The only formal political opposition groups left in Egypt are continuing to play the regime’s game and, predictably, losing.
The relationship between the Egyptian regime and media is becoming more volatile, revealing new divides within the establishment.
Cheap oil is hurting Egypt’s economy in the short term and could have wider political consequences.
Divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt deepen, creating greater confusion about the state of its affairs and threatening the group’s survival.
Despite unprecedented repression and media censorship, Sisi has faced on average five times as many protests as Mubarak did between 2008 and 2010.
Smaller secular parties are missing out on the advantages of electoral alliances, driven by divisions over party domineering and finances.
Parliamentary elections are expected before the end of 2015, but recent legal amendments risk future dissolution of the parliament.
Egypt under President Sisi is more autocratic and repressive than at any other point in the country’s history.
Egypt’s electoral system, which favors individual candidates and parties designed to increase Sisi's populist appeal, will sideline pro-democracy parties.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s current leadership is neither able nor willing to find political alternatives to what the young propose: “smart violence.”
Despite new amendments, Egypt’s revised electoral law falls short of introducing reforms to ensure a fair voter representation and a more pluralistic and accountable political system.
Driven by its distrust of organized political groups, Sisi's regime has gone to considerable lengths to depoliticize the parliament and the country's new “political” elite.
Pope Tawadros II, the main political voice of the Coptic community, has seemingly allied with President Sisi, but this comes at the expense of defending Coptic rights.
Youth members are now assuming a more active role in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, pushing the group to escalate its call for revolutionary action against President Sisi.
The Sisi government’s crackdown on perceived immorality is the latest attempt to instill in Egypt a state-sanctioned interpretation of Islam.
Support for the Islamic State in Sinai and across Egypt has risen as youth grow convinced that the state’s violence can only be met with counter-violence.
The new buffer zone being set up on the Egyptian side of the Rafah border will worsen social grievances underpinning much of Sinai’s violence.
The Egyptian military’s economic interests are driving it to seek further political control.
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s steps to quash dissent exceed the Mubarak era’s in scope and intensity.
The executive branch’s persistent efforts to discourage and punish independent judges have left the judiciary weak and coopted.