The Sisi government’s crackdown on perceived immorality is the latest attempt to instill in Egypt a state-sanctioned interpretation of Islam.
Support for the Islamic State in Sinai and across Egypt has risen as youth grow convinced that the state’s violence can only be met with counter-violence.
The new buffer zone being set up on the Egyptian side of the Rafah border will worsen social grievances underpinning much of Sinai’s violence.
The Egyptian military’s economic interests are driving it to seek further political control.
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s steps to quash dissent exceed the Mubarak era’s in scope and intensity.
The executive branch’s persistent efforts to discourage and punish independent judges have left the judiciary weak and coopted.
As long as Sisi remains heavily dependent on the military and other state institutions, he can neither push too hard against their interests nor count on them to always back his policies.
Sisi’s gradual introduction of subsidy cuts has not led to major unrest, but public dissatisfaction will mount if these are seen as coming at the expense of the poor.
Egypt’s new parliamentary elections law will empower old networks.
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is actively benefiting from Egypt’s heavy-handed approach to insurgency in Sinai.
To be successful, Egypt’s next administration must address macroeconomic instability while also pursuing policies to decrease poverty and unemployment.
Egypt’s Salafi Nour Party is looking to replace the Muslim Brotherhood as the leading Islamist political force, all the while trying to weather the backlash against Islamists.
Despite the challenges of long-term dependence on GCC benefactors, their aid gives Egypt a chance to reengage with the IMF and other international creditors.
Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi formally declared his intention to run for president of Egypt on March 26 and is widely expected to win. What is the outlook for Egypt under Sisi’s leadership?
Egypt’s reaction to the domestic wiretapping of activists and politicians does not bode well for the future of citizens’ rights and the rule of law.
The short-term woes of Egypt’s oil and gas industry will continue until underlying structural issues are addressed, regardless of changes in broader political instability.
If the interim Egyptian government continues to crack down on demonstrations and activists, marginalized youth may turn to more violent means of protest.
No Egyptian government will be stable unless it successfully addresses the country's many interrelated economic troubles.
Transitional justice in Egypt cannot be pursued effectively in the current climate of division and polarization.
Egypt’s military and the Muslim Brotherhood take their fight to Egypt’s university campuses, threatening a return of security force control of universities.