Table of Contents

It is widely recognized that foreign and domestic issues are now powerfully joined. But we need to fully understand how they intersect and what that means for the world. Earlier this year, the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace launched a series of case studies to help policy experts answer this fundamental question:

Are significant changes to U.S. foreign policy required to better advance the economic interests of America’s middle class?

Leading up to the U.S. presidential 2020 election, candidates will be seeking direction on how best to address Americans’ struggles amid uncertain domestic and global environments. However, before policy experts across the political spectrum share their views, they should first test their long-held assumptions about the economic fortunes of America’s middle class and how various U.S. foreign policies may impact them. Local economies across the country look very different today than they did in past decades, and sticking with traditional approaches, or radically departing from them, might ultimately do more harm than good.

Local economies across the country look very different today than they did in past decades, and sticking with traditional approaches, or radically departing from them, might ultimately do more harm than good.

To this end, Carnegie’s case studies are designed to capture additional data and different perspectives from U.S. states across the nation’s heartland. As this first study shows, the findings could usefully inform the development of more comprehensive strategies. They could also help those who generally see the world through the prism of geopolitics and security but wish to pay more attention to economic developments at home. More broadly, they may be useful for explaining the domestic determinants of U.S. foreign policy to local officials, business communities, and the general public, as well as to foreign counterparts overseas.

Carnegie has assembled a bipartisan task force of former national security strategists, foreign policy planners, trade negotiators, and international economic experts to provide strategic direction to the studies and shape their main findings. The views of these former senior officials, who served in prior Republican and Democratic administrations, diverge considerably on individual foreign and domestic policies. But they share a common desire to take a fresh look at their assumptions about how the U.S. role abroad impacts the fortunes of America’s middle class at home. (See Box 1 for how foreign policy and the middle class are defined in this report.)

Box 1

Defining Foreign Policy

Foreign policy serves as shorthand in this report for the spectrum of foreign, defense, development, international economic, trade, and other policies that guide the work of American diplomats, soldiers, trade negotiators, aid experts, and commercial advocates.

Defining the Middle Class

Middle class or middle income in this report refers to households earning an income that is two-thirds to double the U.S. median annual income, adjusted for household size and local cost of living (lower-income households have incomes less than two-thirds of the median; upper-income households have incomes that are more than double the median).1 According to this widely recognized definition—employed by the nonpartisan, nonadvocacy Pew Research Center—the 2016 income range for the middle class in the United States—and in Ohio for comparison—is as follows:


These ranges vary when adjusted for local cost of living and household size. They are also very broad and hence just a starting point for discussion; those people at the top end of the middle-income bracket likely experience very different realities than those at the bottom. Furthermore, as Pew acknowledges, income is an incomplete gauge. A recent poll reveals that Americans’ definition of the middle class is based on many other factors, too, including their ability to hold a secure job, save money, take a vacation, own a home, and earn a college education (in order of importance).2


1 Pew Research Center, “America’s Middle Class Is Losing Ground,” December 9, 2015,; Pew Research Center, “America’s Shrinking Middle Class: A Close Look at Changes in Metropolitan Areas,” May 11, 2016, For a good overview of the many different definitions of the middle class, see Richard Reeves, Katherine Guvot, and Eleanor Krause, “Defining the Middle Class: Cash, Credentials, or Culture?,” Brookings Institution, May 7, 2018,

2 Anna Brown, “What Americans Say It Takes to Be Middle Class,” Pew Research Center, February 4, 2016,

America’s Struggling Middle Class

U.S. diplomats and elected officials have long touted the middle class as the backbone of the country and the shining success story of America’s political and economic models. But America’s middle class has been steadily hollowing out over the last several decades (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

While the percentage of American households considered to be middle class has stopped shrinking in the last several years, and incomes rose for those in the lower-, middle-, and upper-income households between 2010 and 2016, the decades-long trend continues of those in the upper-income bracket steadily accruing an increasing share of the nation’s income and wealth.1 The median income of three-person households in the lower-income bracket in 2016 ($25,624) was less than in 2000 ($26,923); it was about the same for middle-income households in 2016 and 2000 ($78,442). Only the median incomes of upper-income households increased from 2000 ($183,680) to 2016 ($187,872).2 In 1983, the upper-income net worth was 3.4 times greater than the median net worth of middle-income families, but by 2016, it was 7.4 times greater.3

The distributional trends for middle-class American households may partly explain why people are increasingly arguing that the system is rigged in favor of those at that top. Moreover, it could explain why some working families are amenable to policy changes, including in foreign policy, while those in the top income bracket defend the status quo.

