Following Tunisia's elections, the possibility of an increased role for the military in political decision-making is far-fetched.
While the final outcomes of the Arab transitions are far from over, one thing is certain: civil-military relations will be redefined and renegotiated in every country. Arab militaries will inevitably fulfill a more central role in politics, and formalizing this reality may be the only hope for consolidating democratic transitions.
Ennahda’s victory can be attributed as much to its campaign strategy as to the popularity of its message. In an election meant to level the political landscape, the party realized that direct engagement with voters (rather than advertising) was the key to victory.
Tunisians have toppled a dictator: but the opening of voter registration shows there are still many challenges that lie ahead on the road to democracy.
Ennahda, the previously banned Tunisian Islamist party, has entered the new era with a moderate political discourse. However, it faces several challenges and will have to clarify its position on the state's secularism.
While the popular revolution in Tunisia drew strength from its lack of leadership, the absence of a unified voice for the revolution has led to a an incoherent and muddled transition process.
The Tunisian revolution has fulfilled longstanding expectations that the youth bulge in Arab countries would eventually lead to political instability; it also showed that the weakness of opposition movements might be less significant than many observers believe.
Despite some steps to increase the appearance of pluralism, President Ben Ali and the ruling party are in no danger of losing upcoming elections. Still, elections provide a window through which a different political future might be glimpsed.
The National Solidarity Fund has succeeded in reducing poverty and building a culture of solidarity, despite limited political participation.
Is America serious about democracy and political reform in the Arab world? Does the neo-Wilsonian dimension of the Bush administration's policy toward the region presage a decisive departure from the longstanding realist policy of "regime maintenance"?
Tunisians took to the streets in February protesting Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's scheduled visit to their country in November 2005 to attend the World Information Summit. Inviting Sharon, seen as a war criminal by many Tunisians and other Arabs, was an undemocratic decision by the Tunisian regime exercised against the popular will of the Tunisian people.
There is broad consensus in Washington that a "war of ideas" is a central component of the larger war on terror. And in this war, a prime target is the "poisonous" Arab media environment, particularly the new satellite television channels , which are blamed for spreading anti-American sentiment.
To the surprise of no one, on October 24 Tunisians turned out in record numbers—91.5 percent of the country's 4.6 million eligible voters—to re-elect President Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali to a fourth consecutive five-year term. Voters also gave his ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD-Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique), an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections.
The choice of Tunisia to host the November 16-18 second World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) has provoked much controversy. The idea behind the Summit is to bridge the gap between rich and poor countries in a field that has proven to be one of the focal points of present and future progress.
The second of June marked the second anniversary of the assassination of Lebanese writer Samir Qasir, with no indication of who ordered the car bombing that silenced one of the loudest Arab voices criticizing autocratic Arab regimes, particularly the Assad family in Syria.
Until recently Western assistance programs aimed at strengthening political parties were less present in the Arab world than in almost all other areas of the developing world. As part of the heightened U.S. and European interest in promoting Arab political reform, however, such programs are multiplying in the region.
Unlike Arab countries such as Egypt or Jordan, which opened the political space in 2004-5 only to shut it again in 2006, Tunisia has continued unabated its campaign against avenues for the expression of peaceful dissent including human rights organizations, labor unions, and civil society organizations.
Foreign democracy assistance organizations working directly with political parties have come into the line of fire as some Arab governments have pushed back against democratization initiatives over the past two years. In Algeria, Bahrain, and Egypt in particular, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) have been among the first to feel pressure.
In the Arab world, what UN literature calls national human rights institutions (NHRIs) have emerged in recent years. A few of them—for example in Morocco and Palestine—have attained a degree of autonomy in confronting governments.