Commentary
Voters sent mixed messages about funding priorities.
Mark Baldassare, Ian Klaus
{
"authors": [
"James M. Acton",
"Nicholas Blanchette"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [
"U.S. Nuclear Policy",
"Entanglement"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"Middle East",
"Israel",
"North Africa",
"Egypt"
],
"topics": [
"Foreign Policy",
"Nuclear Policy",
"Arms Control"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
The United States’ Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons Are Dangerously Entangled
New evidence from the Yom Kippur War shows how growing entanglement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons could lead to dangerous escalation spirals to nuclear war.
Published on Nov 12, 2019
Source: Foreign Policy
In October 1973, an unreliable radiation detector could have caused the end of the world. The setting was the Yom Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states, and the superpowers found themselves being sucked into the conflict. In the war’s febrile final days, the United States detected what appeared to be radiation from a Soviet freighter headed for Egypt and concluded—almost certainly incorrectly—that Moscow was transferring nuclear warheads to Cairo. Partly in response, on Oct. 24, Washington placed its nuclear forces on a global alert for only the fourth time in history—a step it has taken only twice since. The U.S. alert prompted the Soviet Union to reportedly issue a preliminary order to begin the alerting of its own nuclear forces.
This chain of events, which could have culminated in a nuclear war, provides a timely warning. The United States’ ability to detect and track nuclear warheads has improved immeasurably over the last 46 years, making an exact replay of 1973 unlikely. However, growing entanglement between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons is exacerbating closely related dangers. In particular, nuclear-armed states are relying ever more heavily on dual-use weapons, which can accommodate nuclear or nonnuclear warheads, thus exacerbating the risk that one side might wrongly conclude that another had deployed nuclear weapons. In a crisis or conflict, the result could be an escalation spiral that, unlike in 1973, spins all the way to nuclear devastation...
About the Authors
James M. Acton
Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Nicholas Blanchette
Former Research Assistant, Nuclear Policy Program
Nicholas Blanchette was a research assistant in the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program.
Foreign PolicyNuclear PolicyArms ControlNorth AmericaUnited StatesMiddle EastIsraelNorth AfricaEgypt
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- California’s Direct Democracy and State Policymaking in the Midterms
- What’s Behind South Korea’s Rift With Ukraine and Turn Toward Russia?Commentary
There are limits as to how far the shift in South Korea’s foreign policy will go.
James D.J. Brown
- A New Age of Nuclear Policy: Perspectives from Gen ZCommentary
As the nuclear order rapidly evolves, what can Europeans and other key players do to strengthen deterrence and reduce risks?
Jamie Kwong, ed.
- Taking the Pulse: Can Europe Fund Ukraine Without Russian Assets?Commentary
A sizeable funding shortfall looks increasingly likely to hit Ukraine in 2027. Can the Europeans, with their strained budgets and economies, come up with the cash without seizing frozen Russian assets?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- How Realistic Is a U.S.-Brokered Gas Deal Between Russia and the EU?Commentary
A gas deal would create palpable economic value, but it wouldn’t fundamentally change the position of either Russia or the EU.
Sergey Vakulenko
