2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference:
Welcome and Opening Remarks;
Morning Keynote

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Opening Remarks:
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Speaker:
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Moderator:
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TOBY DALTON: Good morning. It's great to see a full room. My name's Toby Dalton. I'm the deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Program here at the Carnegie Endowment. It's my great pleasure to welcome you to the 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference.

Now, some of you probably have been to these conferences before. I was talking with Sandy Spector out in the hall this morning, who held the first of these conferences in 1989. And he was suggesting that perhaps for people who’ve been to enough of these, we need to have a merit badge or a ring or something like that. (Laughter.) So we'll get back to you on that. In fact, this is the 15th conference, which is amazing to consider the longevity of an event like this. And we’ve worked really hard to put together what we hope is another in a series that really tries to build on this agenda that we’ve been working and wrestling with for quite a while.

Now, part of what makes this conference unique is not just that we talk about nonproliferation and arms control and nuclear energy, but we bring together a diverse audience – officials, experts, journalists, students. And today, by our count, we had some 46 countries represented here, which is fantastic. With a group like that, we expect there to be provocative discussion. And I want to emphasize that as we’ve thought about and prepared for this conference, the emphasis really should be on discussion. All of the panels that we’ll have today and tomorrow are intended to be facilitated conversations. Audience participation is a key aspect of this. And I know that you’re not a shy crowd and I expect that you’ll participate fully.

This conference would not be possible without the support of another – a number of organizations who sponsor the work of the Nuclear Policy Program and the conference specifically. Please indulge me to allow me to mention them here. These are the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the German Federal Foreign Office, the MacArthur Foundation, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the New-Land Foundation, Plowshares Fund, Prospect Hill Foundation, the Sloan Foundation, U.S. Department of State and the Hewlett Foundation.

We owe significant gratitude to these organizations. In addition, we also owe thanks to the trustees and leadership of the Carnegie Endowment, without whose consistent support over the years to subsidize the costs of this conference, we would not be able to have it on this scale. And we are thankful for their indulgence.

You’ll have noted from the walk through the foyer this morning that we have, again, a number of exhibitors. I encourage you to visit with them and hear about the work that they’re doing. Or there’s also several tables for publications. There’s a Carnegie table with new publications that you can take for free from my colleagues George Perkovich, Alexei Arbatov, Lora Saalman. There’s also some general tables that, if you’ve brought publications that you’d like to leave out and let others take home, feel free to put them out on that table. I know that the baggage fees are getting a little excessive these days, but if you feel like loading up for the trip home, please do so.
Let me talk just a little bit about the agenda. We did something different this year, which is we sent out a read-ahead which hopefully you received by email last week. It's also printed on page seven of the program. This conference takes place at this time against a backdrop of, I think, serious concern about what is happening on the Korean Peninsula, there were talks on Iran just last week that don’t seem to have produced any new result. And of course, there’s increasingly bellicose prognostication from The Wall Street Journal about looming proliferation, which if you haven’t seen their section from this morning, I encourage you to do so.

Now, some of you might look at the agenda and wonder, where are these topics – the usual hotspots? Why aren’t there any panels on these? Or, conversely, why are we talking about humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons or emerging powers? Well, on the former, as we thought about the substance of this conference, we assumed that these issues will be ever present in the conversation. They'll be raised in several of the thematic sessions on regime change, on sanctions and on the balance between nonproliferation and disarmament, for instance.

And on the latter point, we think this conference provides an opportunity to focus, not just on issues that are in the headlines, but those that will be of increasing importance and shape how we perceive and analyze these issues in years to come. We think it’s worth the time to spend and discuss those kinds of issues. We’re sure that not all of you will agree with how we have structured this or the issues that we’ve chosen. This is a matter of subjectivity. In any case, I hope you enjoy the discussions, have new perspectives, new ideas and new colleagues from around the world.

Lastly, a note about the roster of speakers. You know, we went to print with the program and then we printed an addendum to the program. And even the addendum isn’t quite correct. There’s always last-minute changes. We’re very much looking forward to hear from Foreign Minister Patriota of Brazil. Unfortunately, he had to stay back in Brasilia at the last minute, so unfortunately, we will not have the chance to hear from him. There are a few other changes that you’ll encounter as you go to some of the panel sessions, but we think that there’s no diminution in the quality of the program, in any case.

A request from the sound engineer, who says that we do not have the technology here to block cellphones, which we probably should investigate for the future: Please, if you haven’t already done so, either turn off or put your phone to vibrate.

