On November 14, 2000, Dr. John Schoeberlein, Director of the International Crisis Group's Central Asia Project and Director of the Forum for Central Asia Studies at Harvard, spoke at the Endowment about the growing presence of Islamic radical forces in Central Asia. The event was chaired by Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, with commentary from Dr. Greg Austin, International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Program Director, and Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate with the Endowment's Russian and Eurasian Program.
"Armed incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan by radical Islamists
whose declared aim is to establish a religious state in Central Asia have sent
shock waves through Central Asia and have drawn as much international attention
to the region as any issue since independence," according to John Schoeberlein.
The incursions lasted from August through October 1999, recurring in August-October
2000. These events, which followed terrorist bombings in Tashkent in February
1999, have drawn attention to the security threat Islamic mobilization poses
for regional security in Central Asia.
At present, the threat posed by Islamic insurgents is limited, with militants
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) operating out of bases in neighboring
Tajikistan and Afghanistan and unable to conduct prolonged military operations.
But Schoeberlein believes that popular support inside Uzbekistan for the insurgency
is expanding.
Schoeberlein offered a complex picture of the socio-economic factors causing
support for Islamic insurgents. While groups in Afghanistan may contribute to
the funding and training of the IMU, Schoeberlein emphasized that Afghanistan's
role in promoting the incursions should not be exaggerated. He criticized the
official accounts of the incursions offered by Central Asia's leaders, which
state that the "impetus of these incursions is entirely from the outside,
and that participants are motivated only by ideological delusion or self-interest"
as "overly simplistic."
"The participants and sources of support behind this insurgency are difficult
to identify," Schoeberlein commented. The official accounts neglect internal
conditions, such as the economic difficulties involved in transition, which
have left segments of Central Asia's population disenchanted with current political
regimes. The expectations aroused at the time that the Central Asian states
gained independence have yet to be fulfilled.
According to Schoeberlein, there has so far been only a low level of public
support for groups like the IMU. Most of the Central Asian population is not
ready to rebel against the status quo. However, the potential for an anti-regime
Islamic movement to spread through underground networks remains possible.
Accompanying public disenchantment in Uzbekistan is the government's "severe
suppression of unofficial Islamic activity." Both in Uzbekistan and in
other Central Asian states, governments are nervous of the role the revival
of Islam could play in providing "an alternative means of mobilization
and expression," said Schoeberlein. "The victimization [of Muslims]
increases radicalism," said Schoeberlein. "The greatest risk to stability
comes from the prospect that the general population will come to see the insurgency
as fighting for their own interests," he concluded.
In his presentation, Schoeberlein emphasized that the Central Asian governments
must move away from an antiquated approach toward Islam that dates back to the
Soviet period. The government of Uzbekistan in particular, by using security
services to harass Muslim activists and demanding the registration of religious
organizations, is using outdated Soviet tactics to deal with a complex social
movement that in many areas of Central Asia is closely linked to the inhabitants's
sense of identity. Instead of viewing the expression of Islam as a security
problem, Central Asian governments should accommodate the more moderate components
of the Islamic revival.
Likewise, the U.S. and international organizations that work in the region should
recognize the "nature and diversity" of Islamic movements. The U.S.
should avoid close association with Uzbekistan's crackdown on Islam, since doing
so might only arouse anti-western sentiments in the region. U.S. foreign policy
is contradictory; while championing the cause of human rights, the United States
gives tacit support for Uzbekistan's suppression of religious movements by placing
the IMU on its list of international terrorist groups. If a greater level of
democracy is to be achieved in the region, the United States, while recognizing
its inherent limitations in influencing domestic policies, should strongly encourage
Central Asian governments to build democratic institutions that are the ultimate
guarantor of long-term stability.
