

Tensions between the United States and Pakistan over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are fueled by Islamabad’s perception of close U.S. ties to India and by Washington’s fear of internal disarray in Pakistan.

Showing undue favor to Indian interests may not only conflict with U.S. goals, it risks undermining the very international rules the United States is looking to strengthen.

Both Washington and New Delhi seek a prosperous, powerful, and successful India, but the two countries must be realistic about addressing their numerous short-term differences.

While the U.S.-India bilateral relationship is important, it suffers from unrealistic expectations and is affected by the largely unavoidable differences in the two countries’ short-term interests.

Near-term expectations for a partnership between the United States and India too often overlook how the interests, policies, and diplomatic style of the two countries sometimes diverge.

Resolving ambivalence over securing a world without nuclear weapons requires cooperative action of both the old and new powers, North and South, East and West.

Sanctions alone are unlikely to persuade Iran to stop enriching uranium, but there are few alternative measures that would increase pressure and change the behavior of the Iranian regime.

The 2010 NPT Review Conference was an "incremental" rather than a "great" success because a number of states found ways to dilute the language in the final consensus document.

Preventing the civilian nuclear fuel cycle from contributing to proliferation is an integral part of the disarmament challenge. The nuclear industry should participate positively in efforts to advance nonproliferation tools rather than seek to distance itself from this challenge.

Conditioning Japanese nuclear cooperation with India on India's nuclear testing restraint would be a reasonable compromise among Japanese interests and among those of its foreign nuclear partners and India, and a significant gain over the status quo.