With that, I wish you a good conference. Whether this is your first conference or your 15th conference, we hope to see you next year for the 16th. And I’ll turn it over at this point to Mark Fitzpatrick to introduce the first session. Thank you. (Applause.)

MARK FITZPATRICK: Thank you, Toby. I’m Mark Fitzpatrick. I’m not from Carnegie. I’m from London, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, where I run the nonproliferation and disarmament program. It’s a great honor for me to be introducing Director General Yukiya Amano, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
I’ve known the director general for the – over 10 years when he was director general in another guise, heading the Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Sciences Department of the Japanese foreign ministry. I knew him when he was ambassador in Vienna, permanent representative to the IAEA, and when he was chairman of the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

He’s headed the agency since December 2009, after winning a hotly contested election. And he must have done something right in the years since then because he was just reappointed without opposition by consensus for another term. Now, the General Conference has to confirm that this coming September, so it’s not a completely done deal yet.

It’s been a challenging three and a half years for the IAEA. The nuclear disaster at Fukushima cast a pall on nuclear energy. North Korea’s provocations and its third nuclear test remind us daily of the failure of the global nonproliferation regime in this regard. The Iran issue has gone from bad to worse. The agency’s November 2011 report laid out the harshest charges yet, but Iran claims it was all politically motivated. The agency’s governing board remains polarized. The spirit of Vienna is, in some cases, a distant memory.

To speak to some of these challenges and to look ahead for the next four years, Director General Amano is going to come to the podium for about 10 minutes. Then we’re going to engage in a bit of Q-and-A. I’m going to take the role of a journalist. And then we’ll turn over that role of journalists to you all for a continued discussion.

Director General Amano, the floor is yours. Would you like to speak from the podium?

(Applause.)

YUKIYA AMANO: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am very much pleased to have been given this opportunity to speak in front of such distinguished audience. I’m very much delighted because I can see nice cherry blossoms here. (Laughter.) As an average Japanese, when we work in a foreign country, we miss cherry blossoms and hot spring. Last week I went back to Japan, and this year the season of cherry blossoms was very early, and I could enjoy the cherry blossoms, and I went to Fukushima to enjoy the hot spring. And now I can enjoy the cherry blossoms again, so my second term start with good omen.

Today I will like to talk very briefly about the contributions of the IAEA towards creating the world free from nuclear weapons. We have various activities, but one of the most important is, of course, our activities in nonproliferation. Before going in details, I would like to briefly explain the basic arrangement of multilateral nonproliferation system regime.

Under the NPT, all the nonnuclear weapon states make commitment not to use nuclear material for purposes other than peaceful ones. And they are requested to conclude comprehensive safeguard agreements and submit declaration to the IAEA.

The IAEA, for its part, has the obligation and right to verify that all the nuclear material and facilities – nuclear facilities in the country is uniquely for peaceful purpose. If the IAEA finds that some activities of a country constitute noncompliance with the comprehensive agreement, then

This arrangement seemed to have worked generally well up to the early 1990s, but the discovery of secret nuclear weapon programs in Iraq after the First Gulf War made it clear that the IAEA was not well-equipped to discharge its responsibilities. The response from the member state was the approval of the additional protocol which took place in 1997. With this additional protocol, the IAEA has an expanded tool to have access to site, information and people. I always remind the IAEA member states that the additional protocol is essential for the IAEA to give credible assurance that all the nuclear material in the country is in peaceful purpose.

When I joined the agency in 2009, the number of countries with additional protocol was 93. Now, the number stands for 119. This is quite impressive and important progress in three years and a half. The recent trend is that the IAEA found the activities of some countries constitute noncompliance with the IAEA safeguards. The IAEA reported it to the Security Council and the Security Council adopted resolutions, but these countries do not implement U.N. Security Council resolutions and do not proactively cooperate with the IAEA as requested by the United Nations Security Council resolutions, which are legally binding as they were adopted under Chapter 7.

We are focusing on Iran, DPRK and Syria. I am sure that you have lots of questions on these issues, so I would like to come back to this issue in the question-and-answer sessions.

Another area where IAEA is lacking is the nuclear disarmament. I would like to make it clear that the IAEA is not a nuclear disarmament negotiation body; it is rather the conference of disarmament in Geneva or the first committee in United Nations that negotiates the nuclear disarmament agreements or bilateral negotiations have taken place.

What the IAEA can contribute is to make its expertise, gained through verification, available for the countries, if so requested. In fact, the IAEA helped to verify the disposal and dismantlement of nuclear weapons when South Africa abandoned nuclear weapons and joined the IAEA as a nonnuclear weapon state. If there are requests, the IAEA is ready to do more too in the area of verification of nuclear disarmament.

