

On August 7, China conducted a test of a hypersonic weapon. Open-source information about what happened that day in a remote part of Inner Mongolia allows for a few observations.

Some are calling for the Obama administration to retaliate by backing out of this or other arms-control treaties. There are better options.

A means of verifying that nuclear warheads to be dismantled are genuine items has been proposed that potentially reveals no information to an inspector about the design of the weapons.

The epithet “Cold War,” as applied to nuclear strategy, is almost never meant kindly. No part of the intellectual inheritance from the Cold War is more frequently maligned than the concept of strategic stability.

While intelligence sharing creates risks for both national intelligence agencies and international verification organizations, it is ultimately critical to the effective verification of arms control agreements.

The United States has spent $1 billion on a weapon that has no mission and has started an arms race with China in the process.

If Washington and Moscow move forward with creating a multilateral nuclear arms reduction dialogue, they should look first to France and the United Kingdom.

A U.S.-Russian arms race in strategic conventional weapons is an unfortunate possibility, but it is not an inevitability.

While physical aftershocks from the earthquake that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, have long ceased, societal aftershocks are still reverberating.

No decision has yet been made about which missions the Conventional Prompt Global Strike would be used for, but there are several possibilities floating around.