



REASSURANCE: WHAT DO ALLIES WANT?

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After already having attended three different sessions, My name's Sinan Ülgen, I'm a scholar with Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program and I will be moderating the first plenary session today entitled, Reassurance What Do Allies Want?

In fact, in the last iteration of this conference two years ago we had an extremely interesting debate on this particular question which was focused mostly on North Korea. Two years down the road we just wanted to return to this topic and try to take stock of the implications for extended deterrence and reassurance over changing landscape in terms of global and regional security dynamics but also the threat perceptions of US allies.

Now a few words about the landscape that I've mentioned... In the past two years there has really been scant progress in addressing the challenge of North Korea and its nuclear program. Six-party talks have stalled and North Korea continues to be intent on developing its nuclear deterrent.

We have to add to that the nature of the U.S.-China relationship which despite a number of points of convergence recently like on Iran on climate change, it remains essentially characterised by what can be called strategic distrusts, which is a mutual distrust of each other's long term intentions.

And last but not least, we have seen the rise of geopolitics on a continent that had positioned itself to welcome the end of history. I'm talking about Europe and definitely about Russia with its assertiveness and belligerence, Russia has upended the Europe security orders leading to a renewed and actually acute interest in Europe to discuss the themes of today's discussion.

Now against this backdrop we have convened what can easily be called a panel of ambassadors. On my right I have Ambassador Jane Hardy. She's the Assistant Secretary the Arms Control and Counter Proliferation Branch at the International Security Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia.

I have Ambassador Chun Yung-Woo who is now the Chairman and the Founder of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum, but before that he was the National Security Advisor of the President Lee Myung-Bak.

At the other end we have Ambassador Jürgen Schulz who is the Deputy Political Director of the German Foreign Ministry.

The way that we are going to structure this conversation is that we are going to have two rounds of interaction with the panellists and then I will turn the floor over to you for about a 30 minute long Q&A.

So let me start with you Ambassador Hardy. We already had a small conversation before, but generally to set the theme a bit, who, what do the concepts of deterrence and reassurance mean for Australia and its neighborhood?

JANE HARDY

Thank you very much for a very good question, Dr. Ülgen, and I'm very honoured to be on this panel by the way with you, and with Ambassador Chun, who I knew from my days in Seoul and from Ambassador Schulz.

The concepts of deterrence and reassurance in our neighbourhood are changing. I should start by stating our official position on extended nuclear deterrence under our ANZUS Treaty with the US. It's not explicitly referred to in our treaty, but in our successive defense white papers it is referred to. Our governments of both sides, both persuasions politically have adhered to the policy of relying on US extended nuclear deterrence and the treaty, the ANZUS Treaty commits both of our countries to consult in the event of an armed attack on parties to our treaty. So that's at the outset that's a given and it hasn't changed. We do rely on US extended deterrence.

In addition, the US, if I just canvas our neighbourhood a little, the US has defense treaties with the Republic of Korea, Japan, Philippines and Thailand of these only Australia, Korea and Japan have a commitment to collective defense in their relationships with the US.

But I want to extend the idea of both deterrence and assurance the US has for more than 50 years maintained a steady conventional military presence in our region which is predominantly maritime in nature but, of course, there are still troops on the Korean Peninsula. Most recently this conventional presence has extended to Darwin to the city in Australia's northern most coast coastal region and we have a small MAGTF there. So it's a marine mobile unit there.

But US also has myriad other things in our region. It has cooperative defense and training arrangements bilaterally and regionally. It's been active in our regional fora which is developed a very, it seems slowly, but when you look back it seems rather fast. In 30 years the Asia Pacific or the Indo Pacific, as we like to call it, has developed some very strong habits of dialogue and cooperation including a joint exercising and cooperation between militaries through the ADMM-plus.

Our region is rapidly changing. It's the locust of economic growth globally now. It also has had rapid democratisation in 30 years. It's seeing a military build-up. The expenditure on conventional forces is developing very rapidly in the Indo Pacific and this is in tandem with economic, an economic rise, and there's another whole debate there about what is actually driving conventional military build-up in what otherwise has been a very stable region for 30 or 40 years. This military build-up is focused on combat aircraft with long range strike capability and blue water naval capability.

So what might this indicate about the kinds of commitments that US allies and partners? I use the term formally, allies is the countries I mentioned earlier, partners are countries in our region that have very strong relationship with the US without having the mutually reinforcing formal defense arrangements that we have.

Well, speaking for Australia we believe that the concepts of deterrence and assurance should be, and are being considered by the US in terms of these new realities of our region, the Indo Pacific, the interplay between regional stability and powerful forces which are shaping our region economically through trade and commerce, and while we remain under the US nuclear umbrella we're improving our own conventional capability in the interoperability with others in our region including our nearest neighbours specifically.

So in our region, the Indo Pacific, what are the factors that drive countries such as Australia to build-up its own conventional capability? Well, I mentioned the powerful influence of economic development, freedom of navigation is a very fundamental issue for us or in the Indo Pacific region.

