2022 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

Can the Russo-Ukrainian War End Without Nuclear Use?

Starting even before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin made a series of nuclear threats. Now, the growing failure of his forces on the battlefield has created widespread concerns that he may order the use of nuclear weapons. How serious is this risk? What options does the United States and the broader international community have to try to deter or prevent Russian nuclear use? How do the possible consequences of a nuclear war compare to the negative precedent that would be set by offering concessions to Russia in an effort to negotiate an end to the war? And, how much worse would this precedent be if such concessions were offered only after Russia used nuclear weapons?

Tick, Tick, Boom? Presidential Decision-making in a Nuclear Attack

If Russia or the United States detected an incoming nuclear attack, its president could, under extraordinary time pressure, be asked to decide whether to launch an immediate nuclear response. This panel begins with a showing of The Nuclear Biscuit, a virtual reality experience developed by Sharon Weiner and Moritz Kütt, which aims to simulate the choices that would be faced by a president in deciding whether and how to respond. How realistic is the simulation? What are the information constraints that would shape a presidential decision to launch nuclear weapons on warning of an incoming nuclear attack? How much do launch-under-attack options contribute to deterrence? Should Russia and the United States retain them, modify them, or scrap them?

A Keynote Conversation with Amb. Gustavo Zlauvinen

A Keynote Conversation on the Future of Arms Control

Presentation of the Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award

In Memoriam

A Keynote Conversation with German Minister of State Katja Keul

Parsing for 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

SIDE SESSION
Unpacking the Challenges at the Intersection of Nuclear Weapons and Climate Change

Organized by the Truman Center for National Policy

Nuclear weapons and climate change are existential threats to the United States and global security, but the urgency of the policy response is plainly inadequate. Furthermore, both threats disproportionately affect marginalized communities and vulnerable populations—including within the United States—and require an intersectional approach in identifying solutions. Despite these parallels, the threats of nuclear weapons and climate change are rarely considered together. Frontline communities are impacted by nuclear weapons and climate change but remain disenfranchised with little voice in policy making on these critical issues. This session will consider how traditionally marginalized and vulnerable populations are often overlooked by policymakers and politicians, and thus lack access to decision-making processes that impacts their communities.

SIDE SESSION
What Happens When Nuclear Weapons Are Used: An Expert Discussion on Humanitarian Response Capacity

Organized by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

What is the reality of the aftermath of a nuclear detonation? In this session, experts from the governmental and humanitarian sectors will focus on humanitarian needs following the detonation of a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon. Nuclear policy discourse about the aftermath of a nuclear detonation is often centered on military retaliation options instead of practical response requirements. By focusing on the realities of nuclear weapon use, this session will help guide policymakers and researchers as they assess nuclear risks and consider policies governing nuclear weapons.

Opening Presidential Address

Studying Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Approaches, Theories, and Defining Questions

Growing nuclear dangers—exemplified by Russia’s recent nuclear threats and North Korea’s development of “tactical” nuclear weapons—compel the nuclear community to critically assess nuclear deterrence's future role in national security strategies, as well as its viability and fallibility. What are the most dangerous escalation pathways that might ultimately lead to the intentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons? In what ways, if at all, do international law and ethical dilemmas constrain the behavior of nuclear weapons states and their leaders, especially in authoritarian regimes? How can new approaches to nuclear and non-nuclear arms control or risk reduction help mitigate perceived challenges with deterrence? What credible security alternatives can replace nuclear deterrence or mitigate some states' current reliance on nuclear weapons? These questions demand further study, greater collaboration among institutions, interdisciplinary analyses, and inter-generational perspectives. The MacArthur Research Network on Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence seeks to provide a platform for discussion, dialogue, and debate across the nuclear community to mitigate the risks posed by nuclear weapons. Organized by Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center

CONCURRENT SESSION:
Resolution Through Resolution? Open-Source Information and Nuclear Policy

Almost exactly 60 years ago, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson revealed highly classified aerial photographs during a Security Council meeting to prove the Soviet Union was deploying missiles in Cuba. Today, unprecedented quantities of information about global nuclear-weapon and fuel-cycle developments are available—much of it produced by private companies and nongovernmental experts. How is this transparency affecting international politics? Does it enable greater scrutiny and hence more effective policy making, including in monitoring and verifying agreements? Does it fuel arms racing by creating public pressure for states to respond to adversaries’ developments? Could it help de-escalate crises by preventing governments from exaggerating their opponent’s actions? Or could it lead to escalation by reducing the flexibility of governments to make face-saving accommodations?

CONCURRENT SESSION:
Poles Apart: Deterrence or Disarmament After the Russo-Ukrainian War?

