interests in the region to make the most of its capabilities.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become the organizing foreign policy concept of the Xi Jinping era.
The United States has important but not vital interests in the South Caucasus, which include preserving regional stability; preventing the resumption of frozen conflicts; and supporting democratic change and better governance as well as the international integration of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is overstretched, underfunded, and assailed on all sides, yet its work has never been so essential.
Twenty-five years after Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became independent states, the South Caucasus remains a strategically sensitive region.
A descent into renewed fighting in the South Caucasus is the last thing anyone wants—least of all the ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis who will be caught in the middle of it.
The sustainability of Armenia’s model of partial democracy is being challenged by growing popular dissatisfaction and a looming generational turnover.
Recent protests in Armenia are the latest example of a growing gap between the Armenian government and society at large.
The Nagorny Karabakh conflict and Armenia’s inability to find a path out of it remain a heavy legacy that blocks the country’s development.
Even if there is a certain historical resonance to Germany’s resolution on the Armenian genocide, the real battle over Turkey’s responsibility is still being fought in Ankara and Diyarbakir.