In her commentary, Martha Brill Olcott stated that the U.S. response to increasingly
authoritarian regimes in Central Asia was insufficient and came too late. In
dealing with the situation, she said, "we are constrained by our perceptions
of Islam," which were shaped largely by the drastic events of the Iranian
revolution. Olcott explained that "the U.S. appears to be taking Uzbekistan's
side in what really is an internal struggle within Islam." She underscored
the difficulties involved in U.S. attempts to influence Uzbekistan's policies
"on the ground," particularly now, when the critical decisions the
post-Soviet state made after independence have been institutionalized.
"The current situation in Uzbekistan," said Olcott, "is almost
like a Shakespearean play that is already in its third or fourth act-there is
not much we can do to change the course of the action." She added, "the
only thing that remains to be seen is whether it is a history or a tragedy."
The Islamic revival in Uzbekistan has been going on for 25 years, and will "not
be reduced by brutal police tactics," she commented. The security situation
in the region continues to deteriorate, given the instability in neighboring
Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, after a decade of slow reform that has
led to social dislocation, Uzbekistan's government has solidified along semi-authoritarian
lines. "By its silence, the U.S. government is condoning practices that
it used to so vociferously condemn when they were done by the communist regimes
in Central Asia," she noted. According to Olcott, the United States needs
to re-examine its policy in Central Asia and reflect on its preferences regarding
Islam's role in political systems. The constructive activities of NGOs in the
region should continue, and the West should make more money available to support
economic reform in Uzbekistan.
Asked about the potential for sizable violence in the region, John Schoeberlein,
while noting that the security risks the current situation poses should not
be exaggerated, outlined two scenarios that could lead to violence. First, the
potential for mass opposition to the government is becoming a possibility with
the large-scale suppression of Islam. Schoeberlein stated that prominent human
rights groups "have estimated the number of prisoners of conscience in
Uzbekistan to be around 20,000," a figure which includes the families of
those imprisoned or sent into exile. Once outbreaks begin, Schoeberlein commented,
"wide-scale violence has a tendency to feed on itself," leading to
massive upheaval. Second, the violence could take on an inter-state character,
if, for example, Uzbekistan were to invade Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan to stop
incursions being mounted from these two states.
Responding to a question on the role Saudi Arabia plays in the region, and its
possible value as a U.S. ally in Central Asia, Schoeberlein explained that while
Saudi Arabia helped finance the Islamic revival in Uzbekistan, its influence
is now limited by the recent religious repression, which has virtually cut off
Saudi Arabia's funding. Schoeberlein also commented that while the matter warrants
attention, cooperation with Saudi Arabia would be difficult because its position
on Islam is radically different from U.S. policy.
Morton Abramowitz brought up the issue of Russia's policies in Central Asia.
Martha Olcott commented that Russia remains a "guard dog in the area that
inherently limits U.S. involvement." Russian policy, which typically views
Islamic radicalism as a terrorist security threat, is tempered by the fact that
"20 percent of the population in the Russian Federation is of Muslim extraction,"
she added. Schoeberlein noted the divide between Russia and the Central Asian
states in their attitudes toward starting a dialogue with the Taliban. While
Russia opposes such a dialogue, some Central Asian states have expressed it
as a possibility.
Concluding the discussion, Greg Austin stated that all of the preconditions
for large-scale violence exist in the region: sharp ethnic divisions have been
reinforced by governments and international organizations, economic and social
conditions have worsened, large numbers of weapons are available in the region,
and the drug trade runs rampant. "While the margin for intervention by
the international community is small," he said, "it does not mean
that we have to ignore it." Austin commented that the U.S. is not currently
devoting its attention and resources in a way that will ease the security situation
in Central Asia and meets U.S. interests in a region that is strategically important.
Noting inherent limitations on U.S. policy, he concluded, "Central Asia
is a foreign policy problem crying out for vigorous, extensive international
collaboration between the major power." Likewise, Austin advocated "multilateralism
from the inside," in the form of organizations like the Central Asian Economic
Union, which bring Central Asian states and populations together to deal with
economic and social issues.
Summary by Erik Scott, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program.