Our continent lies between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and there are some really amazing statistics about the amount of mercantile trade that passes through. For example, just one example the Malacca Strait a very narrow strait, it's been subject to piracy over the centuries and that continues. China, for example, imports energy supplies through ships that come through those straits, about 80% of China's energy imports transit the Malacca Straits, about 40% of world trade transits this one tiny strait. So, again, the maritime issues are of huge importance increasingly.

Now the cyber aspects of security are very important and I'm sure you're all aware of the DPRK, the North Korean attack on Sony which demonstrates the growing issue of cyber security for us all. So this is vitally important to all of our economic growth in the region and our prosperity and our social stability I would argue as well.

So these new factors go hand in hand with the existing post Second World War International Law that's developed in our region the norms and the global mechanisms to which we adhere, including the growing habits of the dialogue that I mentioned. We have I mentioned joint military exercise and important activities in our region involving military including relief of humanitarian disaster relief and so on. We're subject to Tsunamis and there've been some very important examples of cooperation.

The traditional paradigm of nuclear deterrence remains, but now sits within this powerful mix of other factors which are about reassurance. We think the US presence militarily, economically, in our region provides this assurance. We work collectively with the US and other partners in the region on preventing the spread of WMD, illicit trade in WMD related goods is a very significant problem in our region.

We have, again, the North Koreans flouting and finding ways through the export controls that all of our countries in our region do impose, but there are always gaps that they exploit, and we have three nuclear weapons states as defined by the NPT as well as three non-adherence to the NPT, North Korea, India and Pakistan in our region.

So to quickly summarize this growing complexity strategic significance of the Asia or Indo Pacific region is a clear case study I believe of how you need to broaden and nuance the approach to reassurance and deterrence, and rather than talking in terms of strict deterrence we need to think about upholding a rules-based international order and this has a lot of resonance with countries in our region which are rapidly developing countries such as Indonesia.

I might say what I always love to say in these forums in the 1970s both Australia and Indonesia were considering seriously developing their own nuclear weapons and completely assured their path and I think that's been a success story in our region, apart from India and Pakistan all other countries have adhered to the NPT grand bargain and benefitted from it.

They've benefitted from the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They've benefitted from the safeguard system and the non-proliferation system in place and the counter-proliferation efforts that have also grown out of that. Finally, just to say that the US must continue to be engaged on all of these fronts while strict formal nuclear extended deterrence continue to be extended to Australia, Korea and Japan.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. Ambassador Chun, I want to move a bit north. You have been involved in the six-party talks in your previous life. You are, obviously, following the crisis around North Korea's nuclear program very closely, and I want to ask you whether you actually share your insights

about how you see the near future of that situation, and especially since we're talking about extended deterrence and reassurance whether from where you sit or where you used to sit rather, do you see any gaps in terms of the US credibility in providing reassurance?

CHUN YUNG-WOO

Well, I spent more than two years in the six-party talks to denuclearize North Korea, but since I have failed, miserably failed I don't know if I'm entitled to say anything about that. But I don't think we should give up efforts to denuclearize North Korea through peaceful means, but I think it's time to be prepared for the failure of diplomacy and also failure of deterrence. There is a credibility gap, you know, between the US and ROK to the extent that there is a danger of deterrence failure and threat and a deficit, security deficit exists. I think the credibility gap comes from the way that US deals with two sources of security challenges to our risk.

One is as we mentioned North Korea. Another is the rise of China. I don't think I'll have time to talk about China very much, but let me focus on North Korea. We all know that Pyongyang is moving full speed ahead unimpeded toward building its operational nuclear arsenal. Although the South Korean people are used to all kinds of threats from North Korea and invectives from Pyongyang, they are getting increasingly anxious about North Korea reaching the stage of mounting its nuclear devices on missiles, and once Pyongyang gets there, if not already there, it will be a game changer in that it will no longer allow the Republic of Korea a margin of error in deterrence and defenses against North Korea.

At the heart of the mounting anxiety and sense of insecurity lies the persistent doubt about whether nuclear and North Korea can be effectively deterred even with the extended US nuclear deterrence. There have been several instances of failing to deter North Korea when it came to North Korea's provocations their attack on our navy, our corvette, shelling of island and even nuclear explosion tests and long range missile tests.

Kim Jong-Un may not casually resort to a nuclear attack. He is fully aware that such an attack means the end of North Korea as it is. However, the story is different if his dynasty is about to collapse anyway and if he sees the only and the last chance of fending off such a collapse in a nuclear attack and I wonder how we can be sure that such an erratic and unpredictable leader as Kim Jong-un with a track record of reckless provocations can, will never resort to nuclear attack under any circumstances, and what options are there if and when he miscalculates? I think there is a high likelihood of miscalculation judging from his track record and there are questions, these are the questions uppermost in the minds of national security planners in the Republic of Korea.