But these distributional trends and perceptions of fairness are only part of the story. The escalating costs for healthcare, childcare, and education, among other major household expenditures, have transformed what it means to be earning a middle income. As families struggle to meet the unavoidable costs for basic necessities, they are forced to reconsider taking a vacation, renovating a home, buying a new car, retiring when planned, or paying down household debt. A middle-class standard of living several decades ago did not entail having to make such trade-offs.

Attaining a comfortable middle-class standard of living today may require being in the upper-middle income bracket, if not the upper-income bracket, depending on the local costs of living. But it is increasingly difficult to climb into those ranks with only a bachelor’s degree—and especially so without one. Working families accordingly maintain sober expectations about their long-term economic future, even as economic growth rates climb, unemployment levels drop, and business and consumer confidence soar in the near term.

Many solutions to the longterm economic challenges confronting America’s middle class lie in changes to domestic policies on taxes, education, worker training, healthcare, childcare, pensions, family leave, occupational licensing, housing, infrastructure, transportation, and corporate governance.

Many solutions to the long-term economic challenges confronting America’s middle class lie in changes to domestic policies on taxes, education, worker training, healthcare, childcare, pensions, family leave, occupational licensing, housing, infrastructure, transportation, and corporate governance. These issues will remain subjects of debate within and across party lines. President Donald Trump argues that the United States more importantly needs a different foreign policy—an America First foreign policy—to help the middle class. At least with respect to trade policy, he is not alone. A sizable number of Democrats and Republicans share Trump’s view that free trade agreements brokered by past administrations have not served American workers as well as they should have, even as they question his negotiating tactics and oppose many other aspects of his domestic and international agendas.

Thus, we have arrived at an inflection point for U.S. foreign policy. Some core tenets of the U.S. role abroad are being called into question because important political actors, on both sides of the aisle, believe these tenets no longer serve the interests of America’s middle class. U.S. foreign policy ambitions of past decades now appear to be in tension with economic realities at home, in stark contrast to their convergence in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The Evolving Intersection of U.S. Foreign Policy and Economic Considerations

Post–World War II Convergence of Foreign Policy and Domestic Economic Well-Being

American and European leaders had already begun thinking about establishing a Western-led international order following the Great Depression and the emergence of authoritarian blocs in the interwar years.4 But the emergence of the Soviet threat in the late 1940s, following the Second World War, provided a clear, strategic rationale for the United States to build up its defenses, extend a security umbrella over European and Pacific allies, and invest in their postwar economic reconstruction. America needed to build up “the West” as a bulwark against the spread of communism and Soviet aggression.

U.S. political leaders relied on an exceptional and unique set of circumstances to sell a reluctant American public on the imperative for assuming major leadership responsibilities abroad. In addition to the Soviet threat that provided a strategic rationale, the effects of the Second World War provided an economic rationale, too. The war effort had helped to power parts of the U.S. economy, while largely destroying the productive capacities of economic competitors in Europe and Japan. Thus, U.S. economic assistance to nations after the war served to create more markets overseas for U.S. products, with little to fear from foreign import competition. It therefore demonstrably advanced U.S. economic prosperity.

In the post-Depression era, workers making up America’s expanding postwar middle class enjoyed higher wages—thanks in no small part to the power of collective bargaining they enjoyed through high rates of union participation. Major U.S. industries could afford to pay higher wages because of minimal foreign competition. Moreover, both businesses and workers reaped benefits from higher levels of government spending on education and infrastructure during president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal era of recovery programs.