Another very important area is the nuclear security. Nuclear security means to prevent the fissile material and radioactive material falling into the hands of terrorists. The IAEA was involved in these activities since long and has intensified its effort since a decade.

We have established standards, guidances. We have provided assistance. We have trained people, and we have operated – started the illicit trafficking database. We have already some 2,000 cases of illicit trafficking. Many of them are not very important issues, but there are cases in which some tried to traffic highly enriched uranium, and the same people repeat.
So this a real threat. We never know that we know everything. What we know may be a tip of iceberg. The IAEA cannot do all. However, we are prepared to function as the global platform to strengthen the nuclear security efforts.

This July IAEA will host international conference on nuclear security at ministerial level. This will provide us a good opportunity to take all of our member states, over 150 countries, on board. We also have the experts gathering in Vienna and discuss the guidances, standards, assistance, database, and these discussions will help for us to establish the future nuclear security plans.

My last point is about non-nuclear weapon – nuclear-weapon-free zones. As you know very well, we have now five nuclear-weapon-free zones. And it covers 113 countries. This is a very effective tool to achieve the world free from nuclear weapons. And all these five nuclear-weapon-free zones provide for the IAEA verification.

In autumn 2011 the IAEA hosted a forum on the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Middle East. Nuclear-weapon-free zone in Middle East is an issue with long history, and it is a very complicated issue. The idea of the forum is to learn from the experience from other countries. You may think that is simple and easy. Actually, it was not. It took us 11 years to come to reach agreement to actually host this forum.

The result was very encouraging. Of course, we could not produce the agreement, and it was not expected. But despite the complexity of the issue and despite the differences of views, we could have very constructive discussions in the forum. And I’m very happy that we could have this meeting. It is, of course, up to member states in the region – the countries in the region are to decide whether or not to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in that region of the world. But we are ready to help them.

Perhaps 10 minutes have passed, and I stop here, and I'll be very happy to exchange views with you. (Applause.)

MARK FITZPATRICK: Thank you, Director General.

It’s not only cherry blossom season, it’s baseball season, so let me start with a softball. As I said, you were reappointed without opposition. You obviously overcame the hesitancy that some states had about your candidacy that they voiced four years ago. How did you do that? Can you tell me about what – you look back, these 3 ½ years of your achievements – maybe lessons learned, maybe some disappointments and maybe looking ahead to what you hope to do for an encore?

MR. AMANO: The election in 2009 was a very difficult one. But it is very natural that if there are more than two candidates, the views of member states are divided. And it happened in my case, and it also happened with my predecessors’. But once the new director general – elected, differences are put aside, and member states rally around the new director general. I am very
pleased that I have received very strong support from all the member states in the past three years and half.

What I have done? I tried to pursue the objective – objectives of the IAEA in a balanced manner. I did not mention in my introductory statement, but the IAEA is an organization with multifaceted objectives. Nonproliferation is one thing, but making the nuclear techniques available for all the countries is another very important area.

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So in the past years, I tried to pursue these objectives. Just for example, on Iran, I provided the assessment of the IAEA with clarity. I drew conclusion on Syria, and we have hosted the forum on nuclear weapon-free zone in Middle East.

On the nuclear safety, I never thought that a huge accident like Fukushima would happen in my country, but it happened, and the IAEA tried to do our best. Of course not everything was perfect, but I’m very happy that member states get together very quickly to reach agreement on the action plan, and now action plan to enhance the safety is being implemented.

I mentioned nuclear security in my introductory statement, and I also tried to improve on the management. The IAEA is now modernizing the safeguard analytical laboratory with state-of-the-art equipment. The first phase was done under the budget and within the schedule. This is (very rare ?). In many cases, budget is overrun and it takes more time. I think it is one of the examples of effective management.

On disappointment, I do not tend to talk about disappointment – (laughter) – but I wish we could have made more progress in the nuclear – on safeguard implementation issues like Iran, DPRK and others. I also think it would be good if the activities of IAEA in the peaceful application of nuclear techniques was better recognized.

[00:25:17]

MR. FITZPATRICK: Well, you hit that one out of the park. Let me – let me follow up with a fastball. You said that all the – all the member states are favorable. There’s one member state that’s not so favorable. I think they’ve even called not just you – yeah, they don’t like you very much, that one member state, and they seem to not like the agency much. They said that the agency has been infiltrated by “terrorists and saboteurs.”

