

Unlike North Korea, Iran may well be motivated to live up to the terms of its nuclear deal, while the United States may find it even more difficult to deliver.

Economic interests, combined with national security considerations, give Turkey an incentive not to seek nuclear weapons.

If the proposed deal can be completed as now planned, at the end of its duration, near 2030, a major threat to international peace and security and the global nuclear order will have been abated.

It’s easy to forget just how remarkable the nuclear talks with Iran are and that there is no better alternative to the current approach.

The most immediately pressing objective of U.S. policy should be to apply vigorous, creative diplomatic and political energy to prevent another crisis between India and Pakistan, and if one cannot be prevented, to manage it with minimal escalation.

Washington and its allies should strategically continue patient diplomacy unless Iran resumes provocative nuclear activities.

If Iran, the United States and the others could agree to pre-stock fuel for Bushehr and focus Iran’s enrichment program on research and development, it would be in everyone’s interest to extend the negotiations on this basis.

In the book “Managing India’s Nuclear Forces,” Verghese Koithara explores the real-life challenges of nuclear maturity with clinical insight and exemplary balance.

The challenge for Indians and Pakistanis—and for the U.S. government, which inevitably would be impelled to mediate a new conflict—is to take steps now to prevent major terrorist attacks on India and to prepare modalities to manage consequences if prevention fails.

Iran and the P5+1 are unlikely to reach an agreement on Iran’s controversial nuclear program by July 20, but a partial accord is possible by the end of the year.