The broad prosperity and economic security enjoyed by the American middle class in the quarter century following the Second World War laid a strong foundation at home for the United States to exercise global leadership overseas. Such leadership included the United States brokering the world’s first truly global trade agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The United States served as the chief architect and underwriter of international institutions, including the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions helped give universal legitimacy to principles at the heart of the U.S.-led Western order. They acted as force multipliers in support of U.S. foreign policy, providing a vehicle for international burden-sharing. The UN’s existence also provided a framework for managing great power competition, even though Cold War dynamics prevented the Security Council and other UN bodies from realizing their full potential.

From the late 1940s to the 1960s, the United States did indeed have a “grand strategy” that married its foreign policy goals with its domestic economic realities. But the strategy began to fray in the 1970s, prefiguring a shift in the 1980s toward the diminished role of the state, financial liberalization, and globalization. U.S. economic aid and favorable terms of trade granted to Europe and Japan succeeded in accelerating the countries’ resurgence. However, it also hastened their arrival by the 1970s in the United States as fierce economic competitors, at precisely the time when the country was facing mounting economic, political, and social strife. As foreign competition rose, the interests of major U.S. manufacturers looking to decrease costs, and those of organized labor seeking to sustain higher wages and benefits, came to a head. Fissures within the Democratic Party also emerged. The nation made strides to combat racial discrimination as the civil rights movement gained steam. But in the process, many southern Democrats migrated to the Republican Party, dealing a blow to the political coalition on which Roosevelt had relied to build the New Deal.

From the late 1940s to the 1960s, the United States did indeed have a “grand strategy” that married its foreign policy goals with its domestic economic realities. But the strategy began to fray in the 1970s, prefiguring a shift in the 1980s toward the diminished role of the state, financial liberalization, and globalization.

This was happening as economic growth slowed and unemployment and inflation—“stagflation”—soared. The Vietnam War, in addition to claiming tens of thousands of American lives, divided the nation and added to skyrocketing national debt. Facing severe fiscal challenges, the United States abandoned the Bretton Woods arrangements that fixed exchange rates to the U.S. dollar and constrained global capital flows. And trust in government itself eroded during the Vietnam War and the Watergate political scandal. The United States appeared to be in decline—its relative advantages receding—and, hence, policymakers wavered between détente and confrontational foreign policy.

Post–Cold War Attempts to Realign U.S. Foreign Policy and Economic Security

The end of the Cold War created a new geopolitical reality in the 1990s. The United States emerged as the lone global superpower in a more peaceful world. Then president George H.W. Bush put forward a vision for a “New World Order” led by the United States. No longer facing an existential threat from overseas, U.S. leaders faced growing domestic demands to prioritize festering economic challenges at home.

Democratic and Republican administrations in the 1990s and 2000s responded to these pressures by trying to build a foreign policy that would promote economic prosperity. They assumed that the transition to an open, integrated global economy, with the full inclusion of economies around the world, including a rising China, would power global economic growth and create new opportunities for U.S. exports and investment. They moved to leverage the advantages of an integrated North American production platform to compete more effectively in the new global economy. And they tried to transition the previous U.S.-led Western order—which had helped bind America’s allies and partners together through open trade, shared values, and collective action on common security challenges—into a U.S.-led international order. They sought to get Russia and China on board with such an order, rather than exclude them from it—to ultimately create a shared stake in the global order and broaden the international coalition to help counter transnational threats. As a result, the United States would be able to reduce its spending on defense and great power competition; increase domestic investments in education, infrastructure, other long-term productivity factors, and wage growth; and ultimately balance its budget.

However, the U.S. embarked on this path without repairing the social compact among government, business, labor, and communities that had begun to fray in the 1970s. The pro-growth strategies delivered windfall profits for corporate shareholders and those in the upper-income bracket, while wages for rank-and-file employees stagnated. The new global market created enormous new opportunities for U.S. businesses to sell products and services abroad, but it also thrust American workers into competition with China, Mexico, and other low-wage countries. Many communities lost their main sources of economic activity due to outsourcing and offshoring.

