2025 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference

As geopolitics and the climate heat up, there is an emerging rush to significantly expand nuclear power. Shuttered nuclear plants are being rehabilitated, vendors are seeking to construct new advanced and modular designs, and private technology companies looking to power AI and data centers are emerging as key advocates and financiers. How might the anticipated renaissance in civilian nuclear programs affect nuclear weapon proliferation risks, including the potential spread of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities? What are the implications for international safeguards, safety, and security? How should the putative benefits be shared with developing countries? What technologies, including small modular reactors and fusion plants, or policies could mitigate--or exacerbate--the risks of deployment? What are the effects of leadership by private technology companies rather than traditional utilities? 

As geopolitics and the climate heat up, there is an emerging rush to significantly expand nuclear power. Shuttered nuclear plants are being rehabilitated, vendors are seeking to construct new advanced and modular designs, and private technology companies looking to power AI and data centers are emerging as key advocates and financiers. How might the anticipated renaissance in civilian nuclear programs affect nuclear weapon proliferation risks, including the potential spread of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities? What are the implications for international safeguards, safety, and security? How should the putative benefits be shared with developing countries? What technologies, including small modular reactors and fusion plants, or policies could mitigate--or exacerbate--the risks of deployment? What are the effects of leadership by private technology companies rather than traditional utilities? 

Since the end of Cold War, most commentators have believed that the United States’ missile defense policy went either too far or not far enough. Critics questioned the feasibility of defending against even North Korean attacks. Advocates believed the United States should try to defeat limited or possibly even large-scale Chinese and Russian attacks against the homeland. The new U.S. administration seems to have sided decisively with those advocates. Is comprehensive defense the way forward? What kind of programs should the United States prioritize? How might China and Russia respond? What role does missile defense play in assuring allies? Should the United States be willing to put missile defense on the table in any future arms control negotiations? 

Since the end of Cold War, most commentators have believed that the United States’ missile defense policy went either too far or not far enough. Critics questioned the feasibility of defending against even North Korean attacks. Advocates believed the United States should try to defeat limited or possibly even large-scale Chinese and Russian attacks against the homeland. The new U.S. administration seems to have sided decisively with those advocates. Is comprehensive defense the way forward? What kind of programs should the United States prioritize? How might China and Russia respond? What role does missile defense play in assuring allies? Should the United States be willing to put missile defense on the table in any future arms control negotiations? 

Rapid changes in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, its development of new nuclear capabilities, and the persistent opacity about its goals have fueled speculation about Beijing’s motives. Is China abandoning its traditional posture of minimal deterrence and seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal that it can wield for aggressive purposes? Is it primarily interested in bolstering its status as a great power Or, does it simply seek to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces? Finally, how—if at all—should the answer to these questions influence policy and military planning for the United States and its allies? 

Rapid changes in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, its development of new nuclear capabilities, and the persistent opacity about its goals have fueled speculation about Beijing’s motives. Is China abandoning its traditional posture of minimal deterrence and seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal that it can wield for aggressive purposes? Is it primarily interested in bolstering its status as a great power Or, does it simply seek to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces? Finally, how—if at all—should the answer to these questions influence policy and military planning for the United States and its allies? 

During the Cold War, a shared interest in stymying proliferation motivated extensive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its end, however, the great powers have become increasingly interested in bolstering alliances at the expense of nonproliferation. China supports Pakistan’s nuclear program. Russia is formalizing its partnership with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and shielding Iran’s nuclear program from international censure. And, as the U.S.-India deal and the AUKUS submarine initiative exemplify, the United States’ wants exceptions to the rules it originally championed. What are the implications of this fraying great power commitment for nonproliferation? Are there circumstances that might revive cooperation? Can the nonproliferation regime be upheld in the absence of great-power consensus and what role might non-nuclear weapons states play? 

During the Cold War, a shared interest in stymying proliferation motivated extensive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its end, however, the great powers have become increasingly interested in bolstering alliances at the expense of nonproliferation. China supports Pakistan’s nuclear program. Russia is formalizing its partnership with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and shielding Iran’s nuclear program from international censure. And, as the U.S.-India deal and the AUKUS submarine initiative exemplify, the United States’ wants exceptions to the rules it originally championed. What are the implications of this fraying great power commitment for nonproliferation? Are there circumstances that might revive cooperation? Can the nonproliferation regime be upheld in the absence of great-power consensus and what role might non-nuclear weapons states play? 

All nuclear-armed states appear to have military doctrines that include at least some role for limited nuclear strikes. At one end of the spectrum, France envisions a “final warning”—a single limited nuclear strike—before launching a massive attack; at the other, both Russia and the United States appear to plan for a protracted nuclear exchange. In all cases, nuclear-armed states assess that the ability to conduct less than all-out nuclear attacks enhances their capacity to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. But what would happen if deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were used in a limited way? What pressures would leaders face to further escalate toward all-out nuclear war? To what extent would the fear of such an outcome help prevent escalation?  Is there a version of nuclear planning for limited strikes—French-style, U.S./Russian-style, or something else—that better achieves the goal of deterrence?