Now if you can – if you can overcome that level of distrust and move toward a solution to the Iran nuclear crisis, you’re going to be up for a second Nobel Peace Prize for the agency and first for yourself. So do you see any solution, any way forward, at least a way that the states can muddle through without Iran getting to the point where they could make a dash for nuclear weapons without being discovered in time or an alternative worst-case scenario of a war being started to prevent them from getting to that point? Any good ideas for the future?

MR. AMANO: I think IAEA is a technical organization, but we are operating in an extremely political environment. So I’m not surprised that some different countries have different views on what the IAEA is doing, especially in the field of nonproliferation. What can we do to
make our activities fair, impartial and functional? I have given a lot of thought on this issue, and when I joined the agency, I made it clear that I will apply a standard for all the countries. The standard is simple: All the countries has to fully implement the comprehensive safeguard and other relevant obligations if there is any.

I applied this standard not only to Iran but to all the countries. In case of Iran, it is – it is clear that the Board of Governors decided that some of the activities of Iran constitute noncompliance with some of the safeguard agreement. It is not implementing the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Under this situation, what I can say is that, yes, Iran have placed 19 facilities under our safeguard and we can verify that the nuclear material in these facilities are staying in peaceful purpose. But as Iran is not implementing fully comprehensive safeguard and is not implementing U.N. Security Council resolutions, we cannot provide credible assurance that all the activities in Iran is for peaceful purpose. In my view, this is a very factual, impartial statement, assessment, with clarity.

What we can do for the future? Again, the agency’s view is very clear. By applying this standard, we have provided the assessment of the situation with clarity. In any event, in any issues, having a clear understanding of the issue is the starting point. Then in November 2011, I shared the information with member states, and with that, I identified areas which Iran has to clarify. And since January 2012, the IAEA and Iran have been negotiating with a view to reaching agreement on the modality which we call structured approach to resolve all the outstanding issues.

Unfortunately, we have not yet reached agreement, but the way forward is clear. We have provided clear assessment. We have identified issues to be resolved. We are now negotiating on the modality to resolve these issues. We need to reach agreement, and then we implement it.

The IAEA is determined to resolve the Iran nuclear issue through diplomatic means. Resolving this issue through diplomatic means with – by fully cooperating with the IAEA should be in the interest of Iran. Therefore, I really hope that we can find – “we,” I mean Iran and IAEA – will find a common ground.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you, Director General.

Let me ask a follow-up question about this modalities, the structured approach. You’ve been working on it for 16 months. You’ve gone to Tehran. Your senior officials have gone there. So many times when you’ve gone there, it looked like you were almost at the verge of striking a deal, and each time you’ve gone there, no deal. What’s holding up agreement?

And a related question: Is too much attention being paid to the issue of Parchin, where, you know, some people think that even if you go there, you won’t find anything after all these years, no evidence of malfeasance?

Or related: Is too much emphasis being placed on what happened in the past at Parchin and elsewhere and to the detriment of getting a handle on what is going to be happening in the future?
MR. AMANO: Since January 2012, the IAEA and Iran have been negotiating with a view to reaching an agreement on the so-called structured approach. The objective is to clarify and resolve the issues, mainly the issues with a possible military dimension. We have covered a long distance, and while we have some differences – and some of the differences are quite important – we have narrowed the gap. The sticking point in that, for us, we are flexible, but in our view, the agreed approach should be in (consistent ?) with the IAEA verification capability, effective verification. This agreed document should enable us to conduct our verification work. If that is not the case, this does not help serve for the common objective to resolve the issues. Reaching – (inaudible) – agreement on structured approach is important, but we should not lose the big picture. The objective it to build or rebuild the confidence in Iran’s activities. The structured approach should contribute for that purpose. This is the reason why we have not yet been able to reach agreement.

[00:33:58]

And why do we focus on Parchin? Parchin is a priority issue for us, but of course, Parchin is not the only issue. We are asking – we have already asked (difficult ?) questions. We are asking Iran to give us access to the site, but we are also asking access to people and information, as well as the site. Since we identified the facility to which we want to have access – Parchin’s a huge facility, and in the past we have visited, but this time we have pinpointed a facility to which we wanted to have access, and since we identified that facility, Iran has engaged in very intensive and extensive activities. We may or may not be able to find some meaningful things. But if we find something, that is good. If we don’t find anything, that is quite normal, because it is not only Iran that we are working with. We work with many countries. And when we have information that we want to clarify, we ask access. And in almost all the cases, it turns out that there’s nothing abnormal. So the purpose is to clarify the issue. And if Iran gives access to us at Parchin, that will help Iran because that is contribute to enhance the confidence in Iranian cooperation with the IAEA. So I think it is a win-win game, and I continue to ask Iran to give us access to the site at Parchin.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Quick follow-up, Director General. You said in a recent interview that in addition to the information about nuclear activities of a possible military dimension in the past, that this may be continuing now. And the word “now” struck a chord with some headline writers. Do you have any evidence of that kind of activity continuing in the current, present tense?