The probability of deterrence failure, even though it may be minimal, it's too high to live with for those of us South Koreans who live in range of only minutes from North Korea missiles, and the consequences of deterrence failure are too awesome to be left to chances. So what we need for more credible reassurance is to making up for deterrence deficit and re-enforce defenses just in case deterrence fails. I think to this end what we need more than anything is forward deployment of sufficient offensive and defensive assets to Korea in order to render North Korea's nuclear and missile arsenal harmless before they actually use them.

In this regard I think it's imperative to build multiple layers of protection and watertight, including watertight missile defense system to intercept all incoming North Korean missiles at all altitudes, not only low altitude, but at high altitude as well. Although I would not underestimate the role of technical nuclear weapons in US extended deterrence, I think forward deployment of readily useable conventional assets to a striking distance of North Korea's missile sites are, would be far more reassuring to the Korean people than extended nuclear

deterrence hours away, so massive retaliation after suffering hundreds of thousands of casualties it cannot be a substitute for pre-emption and effective defenses.

For the US which is dealing with many trouble spots throughout the world one hour extended deterrence that can be used in one hour maybe very prompt, but we live only about five, six minutes away from North Korean nuclear arsenal and for us striking back after being hit with North Korean nuclear weapons is too late. Well, I wouldn't underestimate the utility of extended nuclear deterrence, but I would say this is not the central part of the deterrence in the case of the ROK. We need I think we can better benefit from forward deployment. They can pre-empt North Korea before the nuclear weapons can be used otherwise I think we will suffer from a perennial perception gap and security deficit. When it comes to nuclear deterrence I said that there is...

SINAN ÜLGEN

To conclude I will give you, we have another round so...

CHUN YUNG-WOO

To conclude I will say that nuclear deterrence, extended nuclear deterrence one hour away from the scene would not be as reassuring as forward deployed precision strike capabilities five minutes, ten minutes away from the source of nuclear threat from North Korea. That's my conclusion.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Yes, thank you. Ambassador Schulz if I may paraphrase what we just heard actually in a different context, one of the sentences that was stated was, time to get prepared for a failure of deterrence and failure of diplomacy, do you think that description fits the Europe of today well in terms of the challenge of the, of the Russian challenge? Would you describe the situation as such and if so, do you think that NATO here has done enough to allay concerns on the part of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in terms of reinforcing deterrence?

JÜRGEN SCHULZ

Well, let me start by saying that I think that nobody has really serious or voiced any serious doubts about the effectiveness of the protection of NATO for its allies, for its member states. Article 5 of NATO is and remains, of course, the backbone and the cornerstone of what NATO is all about and I think there were no serious doubts about that. But you're right in the sense that, of course, the last year 2014 has changed a lot. A lot for NATO and has changed also the security, the environment in Europe in a very dramatic and serious way.

The Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and its destabilising action in Eastern Ukraine have seriously and drastically shaken Europe's rules based post war security order, and this is something new and this is something that we in NATO, in the EU, in the OCE need to address. I think NATO has done overall a good job. NATO has reacted very clearly and the analysis was that this development that we've seen was not an operational glitch. It was not an operational hiccup, but was something very different. It was a, putting into question some very fundamental principles of international law and Europe's peaceful post war security order.

NATO has reacted in what I would call a let's say pivot to reality, and what I mean by that is a pivot to the changing reality in Europe, and the Wales decisions and all the other decisions taken by NATO reflect this very clearly. The base, the sense of it is the essences that we have

sent out very credible signals of reassurance particularly to our eastern allies in NATO who are very concerned that we take these concerns very, very seriously.

We have sent out in NATO in our reassurance policy the one message that the core task of NATO is and remains to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its member states and this is a very serious business. You know that NATO has taken a wide range of measures to this end. I don't want to go into too many details, but just as a reminder NATO has taken measures to provide visible assurance of NATO's resolve including continued rotating air, land and maritime activities particularly in the east of the alliance. NATO has, is in the process of seriously reforming very important instruments that are at NATO's hands, the NATO response force, and in that context we are also developing a very high readiness joint taskforce to be deployed at very short notice.

So in one word collective defense is really very much back on NATO's agenda, it has always been there, but in the strategic concept we have three core tasks of NATO collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security, and through the developments that we have seen last year this aspect of collective defense has come very clearly to the forefront again.

From a Berlin perspective we also pay utmost importance to this, this is very important for us and Germany has also been actively contributing to these measures in many ways. Just to name a very few we are sending Euro fighter jets for Baltic air policing. We are taking part in AWACS surveillance missions. We continue to participate in NATO standing maritime groups. We are the lead nation in building up the interim very high readiness joint taskforce this year together with Poland and Denmark, together with the Netherlands and Norway, and we are also upgrading the multinational core headquarters in Szczecin, Poland together with our Polish and Danish friends, and at the same time we are also taking part in a lot of exercises in the Baltic countries and Poland. So this is something that is very important to us.

To sum it up in one sentence NATO is doing its job. All these measures defensive, proportionate, and if we wouldn't have coined the phrase for something else in a totally different context I would call it smart defense?

