

In briefings following North Korea's announcement to hand over details of its nuclear program, Carnegie experts noted that while it is the first of several hurdles to be overcome before North Korea may fully reintegrate into the international community, it represents the greatest understanding of the North's plutonium program in fourteen years.

In the Gulf Yearbook 2007-2008, George Perkovich discusses what is publicly known about GCC intentions and capabilities to acquire nuclear technology and explores how the development a GCC nuclear program would balance Iran's growing power.

Iranian leaders appear to have recognized that by staying within the rules they can acquire capabilities sufficient to impress their own people and intimidate their neighbors, without inviting tough international sanctions or military attack. The National Intelligence Estimate, in a sense, says that Iran is playing the game so well that stopping it may not be possible within the rules.

Increasing pressure from the UN Security Council on Iran's nuclear program, while making clear the benefits to Iran of engaging in negotiations, is the only effective strategy to resolving the Iran nuclear dispute diplomatically.
Against the odds of staggering poverty, conflicting religious passions, linguistic pluralism, regional separatism, caste injustice and natural resource scarcity, Indians have lifted themselves largely by their own sandal straps to become a stalwart democracy and emerging global power.

George Perkovich says that among the current problems with North Korea, India, and Iran, Iran is the most important to resolve because the Iranians are trying to defy international opinion and produce a nuclear weapons capability after having been exposed in the act of trying.

The international community must adopt and enforce three new, stronger nonproliferation rules: 1) Limit the spread of fissile material production capabilities; 2) States not in compliance with NPT obligations may not withdraw from the NPT without penalty; and 3) Agreement that states will provide nuclear cooperation to others only if the recipient is implementing the IAEA additional protocol.

A team of leading nonproliferation experts offers a blueprint for rethinking the international nonproliferation regime. They offer a fresh approach to deal with states and terrorists, nuclear weapons, and fissile materials through a twenty-step, priority action agenda.
Reading William Langewiesche's new book is like going to a concert and discovering that your favorite rock star is having an off night. The sublime talent rings through in a few electric riffs. The voice registers the deep truth of heavy experience in two or three places. But the show doesn't hold together from start to finish.