All nuclear-armed states appear to have military doctrines that include at least some role for limited nuclear strikes. At one end of the spectrum, France envisions a “final warning”—a single limited nuclear strike—before launching a massive attack; at the other, both Russia and the United States appear to plan for a protracted nuclear exchange. In all cases, nuclear-armed states assess that the ability to conduct less than all-out nuclear attacks enhances their capacity to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. But what would happen if deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were used in a limited way? What pressures would leaders face to further escalate toward all-out nuclear war? To what extent would the fear of such an outcome help prevent escalation?  Is there a version of nuclear planning for limited strikes—French-style, U.S./Russian-style, or something else—that better achieves the goal of deterrence?

Russia recently revised its nuclear doctrine by broadening the range of circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons. According to U.S. officials, Russian is developing a space-based nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon, which also suggests an expanding role for Russian nuclear weapons. How well understood are the circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons and the purposes that such use might serve? To what extent do changes in Russia’s nuclear strategy impact European and global security as well as the risks of escalation? And how should the United States, NATO, and other states respond to such changes?

Russia recently revised its nuclear doctrine by broadening the range of circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons. According to U.S. officials, Russian is developing a space-based nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon, which also suggests an expanding role for Russian nuclear weapons. How well understood are the circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons and the purposes that such use might serve? To what extent do changes in Russia’s nuclear strategy impact European and global security as well as the risks of escalation? And how should the United States, NATO, and other states respond to such changes?

Evidence shows that bringing alternative perspectives and different skills sets to bear helps organizations achieve their goals more efficiently and effectively. But, when it comes to nuclear policy, might it also change those goals?  For example, would nuclear policy communities that reflected more viewpoints affect how governments deal with proliferation threats or the environmental legacy of nuclear-weapons production and testing? Or would it affect policies toward nuclear power or radioactive waste management? What factors shape whether the views of those involved in policy processes are representative of the populations they serve? 

Evidence shows that bringing alternative perspectives and different skills sets to bear helps organizations achieve their goals more efficiently and effectively. But, when it comes to nuclear policy, might it also change those goals?  For example, would nuclear policy communities that reflected more viewpoints affect how governments deal with proliferation threats or the environmental legacy of nuclear-weapons production and testing? Or would it affect policies toward nuclear power or radioactive waste management? What factors shape whether the views of those involved in policy processes are representative of the populations they serve? 

Any nuclear war would have global effects. Depending on the number of weapons used, and their yields and targets, these might include trade disruptions, the spread of radioactive fallout to populated areas, and climatic changes resulting in famine. Because the consequences of nuclear use would transcend national borders, third parties that were entirely uninvolved in the conflict could bear a significant brunt of the suffering. What responsibilities do nuclear-armed states have toward nonbelligerent states? Specifically, in developing their nuclear postures and policies--and in making any decision to use nuclear weapons--to what extent should nuclear-weapon possessors consider global interests alongside their own and those of their allies? How, if at all, should they change those postures and policies to reduce harms to bystanders?   

Any nuclear war would have global effects. Depending on the number of weapons used, and their yields and targets, these might include trade disruptions, the spread of radioactive fallout to populated areas, and climatic changes resulting in famine. Because the consequences of nuclear use would transcend national borders, third parties that were entirely uninvolved in the conflict could bear a significant brunt of the suffering. What responsibilities do nuclear-armed states have toward nonbelligerent states? Specifically, in developing their nuclear postures and policies--and in making any decision to use nuclear weapons--to what extent should nuclear-weapon possessors consider global interests alongside their own and those of their allies? How, if at all, should they change those postures and policies to reduce harms to bystanders?   

During the Ukraine war, Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have, with unprecedented frequency, invoked and evoked the risk of nuclear war. Which (if any) of these “nuclear manipulations” were genuine threats to use nuclear weapons, and which (if any) were allusions and gestures? Who have been the primary targets of these manipulations, and for what purposes? How have the United States and other NATO states perceived and responded to them? What lessons should be learned by nuclear manipulators and their targets—whether for deterrence, compellence, public reassurance, or the strengthening of opposition to the threat or use of nuclear weapons?

During the Ukraine war, Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have, with unprecedented frequency, invoked and evoked the risk of nuclear war. Which (if any) of these “nuclear manipulations” were genuine threats to use nuclear weapons, and which (if any) were allusions and gestures? Who have been the primary targets of these manipulations, and for what purposes? How have the United States and other NATO states perceived and responded to them? What lessons should be learned by nuclear manipulators and their targets—whether for deterrence, compellence, public reassurance, or the strengthening of opposition to the threat or use of nuclear weapons?