One second remark on reassurance, I've very much focused on the military measures that NATO has taken in this context on reassurance, but the best reassurance in the long term would, of course, be a return to a rules based European security order. This is why we should focus on military measures, yes, but we also should not forget about political and diplomatic activities and initiatives.

I just want to mention a few without going into details. You know that Germany and France, for example, together with Russia and Ukraine have engaged in a very determined political and diplomatic effort to at least achieve a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine and come up with some first political steps towards a solution in the so called Minsk Agreement. We have, of course, the European Union that has been very active and has come up with a lot of sanctions, Russia related sanctions, but not to punish Russia or alienate Russia, but with the aim to get in the end to some meaningful negotiations.

I should also mention that, yes, the OCE we haven't been talking about the OCE for so much in the last years, but the OCE has basically re-emerged in this crisis as one of the few international organisations that really can make a big difference, and basically the OCE is going back to its roots because it is now focusing again on security and cooperation in Europe.

Last, very last sentence, the strategic aim, of course, that we have in all this, in all these initiatives is in the end to engage with Russia to end this conflict and to come up with some

political solution, but as long as this is not on the cards yet we need to continue and maybe further enhance this credible reassurance policy.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. Now very shortly just one question, let me start again with you Ambassador Schulz. The issue of burden sharing the fact that for a long time now NATO countries have not really been able to scale-up their defense expenditure commitments the 2% threshold, do you think that's an issue going forward in terms of how NATO will react and how sustainable its own deterrence posture will be?

JÜRGEN SCHULZ

Well, I think it's a very important issue. We have come up with a commitment at the Wales NATO Summit. All NATO member states have committed to that, same for Berlin. We are seeing first positive developments on that front. If I can say, for example, Germany has to take our own example enhanced the defense budget this year, is going to enhance the defense budget in the coming years until 2019. So I think, and the investment part which is very important, also the investment goal we shouldn't forget is also going in the right direction in our case. So I think we all have to make a joint effort, but I do see some positive things.

I see, for example, that in the build up of the VJTF, this very high readiness taskforce I just mentioned, we have six framework nations who committed to lead this VJTF in the future and all these six framework nations come from Europe. So I think there are some signs that Europe is taking these things even more seriously, making a great effort and showing commitment. This is after all also about a changed European security environment and I think this message has resonated with the European allies very clearly.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. Ambassador Chun we heard your policy prescription in order how to enhance deterrence, on both sides of the equation namely you spoke about the need to reposition forward deployed assets conventional assets, but also you talked about missile defense. But you essentially framed this as a response to the challenge posed by North Korea.

The region, however, and especially when you look from your perspective, from Seoul's perspective, there's also an issue related to China. So my question will be how are those policy prescriptions going to affect the relationship with China? Are these going to be seen by China more in a way that would unsettle the relationship?

CHUN YUNG-WOO

Well, my prescriptions are confined to dealing with North Korea, North Korean threats and all those prescriptions will not work with China. We don't need the missile defense system to defend against China's nuclear missiles. I don't think China has such a hostile intent on the Republic of Korea to use their strategic nuclear weapons against us so we don't need offensive weapons to attack China so all these prescriptions will be relevant when it comes to China.

But at the broader regional level I must admit that there is a sense of insecurity and anxiety coming from the rise of China and the way China fails to resist temptation to flex its muscles when it has to change the status quo in the region to change the policies of the countries in this neighbourhood so that creates a new threat perception about the rise of China there's no doubt about that. China may have perceptions that US and US is trying to form a hostile coalition

surrounding China with ROK, Japan, India and all, many of those countries which have, which share threat perceptions about China.

But from the perspectives of ROK and maybe from the Japanese standpoint also I think the persistent concern is that US maybe reluctant to face up to China when it has to do, when it has other pressing issues over which the US needs China's cooperation. For instance, China's cooperation in dealing with issues of great interest to the US, in the Middle East, elsewhere in Ukraine and there is a concern that US might sacrifice the interests of its allies ROK, Japan just to accommodate China to maintain cooperative friendly relationship with China. So that's a concern that we have also.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Let me bring in Ambassador Hardy here. You just showed a description of the challenges posed by China. The words that were used were insecurity and anxiety over the rise of China, is that by and large an analysis shared in Canberra as well?

JANE HARDY

No, I wouldn't use those words. I don't get a sense that there is anxiety over the rise of China. There's great concern where China has flouted the established international norms or laws specifically in the South China Sea and the East China Sea and the, my political bosses have been quite clear on that front and happy to take those discussions to China. But, no, I wouldn't say that there's, unlike Seoul, which Ambassador Chun described as being minutes away from North Korean attack and, of course, very close to China.

We also don't have a sense of anxiety about China's strategic intentions with regard to us. We're more concerned about China's behaviour in the international fora and where there are some really positive examples, for example, China's role in the P5. It's work on the glossary of nuclear terms this has been an extremely positive development in quite a few short years. But on the other hand China's posture with regard to the South China Sea does deliberately cause I believe some concern about what China's intentions are in terms of challenging the existing international law UNCLOS and also the ASEAN Code of Conduct for the South China Sea which we strongly support.

