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Transcript

2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference Afternoon Concurrent Panel II: Extended Deterrence: Defining the U.S. Reassurance Requirement

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[00:00:00]

BRAD ROBERTS: Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. There must still be a lot of people in the hallway or a lot of people interested not so much in extended deterrence, but we're glad to see all of you here today. Thank you.

As you know, the topic of this panel is extended deterrence and assurance and how to balance our need to do the right things in those two areas with our commitment and ambition to try to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in the context of the NPT.

What I'd like to do is just offer a few words from the policy context to start, and then invite my co-panelists to make a few introductory remarks of their own. And then, of course, we'll open it up for discussion.

From a U.S. policy perspective, it's clear that extended deterrence and assurance have become steadily more important over the last two decades since the end of the Cold War. In the Cold War, extended deterrence and assurance were, of course, key factors, but the general problem is (that it ?) sort of slipped from our world view. But it's come back, and the benchmarks for this would – of course, it wouldn't surprise you to hear this from me; the nuclear posture reviews – the Nuclear Posture Review of 1994 said essentially nothing about extended deterrence. It was a problem that had completely disappeared from our nuclear strategy worldview. The Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 said a little bit more; it talked about the importance of meeting the challenges of WMD-armed rogue states. It talked about the importance of maintaining nuclear forces second to none. And this was in service of the assurance of our allies.

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And of course, in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the commitment to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance of allies was one of the top five policy priorities set out by the president. This rising policy salience of extended deterrence and assurance has everything to do with the changing nature of the security environment. The security environment today, over the last two decades – two main developments bearing on this topic. The first is the rise of a handful of new challengers, referred to variously in U.S. policy as rogue states or regional powers or regional challengers – but the problem epitomized today by North Korea, a state armed with nuclear weapons, increasingly long-range missiles, the ability to reach out and threaten and coerce and create provocations and raise the prospect of nuclear conflict.

A second significant factor in the security environment has been the change in relations among Russia, China and the United States. Those relations cast a certain character on the role of extended deterrence and assurance in the Cold War. Today we find ourselves in a world very unlike the Cold War in major power relations. We are not enemies with Russia or China, nor are we allies; our relations remain in transition, but with a good deal of debate about, transition towards what?

And both of these developments in the security environment have compelled increased policy attention to extended deterrence and assurance. As you know, the position of the Obama administration has been that we must strengthen extended deterrence to meet the emerging challenges of states like North Korea, and to strengthen – we must also work to strengthen the assurance of allies in this changed security environment. And our policy framework – this is not

simply, first and foremost a question of nuclear policy. Extended deterrence is best-served by strong political relations between and among allies – alliances that are effectively focused on the problems in front of them and that are active and engaged.

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And the Obama administration has worked hard to deliver on its commitments in both Europe and Asia and the Middle East to strengthen these political relationships with allies. Extended deterrence is also about nonnuclear means of deterrence, and the Obama administration, like its predecessors – both the two post-Cold War predecessor administrations, has emphasized the role of ballistic missile defense as an element in extended deterrence, the short argument being that in the American vernacular, limited missile defense takes the cheap shots off the table. It's very difficult for a regional actor to credibly threaten – to overwhelm the missile defense system, and this thus raises the bar to conflict.

Of course, we as an administration, along with some of our allies, have also seen a role for nonnuclear strike capabilities in this regional deterrence posture. And we've seen a role, of course, for nuclear in the extended deterrence posture of the United States, with a dimension of that provided by forward deployable nonstrategic nuclear weapons, or more precisely, forward deployable nuclear weapons that can be deployed with nonstrategic delivery systems. We as an administration emphasized that aspect of the deterrence because it has a powerful value in signaling the commitment of allies to defend each other. This has an assurance value as well as a deterrence value.

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So the Obama administration worked with partners in Europe in the context of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review to update the NATO Alliance extended deterrence framework. This was a long, serious, carefully conducted largely behind close door high-level review of NATO's nuclear policy and posture which had the result that we can discuss, but which is publicly known.

And in Northeast Asia, the Obama administration has worked with its two key allies to create dialogues. In the NATO context, we have the NATO high-level group, a long-standing mechanism for nuclear dialogue among NATO allies. But there was no such mechanism for dialogue with Japan and South Korea, and we have created those, institutionalized them and covered a lot of ground together.

So what we're going to hear today – there are many currents in the debate among America's allies not – of course, within the Beltway as well, but among America's allies about the requirements of extended deterrence, the nature of the extended deterrence problem in the 21st century, the requirements for U.S. policy and posture. NATO, after all, has 28 members and at least 128 different views on many of these topics. And in Northeast Asia, we have allies who are – as you saw this morning if you were in the plenary presentation from – by the Korean, he, I thought, very respectfully set out the fact that there are varieties of views and opinions in the Republic of Korea about the requirements of nuclear security and the requirements of strategy, the role of extended deterrence, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

This is a significantly diverse and unfolding debate among America's allies. We provide extended deterrence guarantees; we provide security assurances in three regions. But there have already been a couple of panels in this – in these proceedings focused on the Middle East, so we've – and moreover, a plenary session focused this morning on South Korea. So we are picking up some elements of this extended deterrence debate – some of the strands in this debate on this panel that we have not otherwise encountered so far in the proceedings.

We will have two speakers to speak to the perspective of – from Central Europe and from the perspective of NATO's newer members. One of these is Łukasz Kulesa from the Polish Institute of International Affairs. He was the coauthor of one of the most important think tank products in Central Europe on the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, and has played an important role in the follow-up work on nonstrategic nuclear weapons transparency for NATO.

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He'll be followed by Jiří Šedivý – I'm sorry to do an injustice to your name representing my American slang. You have bios – detailed bios in the package, as you know, for all of the speakers, but not one for Jiří. So let me just highlight a couple of points for you.

He is currently permanent representative of the Czech Republic to NATO. This is a position he assumed this past September. He has served previously as an assistant secretary-general at NATO for defense policy and planning, a role that he departed in November of 2010. And in that capacity, was directly involved in the preparatory work on the NATO New Strategic Concept and the pathway that took us to the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review.

