FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:   November 3, 2005
CONTACT:  Jennifer Linker , 202/939- 2372,  jlinker@CarnegieEndowment.org
 
American officials have become very explicit that their strategy for political reconstruction in Iraq hinges on the viability of a “political process” that attracts the involvement and support of major groups in Iraqi society.  In this new Policy Outlook, Is Political Consensus Possible in Iraq?, Senior Associate Nathan Brown examines the four most critical elements of that process—elections, constitutional revision, legislation, and building federalism—and shows how they are just as likely to engender conflict as consensus.  Brown’s analysis provides a set of clear benchmarks for measuring the success of the effort to build a more consensual political system.
 
Click here to read Is Political Consensus Possible in Iraq? or go to http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO23.Brown.FINAL.pdf
 
Brown argues that not only is it difficult to predict success for building a national consensus, but ultimately the United States is forced to rely on a group of Iraqi political leaders who may be far more interested in pursuing their long suppressed agendas rather than forging a cumbersome, perhaps chimerical national consensus. Each field presents easily identifiable benchmarks of progress (or regression) far more indicative of real change:
 
• Elections. Just as important as turnout—the indicator most frequently cited for electoral success—is the nature of coalition building afterward. A narrow coalition will necessarily exclude many; and its efficiency gains might be lost in its likely pursuit of a more particularistic agenda. A broad coalition might facilitate more bargaining among elites.
 
• Constitutional revision. It is unrealistic to expect fundamental changes in the constitution, but a process in which dissidents are offered some symbolic concessions, or real ones (most significantly, limiting the size of regions or postponing their formation), will determine whether the process will be seen as a genuine attempt to meet Arab Sunni objections.
 
• Parliamentary Legislation. If the many gaps in the constitutional text are filled through negotiation among all factions rather than pushed through by a narrow majority, the opportunity for consensual drafting that was lost in the constitutional process might be recovered.
 
• Federalism. If leaders of a potential southern region react favorably to counsels of patience, and national and local leaders work cooperatively on Kirkuk and provincial boundaries in the north, a clear consensual process will have been achieved.
 
Nathan Brown is a senior associate at Carnegie’s Democracy and Rule of Law Project. www.CarnegieEndowment.org/Democracy  
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