China-Russia-U.S.: Nuclear Security Culture and Partnerships

As possessors of nuclear weapons and proponents of nuclear energy, China, Russia, and the United States cooperate in both bilateral and multilateral forums to better ensure nuclear safety and security. Yet their different historical patterns of engagement on arms control continue to impact their current cooperation. A group of Chinese, U.S., and Russian political and technical experts from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Embassy, Russian Embassy, Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, Beijing University, Tsinghua University, and China Foreign Affairs University met to discuss nuclear partnerships at the fifteenth instalment of the “Arms Control Seminar Series” for senior scholars. Carnegie’s Lora Saalman moderated.

Building Partnerships

One U.S. expert noted that Beijing, Moscow, and Washington have an obligation to ensure that their nuclear stores and stockpiles are safe and secure. Another U.S. participant added that this is even more salient now that Cooperative Threat Reduction has been upended to reflect a “peer-to-peer” relationship.

• Differences Among Peers: A Chinese expert asked what role China would be expected to play if it were to join U.S.-Russia nuclear talks. A U.S. expert responded that there remain differences in how Washington interacts with Moscow and how it interacts with Beijing. While decades of Sino-Russian exchange in arms control forums have allowed them to form a “deep relationship among technical and military groups,” Washington and Beijing are still working to build a common understanding, language, and habits. Efforts like the National Academy of Sciences’ Chinese-English nuclear glossary have been an integral first-step in facilitating technical interaction, but sustained high-level Sino-U.S. interaction must occur before this can be translated into policy, the expert argued. 
   
• Coordinating Initiatives: A U.S. expert cited examples of multilateral initiatives to which Beijing, Moscow, and Washington are parties, both within and outside the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet, while there are many activities and initiatives supported by all three nations, this expert suggested that they often lack coordination and might result in redundancies. A U.S. participant asked Chinese and Russian experts whether or not a more defined framework should be sought. In response, a Chinese expert advocated greater cooperation and inquired as to the U.S. participants’ current partners within China. A U.S. expert cited ongoing contact between the U.S. Department of Energy and the China Atomic Energy Agency, China Institute for Atomic Energy, China National Nuclear Corporation, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others.
   
• Sustaining Momentum: One U.S. participant inquired as to the future of the Nuclear Security Summit and whether it might serve as an overarching cooperative framework to coordinate multilateral activities. Another U.S. expert responded that the summit is unlikely to continue in its current form, due to its high-level nature and the need to sustain momentum in a permanent and inclusive framework. Nonetheless, this expert noted that the meeting has energized countries at multiple levels and would provide a basis for the IAEA to carry on with some of its initiatives. Most importantly, a U.S. participant emphasized that the Nuclear Security Summit showed that groups of countries could work together and be very effective in sharing and coordinating resources and technical expertise.
   
• Future Collaboration: A U.S. participant emphasized the necessity and importance of dynamic dialogue among the three nuclear powers on nuclear security in order to combat unexpected issues and to exchange ideas. Coordination, collaboration, and transparent policies will foster much-needed trust and enhance the leadership of Russia, China, and the United States in securing the region, said another U.S. expert. In response to one U.S. participant’s mention of the Cox report, which led to the cessation of the bulk of Sino-U.S. lab-to-lab interaction on nuclear issues, a Chinese expert cited U.S. sanctioning behavior as an obstacle to mutual trust. A U.S. expert responded that Washington prioritizes confidence and transparency with Beijing and has sought to resume cooperation between labs on a number of projects.

Building Security Cultures

Many countries perceive nuclear power as a way to achieve economic development, said one U.S. participant. While such technologies are worrisome because they have the potential to be used for military purposes, countries under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have the right to peaceful use, the expert added. Nonetheless, the U.S. participant maintained that there is a need to build a “security culture” around such endeavors. To this end, the U.S. expert cited the crucial role of the Centers of Excellence within China, as well as their promise as models and training centers for the Asia Pacific and abroad.

• Global Partnership: A Russian participant asked how U.S. experts envisioned China’s role in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A U.S. expert responded that the Global Partnership remains in transition, but it can serve as a stepping stone to greater multilateral interaction and cooperation. Since Russia will assume the chairmanship in the next round, the U.S. expert supported Moscow’s, and all states’, broadening of efforts to work with and engage Beijing.
   
• Radiological Security: Radiological security serves as a new and preventative method of nuclear engagement, said one U.S. expert. Another U.S. expert stated that security of radiological sources is a confidence-building measure for working on nuclear security issues, adding that it “opens doors” to building cooperation with countries that possess nascent civil nuclear aspirations. This is all the more critical, a U.S. expert argued, since inventories for radiological stores are either “nonexistent” or often “inaccurate.” Washington also faces challenges in regulation, licensing, oversight, and industry, a U.S. participant noted. This suggests a need for more vigilant and comprehensive methods among all countries to regulate nuclear stockpiles and to incentivize proper disposal. 
   
• Enrichment and Reprocessing: A Chinese participant asked about the fate of enrichment and reprocessing technology transfers and cooperation among states, particularly for emerging nuclear powers like Vietnam. Noting that such technology and facilities remain sensitive, since they can be applied to nuclear weapons production, a U.S. scholar maintained that the U.S. argument against transfer of such technology has largely become predicated on an economic argument, since maintaining and protecting enrichment and reprocessing facilities is costly. One U.S. expert said that this is why an international fuel bank or other multilateral mechanism would make better sense. 
   
• Reactor Conversion: A U.S. participant detailed how the United States has engaged Russia on minimizing highly enriched uranium use and stores through reactor conversion and other means. Efforts by Russia and the United States to decrease the nuclear material of Central Asian nations has led to joint conversion projects, which has left nations with enough material to engage in civil isotope research and energy production, the expert maintained. While not as comprehensive, similar Sino-U.S. cooperation has begun, a U.S. participant added. A U.S. expert remarked that downblending would not prevent recipient countries from using nuclear technology transfers for conducting civil experiments, but would address some of the concerns over military use.