In examining the development of minilaterals anchored in Southeast Asia, this essay considers whether and, if so, how this subregion could contribute to broader capabilities to deter military aggression.
China has been watching and learning from Russia’s implicit use of nuclear threat, and the lessons learned may add further ambiguity and uncertainty to the interpretation and application of China’s No First Nuclear Use policy in potential conflict situations, including those involving Taiwan.
Despite the limitations of Beijing’s semiconductor industry, Washington has responded to China’s chipmaking ambitions with increasing alarm.
We’re in for a wild ride.
Today, political differences between the United States and China are but one
factor among many leading to a deterioration in the bilateral relationship. Each side
views the other’s form of government—and its international approach—as a risk
to its own.
There are steps both sides can take to arrest the action-reaction cycle that’s driving them towards the brink of war.
Moscow is more beholden to Beijing than it was prior to its invasion of Ukraine.
Ending the escalatory spiral will be difficult, particularly in light of the breakdown in military dialogue channels.
Recently, China has become more ambitious in its drive to revise the international security order by which it now feels more and more restricted.
A China expert sees hardening positions and growing capabilities as destabilizing forces in the Washington-Beijing relationship.
Bilateral disagreements over Taiwan, the South China Sea and regional order are unlikely to abate in the near term. More broadly, the two countries are competing for influence in Asia. But Washington's Asia policy needs to be about more than just competing with China.
If China feels compelled to augment its nuclear forces to achieve an effective escalation management capability, it will make the bilateral nuclear competition much harder to contain compared to when Beijing was mostly seeking a basic secure second-strike capability.
“It’s not so clear how we’re going to get out of this.”
Many argue that regulating Big Tech cedes leadership to China, but a healthy startup ecosystem is America's best defense.
Based on a comprehensive review of publicly available sources, this paper examines China’s
mainstream thinking and general practice on arms control verification.
The war in Ukraine is increasing Beijing’s concern about Washington’s intentions.
Beijing believes its contradictory approach best protects its interests.
China appears to be trying to balance between strategic partnership on one hand and its claim that it adheres to important principles of non-interference, territorial integrity, and state sovereignty.
One week in, what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for China? Where are the places to look for a clearer picture of how China’s position on the war is likely to evolve?
As threat perceptions toward China grow, South Korea faces the challenge of maintaining a strategic equilibrium between Beijing and Washington, a role that keenly interests China.