He, like many of us in the room, has a mixed policy and academic background; he has a Master's degree from King's College, London, and a Ph.D. from Charles University in Prague, and has done tours of duty at the Marshall Center in Europe and at the Institute of International Relations in Prague.

He'll be followed by Koji Tomita, who is currently the deputy chief of mission in the Embassy of Japan here in Washington. You have his bio as well in the folder – the important data point is that we were partners – we were the cofounders of the U.S.-Japan extended deterrence dialogue. And I know him to be one of the clearest voices in Japan's small but blossoming strategic studies community. With that, let me turn it to each of the panelists to make some opening remarks – not too long, please, because we're supposed to be conversational. And I won't time you. So, thank you. Over to you, Łukasz.

[00:11:10]

ŁUKASZ KULESA: Thank you, Brad. It's a pleasure to be here. It's a pleasure and an honor. And I have to say, by putting two representatives of Central Europe in this panel, the organizers proved that they get their priorities right. (Laughter.) Central – yes, indeed, Central Europe is important for this conversation.

So just a couple of remarks to start off. This conversation – this dialogue of ours does – actually, I hope that some of these could be developed further in the debate, including the important

and interesting issue of the relationship between extended deterrence in Europe in the NATO context and in the – in East Asia.

Thank you also for mentioning the report – actually, if after this conversation anybody would still feel the need to learn more, I've got a couple of copies here. So please, free to grab them. And the last caveat is that this – the views that I would present are my own, and do not represent the official Polish let alone the Central – the average Central European position.

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So extended deterrence and assurance – this is more art than science. We already heard today in one of the panels that it's not the exact science; the law of gravity doesn't really apply to this complicated relationship. The ingredients are known, but the outcome, whether we manage to credibly deter or reassure, is very much uncertain. I would say that the perception matter a lot. There was a hardly-noticed piece of news a couple of days ago that we saw the withdrawal of the last U.S. main battle tanks from Europe; after 69 years of being in Europe – the last Abrams tanks were put on the platform and headed towards the harbor. What does it tell us about extended deterrence? Is extended deterrence weakened substantially because we don't have the U.S. (tank fist ?) to support us in the case of a problem? Or does it matter that we have a major – we have modified and better-extended deterrence that do not rely on this traditional 20th century capabilities?

Credibility is the key word here, at least in three aspects – in the aspects of the U.S. internal situation, the allies' perception and also the perception of the potential opponents. And I think, when it comes to the United States, it would be increasingly difficult to justify it to the public opinion in the United States outside engagements in the framework of the traditional alliances – also in the framework of intervention out of the alliances. We are hearing a lot about the financial situation. And so in the time of difficult budget situation, the wariness after a decade of war – this would be a question to be asked, whether it's worth it to engage the U.S. attention and the U.S. firepower to actually defend an ally. So the question, what's the stake for the United States, in every situation, would be very much asked.

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The second aspect – the allies. For the Central Europeans, I would say – and here, allow me to be a bit general – for the Central Europeans, the United States still remains key when it comes to providing assurance and extended deterrence in the NATO context and in the European context. Sorry to the French or U.K. participants who might be here in this – in this room, but this nuclear capabilities and other capabilities don't exactly do the job of assuring us about our security. And when it comes to this assurance, it's the political commitment plus the mix of capabilities – as simple as that.

When it comes to the political commitment, allow me to say that I think we've had a couple of wrong or uneasy moves at the beginning of the Obama administration, and there was some uneasiness in Central Europe about the quality and endurance of the U.S. commitment to the European security. We had – (inaudible) – of the Asian pivot, which could have been done a little bit better, because it created the anxieties about the United States pivoting out of the – of the Europe and of the Central Europe in particular.

But the things improved – the United States is saying all of the right things, in my opinions, and doing quite a lot for reassuring their allies in nuclear – and also in the conventional way. In the capabilities sphere, the nuclear sphere is often, in my opinion, wrongly equated with extended deterrence as such. Yes, this is a part of the commitments and the DPR – this review that was completed last year makes quite clear that the nuclear aspect would remain a part of extended deterrence. Let me just say now that personally, I have a little bit of a problem in making a fetish out of a particular weapons system in a particular location. So all the discussion about the forward deployment B61 – for me, it's a simplification of the extended deterrence problems facing – which we are facing in Europe. But we can come back to that.

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On the nuclear – on the nonnuclear issue, we actually have quite an impressive list of reassurance measures which we are taking in the NATO context. We have the defense planning, we have – or we would have the exercises both in the – in the headquarters and also in the fields that include part of the Article 5 scenarios.

We have the development of missile defense in Europe, which includes the deployments in Romania, and hopefully, in a couple of years, in Poland. Also quite – a couple of other measures that, for me, are proof that that actually – the reassurance issue is taken more seriously than a couple of years ago. And these two issues – the U.S. position and the allies' position, of course, form a two-way relationship. So the allies are expected to contribute to their own deterrence and to their own defense and to the deterrence potential of the alliance.

And also – and this is very important to undermine – to underline – the allies are expected to behave – to avoid making problems – avoid putting the United States in a situation where it might be put into troubles against its will. And the third issue is the credibility of extended deterrence in the eyes of potential opponents. And we are – and when we are talking about the Central European perception, despite all the talk about Russia not being our enemy – when we talk about potential opponents, sooner or later, the Russian (context ?) would (fall out ?).

So I would say Russia is unlikely to openly challenge the United States. It's very unlikely to openly challenge NATO to an all-out conflict. So we are – when we are talking about deterrence, we're not talking about this traditional meaning in preventing an all-out attack on NATO territory. What we might see, we might see are the scenarios where Russia might be tempted to test the West through provoking crisis, through intimidating some of the smaller members of the alliance. And in that kind of scenario, nuclear weapons might not be the first or the favorite means of defusing such a crisis, and we would need a whole range of capabilities to deal with it. Yeah.

