Tibet is at the very heart of the Sino-Indian disputation over territorial sovereignty and much else over the last six decades.
The denial of democratic opportunities, the rise of successful violent movements, and the shifting regional and Islamist contexts make it likely that the coming period of Islamist politics will be dominated by non–Muslim Brotherhood organizations.
While Iran’s foreign policy writ large exists mostly beyond the confines of confessionalism, this much is clear: as Iran’s neighborhood has become more sectarian, so has its behavior.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, newer media and older forms (such as the daily newspaper) have gradually made it easier for Middle East countries to participate in public debates from a variety of ideological perspectives.
Hizb al-Nour is not an Islamist party, at least in its current form; for Salafis, politics is just a means to an end—a way to protect and reinforce their religious movement.
Arguments for “purification” through “nationalization” are redundant in the case of Indian Muslims. They have always looked to local sites and the land of their saints as their holy land.
“Madkhali” Salafists in Libya are active in the battle against the Islamic State, and in factional conflicts.
Parliament has moved on church-building in Egypt, but it is unlikely to be enough.
Events in the Middle East and Russia’s participation in the Syrian conflict have left the majority of Russian Muslims indifferent and have not inspired them to take any particular action, let alone protest. Even the hundreds of militants who have returned from fighting for the banned Islamic State terrorist organization in the Middle East are behaving passively.
Recent changes to Saudi religious institutions are not a sign of wider reform but an indication of the struggle to redefine Saudi Arabia’s religious character.