MR. AMANO: As we have reported in the annex of the November 2011 report, we have the information that Iran was engaged in activities relevant to the development of nuclear explosive devices. And these pieces of information indicate the activities before 2003, but some of the pieces of information indicate the activities after that.

[00:37:14]

As our access to information, site and people in Iran are limited, our knowledge of undeclared activities are reducing. What I meant by now is that the Iran activities could be continuing up to now. But you may recall that what I did was to ask Iran to clarify. We do not have the – by now does not mean we have the information that Iran is conducting activities as of now. We do not know. We have the information – credible information that Iran continued its activities beyond 2003. That’s what I meant.

MR. FITZPATRICK: OK. Director General, the way you – the agency goes about the investigations that Iran has wider implications for the way verification is conducted. The November
2011 report, particularly the annex, relied on a lot of intelligence information from member states, most of whom probably have their own agendas. And I’m wondering if there’s any issue of balance between relying on intelligence sources from member states and the need for impartiality in order to retain credibility amongst all states.

MR. AMANO: Well, as I stated in my introductory statement, after the first Gulf War, it was discovered that Iran – sorry, Iraq engaged in secret nuclear weapon programs. And it became clear that the IAEA did not have sufficient tools.

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We have intensified our efforts to collect as much information as possible. We use all the information available to us to conduct verification. This includes, first, the information collected by our inspectors. We have a huge pile of information collected by our inspectors. This is essential source of information for us. We have also information from open source, and that is very helpful. We also have the information that we obtain, for example, through satellite imagery. And some countries provide us with information, and quite often this is intelligence information.

We cross-check all the informations, inspectors’ information, open-source information, intelligence information and other informations. We collect information over the period. We cross-check these information from technical point of view, and we apply very critical judgment to verify these pieces of informations.

We are prudent, and we do not rush to the conclusion. What we stated is that as we have a variety of information, we believe that Iran has to engage with us and clarify the information. Iran has a case to answer.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you very much, Director General. I fear that I’ve focused too much on safeguards, and there are other pillars to the NPT – other aspects to work. And I think we need to turn to the audience soon. But let me ask just one last question on a different aspect. Let’s talk about nuclear power. In the aftermath of Fukushima, what do you see as the role of nuclear power, and should the IAEA still be promoting an energy source that seems to have so many problems? Is nuclear power still beneficial, sustainable and responsible?

[00:42:15]

MR. AMANO: The basic position of the IAEA is that we respect the decision of each state. It is not us, the IAEA, who decides, but it is the member states – sovereign states who decide whether to keep the nuclear power as part of their energy mix or not.

The Fukushima accident gave a huge impact, and gave negative impact to the confidence in nuclear power. It was also a very important wake-up call for the need to enhance nuclear safety. We have been following carefully of the trend after Fukushima accident. What we have found is that despite the Fukushima accident, many countries continue to include nuclear power as an important option. According to the latest estimates, now we have 437 nuclear power plants in operation in the world.
According to our low estimate, there would be 90 more nuclear power plants on top of these 437. This is low scenario. In the higher scenario, there would be hundreds of nuclear power plants to be added. Now, in the world, 68 nuclear plants are under construction. This is completely different to what happened after Chernobyl. Why this happens? Because the fundamental condition have not changed. Until quite recently, we heard from all the political leaders that climate change is the number one concern of the world. And nuclear power has contributed and will contribute to mitigate the negative impact of global warming gas.

The price of fossil fuel is volatile. Many countries would like to have energy security. The pollution causes – air pollution cause premature deaths. According to the WHO statistic, 2.3 million people die prematurely because of the (particle matters?) and others. I said IAEA estimate – IAEA estimate is not our fantasy.

We ask countries – usually, we put question during this period from April to July, and gather the information and combine them, and that is some other estimate. The difference is that more emphasis is placed on nuclear safety. The pace of growth has slowed down, or slower than what we have anticipated or estimated before Fukushima, but with slower pace and with higher emphasis on safety, nuclear power will expand.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you very much, Director General. I have more questions, but maybe I should give a turn to somebody else. Why don’t – go to the microphones; there are microphones on either side. And I think that'll be easier than me trying to catch – or you trying to catch my eye. And we maybe – we’ll take a couple of questions at a time. If – and when you start, please identify yourself in the usual way and your affiliation. Try to keep your questions short and without extended commentary.