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So the last issue – actually, we all do the – we do the reassurance measures that I described, but at the same time, there is a question how can we do it without endangering the prospects of actually engaging Russia, the prospects of having a positive agenda in which we are forming a more constructive relationship than right now? There are two ways to do it. The first way is to move out of the mutual deterrence relationship and move into to a different paradigm; for example the mutual security paradigm. There are lots of proposals formulated. But such a scenario, such an option

would actually require a big leap of faith for the allies from Central Europe because it would mean a very radical reformulation of our security policy.

And when it comes to defense establishments, I would say they are not really good with making the leap of faiths. They are more on the conservative side. So we should rather work from within the deterrence paradigm; for example, by modifying and improving early warning on crisis when the relationship between Russia and NATO countries deteriorates, through making sure that the communication channels are kept open, and trying to define and implement confidence-building measures in areas such as missile defense, conventional or tactical nuclear weapons.

Thank you very much.

[00:22:44]

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Łukasz.

Over to you, Jiří.

JIŘÍ ŠEDIVÝ: Jiří Šedivý Thank you, Brad. And thank you to the organizers for inviting me. And I can add only a few points to what you said in the beginning and indeed Łukasz said. And there are many overlaps, actually, in my notes that I prepared for this expose with what we have already heard.

So first a few points or few comments on the concept of deterrence as we see it and conceptualize it in NATO. Then I would touch upon conditions of effectiveness for how to make this work within the alliance and for the alliance. And thirdly, a few comments on the nuclear element of the extended deterrence or deterrence as we see it in NATO.

It is – deterrence is a core element of our collective defense in NATO. This was re-emphasized in the Strategic Concept and the DDPR as well. What is also important to keep in mind is that we define our deterrence and defense in the context of a security environment that is highly unpredictable. And our defense planning capability development is therefore not based on a concrete enemy or aimed against a concrete enemy; it is capability driven, capability based.

The concept of deterrence that we are developing and cultivating in NATO is a wide or, I would say, aggregate concept. It's a mix of policies, postures, procedures and capabilities. Some of them are military, other political-military, and some are purely political. It contains sticks but also, I would say, some carrots. It includes the nuclear element as well, but it is much wider. It includes conventional capabilities, ballistic missile defense, but also, as it is stated in the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, policies of arms control, disarmament, and there is the underlying effort also to support nonproliferation.

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Now, concerning the condition for effectiveness of this concept, I would see three main conditions, and Łukasz has touched already on some of those aspects. First of all, there must be political consensus within the alliance about the concept itself and, indeed, the tools and the ways or means and ways to realize it. And we have this consensus formulated in the 2010 Strategic Concept

and the DDPR. The latter document, as Brad said, is a result of months and months of very sometimes difficult debates. And what we can read, actually, in that public document is just a top of a big iceberg, and what is invisible are dozens of various studies, brainstormings, analysis, technical-military and so on, so forth.

So it's a very – very balanced document and it is a compromise, and as such, no one is 100 percent happy with that, but that's life in the alliance of 28 nations.

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Second condition or set of conditions for this concept to work is credibility. Credibility is extremely important in both ways, internally for the allies, the internal assurance, and externally as a signal or message to any potential enemy. And I believe and I'm deeply convinced that we have both aspects of that credibility established and we are working on enhancing or cultivating various aspects of that credibility. And Łukasz mentioned some of the reassurance measures and steps in the conventional area that we are now about to realize in NATO.

A last, third, condition for effectiveness is what I would call affordability and fair burden sharing. These are two interrelated aspects. And this is actually an area for further exploration, and we are just about starting a follow-up debate, debate follow-up on the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review that would deal with this aspect. I can't say more because are about just to defining – we are just defining the initial assumptions for the debate.

Thirdly and lastly as to the nuclear element, now the Strategic Concept says that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. DDPR repeats this. There is indeed also – in the Strategic Concept there are hints towards the ultimate goal or a desire to see the world without nuclear weapons.

Now, we see the nuclear element in that, which is much more constrained than it used to be, or limited than it used to be, still as very important at least on three levels. First of all, at the level of political consultations and transparency amongst the allies. And this also strengthens the cohesion and the mutual trust in the alliance. And also in the political level of the value added by the nuclear element in our wider deterrence, we should not forget about the, I would say, nonproliferation impetus or nonproliferation impact of having that.

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And there was, as far as I understand, here in previous panels discussion, for example, about Turkey. And there is a very good paper, actually, produced by Carnegie about Turkey, which says very clearly, if it were not for the – for the extended deterrent and the nuclear – tactical nuclear weapons basing in Turkey, Turkey might decide, actually, to go nuclear in the current circumstances. Then there is a political-military effect of that element, supporting the credibility of deterrence. Having that, I would say, nuclear shadow or nuclear spice in that wider – you know, wider spectrum of deterrence is important in terms of having as much as possible wide spectrum of choices, strategic choices, strategic choices. It's about flexibility. It's indeed also about the psychological impact of – or signal of our deterrence towards any potential enemy. And what is also important in that respect is the shared responsibility among the allies not only through policymaking and consultations but also through that nuclear sharing arrangement.

And third level is indeed military technical level, the continuity of the capability in NATO. And if we speak about capability, it's not just the bomb and the plane; it is the wide spectrum which we call through – (inaudible) – through the concept of – there is a terrible acronym, DOTMLPF, which means doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability. This is a capability, and it is important to keep it – to keep it in – to keep it continuing.

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So to conclude, all the three levels that I mentioned are very much interrelated and mutually supportive, and indeed, in all those aspects, the extension of the deterrence by the United States over the allies is crucial. So I'm coming back to what Łukasz said, actually, that without the United States we would have a very different alliance, if at all. And indeed, the extended deterrence is a very important part of keeping the alliance together. Thank you.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you.

Koji, over to you.