SINAN ÜLGEN

I think we've covered quite a bit of ground both thematically, intellectually, but also geographically. So now I'd like to turn the floor over to you. By now you must know the drill. We have three different locations where you could get up and pose your questions. So I'm going to go ahead and start with you, sir. Please introduce yourself and your question.

STEPHEN LEONARD

Stephen Leonard, Justice Institute and Trust Foundation. In part NATO was created to prevent expansionism by Russian leaders like Putin. The people of Russia are not the problem. Can NATO handle Putin given the violations of national sovereignty, shooting down civilian airliners and putting the entire world on Putin watch?

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. I'll take a few questions and then turn back to the panel. Please...

HOWARD MORLAND

Howard Morland deterrence is based on a credible threat to destroy certain targets with nuclear weapons and in the case of extended deterrence which Australia is depending upon, what targets would Australia expect the United States to destroy on its behalf in the implementation of extended deterrence?

SAMEER ALI KHAN

Thank you. This is Sameer Ali Khan. I have a question regarding, whenever the North Koreans are about to test their missiles we see that the US deploys Aegis there and Japan deploys its PAC-3 and the same goes for South Korea, but they never attempt to take down North Korean missiles. Does this lack of demonstration go against the spirit of deterrence? Thank you.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. I'll turn to the panel. Let's start with you, Ambassador Schulz, the question about NATO and Putin.

JÜRGEN SCHULZ

Well, to start with what is the relationship between NATO and Russia, and this relationship is still defined in NATO's strategic concept that we have adopted in 2010 and that we've reiterated at the Wales Summit last year, and that is that we as NATO want to aim for a strategic, cooperative relationship with Russia. That is the aim and that still stands. Obviously, this aim is now a little bit further away than it was in 2010 or 2012 after the developments last year, but the aim still stands. The question is how to get there and NATO has reacted in a couple of ways, NATO has suspended the practical cooperation with Russia on a couple of issues, but basically political dialogue is still possible, but doesn't really happen too often these days.

So in the end we do want to go back if that is possible to a cooperative relationship with Russia but that, of course, also requires that Russia comes back to a cooperative relationship and that's what we are trying to get to. Russian people they have to decide how they vote. How they deal with things. The domestic situation in Russia is a complicated one as we all know. But for NATO I only can say is that we are trying, in spite of all the difficulties that that entails these days that we're still trying to come up with a meaningful dialogue with Russia and we will work tirelessly to try this but, again, it takes two sides to do that. Thank you.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Ambassador Hardy, to that rather provocative question...

JANE HARDY

It's a great question because it allows me to say, well, the threat has changed, our treaty is more than 50 years old and the threat has moved and changed, but the treaty is written in such a way and interpreted in such a way as to allow it to maintain its value to us and to the US. I'd say don't forget that the DPRK is developing a missile capability. This I mentioned before. It's what controls really one of our big concerns is that proliferation of ballistic missile technology, but the DPRK can, could potentially reach Australian shores with its nuclear strike capability in the future.

In ten years that I last worked on nuclear issues and now again, the world has seen the rise of other states with nuclear capability. We should be very vigilant and, again, the NPT is very important in this regard, don't discount the fact that states in the future will continue to try and

get a nuclear strike capability. So, of course, the ANZUS Treaty and the extended deterrence provided by the US to Australia would apply to any of those countries.

Thirdly, I'd say the rise of terrorist threats has been very significant in, of course, since 9/11, I'd just comment that the only time Australia has formally invoked our ANZUS Treaty alliance commitments is in response to the attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in 2001. So non-state actors also may develop chemical and biological weapons, states might also, but non-state actors this is a real concern to us. South East Asia and our immediate neighbourhood is very difficult to govern just by its nature and we've worked very closely with Indonesia and others on counter terrorism, but there will always be the potential for a strike by a non-state actor on Australia which we would assume the US would respond to.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Ambassador Chun, there was a question about North Korea.

CHUN YUNG-WOO

Yes, I don't know if I understood the question correctly, but you mentioned that there are always military maneuvers after following North Korean provocation. I think this is necessary to send the message to the North Korean leaders that alliance will respond as necessary and a show of determination to counter such provocations in the future.

But it's different from, one time demonstration of military readiness is one thing, it's different from a permanent forward deployment of the assets necessary to deter and to defend against North Korean provocations and nuclear missile attacks. But I don't think these demonstrations they are, we cannot just send a message that North Korea can get away with such provocations. But I'm not sure how, to what extent it has been helpful in strengthening deterrence against North Korea, but that will not be enough, demonstration will not be enough.

SINAN ÜLGEN

We'll take two questions from Alexei Arbatov and Gareth Evans.

