Narrow by
Use this menu to filter your search results. Check boxes below to return search results related to any combination of issue and regional interest.
Stay Connected to Sada Subscribe Sada is published in English and Arabic and available as articles are published or in a weekly digest.
Enter name and address (All fields are required)
Select Delivery

Sada - Analysis

Egypt’s Assault on Sinai


Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is actively benefiting from Egypt’s heavy-handed approach to insurgency in Sinai.


Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is actively benefiting from Egypt’s heavy-handed approach to insurgency in Sinai.

For over two years, the Egyptian military has been conducting large-scale military operations in North Sinai in response to a series of insurgent attacks targeting Egyptian security forces. However, Egypt’s response—supported by the United States and Israel—to the group conducting the insurgency in Sinai and the Nile Delta, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), lacks innovation and adaptability. The “War on Terror” has become predictable in ways that have been taken advantage of by ABM. Until the Egyptian military and its allies begin to properly understand ABM’s strategy and learn from past mistakes in their approach to confronting Islamist insurgency, they will be largely ineffective in combating this evolving threat.

While ABM and its sympathizers do, undeniably, wave the black banner of al-Qaeda, their appropriation of the themes of global jihad should be understood in primarily strategic terms. ABM is an entirely Egyptian phenomenon, unlike Afghanistan, Iraq, or even Syria, where foreign fighters poured in to participate in a grander jihad; even Palestinian involvement reflects domestic Egyptian political dynamics. At the same time, ABM is distinctly different from other Islamist groups in Egypt. ABM has more than a passing disdain for the Muslim Brotherhood, whom they believed sold out by joining the post-2011 political process; the state claims that the group has an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is now classified as a terrorist group. Their attack on Israel in the early days of Mohamed Morsi’s presidency demonstrates their resolve to cause problems for the Egyptian government, whether it is secularist or Islamist. Moreover, ABM is not connected to the Salafi groups operating in North Sinai’s cities, notably al-Arish, Shiekh Zuweid, and Rafah. However, the Egyptian state has largely responded to ABM’s attacks by targeting these groups, driving them to support greater violence against the state. ABM actively benefits from this conflation. 

Tactically, ABM’s insurgency can be divided into two main phases. The first phase focused on engagement, consisting of a number of high-profile attacks against Israel. While these attacks were largely seen as a tactical failure, the reality could not be more opposite: the border peace between Egypt and Israel was shaken to its foundations, leading to an amendment of the Camp David Accords that allowed Egypt to deploy more heavy weaponry into Sinai. This resulted in the launch of Operation Eagle in August 2011 and its renewal as Operation Sinai in 2012. This was precisely the goal of phase one, and it was met with a heavy-handed security response. Since Egypt has extremely poor human intelligence capabilities on the ground in Sinai due to decades of economic and political alienation, the state’s best bet was to hope that its “kinetic” response would take out jihadists hidden among the civilian population and, of course, silence any journalists who might expose their tactics. This response was a key factor in pushing Sinai’s Salafis to adopt a more violent posture against the state. 

The second phase focused on retaliation, and ABM responded to Egyptian security operations by targeting the security establishment. By targeting military and police rather than Egyptian civilian centers, ABM and its allies are increasingly able to paint themselves as defenders of Egyptian citizens who are being brutalized by Egyptian security forces. This second phase escalated in the aftermath of the Rabia al-Adawiya massacre, which was perhaps the greatest gift the Egyptian military could have handed a group like ABM. This gave ABM and its allies the perfect opportunity to expand its operations into Egypt proper, planting large bombs near police stations and security buildings in Cairo and surrounding governorates including Dakahliya and Sharqiya, as well as targeting the Interior Minister in a failed assassination attempt and a police general in a successful attempt. This did not represent any major change in strategy, but was rather their seizing of an opportunity to conduct retaliation attacks in Egypt proper, which is likely to have been their goal all along. 

Regardless of ABM’s image issues—their al-Qaeda affiliation does not sit well with the majority of Egyptians—the Egyptian response, supported by the United States and Israel, plays directly into ABM’s grand strategy. This response, and the optimism surrounding the recent decline in large-scale attacks in Sinai and Egypt proper, is based on three enormously false premises. The first of these is that aerial bombardment is an effective way to conduct counterinsurgency. Airpower is dangerously indiscriminate, contributing to the perception of an assault against Egypt’s civilian population and increasing support for anti-state violence. The second is that the decline in attacks preceding Egypt’s recent election indicates that Egypt’s strategy to combat the insurgency is working. ABM’s goal is to embarrass and discredit the state, and it was in their interest to let the election proceed without interference. Any attack might have inadvertently legitimized what was clearly a sham election. Rather, ABM was able to sit back and let the Egyptian state embarrass itself. 