KOJI TOMITA: Oh, thank you, Brad. And by the way, I liked the – your characterization of Japanese strategic committee as being small but blossoming. Well, when our government made regional donation of cherry trees a hundred years ago, must be a very small blossoms, but voila, you have – it has developed into great tourist attraction. So let's see. Perhaps you cannot afford to wait for hundred years for our strategic community to develop, but let's see.

Now as the only representative of the Asia-Pacific region, I will try to be reasonably comprehensive without taking up too much time, trying to capture the challenge of the – for the extended deterrence for the 21st century, as well as the appropriate U.S. policy and posture, at least our expectations of them.

Now the first on the challenge for the extended deterrence in this century, I think for the Asia-Pacific region, the challenge is two-fold. Firstly, our region has continued to be reset with the what I may call legacy issues, which test the efficacy of the U.S.-extended deterrence. By legacy issues, I mean, among other things, DPRK, Taiwan Strait, territorial disputes in South and East China Sea. As the recent situation vis-à-vis DPRK demonstrates, Asia-Pacific region remains a very dangerous place. And these issues are not new, and the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. has been effective in not allowing them to develop into major armed conflicts. And despite the rising tension on the Korean Peninsula, we in Japan remain confident in the effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrence.

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But even if these issues are not new, the security environment surrounding them evolves. And we need to adapt to make sure that the extended deterrence continues to work. DPRK's increasing missile and nuclear capabilities, growing assertiveness you've been seeing in territorial disputes, and more fundamentally, the shift in the strategic balance between the U.S. and China – all these factor needs to be taken into consideration as we try to formulate appropriate policy and posture to ensure the region's stability.

The second much broader challenge is how we go about establishing enduring strategic stability between the U.S. and China, how to – (inaudible) – will have huge implications for the extended deterrence in the region. The – understandably, the issue has attracted a great deal of attention from the people in and out in the government, and Brad is one of those people who have been trying to grapple with this question.

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Here I'm not going to the discussion as to what specifically constitute the strategic stability, because at this stage I don't think anyone has a clear answer – not me. I think the concept of strategic stability is not something given or something that can be imposed by one or the other. It is something that needs to be developed jointly by the two parties on the basis of increased dialogue and shared understanding of their respective policies and postures. So I very much applaud the U.S. efforts to in recent years in reaching out to the Chinese – (inaudible) – for meaningful strategic dialogues, and I hope that the Chinese friend will reciprocate these efforts in a more positive manner.

One other point I'd make in the context of strategic stability between the U.S. and China is the need to look beyond strategic capabilities, paying equally serious attention to the shift in balance in the conventional capabilities, because that is an area where Chinese efforts are more pronounced, and the area where – (inaudible) – of concerns may develop between the U.S. and its alliance partners.

Moving on to the question of U.S. policy and posture and response to these challenges I've described, it is almost impossible to develop coherent argument in a few minutes. So I will limit myself to making three or four key points. First of all, as an overarching concept for the U.S. extended deterrence policy in the coming decades, the so-called age of rebalance is significant, and the concept of regional rebalance is significant and welcome. And we want the U.S. government to make efforts to (consult ?) it.

Of course we know there will be distractions in this exercise. I mean, there's a looming fiscal entrenchment. And also the U.S. will be called upon to respond to the other part of the world to fulfill their commitment. But these are all about reasons why you should make conscious efforts to stay focused on the most important long-term security priorities.

Secondly, given the security picture in the region I have painted so far, our approach to extended deterrence needs to be holistic and comprehensive, not just strategic capabilities but also conventional capabilities as well as missile defense, and even looking beyond the traditional domains of space and cyberspace. Identifying an optimal mix of postures, capabilities out of these components in an ever-changing security environment is a daunting task, but this needs to be done, and done effectively.

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And thirdly, in the face of the complexity of the task ahead, I think it is worth mentioning a fundamental principle concerning the extended deterrence, that is to say, the extended deterrence is a two-way process. It is not an unilateral gift by the U.S. to the alliance partners, but requires equally strong commitments and contributions from the – their alliance partners, and Japan is very conscious of this fundamental principle.

And finally, what underpins this two-way process is a close and constant communication between the U.S. and its allies. And here I would like to strongly commend the efforts by the Obama administration and Brad's personal role in this to engage its allies in serious strategic discussions, including Japan. The extended deterrence dialogue, which Brad and I started a few years ago, is now an integral part of the security cooperation between the two countries. So I look forward to further deepening our discussions as we try to tackle the challenges ahead, some of which I have tried to illustrate today. Thank you.

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MR. ROBERTS: Thank you. Those were three excellent, very thoughtful sets of introductory remarks. Part of what always impresses me about this topic is the similarities between the two regions, the concern about a significant rising – a significant power in the background with which we desire strategic stability but we're not quite sure what that means and how to get it and a second set of challenges that in one region are legacy and in another region are not. They're future emerging challenges that are uncertain and unpredictable, so important similarities and differences. I'd like to draw you out, but first of all by way of clarification, since we were late getting started, we will go until about 3:40, 10 extra minutes in the discussion period. So I'll set out a couple of introductory questions or follow-up questions and then open up the floor.

From a Washington perspective, we don't have an extended – we don't have one policy for Europe and another for Asia. We have an extended deterrence policy. And we try to think globally about the posture and policy that underwrites our commitments. I'm curious about what interaction you might perceive between developments in one region, as they bear on your equities, and the other. My proposition is that by and large, NATO has not paid much attention to the extended deterrence debate in East Asia. And in converse, Japan and the Republic of Korea have played – paid close attention to NATO's discussion for what they imply about capabilities – is the United States is going to keep a forward-deployable force or not? If it comes home from Europe, it's probably not going to be available to go to Asia. That would have a big implication for East Asia. And I think that similarly in East Asia, observers look for signs in Europe that what the United States is going to do is appease Russia, and then by implication, going to appease China. So my proposition would be that there's a kind of one-way flow of perception, but I invite comment from the panelists to the extent you would like to do so on this topic.

Would – you're welcome to go first, if you'd like.