ALEXEI ARBATOV

Yes, I'm very unhappy about everything that has been happening in Ukraine and around Ukraine recently, but just for the sake of the record let me tell you that the vast majority of Russian political elite thinks that the turning point in post Cold War European security happened earlier, in 1999 with the bombing of Yugoslavia and later with the cessation of Kosovo and recognition of Kosovo independence and massive exodus of Serbs which was not prevented from Kosovo. I don't want to argue about that and it doesn't relate to the subject of this conference.

My question is as following to Ambassador Schulz. What do you think of the Ukrainian proposal to introduce UN peacekeeping troops in between the hostile parties to make sure that the ceasefire is preserved?

GARETH EVANS

Gareth Evans from the Australian National University and a former foreign minister. If, to all the panellists I guess, if we're serious about reducing the role and salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrine shouldn't we be doing a hell of a lot more than we have been as US allies and partners in taking the nuclear dimension out of extended nuclear deterrence? Isn't it the case

that the conventional capability of the United States combined with each of us and any possible contingency situation is amply sufficient for the indefinitely foreseeable future to deal with any conceivable non-nuclear threat contingency, maybe even nuclear ones as well?

Under those circumstances what was there not to like about the Obama administration's attempt in the Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 to at least move down the path of getting acceptance of a sole purpose declaration and maybe ultimately no first use? Shouldn't we collectively as partners and allies hang our collective heads in shame for rushing back to the old Cold War security blanket with all its ills and irrationalities simply because of that urge for psychological comfort that seems to overtake us on these occasions? Thank you.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. Take a question from that wing.

BRAD HARRIS

Hi, Brad Harris from the Friends Committee on National Legislation. In 2013 amongst tensions in the Korean Peninsula the US flew aircraft that could deploy US tactical nuclear weapons. It flew these aircraft over South Korea. There's been some debate, some scholars believe that this helped deter North Korea from actions, others such as Andrei Lankov at Kookmin University have been explicit in saying that no, this did not play no role in deterring North Korea. I wonder if you could comment.

SINAN ÜLGEN

And a question from there...

MUHAMMAD UMAR

Yes, I was wondering as a response to the United States' – I'm Muhammad Umar from the National Defense University Islamabad – as a response to the United States' what I would consider provocative policy of signing a maritime security pact with India in an effort to curb China's growing influence in the region, we've seen the Russians and the Chinese a greater alliance when it comes to maritime security. Do we see that alliance expand in the future?

SINAN ÜLGEN

I'm going to turn back to the panel, again start with you Ambassador Schulz. Please be selective but I'll make sure that all the questions are answered so go ahead.

JÜRGEN SCHULZ

I'll try to be very selective. First, yes, we know that the Russian foreign policy lead has a very different perception about turning points on European security developments and I wouldn't argue with that. Of course, what I would argue is that the two cases are not really comparable in Kosovo and I don't want to go into too many details. We had months of negotiations. We had many political efforts. This was addressed in the United Nations. It was addressed in many other fora. Afterwards we had a UN presence UNMIG for years before Kosovo became independent although this doesn't apply in the current case. So from our point of view these cases are different, but I take your point that, of course, perceptions are very different that is certainly the case.

On the UN peacekeeping troops for Ukraine I think first of all what we need now is to achieve a ceasefire that is holding. So before the peacekeepers come in to keep the peace we just need to work towards that peace and we are far from it. We still have too many incidents. We have still a very fragile situation and we also know that, of course, just the mechanics of the United Nations to set up a UN peacekeeping mission takes usually a few months.

So this maybe an option at some point of the development, but at this point our focus is very much on the OCE and we try to implement with all means available the Minsk Agreement, and if that successfully is implemented then at some point maybe the UN can also play a role, but we don't think that this is the solution right now for the situation on the ground right now.

Last point, very selectively, do we, should we rush back, should we not make the mistake to rush back to the old nuclear patterns? No, of course not, but also on the other hand I think we also have to acknowledge that we do see at least some new patterns that we have to address and that we have to think about. Don't want to go into details but my very short analysis is that, for example, from a NATO policy and from a Russian policy the nuclear thinking seems to go in very different directions and at some point we also have to address that. Thank you.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. Ambassador Chun, would Seoul be comfortable if the US started to take out the nuclear out of the extended deterrence equation?

CHUN YUNG-WOO

Well, there are a lot of believers, true believers in the myth that nuclear weapons can better deter nuclear weapon states, but I agree with Gareth that that myth will not at least apply on the Korean Peninsula. It's not very relevant on the Korean Peninsula. I don't believe that nuclear weapons can better deter North Korea than or nuclear extended deterrence employed one hour away will better deter North Korea than forward deployed precision strike capabilities on just a short range from, in a striking distance from North Korea.

But I would not rule out, completely rule out nuclear dimension from the extended deterrence even though it has a limited marginal effectiveness I don't think it will be politically feasible at this point to argue that we will rule out that option. But I think in the long run there's a road that we have to take and when it comes to coming back to the North Korean case I think in an extreme circumstances when North Korea will be tempted to use nuclear weapons I don't think nuclear weapons will really, nuclear deterrence will really work.