So we’ll start over here, please, Warren.

Q: Hi, Warren Stern of Brookhaven National Lab, formerly employee of yours, Mr. Director General. So the safeguards regime has evolved substantially over the –

MR. FITZPATRICK: Speak a little bit closer to the mic.

Q: So the safeguards regime has evolved substantially over the past decades, from INFCIRC/66, 153 and then of course the additional protocol, often in reaction to crises. And it’s always best, in reaction to crises, to have a plan already written down or thought about. So my question, sir, is what do you see as the evolution of the regime? What do you see as the next big change to the safeguards regime?

MR. FITZPATRICK: OK, a question about evolution, and then we’ll take a second question so you can think about that a minute. And others, if you want to be lining up at the mic – so over here, this side, please.
Q: Thanks, Mark. Trevor Findlay from Carleton University in Ottawa and Harvard University.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Trevor.

Q: Mr. Amano, as you know, the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands is supposed to be the last in this series, and I note in your address you said that the IAEA is ready to be the global platform for nuclear security. So I’m wondering whether you believe that the agency would be able to take over the role and functions of the Nuclear Security Summits. Thank you very much.

[00:47:57]

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thanks, Trevor. That was going to be my next question, so you got it for me.

So evolution of a safeguard system, and is the agency ready to take the handoff, if given the handoff, from the Nuclear Security Summit?

MR. AMANO: The safeguard approach has been evolving since some decades ago. As I stated in my introductory statement, first we focused on declared facilities. Then we found that that was not sufficient. Additional protocol was approved, but not – of course, not all the countries bring additional protocol into force. And we are collecting information from various sources, and we have the obligation – right and obligation to verify the completeness and correctness of the declarations. So we will continue to use all the information available to conduct our safeguard approach.

Also, technical development is very important. Nowadays we have more sophisticated equipment. The satellite imagery did not exist when the verification system started. We have the equipment that can transmit data on a permanent basis from the site to the headquarters. So using more advanced technology is the key to make the verification effective. We will continue to use all the information available to us by critically cross-checking the information. We will use as much as – advanced technology possible to make the verification effective.

Regarding the relation between the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and IAEA nuclear security activities, we are not viewing – we are not putting a question to ourselves whether we will succeed the summit or not. We have our mandate on nuclear security. We have over 150 countries as our members. And we have a capacity to establish norms, provide assistance, provide training and maintain database.

[00:49:12]

What we want to do – I do not exclude other important organizations doing activities. But someone should function as the global platform to enhance – strengthen nuclear security activities, and we are ready to do that. It does not mean whether – the Nuclear Security Summit will end in 2014 or continue. It is not us who decide; it – but it is on the participants of – on the security summit who decide.
On our part, we’ll continue to work on some July 2013 international conference at ministerial level on nuclear security is a very important event to strengthen out of this. By the way, we have two priorities in the current budget process. One is technical cooperation and another is on the nuclear safety and security.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you very much, Director General. Let’s take two more the – in the back here.

Or, no, I’m sorry. I think maybe you were first here, weren’t you? OK, go ahead.

Q: Hi, this is Samantha Pitts-Kiefer from the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Actually, my question is a follow-up to Trevor’s and your answer. You mentioned the already-existing organizations that work on nuclear security. I wanted to ask you how do you envision IAEA collaboration with these existing organizations to maximize all available resources and expertise and to avoid any unnecessary and potentially counterproductive duplication of efforts?

[00:52:58]

MR. FITZPATRICK: OK, collaboration among agencies, and was I right that you were first in front here? Oh, yes, please, OK.

Q: Thank you very much for your presentation. Michael Rosenthal now on loan to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. But I’d like to switch pillars. You said that you wished that the IAEA peaceful nuclear support programs had more recognition and I’d like to ask you about one of them, which I think is unique in terms of being a public/private partnership, and that’s the Program of Action for Cancer Therapy. I know you support it and I wondered whether you think that would be one means to – or a vehicle to try to enhance the agency’s recognition in those areas.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Michael, repeat the – repeat the program you mentioned?

Q: I’m sorry, it’s the Program of Action for Cancer Therapy PACT.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Program of Action for Cancer Therapy. OK, we’re talking about nuclear application.

Q: Yeah, this is the one program I think that’s unique in agency and public/private, and it has many partners in the industrial sector and also in other U.N. organizations. So, one question is how would you support or grow that program and increase its recognition, and are there other programs in the peaceful uses that would be advantaged by trying to develop public/private partnerships? Thank you.