Furthermore, the United States was eventually forced to increase defense spending—first due to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 11 terrorist attacks and then due to the resurgence of geopolitical competition with China and Russia. The combination of unfunded wars, increased defense spending, escalating costs for entitlement spending in an aging nation, and tax cuts once again led to skyrocketing national debt, adding to the nation’s fiscal challenges as it confronted the Great Recession.

Prevailing Uncertainty and Contradictions

Today, there is confusion at home and abroad about the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy. The post–Cold War era appears to have come to an end. Any hopes of revitalizing the more peaceful and prosperous U.S.-led “New World Order” envisaged three decades earlier have given way to deep anxieties about what lies ahead in a more contested strategic environment.

Many across the political spectrum are arguing for reinvigorating the Western alliance to contend with resurgent geopolitical competition with China and Russia. They are also calling for tougher action to combat mercantilist and unfair Chinese trade practices. But they appear ambivalent, conflicted, or divided over the core tenets of previous U.S. strategies to unite “the West.” These core tenets once included leaving no doubt about U.S. security guarantees for allies; actively supporting a Europe that is whole, free, and at peace; strenuously defending democracy and human rights; leading and maintaining a united front in international institutions to advance shared interests and values; and promoting free trade.

The Trump administration’s national security strategy documents indicate that these principles continue to guide U.S. foreign policy, albeit with key adjustments expected with the transition from a Democratic to a Republican administration and with the changes in the strategic environment. But the core underlying principles, which have guided U.S. foreign policy over the last several decades, appear to reflect more continuity than change.5

Trump’s own interpretation of his America First foreign policy, however, entails a more dramatic break from the past. He is not just pushing allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to spend more on their own defense, as previous presidents have done, but is also calling into question the fundamental benefits the United States derives from alliances. He is pressing China on unfair trading practices—for which there is broad support across the political spectrum (for the goal, not necessarily the tactics). But he is also imposing tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from allies and has at various moments threatened tariffs on imported automobiles and auto parts on national security grounds. And he continues to propose massive cuts to U.S. foreign aid and contributions to international organizations. These are just some of the major changes to U.S. foreign policy he is pursuing in the name of advancing the economic well-being of American workers and families.

The relationship between U.S. foreign policy and middle-class well-being now commands center stage, at a time when the trajectory of the U.S. role in the world has come to an inflection point. Would a significant change to U.S. foreign policy, whether along the lines of Trump’s America First policy or otherwise, address the causes of the economic struggles American families face? Relative to domestic policies, how much does U.S. foreign policy really matter to the economic well-being of the American middle class? How do the domestic and international agendas fit together? These are some of the big questions explored in this study, as part of a larger effort to identify ways to make U.S. foreign policy work better for the American middle class.

Ohio as a Bellwether State

This report begins to tackle the above questions from the ground up, using Ohio as a compelling first case study. Ohio once represented what journalist Neal Peirce described in the 1970s as “the personification of the Middle Class Society” in America.6 Today, Ohio’s economic and political dynamics represent a microcosm of the country itself. Some of its cities, such as Cincinnati and Columbus, are prospering as they attract young, educated talent and global investors to a modern, diversified twenty-first-century economy. The state has rural areas thriving with productive farms and agribusiness. And it boasts abundant shale resources and hosts military facilities and units that are critical to the nation’s security and the state’s economy.

Yet Ohio also has inner cities and rural areas under stress. There are towns struggling to reinvent themselves after the devastation of their twentieth-century manufacturing facilities due to automation and trade. The state confronts resource constraints to upgrade critical infrastructure and upskill its workforce.

Altogether, Ohio’s regions and congressional delegation span the political spectrum of conservative Freedom Caucus members, traditional Republicans, moderate Democrats, and social and economic progressives. Since 2010, it has been led by a Republican governor with a national profile whose politics defy neat categorization. And, as is often said, Ohio remains a bellwether state. Every presidential candidate since 1964 who won Ohio captured the White House, including Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 and Donald Trump in 2016.

To further understand Ohio’s increasingly diverse economic interests and challenges, Carnegie partnered with OSU’s John Glenn College of Public Affairs. The college has been leading several research efforts on the future of Ohio’s economy and its middle class, including through the Toward a New Ohio project and Alliance for the American Dream project. To provide additional core input on Ohio’s realities, the school convened researchers associated with those efforts, enlisted the expertise of its leading academic authorities on Ohio’s economy, and drew on its statewide networks.