There is also a credibility problem with nuclear weapons because who will authorise the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. It cannot be used without explicit authorisation from the President of the Republic of Korea even if the US President may wish to use it I don't think any president will propose to use it without consent of the other alliance partners. I don't think any president will try to use nuclear weapons against North Korea especially when it comes to, they will have I think a moral burden of being the first to use nuclear weapons after the Second World War and also using nuclear weapons against Korean compatriots in North Korea that's different.

So I don't think any president who authorises will be free from the moral consequences of using such weapons. So I think they will hesitate when the moment of truth comes and I don't think it's going to be very credible, and there are not, in my knowledge, there are no military targets in North Korea. They cannot be destroyed by conventional weapons and that would absolutely require the use of technical nuclear weapons. So in that regard if the budget sustaining extended

nuclear deterrence more of that can be used to reinforce conventional offensive and defensive capabilities I would welcome that. I see no objection to that.

SINAN ÜLGEN

By the way, the moral consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, is the theme of another panel today or tomorrow. Very briefly there was another question about whether the US flying aircraft over Korea was effective in ushering up, in solidifying extended deterrence whether it helped with the credibility.

CHUN YUNG-WOO

I'm not quite sure about that. Well, as a show of force that was effective for the moment psychologically that may have worked, but I don't think it could have really enhanced effectiveness of deterrence. When the Korean people feel threatened by North Korean nuclear tasks or provocations the sense of insecurity can be addressed with such military exercises and deployment of tactical or fighters, bombers that can deliver technical nuclear weapons or deployment of aircraft carriers, but that's just for the moment to mitigate the sense of insecurity. But I don't think it can be a substitute for real reinforcement in deterrence capabilities.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Ambassador Hardy, there was a question about the future of regional security alliances and its implications for the regions.

JANE HARDY

I didn't remember the exact question, but I can certainly say that just to build on what Ambassador Chun said we also applaud the move by the Obama administration to declare that it would reduce the reference to nuclear weapons in the doctrine of the United States and that is something that is welcome because we don't want to see nuclear arms race in our region in response to the provocations by North Korea. In regional terms can I ask you to rephrase the question again, the...?

SINAN ÜLGEN

The question was on, well, there was specific reference to the agreement between US and India and what that means whether that's the future.

MUHAMMAD UMAR

What I meant was that we've seen as a response China and Russia working together in the East China Sea and South China Sea, will we see that expand as the US tries to get other allies to patrol East and South China Sea?

JANE HARDY

Well, actually I would prefer not to get into a discussion about the East and South China Sea except to say that we urge China, in particular, as a major player in this region to abide by UNCLOS and to work with ASEAN on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.

I think your question actually points to what I was saying earlier about the build-up of conventional forces in our region. It's an issue that's related to the build up of conventional

forces as countries in the region strive to keep sea lanes open to make sure the rule of law applies to the maritime domain and that is a hugely significant issue for our region, and is why I say that we no longer see nuclear deterrence specifically as a very, as the narrow way it was interpreted at the height of the Cold War as the main strand of US deterrents for its allies in our region.

I just want to make a little comment too that my former boss, Gareth Evans mentioned sole purpose and this is a very important doctrinal issue, and when the United States released its Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 the Australian government welcomed this review very much and actually said that the United States knows that Australia would be comfortable if the US was to reach its objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons, although we are conscious of the significant work required still to come to establish the conditions to do so safely. So that is a very significant channel of discussion between the US and its allies now and in coming years and I think we should all work towards that and keep that in mind very much so.

And also remind everybody that the Nuclear Posture Review extended a negative security assurance to all of those states, parties to the NPT that abide by the safeguards obligation. There are enormous benefits to all of the NPT states parties of the assurance provided by the US in that statement in 2010. It shouldn't be forgotten as we go into the NPT Review Conference, I'm sure we'll discuss that more, later.

SINAN ÜLGEN

There's another panel for that too. The last round of questions let's start with you.

SIAN YUNG

I'm SeYoung Jang, Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School. I have a question to Ambassador Chun Yung-Woo. Two years ago at this conference the Korean lawmaker [unclear 01:01:01] stated that South Korea might withdraw from the NPT and then match North Korean nuclear programs, advised that when South Korea faces an extraordinary threat to national interest. So these remarks created lots of concern in the US about South Korean intention to go nuclear.

What's your personal opinion about his remarks and do you see any possibility that South Korean government consider a nuclear option, not just having nuclear, US technical weapons, but developing nuclear weapons, its own nuclear weapons to counter North Korean threat in the future? Thank you.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Another question.

KATERYNA BILA

First of all, I'm the Representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Head of Commission for arms control non-proliferation. Small remark about the difference between Kosovo and Ukraine, there was no foreign invasion in Kosovo. In Ukraine we have foreign aggression.

