Yen Chen-Shen of National Chengchi University, Edward I-Hsin Chen of Tamkang University, Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Wang Jianwei of the University of Macau discussed the trilateral dynamics of the relationships among China, Taiwan, and the United States. Carnegie’s Douglas Paal moderated and Michael Swaine provided commentary.

Taiwan’s Rising Fear of Abandonment

  • U.S. Strategy and Taiwan: There is increasing support in the United States for ‘abandoning Taiwan’, according to Chen. He cited Charles Glaser’s article on this topic in Foreign Affairs, while acknowledging Paal’s rebuttal to it. Most people in Taiwan do not feel that Taiwan is a part of America’s strategic architecture, but it will not help cross-strait relations if the United States abandons Taiwan, Chen asserted.

  • Relative Levels of Support: Swaine argued that in the United States, abandonment of Taiwan is “unthinkable;” rather, the question is about relative levels of support. Paal noted that if Taiwan feels like it keeps being abandoned, this may be a sign that it should reexamine its policies. Glaser added that the status-quo policy serves U.S. interests, so there is unlikely to be a change in future Republican or Democratic administrations.

  • Fears of Peaceful Resolution: Swaine also noted that both Chen and Wang assumed that the United States fears peaceful reunification between Mainland China and Taiwan or opposes a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue because it feels such outcomes would threaten the U.S. strategic position in the region. However, Swaine argued that such a view is a “fundamentally faulty assumption.”

Current U.S. Policy and Arms Sales to Taiwan

  • Effects of U.S. Policy: Current U.S. policy, Chen claimed, is hurting the Republic of China’s interests even more than the rise of the abandonment school, largely because of U.S. reluctance to negotiate F-16 C/D sales to Taiwan. He also suggested that placing Taiwan in the same paragraph as the “core interests” commitment in the U.S.-China 2nd Joint Statement was a major blow to Taiwan, though the phrase “core interests” was removed in the 3rd Joint Statement.

  • Arms Sales to Taiwan Likely: Glaser stated that there is likely to be another U.S. arms sale to Taiwan soon, but China is prepared to contain the damage to U.S.-China relations, as long as the sale does not cross certain red lines. Moreover, such sales are unlikely to harm Mainland China-Taiwan relations.

  • Reevaluate Cross-Strait Policies: Swaine acknowledged that while perhaps the United States needs to reevaluate its arms sales policy, the People’s Republic of China needs to reevaluate its cross-strait policies, since its continued military buildup may eventually provoke U.S. arms sales that cross red lines.

The Implications of Taiwan’s Domestic Politics

  • Political Talks Unlikely: Even if he is reelected, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou is unlikely to pursue political negotiations with China, Chen argued. He said Taiwan’s people are not psychologically prepared for such negotiations, no consensus exists on the issue domestically, and U.S. and international support is insufficient, he added.

  • What if the DPP wins?: Even if Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ying-wen were elected in Taiwan, Glaser explained it is unlikely that a DPP administration would take actions similar to Chen Shui-bian, the previous DPP president, since it could cause the United States and Mainland China to come together in a way that would not benefit Taiwan’s interests.

  • Taiwan’s Election and Mainland Policy: Within the People’s Republic of China, some scholars argue that Chinese President Hu Jintao has been too soft on Taiwan and that Ma is actually seeking a “peaceful separation,” while others argue that the mainland should be more flexible, explained Glaser. She warned that a DPP victory, especially if unexpected, could strengthen the PRC hardliners, affect PRC personnel decisions, and even lead to a PRC deadline or a reaffirmation of the 2000 Taiwan white paper, which outlined situations under which the PRC would use force against Taiwan. However, the most likely response would be for the mainland to appeal to Taiwan’s people in an effort to separate them from the DPP government by 2016.

Positive Trends and Potential Complications in Trilateral Relations

Wang observed that the trilateral Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship shows positive trends.

  1. It is much less of a zero-sum relationship than previously, as one side is able to maintain positive relations with both of the others;

  2. The U.S. factor in cross-strait relations matters less than in the past;

  3. Beijing has tried to insulate cross-strait relations from U.S. arms sales.

Despite these positive trends, Wang identified four areas of potential complications: 

  1. If Ma is reelected but does not pursue political negotiations with Beijing, it could strengthen PRC hardliners, especially after Hu leaves office in October 2012.

  2. Ma may lose reelection to the DPP’s Tsai, who does not support the 1992 Consensus.

  3. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are a time bomb, though the PRC will try to prevent the issue from damaging U.S.-China relations as long as the sales do not cross certain red lines.

  4. Changes in the Asia-Pacific strategic environment.

Taiwan’s Need for Status-Quo Consistency

In discussing the “numerology” of cross-strait relations, Yen pointed out that Taiwan, Mainland China, and the United States have all used numbers to describe their policies toward cross-strait issues. He mentioned examples such as Ma’s three nos, then-President Bill Clinton’s three nos, Hu’s four absolute nos, and the “One China” policy itself.

However, Yen argued that Mainland China has historically been more consistent in its use of numbers, and that Taiwan needs to be more consistent in its numbers and not try to change the status quo, rather than presenting a new set of numbered principles with every new administration.