[00:54:24]

MR. FITZPATRICK: OK, so the questions were collaboration among agencies and organizations in nuclear security and public/private support, in particular for nuclear applications such as nuclear therapy.
MR. AMANO: First, regarding the coordination among them, different players are nuclear security, one of the objectives of – from the nuclear security conference in July is to better coordinate the activities. We have invited – various players are working in this field and we have invited experts, and we are very much willing to hear their views. Different organizations have different expertise, and we do not mean to monopolize the work. And that is not effective either. At the same time, better coordination, better exchange of views is very useful.

We are sending peer review missions to countries and that can give some advice to us and to other countries. And some – soon, this international conference on nuclear security that invite all the member-states of the IAEA, over 150, and international experts, we can have better views of what the stakeholders are doing, and that will help to better establish our plan on the nuclear security in the coming years.

[00:56:17]

On the coordination private and public and with other international organizations coordination on cancer therapy and others, this is a crucial element. The IAEA is very much interested in cancer therapy in developing countries because this is the real issue. In the past people tend to think that cancer is a disease in developed countries. That is not the case at all. Two-thirds of deaths occur in developing countries. Two-thirds of cancer patients in developing countries come to screening too late. Therefore, we cannot give life-saving treatment. This is definitely a global health agenda.

The IAEA – why IAEA is involved? Because we have nuclear medicine. We have – nuclear techniques are very useful to screening and diagnose the cancer. It is also very useful to – for the therapy.

I do not mean that we can do all. For example, prevention. It is not the IAEA’s role, and I do not have the expertise how we had better to get rid of smoking. It is WHO’s work. And health care system is not our expertise, and we know our limit. So we have made an agreement between WHO and IAEA, and we are working together.

We have expertise in particular field, but we know our limit, and we recognize the need to cooperate with other entities. In case of cancer, it is WHO. Nowadays the private companies have expertise and have – and financial means. They help us to finance the cancer program. This coordination is not only in cancer programs. Just – for example, we have a very important program for the plant mutation, food security, food safety. And since (long ?) we have the joint unit established by FAO and IAEA. And this joint unit is the locomotive to promote activities in food and agriculture.

[00:59:04]

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you, Director General. We’ll go to the gentleman in the back, and then – diagonally here, and then I – I’m supposed to be getting somebody’s flash cards, or – I’m sorry, we’ll go – we’ll go – gentleman here, and then the one in back, and then we’ll keep going. But somebody has to tell me how much time I have left, and – OK, got it. Thanks. OK. We got time.
Q: OK. Thanks. Ed Lyman, from the Union of Concerned Scientists. You spoke of the interest of the agency in verifying nuclear disarmament activities. So in that light, I'd like to ask you about — about two years ago, the U.S. and Russia both requested that the agency begin negotiations on the agreement to provide monitoring — I’m not sure I — verification is the right word — of the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement. There’s been very little public information about the status of those negotiations, so I’d like to ask if there’s anything you can say publicly about them, about who would pay for them, about whether design information of the facilities that are already under construction would be provided to the agency. Thank you.

[01:00:13]

MR. FITZPATRICK: OK, a question about the status of the U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition management program.

And over here, please.

Q: Thank you. I’m Tum Jao (ph), from Georgia Tech. I have a question about the state-level approach of conducting safeguards. I understand that it is a very important effort to build a more efficient and more effective safeguard system. However, on the other hand, it looks like a — the effectiveness of the safeguards also depends a lot on the relationship between the agency and the state inspected. So I know the — so if the state inspected does not have a good and a cooperative relationship with agency, that could create a lot of problems for the inspection, for the safeguards. So under the state-level approach, those states that might receive more focus, that might receive more close — a closer scrutiny, they may feel unfairly targeted by the new approach.

So I was wondering, do you think the two goals can be compatible; one is to build a more effective and more efficient safeguard system, and the other is to maintain or even promote a better relationship between the agency and the state inspected? And if so, what are the measures that IAEA could do to, you know, help promote a good relationship between the agency and the state inspected, and if — and the state-level approach?

Thank you.

MR. FITZPATRICK: So question about the state-level approach and how to balance questions of fairness of scrutiny with efficiency and relations with the state, but the first one was the plutonium disposition.

MR. AMANO: First, regarding the plutonium management disposition agreement, we have received letters from the secretary of state and from — of the United States and from the foreign minister of Russia, some years ago. And we have had rounds of discussions on this issue.

