Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
For Iran to admit that it worked on nuclear weapons would be more significant than Iran’s 2003 statement that it failed to declare to the IAEA a flurry of nuclear activities which could be justified by Iran’s peaceful nuclear program.
A final agreement could emerge on schedule if negotiators—especially in Iran and in the United States—respond to their domestic critics by cracking whips to get fast results.
The success in concluding the initial step of the Iran deal was bought at the price of a lack of clarity about how all seven countries should proceed in negotiating the final step during the next twelve months.
If all goes according to plan, Iran will sign a comprehensive final agreement on its nuclear program in 2014. But it would be unwise to bet that events will unfold as planned.
China’s decision to supply Pakistan with further power reactors has raised concerns that Beijing is breaching nuclear trade rules.
In responding to the challenge of nuclear proliferation, nuclear trade controls and nuclear disarmament have separate missions.
Ongoing and difficult diplomacy with Iran does not provide U.S. lawmakers with grounds to require potential 123 partners not to enrich uranium or reprocess reactor fuel as a matter of principle. That would seriously endanger 123 agreements in some cases.
Lethal radioactive material spent two days on the loose in Mexico, when hijackers stole a truckload of the highly dangerous metal cobalt-60 as it was in transit from a hospital to a secure storage facility.
With the initial Iran Deal done, it is time to look forward to its implementation and verification. That means that the International Atomic Energy Agency will have more work to do over the next six months. But what, exactly, will it be doing?
The international community must be aware of the risks and opportunities inherent in a final deal over Iran’s nuclear program.
