George Perkovich

Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair
Vice President for Studies
Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.
Education

PhD, University of Virginia
MA, Harvard University
BA, University of California at Santa Cruz 

Languages
  • English
  • French
  • Russian
Contact Information

Latest Analysis

    • Commentary

    The Obama Nuclear Agenda One Year After Prague

    • March 30, 2010

    President Obama should assess whether any other leaders of major countries are seriously prepared to pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world. If some are, he should invite them to join him in detailing a ten-year action plan to minimize the dangers posed by fissile materials and maximize the potential of peaceful nuclear energy.

    • Commentary

    Nuclear Weapons as Valuable Sources of Deterrence and Stability, Versus the Risks of Nuclear Annihilation

    • March 24, 2010
    • Abolition Debate Series

    World government need not be invoked in considerations of abolishing nuclear weapons. Instead, nuclear abolition can be a realistic organizing principle of states seeking to balance and order their relations in ways that remove the threats of mass destruction.

    • Commentary

    Nonproliferation's Contribution

    • February 22, 2010
    • eJournal USA

    More than ever, preventing nuclear weapons proliferation requires cooperation among the United States, Russia, and China, plus emerging powers. To achieve this cooperation, measures must be crafted to uphold the bargain between disarmament and nonproliferation.

    • Commentary

    Nuclear Weapons in Germany: Broaden and Deepen the Debate

    • February 17, 2010

    Recent arguments against a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Germany are based on anachronistic perceptions regarding NATO’s nuclear weapons capacity, but bring up important points concerning broader implications for nuclear disarmament.

    • Commentary

    Book Review: Bomb Power

    • February 07, 2010
    • Book Review

    Although the atomic bomb poses profound challenges to American constitutional governance, the post-Cold War environment should allow alternative ways to balance nuclear deterrence with a deliberative decision-making process that does not put nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the executive branch.

    • Commentary

    Global Implications of the U.S.-India Deal

    • January 01, 2010
    • Daedalus

    By exempting India from nonproliferation rules, all 45 members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group are complicit in the U.S.-India nuclear deal, and they should all feel compelled to cooperate to ensure that the India deal does not turn into a dangerous precedent.

    • Commentary

    Nuclear Quagmire with Iran

    • November 24, 2009
    • Council on Foreign Relations Interview

    Iran's domestic political turmoil has seemingly caused it to back out of an agreement with the P5+1 to send its processed uranium out of the country. The United States and its allies must now redouble efforts to make sure that Iran does not try to make nuclear weapons

    • Commentary

    Dealing with Iran: The Power of Legitimacy

    • October 07, 2009

    Rules are the key to maintaining necessary pressure on Iran and framing a mutually-acceptable, face-saving outcome. Iran must take steps to build and maintain international confidence that all its nuclear activities are peaceful, and that none have military dimensions.

    • Research

    Establishing the Right Precedent in Supplying Fuel to Iran

    • October 07, 2009

    The reported agreement to refuel the Tehran research reactor by shipping Iranian-made low enriched uranium to other states for further enrichment and fuel fabrication could be a good precedent for meeting Iran's future and potentially larger nuclear fuel needs.

    • Commentary

    Can Sanctions Work Against Iran?

    • September 25, 2009
    • New York Times

    The UN Security Council should better define what constitutes peaceful nuclear activities to ensure that Iran cannot cross the line and covertly pursue nuclear weapons projects.

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