[01:02:48]

This is a very complicated issue, but the basic idea is that 34 tons of plutonium will come from the military cycle. Plutonium — 34 tons of plutonium will be no longer needed for the military purpose and this plutonium is to be stored or disposed of. And these two countries, United States and Russia, have asked IAEA to play a role to verify the disposal of the plutonium.
This is not a simple question. There are discussions how to deal with the disposal. There are various techniques. Shall we eradicate it in the reactors, or shall we store it or shall we dispose it? These aspects should be addressed. We need to address the financial aspects; we need to define the role of the IAEA. So this is not an easy, simple task, but we have been working on this issue. Rounds of discussions have taken place. And we are continuing these efforts.

I cannot say at this stage when and how we can complete this process, but the idea is to — is that the IAEA plays a role so that the 34 tons of plutonium coming from the military cycle will no longer be reused, reentered into the military cycle.

Next question is about the state-level approach and impartiality. State-level approach is not something new. This — first, safeguard is an evolving process and this concept of state-level approach has developed, especially after the early 1990s. And we use all the information available for the agency after carefully scrutinizing the information. I use the standards that all the countries have to implement fully the comprehensive safeguards and other relevant obligations. There is not such a thing that, well, some countries, we — our safeguard approach is generous, or some country’s approach is strict. We apply the same rule, that is, the comprehensive safeguard and relevant obligations.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you, Director General. I think you’re running out of voice. We have maybe time for two more –

MR. AMANO: I have a cold. Sorry.

MR. FITZPATRICK: — two more quick questions. We’ll have to make them quick to fit them in. So over here and then – OK.

Q: Good morning, Director General Amano — in fact Ambassador Amano, because I was in Vienna as ambassador of Pakistan to the IAEA when you came to Vienna. And it’s a pleasure to see you speak here and to learn new things about what’s happening.

Ambassador, I want to ask you about — and I run a think tank now in Islamabad based on — focused on security and nuclear issues. I want to ask you about the expansion of the Board of Governors. I mean, there has been an amendment to the IAEA statute that’s on the books, that’s on the table for many, many years now. And the expansion is badly needed because this was a structure that was created in 1957 or ’58, and ever since, so much has happened and the organization has evolved. So we need to have an expansion of the Board of Governors. And the matter is held up.

Can you tell us what is the present position? Thank you.

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you. And final question.
Q: OK. I'm Hama Sait (ph) from Pakistan (Strategic Plan Division ?). My question is with regard to the nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East. I know that your – IAEA’s job is more technical in nature and not politics, but you can’t avoid the politics. The recent postponement of the conference on the Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone, and (there was written ?) in statements by (the NAM ?) and the recent couple of weeks back the statement by – (inaudible) -- to undermine the NPT’s vitality. So how do you see the IAEA’s role in that so that to ensure that nonproliferation – (inaudible) -- aim of yours is not undermined by this nuclear weapon-free zone political part of it? Thank you.

[01:08:40]

MR. FITZPATRICK: OK. IAEA Board of Governors expansion and the role of Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone.

MR. AMANO: The IAEA Board of Governors took a decision to expand the membership of the Board of Governors, but it has not yet entered into force. From time to time, the member states push the idea or try to accelerate the entry into force of this amendment, but the progress is quite limited. It is not only related to this amendment. There is another amendment to introduce the biennial budget. And if it enters into force, that will enormously enhance the efficiency. But this has not yet entered into force.

One of the problems on the amendment of treaty, that member states are very enthusiastic in amending, but follow-up is rather weak. And this happens in this case. It is not only in the IAEA statutory-related issues, but we see the other issues, like the amendment of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. But we would like to see the entry into force of these amendments.

For the nuclear weapon-free zones and postponement of the nuclear weapon-free zones in the Middle East meeting, this is a matter that is handled by the secretary-general of the United Nations and the facilitator who was appointed by the secretary-general. So I do not have – I am not that involved in the hosting of the nuclear weapon-free zone conference under the NPT.

What we can do is that we are helping five nuclear weapon-free zones existing in the world in the field of verification and in the peaceful use, for example, in the Pelindaba Treaty. So if requested, we are ready to help the establishment of the nuclear weapon-free zones and implementation of the nuclear weapon-free zones, but addressing the issue under the NPT is rather done by other entity.

[01:11:42]

MR. FITZPATRICK: Mr. Director General, thank you very much. I wasn’t keeping score, but if this was a baseball game, I think you have a very high batting average. (Laughter.) Best wishes for a winning season for the IAEA team in your next four years.

MR. AMANO: Thank you very much. (Applause.)

MR. FITZPATRICK: Thank you very much. Thank you all.
(END)