

The United States should stop emphasizing talks with the Quetta shura and the Haqqani network as the solution to Afghanistan’s problems. The insurgency has virtually no incentive to negotiate when its adversaries are headed for the exit.

Washington may not be able to effect the Pakistani policies it wants without moving into a more transaction-based framework for U.S.-Pakistani relations.

The attacks on 9/11 diverted the Bush administration's focus from the rise of China to a new war in Afghanistan, bringing with it the prospect of American military operations in the region and a previously unimaginable rehabilitation of relations with Pakistan.

Since 9/11, the U.S.-Pakistani bilateral relationship has become increasingly tense due to divergent objectives, poor alternatives, and differing viewpoints between the two countries.

The key to success in Afghanistan lies in transforming what is basically a foreign military operation into a peace building operation led by the Afghan government and the UN and backed by international support, including military support if necessary.

The raid that killed Osama bin Laden has marked a turning point in power relations within Pakistan, with the embarrassed Pakistani military seizing on this incident to undermine counterterrorism cooperation and weaken the civilian regime.

Military pressure still plays a critical role in convincing the Taliban and those who support them in Pakistan to abandon their current strategy and negotiate a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan.

While its technical characteristics were India’s primary criteria for its new combat fighter, the first round of the procurement process did not take into consideration how such an acquisition fits into the country’s resource constraints and strategic considerations.

India's rejection of America's F-16IN and F/A-18E/F in its MMRCA competition was not a strategic snub, but rather the product of technical considerations alone.

While Pakistan’s concerns about violations of its national sovereignty are understandable, Islamabad’s inability to maintain control over its borders and prevent terrorists from entering the country undermines its argument.