I would like to say as well that nobody wants to punish Russia, but it's a little bit threatening strategy because a year ago nobody wanted to punish Russia when green men appeared in Crimea because nobody knew who it was. A year after today Putin recognised that those people were representative of Russian troops and it was a strategy of Russia. In this situation in a year, less than a year they turned this flourishing sea resort into the modern military base.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Can I have your questions because we are just running out of time...

KATERYNA BILA

Okay, don't interrupt me please.

SINAN ÜLGEN

I had to, I'm sorry.

KATERYNA BILA

Because everybody speaks about my country and I would like to give small clarification of what is going on.

SINAN ÜLGEN

This is not the place, I'm sorry we're running out of time so if I can have your question.

KATERYNA BILA

At this point I would like to ask distinguished colleagues what is the level of waiting for Russia to being punished because all these political talks which we do expect that they will receive the good come out they are violated in the field. So while we are waiting hundreds of people are being killed in the east of my country. So what is the level of your patience for this country and for their aggressive policy? Thank you.

SINAN ÜLGEN

And the last question on the right.

SONJA RE [unclear]

My name is Sonja Re [unclear 01:03:49]. I'm a journalist with a Seoul broadcasting system from South Korea. I've a question to Ambassador Jürgen Schulz and also Ambassador Jane Hardy. As you know Ambassador Chun from South Korea raised a question the missile defense system deploy United States missile defense to South Korea even though they did not refer to specific idea, but he seems to be talking about the forward deploying United States high altitude missile defense system in Korea. But, obviously, it looks very reasonable to think about missile defense system instead of extending the risk, and President Obama may prefer defense better than attacking the enemy with nuclear weapons. But the problem is that...

SINAN ÜLGEN

I really have to get your question we're really running out of time.

SONJA RE

Yes, okay, my question is to Jürgen. Is the missile system stabilising or destabilising with regard to nuclear weapons, and is it a good idea to forward deploy United States missile defense assets

in Germany or in Australia or in Ukraine to defend from the attack from like the nuclear missile coming from Iran or Russia or from North Korea?

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. Now, we've officially run out of time, but I suppose we can extend our session for a couple of minutes. So I'd greatly appreciate it if you can be succinct in your answers starting with you Ambassador Schulz.

JÜRGEN SCHULZ

Thank you. About the question from the Ukrainian representative we do not use terms like punishment that is not how we express ourselves, but we do have taken a lot of measures to underline our condemnation of the Russian behaviour in Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine. You know the list I just want to remind you. The EU has taken a lot of sanctions, Russia has, Russian membership of the G8 has been suspended, the US have taken very serious economic sanctions through the NATO Russia cooperation has been suspended very many bilateral cooperation problems have been suspended. I could go on and on and on. So it's not that the international community is not reacting that is certainly not the case. They are reacting but, of course, it's much more complex than just coming up with sanctions or condemnations.

On the question of US nuclear weapons in Germany you know the NATO policy we aim for a nuclear free world but, of course, we have to first of all create the conditions for that. We're not quite there yet I'm afraid and for the time being we consider this still to be a very good policy to have these arrangements.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. Ambassador Chun.

CHUN YUNG-WOO

Well, I don't want to quarrel with the Korean politicians. They have their own views. I have my own. I don't think a nuclear armament will serve ROKs national security interests. As I said earlier it doesn't help in deterring North Korea and it will create more problems. I think what will erode international confidence in the ROKs commitment to non-proliferation goals and, well, even after unification I think a commitment to nuclear free Korean Peninsula will be essential in securing support for the unification of the Korean Peninsula from our neighbours.

Assuming that Korea goes nuclear, a unified Korea goes nuclear, I don't think Korea can prevail in any nuclear arms race with our bigger neighbours China, Russia. I think if Korea decides to go for nuclear armaments Japan will follow suit and we'll be surrounded by bigger nuclear weapons states, and I don't think that will in any way serve the security interests of the Republic of Korea or unified Korea. So I wouldn't agree with any politician who'd argue for nuclear armament of our own.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Ambassador Hardy your last words of wisdom.

JANE HARDY

Well, just quickly if I interpret the question correctly on ballistic missiles and prepositioning.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Missile defense.

JANE HARDY

Missile defense, sorry, missile defense, Australia is not actually probably the most effective geographical location on which to position assets related to missile defense I'd just quickly say that.

Secondly though it points to the issue that we're talking about global positioning and global postures, and the US as the super power has a global posture review which is ongoing. We're part of that dialogue and we talk to the US and other allies about that all the time.

I'd just finish by saying maybe ten or 15 years ago the North Korea issue was seen as a regional issue. It's now understood as a globally significant issue in that actors such as North Korea can and has the capability of changing the global strategic dynamic in a matter of minutes if it attacks South Korea or any other country for that matter. Japan I should also mention. So I think that the equation has changed and we must consider these things in terms of global strategic stability.

SINAN ÜLGEN

Thank you. As your moderator of this morning I will not even attempt a wrap up, but this is the part where I hope you'll join me in thanking the panel for what I hope was a very insightful exchange of views and you are all invited to lunch.