Finally, policy analysts have argued that ABM poses a “real and serious terror threat,” but the insurgency in Sinai is much less of a security challenge to the United States and Israel than it would seem. This feeds the American misconception that Sinai’s insurgency is connected to global jihad and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This, once again, plays into ABM’s strategy. Although ABM’s opening salvo was against Israel, this does not imply that Israel is a serious front in their war. Rather, their opening tactics—as well as their name, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which is commonly translated as Champions of Jerusalem—were pursued more for their publicity value on the international stage. They used Sinai’s strategic location, Egypt’s vulnerability to U.S. pressure, and U.S. obsession with Israeli security as a lever to force a military confrontation. 

The reaction from all parties was predictable: the United States and Israel supported an Egyptian offensive into Sinai that paralleled Egypt’s increasingly brutal crackdown on domestic political dissent. This is made doubly important by the fact that ABM has largely refrained from targeting Egyptian civilians, calling into question the credibility of the state’s claim that it is waging a war on terrorism. Rather, it might appear that Egypt is waging a war on its own population for the sake of U.S.-Israeli interests. This serves only to benefit ABM by further discrediting Egypt’s military regime in the eyes of its citizens. Until Egypt and its allies realize the consequences of their actions in the eyes of the Egyptian people, they will continue playing into the hands of ABM. 

Joshua R. Goodman is a graduate student in Political Science at Yale University and author of Contesting Identities in South Sinai: Development, Transformation, and the Articulation of a Bedouin Identity Under Egyptian Rule (2013)


Comments (4)

  • Dr. R
    2 Recommends
    These terrorists or freedom fighters, whatever appellation one wishes to use, are not very different from microscopic insects we have in S. Florida aptly named " no seeums." Their bight hurts and they are a nuisance.
    Similarly, these terrorist groups have no real beneficial objective than to cause trouble and to support setting up extreme Islamic states. Your profs may try to give them more legitimacy than that, but there is none. I know since I was a prof for 50 years and have lived in the Middle East.
    Quite simply, these groups must be extinguished no differently than we use pest control for no seeums. Problem is, they're back the following year.
    So, tell me, what is your or your professors' brilliant solution to this extremist Islamic problem? And if there is no solution, what's the point of discussing it? This is no different than departmental meetings at universities that get absolutely nowhere.
    Reply to this post

    Close Panel
  • Sherifa Zuhur
    Another very puzzling article. Established contacts between al-Qa'ida and terror groups in the Sinai go back to 2003. So why allege that ABM is a "purely Egyptian" entity and pretend that it is no security risk to the US and Israel. Israel apparently agrees with Egypt's government that this insurgency, resulting in deaths of 100s of police and military and which has involved missiles targeting Eilat is very serious. ABM further is acting, apparently, in support of the Muslim Brotherhood and out of rage for ex-Pres. Morsi. Let's hope young specialists on the Sinai do better research into the strategic consequences of permitting such groups to grow and expand in this beautiful area which cannot hope to re-attract tourism, nor improve life for the bedouin until the ABM and its ilk are demolished.
    Reply to this post

    Close Panel
  • Maria
    Could you submit a solution? As I seems you live far away, it is very easy to critize, I am not sure in who´s benefit. Your information is imcomplete, books are full of bright ideas that can not be apply in reality. We need in Egypt practical solutions to the many problems we have. If this situation happens in your country, would you have the same words to critize it? Certainly not. thank you
    Reply to this post

    Close Panel
  • Egyptophile
    You are very wrong! Egyptians applaud strong government and indeed need it. Sympathy toward ABM and any other similar group is vastly diminished by these provocative acts. The state must, like justice, act and be seen to act.
    Egypt was badly shaken by the real prospects of breaking up thanks to the plans of the MB when they came to power. This was enough to alarm Egyptians enough to yearn for stability. This is the basis for their support and approval of the army. In fact your argument can be turned on its head. You can argue, on sound basis that ABM is a boon for the army, who can continue to govern with a higher consensus, as if they needed one.
    Incidentally ABM is not an Egyptian phenomenon. It is part of Hamas or linked to it. Their very first appearance on the scene was about two years ago when they blew up the UN observers' vehicle coming out of Beirut airport.
    You analyze with an American eye and see what you want to see.
    Reply to this post

    Close Panel


Trending Topics


Stay Connected

Subscribe to Sada:
Subscription Options Sada is published in English and Arabic and available as articles are published or in a weekly digest.
Select Delivery
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW Washington, DC 20036-2103 P: 202.483.7600 F: 202.483.1840
Carnegie Middle East Center Emir Bechir Street, Lazarieh Tower Bldg. No. 2026 1210, 5th flr. Downtown Beirut P.O.Box 11-1061 Riad El Solh Lebanon P: +961 1 99 12 91 F: +961 1 99 15 91