Local Perspectives

There is a rich debate taking place within the Washington, DC–based foreign policy establishment about the future direction of the U.S. role abroad. This study introduces some less familiar voices and viewpoints into the mix. It seeks to expose those in the nation’s capital responsible for developing and implementing foreign policies to the diverse perspectives Ohioans express on international issues affecting the middle class. The aim is not to sell Ohio on any particular set of policies devised in Washington. Rather, it is to sell Washington on the need to better understand the aspirations of middle-class families and communities in Ohio, the constraints they face, and the perceptions they hold about how U.S. foreign policy affects their interests.

Recent research undertaken by the team at OSU provided the foundation for this study, particularly three papers published by the John Glenn College as part of its Toward a New Ohio project. William Shkurti, a former budget director in Ohio’s state government, and Fran Stewart, an Ohio-based former journalist and current public policy researcher on regional economic development, authored the papers.7

To supplement the research, several dozen interviews and focus groups were conducted across Ohio with state officials, heads of economic development associations, entrepreneurs, small business owners, local labor leaders, and local civic organizations. The team at OSU—which included Professor Ned Hill, a leading expert on Ohio’s manufacturing industry—drew up the list of interviews. Fran Stewart, who is based in Cleveland but grew up near southern Ohio’s Appalachian region, organized and led the interviews and focus groups. Members of Carnegie’s Geoeconomics and Strategy Program joined many of them. The interviews took place in six communities representing Ohio’s distinct regions: Cleveland, Columbus, Coshocton, Dayton, Lima, and Marion. This allowed the study team to capture perspectives from (1) big cities that drive much of the state’s economy, yet are very different from each other; (2) smaller cities that are thriving or struggling to reinvent themselves; and (3) more rural counties with different economic outlooks. The mix of communities also ensured that the interviews spanned areas that voted for Trump and areas that voted for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, by both overwhelming and narrow margins (see Figure 2).

Members of Ohio’s congressional delegation and their staffs, as well as DC-based national business and trade associations and labor organizations, all possess extremely valuable perspective on the issues in question. Task force members briefed some of these representatives on this effort and benefited from their informal advice. But no Washington-based officials were included among the formal interviews, because priority was given to shedding light on local perspectives.

The interviews conducted in Ohio constitute a very important input to this study. They prompted and provoked review of academic literature and government statistics. They provided concrete anecdotes and examples to make general points more specific. And they informed the report’s focus and organization. However, the study’s findings and conclusions are not based on the interviews alone. The interviews represent a relatively small sample size. And, as diverse as the locations were, different perspectives may have emerged in other locations, such as Akron, Ashtabula, Athens, Cincinnati, Toledo, and Youngstown.

Figure 2

Underlying Themes

Key messages emerging from the interviews fell into three broad categories:

The reading of the past matters. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan clearly speaks to many Ohioans’ sense of nostalgia and grievance about a time when the state led the nation in delivering good-paying manufacturing jobs that made a middle-class lifestyle accessible to most households (with the notable exception of people of color and other marginalized groups). Many describe the net loss of approximately 750,000 manufacturing jobs between 1969 and 2009 as centrally relevant to the decline of Ohio’s middle class.8 But views diverge considerably over the degree to which trade policy created that outcome relative to other factors, such as automation and domestic competition. In reality, the cause of manufacturing job losses was not an either/or proposition, as some of the national-level debate sometimes implies. The relative weight of different factors varied across time and place over the past fifty years.

To better understand how trade policy and other factors contributed to shaping Ohio’s economy, Chapter Two describes the transformation of Ohio’s manufacturing sector over the last half century, drawing on state-based and national-level research. This historic grounding helps illustrate why a focus on trade alone does not do justice to the full range of struggles various communities confront in the twenty-first-century economy. It also helps shed some light on why the debates over trade with China, the future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the renegotiation of NAFTA have been so contentious and emotionally fraught. Due to the recentness of the renegotiation of NAFTA, this report does not comment on the effect it will have on Ohio’s middle class.