MR. KULESA: Yeah, I – if people were not paying attention in Europe to the developments in Asia when it comes to extended deterrence, they're obviously paying attention right now. And I think the situation will be analyzed and reanalyzed both by us, the think tankers, and by the governments in terms whether reassurance was enough for – and to deterrence was enough to diffuse the current North Korean crisis or not. But I think you are right, that our discussions in Europe are sometimes too much self-centered.

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There's of course a question of whether the presence of the U.S. weapons in Europe would reinforce the case for redeploying the U.S. weapons to the Korean Peninsula. I haven't seen anybody making this proposal as of yet, but sooner or later we would have an – (inaudible) – saying

that the weapons are in the right place. They shouldn't be in Belgium, they shouldn't be in Germany but they might be in an airbase in Korea.

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I think some similarities in terms of the credibility issue for the United States. In Europe, lots of questions were asked about the Georgian-Russian conflict in 2008, in what circumstances in this limited scenarios, operation, intimidation – in what circumstances would the United States be willing to engage. And I think in East Asia, the similar questions were asked about the shelling of the island and sinking of the South Korean corvettes.

And I think the answers are in a sense also similar in terms of making sure that our conventional capabilities are strengthened in East Asia, more money spent on the military equipment, also the decisions – the South Korean decision to extend the range of the ballistic missiles in Poland, a decision to purchase our own air defense system with limited missile defense capabilities.

And then the last point, an impact on any reductions or relocations of Russian tactical nuclear weapons from the European theater to the Asian area. We already had it in the 1980s when the Japanese were concerned about the relocation of SS-22 (ph) east of (Urals ?). So if somebody in the NATO context is making the proposals that maybe the Russian weapons should be relocated further away from NATO borders, we should be clear that it means it would go closer to the borders of our friends in the Asia region.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you.

OK. Jiří, would you like to add something?

MR. ŠEDIVÝ: Yes. You are right, but that NATO or allies do not actually care very much about the extended deterrence in Asia. We don't have – as far as I recall, we have not had any formal or informal exchange of information. There were some – because Japan is – and South Korea as well, they are in the category of contact countries, so there are some very basic or embryonic staff-to-staff talks, and there were – with Japan, we had started this a couple of years ago. But the main issue, which is related to the deterrence and defense, that was discussed or where we had some elementary, I would say, exchange of information, was the ballistic missile defense systems. Now there might be one policy – a U.S. policy of extended deterrence, but definitely there are – there are different institutional underpinnings to that. And in that respect, this is a big, big difference between that one in Asia and that one in the Atlantic area, because of NATO, because of its (all ?) procedures and established processes, because of the fact that NATO is a collective defense alliance of 28 allies and so on and so forth. So there are many differences in that – in that mechanics of realization, of implementation, of extended deterrence.

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The question about – I'm shifting those things from here to there – it's nice – it could be a nice topic for debating about us perhaps, but I don't see it in, I would say, foreseeable future or midterm future next 10 years as feasible almost, I would say, at all, given exactly that we have – we have now a clear policy consensus, policy statement in terms of strategic concept, in terms of GDP (R?). And there is – there is no, I would say, no intent, no plan, no need, actually, it seems from our perspective, to even start discussing that.

So therefore, I see that there will be continuity of that deployment, continuity of that shared placing. There might be, as I said, some discussions about some shifts within the framework of the DPR concerning the burden-sharing. There will definitely be discussion once the life cycles of the elements of the capability will be coming to its end or when there will have to be some upgrades or modernizations or whatever. But that's most I can envisage in the next, let's say, 10 years.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you.

Koji.

[00:51:21]

MR. TOMITA: Well, I think Brad's characterization is about right. I think at the fundamental level, security's indivisible, so it's important for the U.S. government to have a global perspective. And from time to time, there may be an issue which demonstrates that our security is indivisible – (inaudible) – this mean we can go back to the SS treaty debate that we had these other days?

But even if we don't reach to that sort of level of debates, listening to today's presentation by my previous speakers, I thought we have many commonalities, you know, challenges in our (personal ?) deliberations. So I see a merit in developing further a discussion between Japan and NATO countries, although, as the ambassador pointed out, there is a sort of embryonic stage of discussion between the two. I think there's – (inaudible) – in our discussion.

One specific area we'll be very much interested in learning from the experiences in NATO is the way the communication collaboration is done in NATO. As I said in my presentation, we have just started extending (tariffs ?) but NATO has a more structured way of doing business, including information sharing, planning and so on and so forth. I'm not saying that we can simply transplant the system in your Europe to Asia-Pacific, but still I think we can – we can learn from the – how business is conducted in the NATO corridors as we try to develop our discussions and dialogue with the U.S. government.

[00:53:45]

MR. ROBERTS: Great, thank you.

Let me ask one other question and then invite people to come up to the microphones. And this is – I don't know if Susan Burke (sp) is in the room this afternoon – she was in the room this morning when the South Korean spoke and asked an excellent question, which was – he – and some of you heard him, but not everyone in the room. And he made the case for the ROK to withdraw from the NPT in order to create nuclear weapons of its own in a step-by-step process that would match the North and thus give the North an incentive to stop. And he was asked by Susan, what impact do you think that would have on the NPT regime? And he gave a telling answer, which was, I'm not really a specialist in international law.

But if there were to be – and he was careful to say that he's not raising a question about the credibility or the capabilities of the United States. And he was careful to say that he thought the U.S. nuclear umbrella was credible for a particularly important problem, which was deterring nuclear

attack and deterring war in general, but that it had proven deficient in deterring nuclear acquisition and so far, limited nuclear buildup. And therefore, something more is needed.

Can you help us to just think a little bit about the implications for the security environments you sit in of this possible pathway forward for the Republic of Korea? A withdrawal from the NPT – his assumption is that the U.S.-ROK alliance would remain in that circumstance; that's a big assumption. I'm not – I'm not so sure about that. But let's work with the assumption. And part of the assumption was that he would not be raising questions about the credibility of U.S. guarantees. Would the impact of this South Korean action be minor in the European and Japanese security environments or would it be more significant? Jiří, let me ask you to start this time – (scattered laughter) – because I keep putting Łukasz on the spot.