Nuclear weapons appear to have shaped the Russo-Ukrainian war even in the absence of their use. The possibility of nuclear escalation apparently contributed to NATO’s decision not to commit forces as well as Russia’s decision to refrain from attacking NATO states to try to stem the supply of military equipment to Ukraine. Is this interpretation correct? If so, what implications might it have for nonproliferation and disarmament? Is the main lesson to acquire or retain nuclear weapons to deter aggression against yourself and your allies? Or is it that disarmament should be a priority since nuclear weapons can enable aggression by deterring others from defending the victim and because the international community should not be held hostage to unilateral threats to instigate nuclear war? For the foreseeable future, which conclusion are nuclear-armed states, their allies, and non-nuclear weapon states more likely to draw?

SIDE SESSION
Educating Students, Military Officers, and Policy Professionals on Nuclear Issues

Organized by National Defense University INSS Center for the Study of WMD

Providing education on nuclear issues—whether to undergraduates, military officers, policy professionals, or the public—is critically important. But educators at all levels can encounter myriad challenges in attempting to develop and deliver informative and engaging content addressing the complex and interdisciplinary nature of nuclear policy. This session will provide information on nuclear education best practices, assess present challenges, and identify issues for audience discussion. Panelists will share their experiences in education and teaching at civilian and military institutions in the United States and Europe, as well as insights on nuclear policy educational needs gained from advising policymakers.

SIDE SESSION
New Challenges to Strategic Stability in the China-India-Pakistan Nuclear Competition

Organized by the Stimson Center

Strategic stability within the China-India-Pakistan triangle is becoming more difficult to sustain. The accidental launch of an Indian cruise missile into Pakistan in March was arguably the first time that one state fired a nuclear-capable missile into the territory of a nuclear rival. Developments in naval nuclear forces include Pakistan’s acquisition of Chinese submarines for nuclear and conventional missions, generating inadvertent escalation risks. This session will explore deterrence stability challenges, such as emerging drone and cyber technologies, evaluate how great power competition affects third-party crisis mediation, and discuss potential confidence-building measures to reduce dangers within this increasingly unpredictable strategic competition.

CONCURRENT SESSION
Plus Ça Change? Innovations in Delivery Systems

Nuclear-armed states are rapidly enhancing the capabilities of existing kinds of delivery systems while developing and deploying a variety of new ones. The range of terminally guided ballistic missiles is steadily climbing and their accuracy improving. Hypersonic boost-glide weapons have now been deployed. Additional new kinds are under development: orbital weapons, hypersonic cruise missiles, and nuclear-powered cruise missiles and torpedoes. What implications do these developments have for nuclear deterrence? Do they enhance the credibility of nuclear first use (limited or otherwise)? Do they complicate escalation management? And do they help lock in mutually assured destruction or risk undermining it?

CONCURRENT SESSION
Will We Know It When We See It? Diversity, Equity and Inclusion in Nuclear Policy

Governmental institutions play a critically important role in advancing diversity, equity, inclusion, and justice in the nuclear policy field given the size of their workforces, agenda setting function, and ability to adapt policy processes to improve outcomes, particularly for minority communities. How do these institutions define their metrics for success in this endeavor, and how are they performing in meeting these objectives? What effect did the COVID-19 pandemic have on these efforts? And what lessons have been learned thus far on promoting accountability toward the defined objectives?

CONCURRENT SESSION
Arms Control in Europe After the Russo-Ukrainian War, Really?

Following the extension of New START in 2021, Moscow and Washington began a strategic stability dialogue to explore next steps. This process assumed greater political salience in the run-up to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Russia and the United States and NATO exchanged various proposals for arms control measures in Europe. These proposals included geographical limits on intermediate-range missiles and inspections of Aegis Ashore missile defenses. Can arms control help to end the war or build a more robust European security architecture afterwards? If so, what security concerns should it aim to address and through what types of measures? And under what conditions would it become politically feasible?

CONCURRENT SESSION
Wizardry from Oz? AUKUS and Nonproliferation

The United Kingdom and the United States plan to transfer naval nuclear propulsion reactors fueled by highly enriched uranium to Australia—the first such transfer to a non-nuclear-weapon state. What are this program’s implications for the nonproliferation regime? Can the IAEA credibly apply safeguards to fissile materials in such military uses? Might the agreement motivate interest among other non-nuclear-weapon states in naval nuclear propulsion? Does it suggest a fraying consensus among great powers on nonproliferation standards? And can the three AUKUS partners help establish new norms and rules to mitigate any negative consequences?