Most interviewees clearly identified themselves as globally oriented, in favor of foreign investment and fair trade on a level playing field and adamantly opposed to seeing the world in zero-sum terms.

Present realities matter even more. Virtually all interviewees, including those most wistful about the past, emphasized the need for those in Washington, DC, to devise international policies that reflect the circumstances Ohio’s middle class now faces. They understand that the manufacturing sector will never account for the same proportion of high-paying middle-class jobs that it did in the 1950s. Yet, at the same time, they stressed how Ohio’s manufacturing sector and its economy more generally have come a long way since the early 1980s, when the now resented and outdated “Rust Belt” label emerged. The structure of Ohio’s economy and its outlook in 2018 are very different than they were in earlier decades. Chapter Three focuses on the opportunities and challenges arising for the middle class in Ohio’s increasingly diversified economy. State officials will have to contend with a broad range of domestic policy dilemmas as they work to create good-paying jobs, make more Ohioans qualified for those jobs, and help support the working poor and those left behind by the modern economy.

Policies that account for places with diverse circumstances and challenges matter most. The six micro–case studies of Columbus, Cleveland, Dayton, Lima, Marion, and Coshocton, as detailed in Chapter Four, illustrate vividly the divergent fortunes of cities and towns in a changing global economy. There is clearly no single significant change to U.S. foreign policy that will advance the economic interests of the middle class, because those interests themselves vary. However, caricatures of the opposing interest of those in Trump and Democratic strongholds do not appear to reflect reality. Ohioans are not neatly divided into camps: isolationists versus globalists, protectionists versus free traders, supporters of a zero-sum versus positive-sum world. Most interviewees clearly identified themselves as globally oriented, in favor of foreign investment and fair trade on a level playing field and adamantly opposed to seeing the world in zero-sum terms. The differences among Ohioans’ opinions were more nuanced, as elaborated in their own words in Chapter Four, which is the heart of this report.

Based on the data and perspectives underlying these themes, as well as their own experiences in government, task force members identified five sets of policy directions and questions that policymakers will need to grapple with to better advance the economic well-being of America’s middle class. Elaborated in greater detail in Chapter Five, they center on:

  1. Clarifying the U.S. national economic interests
  2. Linking trade to a comprehensive economic strategy
  3. Developing a national strategy for foreign direct investment
  4. Highlighting the economic trade-offs around defense spending
  5. Defining the U.S. global leadership role and its economic implications


1 Rakesh Kochhar, Pew Research Center, “The American Middle Class Is Stable in Size, but Losing Ground Financially to Upper-Income Families,” September 6, 2018,

2 Ibid.

3 Pew Research Center tabulation of Survey Consumer Finances public-use data. Rakesh Kochhar, Pew Research Center, “Wealth Gap Is at Highest Record Level” in “The American Middle Class,” presented to the Carnegie Task Force, Washington, DC, November 17, 2017.

4 This historical review of the intersection of U.S. foreign and domestic policy in the post–Second World War and post–Cold War eras draw from, and are informed by, the following sources:

Rawi Abdelal and John G. Ruggie, “Chapter 7: The Principles of Embedded Liberalism: Social Legitimacy and Global Capitalism,” in New Perspectives on Regulation, ed. David Moss and John Cisternino (Cambridge, MA: The Tobin Project, 2009).

Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft From Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (Brookings Institution Press, 2018).

Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

Jefferson Cowie, Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of American Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York: The New Press, 2010).

John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 3 (May/June 1996): 79-91.

Jonathan Kirshner, American Power After the Financial Crisis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011).

5 “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, White House: Donald J. Trump,

“Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” January 2018, Department of Defense: James Mattis,

6 Neal Peirce, The Megastates of America: People, Politics and Power in the Ten Great States (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 299.

7 William Shkurti and Fran Stewart, Toward a New Ohio paper series, The John Glenn College of Public Affairs, 2018,

8 William Shkurti and Fran Stewart, “The Decline of Ohio,” Toward a New Ohio paper series, The John Glenn College of Public Affairs, 2018,