[00:56:29]

MR. ŠEDIVÝ: First of all, I was here in the morning, and my understanding of that statement was that actually, this would be an option, should the credibility of the extended deterrence of the United States collapse somehow in the eyes of South Korea. That was my understanding, that that would be some sort of automatic means, a combination of the withdrawal from the NPT and going nuclear.

I first of all think that this scenario is very, very remote, although we cannot exclude it. Now, impacts on us and our – or your question was how this would impact on our perception of the credibility of the extended deterrence in NATO, as far as I understood it. You said minor, and I would say almost neglectable, because as I said, we are in different situation, we have all that institutional, military, political, monetary, technical underpinning of this. We have a consensus and so on and so forth. That would be my answer.

MR. ROBERTS: Would you agree or disagree?

[00:57:47]

MR. KULESA: Well, I would develop the Korean arguments a little more, because as I understood, the idea is that South Korea should build up in order to go down; in a sense, if you want to negotiate with North Korea, which has nuclear weapon capabilities, you should have these capabilities or the weapons themselves. So first, you build up and then you make a proposal to North Koreans, which might seem attractive. But here, I agree, the costs would be quite enormous for the South Koreans in this region in which these actions would be viewed with alarm, not just by North Korea, by – but also a couple of other neighbors.

And then for the NPT regime as such, you could make an argument that North Korea is a special case, it's a – (inaudible) – it should never have been admitted into NPT in the first place if the idea from the very beginning was to violate it. But for one country could make this kind of argument; for South Korea, that would be much more difficult. And I'm afraid that would be the end of the NPT as we know it.

As for the relationship with the NATO dimension, actually, we already have the buildup in the way that we have before deployed weapons in Europe. So in a sense, we are saying to the Russians that might not be a bargaining chip, but this is something – this is an element that we can

use when we want to do – when we want to do something together. For the South Koreans, they don't have present anything on their territory to actually show to the other side.

MR. ROBERTS: Koji.

MR. TOMITA: Well, I think – (chuckles) – I wasn't here to listen to the debates. But somebody from the country which is the very vicinity of Korea, I must say that it will have huge implications, political strategy could have (many ?) implications. Of course, our Korean friends are entitled to make their own decisions as to what should be the most appropriate way to defend their country, and you can make a number of arguments for or against this proposition. And I hate to repeat any arguments which may have been done during the course of this morning, but let me point to just two points: The first is vis-à-vis DPRK, and of course, ROK going nuclear has a danger of leading to further escalations, and in fact beyond that, my sense is that the game DPRK is up to now is very much motivated by their desire to legitimize their possession of nuclear weapons. So they tramp up all these – (inaudible) – and so on and so forth.

[01:01:29]

So – and eventually, they may come back to negotiating the table, but they want to come back as a nuclear power. I think that is a game they are – they are now trying to play.

So on the other hand, the Six Party process is trying to achieve denuclearization of the – (inaudible) – so if ROK goes nuclear, I think we have to play a different game. So I don't know what exactly the Korean speaker said, but he wasn't talking about the U.S. deterrence as not effective for stopping nuclearization. But I'm not sure whether ROK going nuclear is effective for denuclearization of North Korea. That's the first point.

The second point is however much we try to explain that this is not the credibility of the U.S. deterrence, there'll be – an implicit message is that there's some sort of lack of governance in the U.S. extended deterrence and that up to the – I mean, ROK going to nuclear – (inaudible) – to encourage the sense of security in and out of the other country, I'm not so sure. So these are two points I'd like to make.

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, artfully presented.

Let me invite questions and comments from the floor. And as before, please introduce yourself and please direct your question and please be brief, thank you. I'll start in the back left.

Q: Yeah, sure, Gareth Evans from the Australian National University.

[01:03:35]

And my question is particularly directed, I guess, to our Czech and Japanese colleagues, but others, please feel free to jump in, as I'm sure you will, Brad, when you hear the question. What exactly is lost? What would be lost in hard security terms for either of you by downplaying the nuclear element in extended deterrence and moving the U.S. assurance much more explicitly, making it clear that the – it's only available for nuclear threat contingencies; in other words,

accelerating the move towards an embrace of a sole purpose posture, which was flagged in the NPR, but only in some wistful future way.

I can – just a comment, I can – will understand the psychological dimension of wanting an all-purpose nuclear reassurance available for a whole variety of threat contingencies, but doesn't that come at a hell of a cost if you are serious about reducing the salience of nuclear weapons and getting some serious movement towards ultimate nuclear disarmament, if you're serious about keeping China committed to no first use over the long haul and so on? And isn't that cost an unnecessary one, quite unnecessary, given the scale of the conventional capability that the U.S. and its allies together will have for the indefinitely foreseeable future?

[01:04:58]

MR. ROBERTS: So let me observe that with the significant number of people lined up, I'd like to break with the habit of having all four of us respond on all points. So if I could start with Koji on the response to this and then turn to one of the two of you for a response.

MR. TOMITA: I think what I was trying to say in my presentation is not attempt to downplay the role of nuclear weapons. What I wanted to say that the security picture we are imagining is a very complex one. And extended deterrence needs to cater to vast scenarios and varying degrees of escalation from lower intensity to higher intensity. And we need a toolkit to respond to all these complex challenges.

So I'm not going into details about what capability is needed for what sort of contingencies and so on and so forth, but the point I was trying to make is coming up with optimal sort of mix of questions of capability as opposed to the kind of security situation I have discussed.

MR. ROBERTS: Would one or the other of you like to comment?

MR. SEDIVA: Very briefly, and I already touched up on that in my expose. And the nuclear shadow – (inaudible) – the ultimate (stick ?) that is part of the deterrence – ballistic deterrence approach is important for having flexibility of strategic choices of having – strengthening the credibility of that deterrent.

