Under article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon states are required to accept IAEA safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to non-peaceful uses. Since the 1990s, the IAEA has become increasingly focused on the detection of non-declared activities, including in states without an additional protocol in force. How far should the IAEA go in this regard? Should non-nuclear-weapon states provide greater access to their nuclear activities, particularly fuel-cycle activities, in the future? Will they? How should the IAEA and member states respond to concerns that safeguards judgments might be influenced by high politics and become more subjective and perhaps even discriminatory?   


​Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace


Jill Cooley, Y-12 National Security Complex
Sonia Fernández Moreno, Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
Gennady Pshakin, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering