Many argue that regulating Big Tech cedes leadership to China, but a healthy startup ecosystem is America's best defense.
Based on a comprehensive review of publicly available sources, this paper examines China’s
mainstream thinking and general practice on arms control verification.
The war in Ukraine is increasing Beijing’s concern about Washington’s intentions.
Beijing believes its contradictory approach best protects its interests.
One week in, what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for China? Where are the places to look for a clearer picture of how China’s position on the war is likely to evolve?
As threat perceptions toward China grow, South Korea faces the challenge of maintaining a strategic equilibrium between Beijing and Washington, a role that keenly interests China.
As the US-China strategic rivalry has intensified, the need for arms control talks to manage the increasing strategic instability between both states has grown.
Three months after the Biden-Xi summit, the two sides’ divergent framings of the bilateral relationship are hindering progress.
China’s reported construction of more than 200 new missile silos and the testing of an orbital hypersonic glider drew most of the international attention, but there may be more than meets the eye.
While there is a compelling case to be made about the downward trajectory of China’s power, it is difficult to argue that Chinese leaders perceive themselves to be running short on time. In recent years, the actions and rhetoric of the Chinese government reveal little doubt about how it sees the future.
President Xi Jinping’s March order to further “accelerate the construction of advanced strategic deterrent” systems most likely reflects his deepening concern that China’s inferior nuclear capability could embolden U.S. hostility and undermine Beijing’s rise.
Chinese decision makers have never elaborated in public about speeding up China’s traditionally modest nuclear modernization program. But their occasionally reported public statements reveal how their thinking has evolved.
Biden and Xi will meet virtually to discuss the many issues plaguing the U.S.-China relationship. Which issues will rise to the top—and what can the two leaders do to address them?
Despite rolling out the Build Back Better World (B3W) and increasing funding for the Development Finance Corporation, the Biden administration is on the back foot in the developing world.
Browbeating billionaires won’t address structural imbalances in China’s economy.
The fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban may not have immediate implications for the credibility of U.S. commitment to Taiwan. But the Afghan National Army’s rapid collapse and the American military’s hasty withdrawal highlight important facts for decision makers in Washington, Taipei and Beijing.
As U.S.-China relations have soured, high-level contact between the two countries’ militaries has declined. Some form of resumed military-to-military interactions could help prevent a misunderstanding or miscalculation from spiralling into a full-blown conflict.
Satellite data has revealed the construction of new nuclear missile silos in Gansu and Xinjiang in western China. How U.S. and Chinese experts interpret the buildup and the motivations behind it could greatly reshape their security relationship.
For now, Malaysia remains committed to maintaining public displays of friendly relations with China while handling any differences quietly. But the difficulties and pressures of keeping the friendship real, alive, and substantive are greater than ever.
Biden’s Build Back Better World partnership aims to offer developing nations an alternative to Chinese financing.