And it is contextual, I mean, as we say in the strategic concept, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. We also say that for the time being and given our – given the security environment, we have a right mix of conventional and nonconventional elements to the deterrence and – for the deterrence. And this could – this could indeed change. And I hope actually that I will see this scenario that we will no more need that nuclear element in the wider spectrum of the tools. But at the present moment, all 28 allies perceive this as a still indispensable part of the concept.

[01:08:18]

MR. KULESA: Very briefly –

MR. ROBERTS: Sure.

MR. KULESA: – in the NATO context, I think we have already seen a downplaying of the nuclear aspect over a very long time. And quite perversely, this was stopped when some countries rushed into the proposal to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from their territories, because it forced some other countries to react and reestablish the status quo that Ambassador was talking about.

And probably – but probably as NATO, we should be more clear and repeat more frequently that we are talking about extreme circumstances of the use. This is not a nuclear trigger-happy alliance.

[01:09:07]

MR. ROBERTS: Thank you. Over here.

Q: Hi, I'm Christine Leah (sp) from MIT.

We're talking about these concepts of nuclear strategy and how they apply (toward some ?) nuclear deterrence, strategic stability, pre-emption, et cetera. I'm just wondering to what extent historically were these concepts developed because of long-range missiles were nuclear weapons themselves? And the reason I ask that is to say if we're talking about nuclear disarmament and getting to global (zero ?), how much thought is being given to how these concepts might work in a world without nuclear weapons?

MR. ROBERTS: You're a guy from a think tank. You get to answer that one. (Chuckles.)

MR. KULESA: As far as I know, you also are – you also are out of government right –

MR. ROBERTS: I'm just unemployed, so – (scattered laughter).

MR. KULESA: OK, if I understood the question correctly about the extended deterrence without nuclear weapons. I would say extended deterrence existed as a – maybe not as a developed concept with a number of think tanks doing monographs of it but a kind of gap filling existed before the invention of nuclear weapons. So, it would continue to do so. I don't see any major changes in the – in the basics of the – of the instrument. It will still be about a relation of trust capabilities and whether it's enough to prevent somebody else from doing something. Is that good enough for the think tank?

MR. ROBERTS: That was a good answer, thank you.

[01:10:49]

Q: Jan Lodal, NDI. In the spirit of (Garrett's ?) question, continuing along, it seems to me that we've made this a little bit easier for ourselves on this panel because we have alliance relationships, of course, with NATO – we are in the alliance – and with Japan, and so we have defense commitments there. That would seem to include defense against nuclear attack, and we believe that deterrence is the best way to defend against nuclear attack. So, it seems to me that that's all part of our alliance relationship no matter what, and it gets a little more difficult about the nuclear umbrella over countries with which we don't have alliance relationships.

So, isn't the real issue with those countries where we have alliance relationships the forward-deployed systems? Because when we had them out there in the field, it was pretty clear what all the linkages were and it's been difficult ever since we've pulled them back to try to figure out what the concept means. And now it's left in Europe where we have some forward deployed that's left there, and a lot of the DDPR presumably was about that. So I get – and then it was raised again this morning about Asia in terms of South Korea and perhaps putting them back there.

[01:11:57]

So, would those of you on the panel agree that whether we have forward-deployed systems or not doesn't really terribly affect the United States' commitment to use its nuclear weapons as a deterrent to cover both our alliance relationships as well as our own? Number one.

And number two, are the forward-deployed systems in Europe – in particular Russia – really what's driving some of the comments that I think some of you made about the salience of this issue in Europe?

MR. ROBERTS: Who would like to start? Jiří?

MR. ŠEDIVÝ: I'm not sure that I – that I completely understood it.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, let me, if I may, put – they were elegantly expressed questions. Let me put a sharper point on one of them. One of the recent Global Zero project reports argued that nuclear weapons forward-deployed with nonstrategic delivery systems have no military purpose and if we need to provide extended deterrence, we can do so fully capably with the triad of strategic systems and that's good enough. So, why not bring the nonstrategic weapons home, why not retire the dual-capable aircraft that carry them? What's so important about the DCA thing, and is it really about Russia or is it about something else? To restate your question, Jan, and I hope I did it justice.

[01:13:47]

MR. ŠEDIVÝ: It's not about Russia. It's about general assurance and it's about internal credibility of deterrence. And, again, having the substrategic option just adds to the wider flexibility and choice that – and we are not speaking about use. We are speaking about, let's say, a psychological emanation of that part of now the wider strategic deterrence to a – to what's a potential enemy. That's it. I would – I would not use the notion of "use" at all.

MR. ROBERTS: OK. Łukasz, would you like to add something?

MR. KULESA: In terms of forward deployments, I think taking the current strategic circumstances in Europe, if we were to devise deployment patterns, we probably wouldn't put them in the European territory, but since they are – they are there, they function not as in terms of their military capabilities or their military usefulness but as the symbols.

And when I talk about the fetish status of certain categories of weapons, I think that that's, in a certain sense, happened to the B61, both for the disarmament people who somehow think that if you get them out of Europe you will start an era of universal happiness on the continent, and the

Russians would basically throw themselves into our arms and you'll have a long embrace. But also a fetish for those who like the idea of deterrence, who'd like to see the retention of nuclear deterrence, who started to assign to these weapons being deployed in Europe, I think, a unjustifiably high position in the overall deterrence potential of the alliance. So in a sense, from both sides of the camp, we have the elevation of the forward deployment in Europe, which is not justified if you are an outside observer just looking at the issue unpassionately (ph).

MR. ROBERTS: Koji?

MR. TOMITA: Well, I – it may have some bearing on the Asia-Pacific context; I mean, the question of tactical weapons in Asia. And, again, I come back to the question of having (took ?) response to various scenarios.

And in Japan, we have a saying: The greater contains less – which means if you go shop – go to shop and try to buy suits or shoes, if you are not sure about the size, buy big one because big one can take care of small one. But that does not apply to strategic weapons. I mean, do the old strategic weapons take up all the contingencies in a credible manner? That is a question we need to address – I mean, in thinking about how we – what sort of posture we are going to have. But this is not – whether or not we need to actually deploy certain assets on a permanent basis to Asia-Pacific, that is a different question. But as far as a question of capacity, I think we need to look at – (off mic). That's my – (off mic).

[01:17:55]

MR. ROBERTS: So, let me add just one point to this – and that is one ally not represented on this panel, when asked: Why isn't the triad enough? Five-thousand weapons, 1,500; et cetera. And if the purpose is to signal our resolve, well, you know, Americans just did it with B-2s and B-52s and F-22s, and why isn't that good enough?

And the answer was, from that ally: In any actual conflict with one of these regional actors, that actor will be trying to test the resolve of the alliance altogether and to split the United States from its allies. You can use your triad all you want to demonstrate your resolve; it doesn't demonstrate our resolve. That's the case that they make for – that was made by that ally at that moment for a nonstrategic component in the overall umbrella.

Let me go to the back again over here.

[01:19:04]

Q: Ward Wilson, BASIC. We were having a little conversation about extended deterrence, and a friend of mine said, oh, extended deterrence, it's just – it's the same as voodoo. And the other person sitting there said, no, it's not, that's not true at all; voodoo really works.

So, there's this – there's this, I think, a certain amount of skepticism about extended deterrence, and I wanted to ask about two specific historical cases and reflect on them. One is the Middle East – two failures of deterrence. One is the Middle East war in 1973 – Israelis in the occupied territories; deterrence fails twice – once with the Egyptians, once with the Syrians; and the

Falkland Islands War in 1982. And people often say, well, those aren't deterrence failures because deterrence really only – you know, it's for the central, most important values of the country.

And I guess what worries me about extended deterrence, and maybe you can reassure me – is if you can't extend deterrence over the occupied territories where your soldiers are waiting to fight and die, and if you can't extend deterrence over islands that you own, where your citizens live, how can you extend deterrence over Germany or Japan or any other country?

Maybe you can – ?

[01:20:26]

MR. ROBERTS: Well, I'd offer a quick – I've already gotten – now the five-minute slide, and I know you're all lined up here and I apologize for leaving so many people standing. You know, the position of the – this is – and to be fair, this is a continuing discussion among allies. Why can't we make nuclear deterrence more effective at preventing North Korean provocations? Why can't we make nuclear deterrence more effective at preventing issues in the East China Sea? Why can't we make extended deterrence to all sorts of things?

Well, nuclear weapons are very good for a very small set of problems, and they have a certain credibility unlike any other instrument for dealing with threats to vital interests. But there are other kinds of threats that aren't to vital interests, and it's asking a lot of nuclear weapons – and a part of the discovery process of having nuclear weapons is that states discover what they're not very good for. But this is the problem Schelling wrote about – the 20- to 30-year learning curve of learning that nuclear weapons actually have only very limited uses in national security strategies.

In the interest of time, let me just thank you for the question and move back to Miles back here.

Q: Miles Pomper from the Monterey Institute. I had a question for Mr. Tomita and either one of our Central European presenters. This is getting back to Łukasz's point about fetishizing particular weapons or particular locations. I mean, what strikes me is in the – you know, in the steps leading up to the MPR and the strategic dialogue you and Brad (sp) were involved in, there was an acknowledgment by Japan, a decision that you didn't need the nuclear tomahawks anymore as a measure to provide extended deterrence to you; this particular weapon system. And for a long time before that in East Asia, there have not been forward-deployed weapons.

So, sort of making a wrinkle on Jan's thing, what's the – I mean, you could have B-61s on planes in the United States that could develop – deliver the weapons. If you're talking about the weapons system as opposed to the actual – you know, as opposed to just, you know, talking about the spectrum of possibilities. You could have other ways of deploying the system.

[01:22:54]

Saying that you need to have planes in two countries that – the only ones that actually have – are jointly operating the plans are countries that are the least likely to provide you the reassurance that you claim to seek in dealing with a Russian enemy. And these are countries like Germany and the Netherlands who are the least likely to want to engage in a conflict. Most of the other systems in

the other countries are actually U.S. planes anyway, staffed by U.S. pilots. I'm a little curious about how this provides so much more reassurance to have it in Europe in countries that don't actually show a lot of willingness to engage in conflict, as opposed to the situation in Asia where it's still U.S. reassurance but not deployed in that area.

MR. ROBERTS: It's – (inaudible).

MR. KULESA: I agree with Miles.

(Off-side conversation.)

[01:23:46]

MR. ŠEDIVÝ: I mean, we are speaking about very much the residual role of the nuclear element in the wider spectrum of the deterrence tools. Now, say that one or two of the allies that are hosting these capabilities are not reliable. I – (chuckles) – and building a scenario where Russia is an actor – I mean, I cannot accept it at all.

I mean, as I said, we do not identify any concrete enemy. Our whole process of defense planning is capability-based, and the residual element of nuclear weapons in – of this kind of nuclear weapons in the wider spectrum of deterrence has what I already repeated several times – flexibility, sharing, consultation, mutual transparency, mutual trust.

MR. KULESA: Just for the record, I don't see a situation in which we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. Our interest – our existential interest would be threatened and the German existential interest would not be threatened, or Dutch existential interests.

I might have questions about some allies more to the – to the west, but with these two I believe we are talking about the situations that they would feel equally threatened as we would.

[01:25:37]

MR. ROBERTS: With apologies to those who are still standing and waiting, we've gotten the final hook. Let me ask the panelists if there's any note they'd like to make in closing. No, no?

Well, with that, apologies to those who were lined up. We will all remain on the stage for a couple of moments here; happy to take further questions off mic. The group will reconvene in here, I believe, at 4:00. Thanks very much, everybody. Appreciate your good questions. Please join me in thanking the panelists.

(Applause.)

(END)